




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A background image showing the silhouettes of several people, likely migrants or refugees, walking against a bright, hazy sky. One person in the foreground is carrying a large bundle on their back. The overall tone is somber and evocative.

# Reporting on Migrants and Refugees

HANDBOOK FOR JOURNALISM EDUCATORS

UNESCO Series on Journalism Education



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**Reporting** on  
**Migrants**  
and **Refugees**

HANDBOOK FOR JOURNALISM EDUCATORS

**UNESCO Series on Journalism Education**

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## SHORT SUMMARY

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### **Covering migration: A challenge for journalism educators worldwide**

This handbook enables journalism educators worldwide to address one of the challenges of the 21st century – migration and refugee matters. In a set of thirteen modules, journalism educators are provided with a comprehensive curriculum. It covers all aspects needed to train analysis, research, presentation, marketing, and ethics of migration coverage.

The handbook is unique as it comprises results of communication studies as well as political and social sciences. It has been developed by an international and cross-cultural group of media researchers, media educators and media practitioners.

Journalism educators will be enabled to jump-start a new curriculum. Journalism students will learn that matters of migration and forced displacement are concerned about human beings and therefore require knowledge and awareness of accurate facts, reliable sources, ethical reporting and good practices. Experienced journalists will benefit from using the volume as a self-learning tool, and media development organizations may adapt the curriculum to their training plans.



The project will impact a more comprehensive coverage of migrant and refugee matters in countries of origin, transit and destination, and a more balanced and informed public debate across countries and cultures.



*“Since wars begin in the minds  
of men and women it is in the minds  
of men and women that the defences  
of peace must be constructed”*

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

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### LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

4Mi	Mixed Migration Monitoring Mechanism Initiative	IOM	International Organization for Migration
ADB	Asian Development Bank	IRC	International Rescue Committee
AfDB	African Development Bank	ISIL	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
AFP	Agence France Presse	ITU	International Telecommunication Union
AMI	African Media Initiative	JiGC	Journalism in a Global Context
AP	Africa Positive	LDC	Least Developed Countries
AU	African Union	LGBTI	Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Intersex
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation	LIC	Low-Income Countries
C-Africa	African Regional Organisation of the International Trade Union Confederation	LMIC	Low- and Middle-Income Countries
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women	MENA	Middle East and North Africa
CEE	Central and Eastern Europe	MSF	Médecins Sans Frontières
CNN	Cable News Network	NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
CPI	Consumer Price Index	ODA	Official Development Assistance
CPJ	Committee to Protect Journalists	OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
CPLP	Community of Portuguese Language Countries	OHCHR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
CSO	Civil Society Institutions	PTSD	Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
DTM	Displacement Tracking Matrix	SBTF	Standby Task Force
DW	Deutsche Welle	SDG	Sustainable Development Goals
EASO	European Asylum Support Office	SIDS	Small Island Developing States
EJN	Ethical Journalism Network	UNDESA	United Nations Department for Economic and Social Affairs
EJO	European Journalism Observatory	UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
EMN	European Migration Network	UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
EU	European Union	UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
EUROSTAT	European Statistical Office	UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
FDI	Foreign Direct Investments	UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
FOIA	Freedom of Information Act	UNPD	United Nations Population Division
GO	Government Organisation	UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees
HDI	Human Development Index	UNSD	United Nations Statistics Division
HDR	Human Development Report	WDI	World Development Indicators
ICIJ	International Consortium of Investigative Journalists	WFP	World Food Programme
IDMC	Internal Displacement Monitoring Center		
IDP	Internally Displaced Person		
ILO	International Labour Organisation		
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation		

Note: In the English language version of this handbook, countries are referred to by their English-language names and abbreviations that ensue. For official country names, see <https://www.un.int/protocol/sites/www.un.int/files/Protocol%20and%20Liaison%20Service/officialnamesofcountries.pdf>.

## FOREWORD

My first contact with this project was when I was invited to contribute a Ugandan perspective to what turned out to be an 11-country content analysis on the coverage of migration and forced displacement within and between Africa and Europe in 2016. After many emails and face-to-face exchanges, an article titled “Covering Migration – in Africa and Europe: Results from a Comparative Analysis of 11 Countries” was published by Journalism Practice in 2020. One of the findings of this study was that media both in Africa and Europe paid scant attention to the causes of migration and forced displacement. Based on these findings, an even larger idea was hatched: There was a need to consolidate the wealth of knowledge and experience of the team into a single resource to contribute to improve and add depth to the coverage of migration and forced displacement across the globe. Led by Prof. Susanne Fengler, Monika Lengauer and Anna-Carina Zappe from the Erich Brost Institute for International Journalism, this idea turned into reality with support of partners from almost all continents. It took over 30 dedicated authors and authorities in the media, migration and forced displacement from almost 20 countries to deliver “Reporting on Migrants and Refugees: Handbook for Journalism Educators”.

There is little doubt that coverage of migration and forced displacement is complex and in some cases dangerous. Any textbook seeking to impart knowledge and skills about covering migrants and refugees therefore would benefit from a multi-disciplinary, multi-cultural approach. One rarely finds a one-stop point for such comprehensive information, resources, tips and cases on this subject. This handbook is timely, and its depth and flexibility are of great advantage to its international audience. The handbook provides a wealth of freely accessible resources which respond to the needs of its less-resourced users. There is incredible international collaboration, with a great selection of apt case studies. The cases are drawn from every part of the globe (except the Pacific). The handbook is richly referenced – a bonus for any journalism educator who would use it to teach or research. It also covers a range of theories of migration and forced displacement, creating a basis for the analysis of reporting about migrants and refugees.

Module 1 sets the stage and lays out the structure of the handbook. Subsequent chapters deal with key actors, factors, terms, statistics and the context factors of migration and forced displacement. Module 4 addresses the nature of the story on migration and forced displacement, leveraging a rich body of research and challenging journalism educators to think interculturally. Module 5 deals with the effects the media potentially or actually have on perceptions of migrants and refugees as well as on the political context to these perceptions, and it highlights professional challenges. Module 6 and 7 shine the torch on the place of poverty, conflict and gender as well as the importance of and challenges to press freedom in covering this complex subject. It further underscores the importance of context in both writing and analysing the story of migration and forced displacement. Module 8 then zeroes in on migration with a focus on Germany whose Chancellor Angela Merkel

## FOREWORD

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made headlines in 2015 when she welcomed into the country hundreds of thousands of refugees with the words, “We can do it.” Module 9 introduces intra-continental movements with a focus on “African Movements”. The all-important aspect of professional ethics is the subject matter of Module 10. Here the author introduces the role of fact-checking, verification and word-choice complete with practical examples. The subject of trauma, often ignored in covering the story of migrants and refugees is explored in detail in Module 11. One must note here that trauma is addressed as it relates to migrants and refugees, but also as it affects journalists who cover them. Module 12 reveals that the cross-border nature of a large part of migration and forced displacement requires collaboration between media professionals, but also with migrants and refugees. The 13th module discusses the oft-forgotten element of pitching the migrant and refugee story.

This is an excellent and long overdue piece of work with the potential to transform the coverage of migration and forced displacement across the globe. It is hard to imagine a more elaborate and well-researched teaching resource on this subject on the market today. This should be a must-have for every journalism training institutions across the globe.

**Prof. Monica B. Chibita**  
**Dean, Faculty of Journalism, Media and Communication**  
**Uganda Christian University**

## FOREWORD

People are on the move on a massive scale and a myriad of reasons, making the complexity hard to grasp – and even harder for journalists to cover. News media cover the story when something dramatic happens or when the matter becomes a political issue. But to improve public understanding, there is a lot more that journalists and journalism educators can do. To read this handbook is to realise just how much there is to learn. It is to recognise that real expertise is required if reporters are to really do justice to journalism about migration and refuge. For example, what's the significance when journalists treat as synonyms the labels of migrant, refugee and internally displaced person? Why can it be a problem to use phrases like “illegal immigrant” or “undocumented migrant”? Some journalism teachers will likely pick and adapt a few modules from this handbook, and integrate them into their wider classes. Others may be inspired to use this resource to deliver a completely dedicated and specialized course. In either case, the lives of journalism students will be enriched. This is because these pages are a treasure-trove of eye-opening insight as well as innovative learning exercises.

This publication is a very substantive tome, requiring up to two days' of intense reading. But undertaking such a study brings high rewards. As journalism teachers, you'll learn volumes about a major phenomenon of our times, as well as pick up ready-to-roll exercises for your classes. In addition, the editors have done a fine job of finding snippets from working journalists as well as in presenting country-specific fact boxes from key journalism educators. Furthermore, to make it easy for you to do further follow through, there is also a rich accompanying website containing many more case studies and in-depth research. Among other insights, what emerges from this handbook is the importance of reporting people on the move in terms of the places of origination, transit and destination. No one can understand the full story if they look at just one stage of the process.

The publication also shows us how to unpack the story as both individual and group levels, and with sensitivity to key factors like gender and age, diverse motivations and associated trauma. Too often, the issues are framed as “the refugee crisis” or “immigration crisis”. Yet, journalists can do well to ask “a crisis for whom”, as well “as an opportunity for whom”. This recognises that there can be beneficiaries of this “crisis” – including those on the move but also as regards those enabling transit, and those in destination spaces. And, as the handbook reminds us, it would often be more accurate to reference the “crisis” as one of being a crisis in policy. Thus, it becomes important for journalists to dig into how the movement of people – from origin to destination, through transit – intersects with how duty bearers have created policy frameworks relevant to the totality.

Journalism plays a key role in regard to balancing the relationship between rights holders and duty-bearers. As this handbook well shows, both migrants and refugees have rights, and correlatively everyone has a duty to respect these. In particular, policy-makers – who manage such human displacements, need quality information as well as the glare of publicity to make them accountable. News media too have a duty towards the people on the move about whom they are reporting, as part of their obligations to human rights more broadly. There are both legal and ethical issues related to

the movement of people, and journalists need to know and align with these fundamentals. At the same time as all this, the handbook also flags the possibilities of construction journalism – not at the expense of holding powerful actors to account, but about the value of going beyond exposing problems towards investigating solutions. All this also points, as the handbook well shows, towards the value of collaborations - across countries as well as in reporting on internally displaced people. And the pages give tips on how traditional news values and the notion of “stories of interest” can be used to pitch coverage and get coverage through the editorial gates and out into the light of day.

UNESCO’s mandate includes the aim of strengthen journalism, conceived as a special exercise of freedom of expression – one in which the participants commit to communicate verified information in the public interest. Journalism education is a targeted vehicle for improving journalism. This handbook adds to UNESCO’s existing Series on Journalism Education which seeks to make a difference within journalism education worldwide – bearing in mind of course the large geographical range of profiles of the phenomenon of people on the move. To the credit of the editors, while most attention is given to Africa and Europe and including the inter-connection between them, the insights can be abstracted for value to other continents. The handbook is also impressive for its recognition of the impact of Covid-19 for migration and refuge. Strengthening journalism education is one of the four key results sought by UNESCO’s International Programme for the Development of Communication (IPDC). Each two years, the UNESCO Member States elect 39 of their number to govern the IPDC, which is a unique intergovernmental programme within the UN system that specializes in media development matters. Marking its 40th anniversary in 2020, the IPDC has already supported a range of handbooks on other topics. Many of these have met with such enthusiastic receptions that readers have offered voluntary translations. Such offers are always very welcome, because they enable knowledge to be spread outside across many languages. To begin with, this current handbook will be published in English, French, Arabic, Spanish and kiSwahili. But if any reader are interested to volunteer to help make this resource available in other languages, you are warmly invited to get in touch.

The need for well-trained journalists doing quality reportage on migrants and refugees in today’s content mix is underlined by the unprecedented, even overwhelming, flows of disinformation and conspiracy theories in circulation. Quality journalism around migration and refuge is especially vital where populism and prejudices have become normalised for large swathes of humanity and unleashed misunderstanding, fear and hate.

May this handbook therefore become an impactful contribution towards a world in which the management of people on the move is done with the best available information and consideration of human rights, rather than being guided superficial or sensationalist coverage that can fuel both fantasy and frenzy.

**Prof. Guy Berger**

**Director for Strategies and Policies in the field of Communication and Information**

## INTRODUCTION

Unprecedented numbers of people are on the move in these modern times. In 2019, 272 million people globally were migrants and refugees, an increase of almost 120 million since 1990 (Migration Data Portal, 2020). The number and proportion of these flows already surpasses some projections made for the year 2050, which were in the order of 230 million (IOM, 2019b, p. 2). Currently, international migrants comprise 3.5% of the global population, compared to 2.8% in the year 2000. Because the number of people on the move internationally “is growing faster than the total population, their share of the world’s population has been increasing” (UNDESA, 2019, p. 1). Large movements of migrants and refugees have political, economic, social, developmental, humanitarian and human rights ramifications. Those who move may endure great risks; they may be subjected to criminal human traffickers and perilous journeys; they face an uncertain reception at their destination; they have rights. The capacities of host countries and communities, their social and economic cohesion,<sup>1</sup> are affected. So are the countries of origin, who may suffer from brain drain – or benefit from brain gain, harvested from former migrants returning home.

Migration and forced displacement are cross-cutting and multi-faceted, highly international, cross-cultural and interdisciplinary subjects. They require knowledge in an array of complex and interrelated matters including human rights, sustainable development, the media, journalism, public opinion at home and abroad as well as political, economic, cultural, psychological, theoretical, and practical issues, agents of domestic, regional and international policies and related organisations (government organisations, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and international non-governmental organisations). These are only a few matters besides the known – but to be debated – context factors.<sup>2</sup> Migration and forced displacement transcend all fields of human life.

This has become even more evident in the Covid-19 pandemic, which presents an unprecedented global challenge, the “number one global security threat in our world today” – United Nations (UN) Secretary-General António Guterres could not have chosen more drastic words as he addressed the media in September 2020. He condoled “one million lives lost to the virus. Meanwhile the outbreak remains out of control” (UN, 2020c). The scope of this pandemic and the associated mobility restrictions are historic. Its impact is harshest for people on the move, such as migrants in irregular situations, migrant workers with precarious livelihoods and people fleeing because of persecution, war, violence, human rights violations or disaster, whether within their own countries – internally displaced people (IDPs) – or across international borders – refugees and asylum-seekers.<sup>3</sup> The disproportionate impact of the Covid-19 pandemic presents itself as three interlocking crises:

- 1 Social cohesion comprises integration, an important topic that will be developed as a new e-learning platform with funding by the German government.
- 2 Context factors of migration and forced displacement are also known as “push” and “pull” factors – see Module 3 for details and/or the glossaries recommended in Module 2: EMN (2018); IOM (2019a); UNHCR (n. d.).
- 3 For definition of ‘irregular’ migrants and all other groups, see the glossaries recommended in Module 2: EMN (2018); IOM (2019a); UNHCR (n. d.).

a health crisis, a socio-economic crisis and a protection crisis. People live in often poor or crowded conditions which lack access to basic services such as water and sanitation or nutrition; women and girls face risks of gender-based violence; refugees may be stranded, unable to seek protection across borders. Covid-19 severely impacts the rights of many people on the move (UN, 2020a; UN, 2020b). “In the face of this lethal disease”, UN Secretary-General Guterres said, “we must do our utmost to halt deadly misinformation” (UN, 2020c).

Journalists have a pivotal role in this respect – to inform the public professionally (UNESCO, 2020). Their work, however, is also hampered by the pandemic – not only because the top news story of the refugee crisis (see Module 4), which was heavily discussed in the media, was superseded by the next crisis, Covid-19 – but also because the working conditions for journalists have changed. Reporters Without Borders showed in a global survey of the impact of Covid-19 on their working conditions and on press freedom that the pandemic amplified “the many crises that threaten the right to freely reported, independent, diverse and reliable information” (Reporters Without Borders, 2020). Quality journalism is essential under conditions whereby authoritarian governments “implement the notorious shock doctrine – ... [and] impose measures that would be impossible in normal times” (Reporters Without Borders, 2020). A UNESCO study on Covid-19 related disinformation (Posetti & Bontcheva, 2020a; Posetti & Bontcheva, 2020b) emphasises the human rights context (Posetti & Bontcheva, 2020a, p. 4). The media sector could, among other “options for action”, consider international collaborations around Covid-19 and its impact on migration and ensure that experiences of developing countries are not overlooked (Posetti & Bontcheva, 2020b, p. 13).

Journalism education needs to take on these critical global issues of our times all of which are interdisciplinary study fields. For migration and forced displacement, this task has been raised in first initiatives that have inspired this handbook (Posetti, 2015; Turpin, 2018; UNHCR & NUJ, 2015). Journalism education has been addressed in the Global Compact for Migration which includes the need to sensitize and educate media professionals on migration-related issues and terminology in order to promote “independent, objective and quality reporting” guided by “ethical reporting standards [...] in full respect for the freedom of the media” (UN General Assembly, 2018, p. 26, para 33(c)). While no *one* state can manage the political challenges of migration and forced displacement on its own, no *one* journalism education institution and no *one* media system can manage the challenges on its own, not to mention a single newsroom or individual journalist. Migration and forced displacement are global matters as much as they are individual matters, and journalism education needs to respond to these challenges.

This is where “Reporting on Migrants and Refugees: Handbook for Journalism Educators” intends to add value, when shared, taught and trained within a network of international journalism educators and journalism students. It is set up to encourage the exchange of views, as well as joint reporting and assumes a step-by-step development, aimed at true ownership across continents and media cultures, starting with Africa and Europe, reaching out to the Middle East and North

Africa (MENA), Asia, the Americas and the Russian Federation. The handbook has been conceptualized and developed by an intercultural core team of journalism scholars and media practitioners from Europe and Africa and includes feedback from over 100 African and European journalists, who have participated in pilot training workshops based on this material since 2018. While much concerns Africa and Europe, the content is relevant elsewhere as well (for perspectives of the MENA region, Asia, the Americas and the Russian Federation, see the project portal [www.mediaandmigration.com](http://www.mediaandmigration.com)).

Research on reporting migration and forced displacement in African and European media has shown that the topic is either wholly underreported or suffers from one-dimensional, self-centred perspectives. Comparative studies involving Africa and Europe show that news media on both continents focus on spectacular shipwrecks in the Mediterranean Sea, while analysis of the complex causes leading to these population flows tend to be marginalized. According to analyses by the African Media Initiative (AMI), migration coverage in many African countries overlooks the economic and socio-political realities driving people to move from Africa to Europe – while European media are frequently focused on the issue of border security (Fengler et al., 2020). This suggests that European journalists are as much in need of training as their African counterparts – a task that is one of the core ideas of this handbook, as we seek to address journalism educators and their students across continents, and hope to connect them through our project portal [www.mediaandmigration.com](http://www.mediaandmigration.com).

It is important to embed the story about migration and forced displacement within the actual context of the national culture and political economy. Reporting about countries of origin has tended to emphasize the impact of migration and forced displacement on countries of destination. However, migration can – and should – serve as a mirror of the societies from which the people emerge. The story needs to be brought home in a way that is as dispassionate as it is compelling and convincing, and bring in the perspectives of all stakeholders, local and international. Media reporting constitutes the first draft of a people's history. What are journalists telling about an era that is marked by these dangerous and massive movements of citizens in search of greener pastures and where they end up.

The handbook addresses migration and forced displacement in ways that require research-based knowledge and a critical appreciation of sources. In emphasizing the scholarly foundation of journalism, this handbook intends to respond to this need. Research has also shown that the individual migrant and refugee is rarely the subject of coverage; this handbook turns to *people* as a priority of reporting and its key points will be relevant to all regions of the world.

From an analytical perspective, these people fall into different categories, and things are getting a little complicated here, which requires that journalists pay attention to details; they need to study about migrants and refugees in order to ably inform their audiences and facilitate the public discourse, and this handbook for Journalism Educators intends to help. Journalists need to know that

*people on the move* may be *forced* to leave their home countries as refugees and seek asylum elsewhere, and that other people may be *forced* to leave their home but remain in their home country as IDPs – the IDPs outnumber refugees by far but are severely underreported. These and more groups (for instance, stateless people) are defined as “forcibly displaced” people, and most of them are under the protection of the United Nations Refugee Agency UNHCR.<sup>4</sup> In 2019, UNHCR reported 74 million *forcibly displaced persons* under its protection, plus 5.6 million Palestinian<sup>5</sup> refugees, totalling around 80 million (UNHCR, 2020, p. 1). Palestinians are a special group of refugees under the mandate of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA). Other people on the move may choose to depart from home, and they are assumed to do so *voluntarily*. They are *migrants*. Nearly 180 million of 272 million (two-thirds) of *international migrants* are *labour migrants* of whom most come from developing countries and aim for larger economies (IOM, 2019b, p. 2, p. 25).

### Aims and structure

The handbook seeks to provide journalism educators with a comprehensive set of modules, enabling them to train journalism students to better understand the complex factual dimensions of covering migration and forced displacement, and to translate this knowledge into sound and sensitive, yet critical and challenging reporting techniques.

This handbook is based on five years of research and analysis in the context of the Journalism in a Global Context (JiGC) project, founded in 2015, to promote the media’s role for migration and forced displacement in Africa and Europe. In the JiGC project, journalism scholars and media practitioners from Africa and Europe have joined forces to develop an intercultural perspective on reporting on migration and forced displacement. Key partners of the project are the Erich Brost Institute for International Journalism (EBI) at TU Dortmund University in Germany, the NGO Africa Positive (based in Germany), and the AMI (based in Kenya), representing 2,000 independent news outlets across Africa. Our academic partners on the African continent include Makerere University, Kampala, Uganda; Ghana Institute of Journalism, Accra, Ghana; University of Dar es Salaam, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania; Uganda Christian University, Mukono, Uganda; Daystar University, Nairobi, Kenya; Addis Ababa University, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; Nnamdi Azikiwe University, Awka, Nigeria; Witwatersrand University, Johannesburg, South Africa; and the University of Yaoundé I, Yaoundé, Cameroon. Furthermore, we have partnered with the Institut Supérieur de l’Information et de la Communication (ISIC), Morocco; the American University in Cairo (Department of Journalism and Mass Communication); St. Petersburg State University (Russian Federation); and Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP) Sao Paulo. Along with researchers from Bangladesh, Nepal, Myanmar, and Pakistan, scholars from these universities and practicing journalists have contributed to this handbook, including the accompanying resources. The German Foreign Office as well as the Robert Bosch Stiftung have provided

4 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

5 Note that the UNRWA refers to “Palestine” refugees, not “Palestinian” refugees, defining the group as “persons whose normal place of residence was Palestine during the period 1 June 1946 to 15 May 1948, and who lost both home and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 conflict” (UNRWA, n.d.). This handbook uses, in line with common parlance, the term “Palestinian” refugees.

funds to create the JiGC network and to conduct conferences, trainings and cross border research projects. The foundation's support enabled us to develop this teaching material with a priority on interregional dialogue between Africa and Europe and a differentiated discourse on migration within and between societies.

In a series of international conferences and workshops in Addis Ababa, Dakar, Dortmund, Nairobi and Rabat, the JiGC team has jointly identified the challenges to media actors and organizations especially in African, but also in European countries that this handbook shall address. Over 200 journalists and scholars invited to share their experiences stressed a lack of knowledge about the dimension and cross-cultural aspects of the migration story. They emphasized the need for more resources for investigative research and better support from editors to follow-up on critical stories. Not only can African journalists gain from training to tell the African story of migrants and refugees; by building intra-African journalists' networks – acknowledging that this is a complex matter (Berger, 2011), they can also counter the dominance of international news wire material. Independent media outlets for the publication of multifaceted, in-depth stories and the entrepreneurial skills to find a market for investigative stories also need to be addressed. Input from European journalists and a body of research related to portrayals of immigration in Europe indicate a matching gain for reporters there from provision of training on the topic.

The content for this handbook has been piloted in training sessions in Africa in 2018 and 2019, and African journalists involved in these trainings have confirmed the above shortcomings of reporting realities. Also, the handbook has been tested in teaching journalism students at the TU Dortmund University over three semesters. Of the 100 participants in our pilot workshops in Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast and Nigeria, many had no prior experience with migration and forced displacement as a topic of reporting or had not linked the phenomena to questions of development. Participants alluded to a lack of awareness about the difficulties that migrants face in European destination countries. They also assessed that even though African citizens may be aware of the dangers of irregular migration, the expected positive outcomes of migration to Europe – remittances and financial benefits for the family as well as gains in reputation – outweigh these risks. European journalists involved in our pilot conferences stressed the need for intercultural exchanges in order to understand migration.

This handbook seeks to equip future journalists with the skills and knowledge described above. It particularly addresses journalism educators and journalism students in academic programmes in Africa and Europe, as well as in journalism faculties around the globe who are very welcome to adapt this handbook to their specific contexts. Material is conceptualized in three tiers:

- Tier I: Research-based knowledge delivery on migration and forced displacement with a focus on context factors in Africa and Europe, as well as on reporting these matters.
- Tier II: Case studies of context factors in Africa and Europe.
- Tier III: Journalism practice on reporting migration and forced displacement and creation of cross-cultural reporting networks.

Perspectives on migration and forced displacement in MENA, Asia, the Americas and the Russian Federation are provided online. In addition to these country perspectives, the project portal [www.mediaandmigration.com](http://www.mediaandmigration.com) offers many resources and thereby complements the handbook.

Multimedia and interactive background material are available on the project portal [www.mediaandmigration.com](http://www.mediaandmigration.com). Thirteen courses are laid out as modules to be implemented in a semester of maximal thirteen sessions. The modular structure permits for reducing or extending the number of sessions according to the specific academic structure and requirements. Ideally, a minimum of 12 sessions is recommended. Each session consists of 90 minutes. Modules summarizing relevant research on migration and forced displacement are more extensive than modules with a journalism focus, as the aim of this handbook is to provide as much service as possible to journalism educators to facilitate widespread teaching of the topic.

The handbook attempts to be user-friendly and applicable across media education systems. Appreciating widespread realities (lack of funding, traditional didactics, power cuts, shortage of library and laboratory resources, academic-practitioner-divide etc.), the handbook offers both options to either focus on lectures, suggesting occasional guest lecturers, or to create more participatory spaces for students. The modules advocate a participatory teaching methodology, fostering teamwork and participants' engagement. Each module starts with an overview of the module's aims, which are addressed to educators.

Thereafter learning outcomes are formulated, which according to the taxonomy by Anderson and Krathwohl (2001) reflect the learning objectives the students are pursuing, and what the participants should be able to do after completing the module. The taxonomy is a well-known framework to categorize educational goals in six different cognitive levels (see Figure 1).<sup>6</sup>


The description of learning objectives thus plays a key role in the design of exams and teaching. Learning objectives provide clear instructions for teaching and at the same time for an examination. That is why the learning outcomes are also reflected in the suggested activities for classroom and assignments. The learning outcomes also address not only the cognitive learning objectives, but also the affective and other domains.<sup>7</sup>

The learning outcomes are followed by outlines in each module, which combine a summary of the module's topic and its introduction; the modules then proceed to present the topic, offer context, classroom practices and a comprehensive list of references. Educators and students will find

6 The taxonomy by Anderson & Krathwohl (2001) is a revised version from Bloom (1956). There are six (cognitive) levels in the taxonomy.

7 The affective domains' core levels are receiving and responding values. Higher degrees of internalization (acceptance of a value, preference for a value, commitment; organization and characterization) are difficult to verify in courses. The so-called 'psychomotor domain' includes physical movement, coordination, and use of the motor-skill areas and could for example imply that journalistic techniques such as writing, photographing and related skills are being mastered. For further information see among others: Krathwohl, Bloom, & Masia (1973), Simpson (1972), and Harrow (1972).

**Figure 1: Bloom's taxonomy of cognitive processes often asked of students in educational settings**



Source: Armstrong (2010). Own illustration.

a selection of short videos, audios and e-learning material on the project portal [www.mediaandmigration.com](http://www.mediaandmigration.com), most of it produced exclusively for this handbook and to be used in classroom work. Each module includes interviews with experts, migrants and refugees, and a selection of best practice journalistic pieces. Most importantly, educators are invited to download fully developed slide sets for lectures from the project portal [www.mediaandmigration.com](http://www.mediaandmigration.com), and we hope that they find it helpful to freely adapt the slides to their specific local needs and purposes.

### Thinking out of the box!

This handbook is also inspired by cultural projects and art. Journalism educators from across the globe will identify their own inspiring examples. The handbook with its focus on migrants and refugees offers a few best practices: Artists who believe that messages delivered in music are stronger than those uttered in words (e.g. see Module 7, Cameroon (Prolific Dream Revolution 237)), or artists who create words in poems that reverberate stronger than those in prose (Mansour, 2018). We, at the EBI, have also embarked upon the art and academia avenue: The international artist Yoko Ono showed “Add Color (Refugee Boat)” in Dortmund. Her participatory artwork was opened on the occasion of the annual conference of the European Journalism Training Association (EJTA)

in October 2019, hosted by the EBI. Yoko Ono has been preoccupied with the suffering of people taking flight from wars and oppression for decades and has done a number of major works that reference this plight, including *Add Color (Refugee Boat)*. Our students were actively involved as guides and communicated with thousands of visitors over three months. They learned aspects of journalism that do not reveal themselves in the classroom. Journalism student Roman Winkelhahn shares some of the lessons learned: “Visitors of this exhibition are very honest. When they stand in front of the refugee boat, invited to write down their thoughts, they do that. Point blank. For us as journalists, honesty and authenticity mean a lot. That’s why it has been so enriching to take care of the exhibition and interact with its visitors. Listening to the experiences of migrants and refugees gave us insights into one of the major topics of our time.” The show was a popular success, and more so: Our journalism students interacted with the many visitors from across the planet on a daily basis, learned from their stories as migrants and refugees, and discussed how the story of migration and forced displacement is being told in different journalism cultures.

### Conclusion

By promoting the quality of the news coverage on migration and forced displacement in countries of origin, transit and destination, the project will hopefully add to the quality of the public discourse. The handbook seeks to strengthen the independence of journalistic actors and organisations in countries suffering from political and economic restrictions on press freedom by promoting their professionalism. It will foster a multi-faceted debate about the crucial issue of migration and forced displacement in the media, thus impacting decision-making processes on different levels of society. The handbook will improve the research and reporting skills of participating journalists, and substantially broaden their knowledge and understanding of the issues in a global context. By creating intra-African networks of journalists and fostering pan-African intercultural understanding, journalists will expand their understanding of developments in neighbouring countries and be able to draw on the expertise of fellow professionals in other African countries for their coverage. This also applies to Europe and the exchange between African and European media practitioners. For all world regions, the handbook can help to train entrepreneurial skills of participants to enable them to find markets for their stories and reach out to editors for their support. Participants are encouraged to pass on knowledge to colleagues and supervisors, while journalism instructors are encouraged to offer more substantial and effective classes in the field of global reporting. It is our hope that this handbook will empower journalism educators, students and practicing journalists in their reporting. We hope that the new reporting will build trust, in that it shall be rooted in academic knowledge, guided by competent decisions on which data resources to use and a critical reflection of institutional sources. People shall be at the centre of the reporting, not only elevating them to actors, but also empowering them to make informed decisions for the actual – and future – society they live in.

*Susanne Fengler, Monika Lengauer, Anna-Carina Zappe and all contributing authors*

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## MODULE 1

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# Matters of Migrants and Refugees – Challenges of the 21st Century

by Susanne Fengler  
and Monika Lengauer



## MODULE AIMS

- To introduce participants to a global perspective on matters of migrants and refugees.
- To alert participants to the impact on countries of origin, transit, and destination.
- To encourage participants to develop a critical point of view to assess the current debate.



## LEARNING OUTCOMES<sup>1</sup>

At the end of this module, participants should:

- Be aware of the relevance of the issue for countries of origin, transit and destination.  
→ **Affective LO: Receiving**
- Recognize the challenges of covering sensitive topics such as migration and forced displacement. → **Affective LO: Responding**
- Demonstrate an idea of the current dimension of the topic on different continents.  
→ **Cognitive LO: Applying**
- Examine different types of material about migrants and refugees.  
→ **Cognitive LO: Analysing**

## Introduction

Matters of migrants, refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs) are the challenge of our century: By mid-2020, the numbers of migrants and refugees worldwide reached an all-time high since World War II (IOM, 2019b, p. 2; UNHCR, 2020a, p. 2) as over 272 million people are estimated to have migrated voluntarily or have been forcibly displaced<sup>2</sup> (Migration Data Portal, 2020b). Surging flows are the reality of our time across continents, as Figure 2 from the Asian Development Bank (ADB, 2018, p. 80, Figure 5.2) clearly demonstrates.

A large part of international migrants leave home to search for better life opportunities – nearly two-thirds are labour migrants<sup>3</sup> (IOM, 2019b, p. 2). Regarding refugees and other forcibly displaced people, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), by the end of 2019, counted 74 million forcibly displaced people for reasons such as persecution, conflict, violence or human rights violations (plus 5.6 million Palestinian<sup>4</sup> refugees). These are the highest levels of

<sup>1</sup> See Introduction, Footnotes 7/8.

<sup>2</sup> Note that UNHCR operates with the term “forced displacement”. Forcibly displaced people include all those under the mandate of UNHCR including refugees, IDPs, asylum seekers, stateless people and others. Forcibly displaced people are also Palestinian refugees, for whom the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) has a mandate. See Module 2 for details, and visit the UNHCR glossary for definitions of people under its mandate (UNHCR, n.d.).

<sup>3</sup> For the definition of labour migrants, see glossaries recommended in Module 2: EMN (2018); IOM (2019a); UNHCR (n.d.).


<sup>4</sup> Note that UNRWA refers to “Palestine” refugees, not “Palestinian” refugees, defining the group as “persons whose normal place of residence was Palestine during the period 1 June 1946 to 15 May 1948, and who lost both home and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 conflict” (UNRWA, n.d.). This handbook uses, in line with common parlance, the term “Palestinian” refugees.

forced displacement on record, and the numbers are striking across continents<sup>5</sup> (UNHCR, 2020a, p. 3, p. 30, pp. 71-82).

- 8 million people in Colombia have been forcibly displaced internally due to decades of armed conflicts.
- 7 million Syrians have been registered as refugees and 6 million have been displaced internally caused by the conflict.
- 5 million people in the Democratic Republic of the Congo have been internally displaced and almost 1 million have been registered as refugees.
- 4 million people from Venezuela have been displaced abroad.
- 3 million people from Afghanistan have been registered as refugees.
- 2 million South Sudanese have been escaping the civil war that followed independence<sup>6</sup>.
- 1 million stateless people<sup>7</sup> have fled Myanmar.

Other countries of origin for forced displacement include the Ukraine, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, the Central African Republic (CAR), Ethiopia and Yemen (UNHCR, 2020a, p. 6). The vast majority of refugees (68%) comes from just five countries (Syria, Venezuela, Afghanistan, South Sudan and Myanmar), and similarly, most IDPs come from Colombia, Syria, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Yemen, Somalia and Afghanistan. It is important to note that most forcibly displaced people are IDPs (around 46 million) who remain in their home country, and around 20 million are refugees who cross international borders (UNHCR, 2020a, pp. 2-3).

**Figure 2: International migrants, by region of origin (million)**



Asia remains the largest source of international migrants. Countries with sustained population growth and an expanding workforce continued to lead outward migration, according to the Asian Development Bank (ADB, 2018, p. 80). Source: Calculations by the ADB, using data from UNDESA (ADB, 2018, p. 80, Figure 5.2). Own illustration.


<sup>5</sup> Numbers and decimals are rounded in this text, keeping a good balance between accuracy and readability.

<sup>6</sup> South Sudan gained independence in 2011, the civil war started in 2013.

<sup>7</sup> For the definition and protection of stateless people, consult glossaries recommended in Module 2, particularly UNHCR (n.d.).

The issues of migration and forced displacement also deeply impact countries that provide shelter. Just a few examples may illustrate this. Only five countries host the majority of refugees: In 2019, Turkey hosted 3.6 million refugees, Colombia 1.8 million, Pakistan 1.4 million, Uganda 1.4 million and Germany 1.1 million (UNHCR, 2020a, p. 3), while, conversely, two thirds of all international migrants live in just 20 countries, mostly in the USA (51 million), Germany and Saudi Arabia (around 13 million each), Russian Federation (12 million) and the United Kingdom

**Figure 3: Top 20 destination (left) and origin countries (right) of international migrants in 2019 (millions)**



More than 40% of all international migrants worldwide in 2019 (112 million) were born in Asia, primarily in India and China. Mexico was the second largest country of origin, and Russian Federation was fourth. Besides the USA, several European countries have sizable populations of migrants, particularly Germany. With regard to the distribution of international migrants by countries' income group,<sup>8</sup> nearly two thirds of international migrants resided in high-income countries in 2019 – around 176 million. This compares with 82 million foreign-born people who resided in middle-income countries (about one third of the total migrant stock) and 13 million in low-income countries in the same year (IOM, 2019b, p. 26). Source: IOM World Migration Report 2020 (2019b, p. 26, Figure 2). Own illustration.

<sup>8</sup> See Module 2 for details. The country distinction in income groups refers to the World Bank comprising low income economies, lower middle-income economies, upper-middle income economies and high income economies (UNDESA, n.d.; World Bank, n.d.).

(10 million; UNDESA, 2019a, p. 11; see Figure 3). However, the process around migration and forced displacement has fundamentally changed in a world of ever-growing information, digitalization and mobility. Although migration is a global phenomenon, most movements involve a limited set of countries. The phenomenon increasingly transcends regional and continental borders, resulting in even more challenges for migrants and refugees, destination societies, policy makers and media professionals who play a key role in shaping public opinion.

The examples introduced above not only clearly demonstrate the relevance of the topic, they also remind us of the need for a careful choice of words. The media often uses terms with very different meanings interchangeably, mixing up migrants, refugees, irregular migrants,<sup>9</sup> IDPs, mixed movements of refugees and migrants etc. Migrants usually leave their home countries in search of better life opportunities unlike refugees who are forced to flee war, violence, conflict or persecution and have crossed an international border to find safety in another country. Distinguishing between migrants and refugees is a sensitive political issue on the one hand, while, on the other hand, the difference between the two groups is clearly regulated by international law. Refugees are defined under international and regional refugee law, and the international community has legal obligations towards them (the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol determine the obligations of signatory states; UNHCR, 2016). Both, migrants and refugees, have, however, rights by virtue of their humanity (see Module 2). The differences between migrants and refugees explain that two different Global Compacts were negotiated (UN, 2020). Both grew out of the 2016 New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants (UN General Assembly, 2016).



**SUGGESTION FOR AN EXERCISE TO ADDRESS THE COGNITIVE SKILLS OF APPLYING AND THE AFFECTIVE SKILLS OF RECEIVING:**

UNHCR and EarthTime visualize refugee flows in selected situations between 2000 and 2015 (Earthtime & UNHCR, 2019). Keep in mind that each dot represents 17 refugees. Participants should select different situations – Nigeria, Colombia, Syria or any other of choice – and write a short news report (at least 600 characters) on the situation, using the Migration Data Portal's country page as reference for data and background. They should share their news reports and their knowledge and assessment of migration and refugee movements in class.

<sup>9</sup> A whole array of terms is used for migrants who do not have the required legal documents (e.g. visa) to enter and/or stay in a foreign country, see Module 2.

## The Global Compact on Refugees and The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration

The two compacts – the Global Compact on Refugees and the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration – address the management of people on the move, and how to protect them in states of origin, transit and destination. The compacts offer the first widely accepted new normative frameworks on the movement of people since 1951.<sup>10</sup> “The momentum for developing the compacts stemmed from the arrival of over a million migrants and asylum-seekers in Europe in 2015 but, in the process of negotiations, many other long-standing issues of concern were included, such as protracted displacement and measures to protect the rights of migrants” (Ferris & Martin, 2019, p. 5).<sup>11</sup>

The Global Compact for Migration (UN General Assembly, 2018a) is anchored in international conventions that determine the rights of migrants and refugees alike: human rights primarily, and conventions against organized crime (including the protocol to prevent trafficking and the one against the smuggling of migrants); the slavery convention; climate change convention; conventions on promoting decent work and labour migration; the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development etc. (UN General Assembly, 2018a, p. 1, Preamble, para 2). The compact intends to improve the global partnership by referencing “solidarity”, “shared responsibilities”, “unity of purpose” and “common understanding” on international migration which “undeniably affects our countries, communities, migrants and their families” (UN General Assembly, 2018a, p. 1, Preamble, para 8) in origin, transit and destination countries. The compact aims to:

“facilitate safe, orderly and regular migration, while reducing the incidence and negative impact of irregular migration [...] safe, orderly and regular migration works for all when it takes place in a well-informed, planned and consensual manner. Migration should never be an act of desperation. When it is, we must cooperate to respond to the needs of migrants in situations of vulnerability and address the respective challenges. We must work together to create conditions that allow communities and individuals to live in safety and dignity in their own countries” (UN General Assembly, 2018a, p. 4, para 11, 13).

In para 12, the compact explains that it intends to “mitigate the adverse drivers and structural factors that hinder people from building and maintaining sustainable livelihoods in their countries of origin, and so compel them to seek a future elsewhere”.

10 Ratification of the 1951 Refugee Convention, followed by its 1967 protocol (see Module 2).

11 UNHCR defines a protracted refugee situation as one in which 25,000 or more refugees from the same nationality have been in exile for at least five consecutive years in a given host country (Palestinian refugees are not included as they are under the UNRWA mandate). Refugees remaining in long-term exile require special attention from a protection and solutions perspective. It is estimated that some 15.7 million refugees (77%) were in a protracted situation by the end of 2019, slightly fewer than a year earlier (15.9 million). These 15.7 million refugees were living in 32 host countries, constituting an overall total of 51 protracted situations. Figures include the long lasting refugee situation of Afghans in Pakistan and Iran as well more recent situations like that of South Sudanese refugees in Kenya, Sudan and Uganda (UNHCR, 2020a, p. 24).

The compact is aspirational in nature, but it opens doors to manage international migration in ways that are orderly, regular and safe – which the current “legal and policy architecture [...] has historically failed” to do (Gest et al., 2019). Twenty-three objectives lead the way, starting with the collection of accurate data (Objective 1; see Module 2). Relevant in the context of media and migration is objective 17 that aspires to eliminate “all forms of discrimination and promote evidence-based public discourse to shape perceptions of migration”.

The Global Compact on Refugees (UN General Assembly, 2018b) builds on existing international laws and standards, including the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol as well as on human rights treaties. It calls on all stakeholders to heighten their efforts and prevent or resolve conflicts as well as to tackle the root causes of large refugee situations (para 9). Responsibility and burden shall be shared predictably and equitably among all United Nations (UN) member states together with other stakeholders, including the media (UN General Assembly, 2018b, para 3).

In its four key objectives, the Global Compact on Refugees aims to: (i) ease the pressures on countries that host refugees, particularly those in countries neighbouring conflict zones; (ii) enhance the refugee self-reliance (for instance in food security and nutrition); (iii) expand access to third-country solutions (these are safe and regulated avenues for refugees to lawfully stay in a third country – for instance through humanitarian visa, family reunion, educational or employment opportunities, and they are in addition to resettlements<sup>12</sup>); and (iv) support conditions in countries of origin for return in safety and dignity (UN General Assembly, 2018b, p. 2, para 7).

International observers wonder whether migrants and refugees will be better off as a result of these agreements. McAdam (2018) predicts that 2018, the year the two compacts were endorsed, “will go down in history as a significant year for the protection of refugees and migrants”, but she adds “at least on paper” (McAdam, 2018, p. 571). On the bright side, both compacts promise to respect the human rights of people on the move, and they have the support of a large majority of UN member states.<sup>13</sup> They represent new normative frameworks for the movement of people in that they set out new standards and create new mechanisms for strengthening international cooperation with respect to migrants and refugees (Ferris & Martin, 2019). The Global Compact for Migration is a beginning for the global regulation of migration (McAdam, 2018). The Global Compact on Refugees accelerates a move towards “making refugees partners in their own futures” in that it aims to replace refugee-hosting arrangements like camps by “a model that promotes the social-economic inclusion of refugees, including access to national education, health and other services, as well

<sup>12</sup> For definition of resettlement, see glossaries recommended in Module 2: EMN (2018); IOM (2019a).

<sup>13</sup> The two compacts grew out of the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants which the UN General Assembly (UNGA) unanimously adopted on 19 September 2016. The Global Compact on Refugees was endorsed by the UNGA on 17 December 2018, with 181 votes in favour, two against (Hungary and the USA) and three abstentions (Dominican Republic, Eritrea and Libya). The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration was adopted by 164 governments at an intergovernmental conference in Marrakech, Morocco, on 10 December 2018. It was formally endorsed by the UNGA on 19 December 2018, with 152 votes in favour, five against (Czech Republic, Hungary, Israel, Poland and the USA) and 12 abstentions (Algeria, Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Chile, Italy, Latvia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Romania, Singapore and Switzerland; UN News, 2018).

as jobs” (Grandi, 2019, p. 24). The two compacts respond to a very diverse set of interests and aspirations, they are explicitly non-binding, and they recognize the primary responsibility and sovereignty of states. Both compacts are aspirational, but they are meant to pursue solutions. In the case of the Refugee Compact, implementation will be reviewed in a Global Refugee Forum every four years (the first was held in Geneva in December 2019), and the progress of the Migration Compact will be discussed in a four-yearly International Migration Review Forum, starting 2022 (UN General Assembly, 2018a; UN General Assembly, 2018b).

Covid-19 might be the first major challenge to the Global Compact on Refugees and the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration. The pandemic carries the risk that displaced populations will be “excluded from access to health care, economic safety nets, and recovery efforts” (Lambert et al., 2020, p. e313). Both compacts, as outlined above, aim at new normative frameworks for the movement of people with new standards and new mechanisms for strengthening international cooperation. Covid-19 has shown a different new reality, with thousands of travel restrictions, border closures, and rapidly changing regulations. People have been stranded at borders, placed in detention, deported or unable to return home; some “have been discriminated against and excluded from access to rights [...] including information, testing” etc. (UN Network on Migration, n.d., p. 3). Under these conditions, migrants and refugees are vulnerable to stigma and xenophobia (UN Network on Migration, n.d., p. 3; UNHCR, 2020b). These contexts threaten to slow the momentum towards the inclusion of migrants and refugees in health and social protection systems and economies envisioned in the two compacts. Good practices (UN Network on Migration, n.d., pp. 8-22) show that governments around the world have offered an amnesty period enabling migrant workers without documents to travel home (Kuwait), have automatically renewed work permits and visas for migrant workers (United Arab Emirates), have released people from detention (Netherlands; Zambia) or coordinated health services for the care of migrants (Colombia). Portugal has determined that all migrants and refugees with pending residence permit applications will receive temporary residence and have access to the same rights as citizens, including social support. Germany has set up an online



**SUGGESTION FOR AN EXERCISE TO ADDRESS THE COGNITIVE SKILLS OF ANALYSING AND THE AFFECTIVE SKILLS OF RECEIVING:**

Split participants into two groups: Group 1 researches the Global Compact for Migration. Group 2 researches the Global Compact on Refugees (UN, 2020).

Scrutinize the respective compact for media-related content and summarize findings in a one-page-paper following the question: What voluntary contributions could media make that could synergize with the objectives of the two compacts?

platform to recruit seasonal workers, including applicants for asylum, to harvest crops as a result of labour shortages created by Covid-19 (Lambert et al., 2020; UN Network on Migration, n.d.; UNHCR, 2020b).

### **Different countries – different perspectives**

The debates in many countries about the Global Compact for Migration and the Global Compact on Refugees have shown that the perceptions of issues of migrants and refugees differ fundamentally. While much of this handbook focuses on Africa and Europe, we strongly encourage fellow educators from other regions in the world to complement the examples and illustrations we use in Modules 1-13. Our distinguished co-authors from MENA, Asia, the Americas and the Russia Federation contribute academic and journalistic analyses and unique insights into migration and forced displacement across the world regions. These invaluable resources are published as full papers on the project portal [www.mediaandmigration.com](http://www.mediaandmigration.com).

Indeed, many people are struck when they learn about the perception of migration and forced displacement elsewhere. In Africa, migration has a positive connotation for many people, while met with xenophobia in some cases, or is not considered newsworthy as the phenomenon is deeply engrained in the continent's societies. Circular migration<sup>14</sup> – the fluid movement of people between countries – is a common phenomenon across Africa where several regional unions warrant free movement.<sup>15</sup> Borders are routinely crossed because, for instance, ethnicities remain closely connected within their shared cultures, traditions and languages despite being spread out across different nation states that were created by former colonial powers (Robinson, 2016). Often overlooked by international observers, many African countries host large numbers of refugees and labour migrants from neighbouring countries. The interactive map by EarthTime and UNHCR (2019) visualizes some scale, and the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA) regularly updates the data. In 2019, 65% of all sub-Saharan Africa migrants were living in other sub-Saharan African countries<sup>16</sup> (UNDESA, 2019b, p. 3). In some cases, migration often has a positive connotation (see box on Nigeria below). A person who has travelled abroad – especially to Europe – enjoys a higher prestige upon returning home (Marfaing, 2016). Many Africans feel strongly connected to former colonial powers, and consider France, Portugal, and the United Kingdom a logical extension of their personal radius (see Module 3). The trend is promoted by the positive picture of Europe which is created not only by the news and entertainment media but also – maybe even more so – by the photos and messages that migrants and the diaspora are sending home through

14 For definition, see glossaries recommended in Module 2 (IOM, 2019a; EMN, 2018).

15 Nominally, at least, free movement is regulated for instance in the Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS; ILO, n.d.). The African Union promotes free movement (African Union, 2018).

16 This is in line with the standard international migratory movements: Most international migrants move to other countries within their region of birth, for instance over two thirds of all European-born international migrants reside in Europe. In 2019, 42 million of the 61 million international migrants born in Europe resided in European countries (69%). Most migrants from sub-Saharan Africa were living in other countries of sub-Saharan Africa (65%; UNDESA, 2019b, p. 3).

social media. Migrants are usually under strong pressure to demonstrate success to their home communities who have often gone to extreme ends in jointly financing the migration of a member and who expect return on their investment through remittances (Sanchez et al., 2018). Remittances have become a major source of income in many African countries (African Development Bank Group, 2011; Plaza & Ratha, 2011). As a consequence, it is a challenge for many political leaders to act upon migration issues, also with regard to precarious local labour markets in countries of origin (Koch et al., 2018). In the case of Nigeria, the European Union (EU) announced the tightening of procedures for getting a Schengen Visa for the nationals of Nigeria arguing that the country was “failing to play its part in the return and readmission of its nationals staying illegally in Europe” (Schengen Visa News, 2020). The lack of domestic newsworthiness about Africans migrating means there are only a few stories and headlines in African media that focus on people leaving the continent and heading north.

In contrast, the so-called migration and refugee crisis that started in 2015 has dominated political agendas and public debates in Europe particularly since German chancellor Angela Merkel’s decision to accept an unrestricted number of victims of the Syrian civil war in 2015 (European

**Chinyere Stella Okunna, Professor at the Department of Mass Communication, Nnamdi Azikiwe University, Awka, Anambra State, Nigeria:**

“Public opinion about migration is mainly positive in Nigeria, as migration is generally seen as desirable. In fact, Nigerians admire (even envy) and commend people migrating out of the country. Nigerians can go to great lengths to sponsor family members and friends to leave the country. The pull factors here are a combination of various forces, including economic, prestige and other factors. In addition to the economic benefits from migrating to ‘greener pastures’, to live or study abroad is a status symbol greatly sought after by most Nigerians. Nigerians migrate everywhere all over Africa, especially South Africa, Libya, Ghana and Togo. In fact, Nigerians migrate to every country of the world, including the remotest and most inhospitable parts of the earth. This astounding dispersal is effectively captured in a popular Nigerian joke saying that if you go to any country in the world and you don’t find a Nigerian (particularly the Igbo), you should run away from the place as fast as your legs can carry you. The push to migrate from Nigeria to African and other countries is virtually irresistible. Nigeria’s development has not lived up to expectations.”<sup>17</sup>



Source: Private.

<sup>17</sup> For a first overview of migration and forced displacement from and to Nigeria, see the Migration Data Portal’s country page (Migration Data Portal, 2020c).

Commission, 2018). Since then, the discussion about the EU's capacity to accommodate migrants and host refugees had a considerable impact on election outcomes, for instance in the United Kingdom, Germany, France and Italy. Populist parties emphasized threats of uncontrolled movements of people. This has shed light on a sharp divide between Central Eastern European (CEE) and Western European countries in terms of migration policy (Lehne, 2016; see Module 5). More recently, the perspective of an ever-growing immigration from African countries into the EU – ascribed mainly to a lack of economic growth and a sharp rise of population on the African continent expected until 2050 (Kebede et al., 2019) – has gained prominence in public debates in Europe and resulted in numerous political initiatives. Photos of refugee ships in the Mediterranean Sea, overloaded with African migrants, have become iconic images in the European media – as have pictures from Central American migrants at the US-Mexican border. However, other places affected by issues of migration and forced displacement only get sporadic attention by the world media, or no media coverage at all.

Many Europeans themselves have experienced forced displacement. In the 20th century, World War II uprooted some 40 million European refugees. Today, however, matters of migrants and refugees are perceived controversially in Europe. A relevant factor is that EU countries are hesitant to open up labour markets to non-EU nationals. Along with tightened visa restrictions, applying for asylum has for a long time been the only option to access EU labour markets for people not carrying a European passport. This has, in return, triggered confusion and debates about the actual motivation and status of migrants and refugees. In the aftermath of the migration and refugee crisis of 2015, many European countries experienced growing public discontent with migrants and refugees, which increased with growing numbers of asylum applicants.

History impacts the perception of migrants and refugees in Europe as well (see Module 8). Germany's decision of 2015 to open its borders needs to be interpreted in the context of World War II when the Nazi regime forced millions of Europeans into death, escape and exile, and where millions of Germans themselves were forcibly displaced after the subsequent loss of territory to Poland and Czechoslovakia. On the other hand, sensitivities in many CEE countries are rooted in a complex of war and conflict, history, political developments and cultural identities; CEE countries experienced the loss of their sovereignty and were forced into the Soviet bloc after 1945. Different perceptions of how to deal with the challenge of migration and asylum are continuously causing tensions among EU partners, reflecting differences in history, culture, labour needs and population demographics in terms of ageing, amongst other issues. The question of repatriation<sup>18</sup> can serve as another example of how attitudes of publics and policy-makers in Africa and Europe can differ (de Haas, 2009). On the one side, many African leaders seek to avoid repatriation of nationals being denied asylum in Europe; for instance, readmission can harm the international reputation of states and can be perceived as shameful by African families,

18 For definition, see the glossaries recommended in Module 2: EMN (2018); IOM (2019a).



## Handbook structure

Besides pressing issues like climate change and new challenges like the Ebola outbreak that started in 2014 or the Covid-19 pandemic, migration and forced displacement are likely to dominate the global agenda of this century. Taking into account the push and pull factors – outlined in Module 3 and discussed in-depth in the case studies (Modules 6-8) – experts expect the numbers of international migrants and refugees to remain high.<sup>19</sup> Journalists and newsrooms across the world will be challenged to cover this complex and sensitive subject. The UN Global Compact for Migration seeks to:

“[p]romote independent, objective and quality reporting of media outlets, including internet-based information, by sensitizing and educating media professionals on migration-related issues and terminology, investing in ethical reporting standards and advertising [...], in full respect for the freedom of the media” (UN, 2018, p. 24, Objective 17, para 31(c)).

This handbook seeks to assist journalism educators to prepare the future generation of journalists for this task. It is equally of value, however, for working journalists and mid-career training initiatives. While the handbook focuses on migrants, refugees and IDPs in and between Africa and Europe, data and examples from other regions are also included, and the structure and materials allow journalism educators to adapt it to their own case studies. The handbook focuses on migration and forced displacement in all their facets. It is our aim to encourage educators to alert journalism students – as future agents of change in their societies – to the fact that we all first have to study and try to understand these complex matters of migration and forced displacement well. Only then can reporting do justice to migrants, refugees and IDPs as well as to people in both originating and host countries through knowledge-based, accurate, clear, compassionate, professional and fair coverage.

Population movement, if managed wisely and jointly among all stakeholders, can be a successful strategy to minimize the risks of a life in poverty and hardship for extended families; such movement can also benefit the sending country as well as the receiving nation. Movement is not the only strategy, and for many dead, missing and stranded irregular migrants<sup>20</sup> it, tragically, was the wrong choice.<sup>21</sup> Particularly irregular migration does not compensate for a lack of opportunities at home. The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration accentuates these and other objectives. Governmental or non-governmental development programmes, sometimes supported by international

19 Future migration trends are difficult to forecast as migration data are scarce and often incomplete, and many unpredictable factors may push people across international borders – often in response to rapidly changing economic, social, political and environmental factors. Vollset et al. (2020) forecast for 2100 the largest immigration in absolute numbers in the USA, India, China and the largest emigration in Somalia, the Philippines, and Afghanistan. The Migration Data Portal (2020a) advocates for “greater preparedness and resilience through setting up contingency plans for various future possibilities”.

20 For definition of “irregular” migrants, see glossaries recommended in Module 2: EMN (2018); IOM (2019a).

21 To save lives and establish coordinated international efforts on missing migrants is one of 23 objectives of the Global Compact for Migration.

development cooperation agencies, may support educators, innovators, creators and entrepreneurs in countries that originate migrants.

According to Eric Chinje, former President of the African Media Initiative (AMI), news media in Africa rarely tell African success stories but copy the stereotypical negative image of Africa from foreign media. Balancing the – much-needed – critical coverage with positive examples, which may inspire young Africans to avoid the risky passage abroad, is also part of the media’s social responsibility. In destination countries, news media can do a lot to explain inflows of people, including stories that counter stereotypes, humanize the ‘other’ and show net benefits to local economies facing prospects of ageing populations and labour shortages. By the same token, constructive and solutions journalism is also an option for media in destination countries in the face of domestic challenges linked to migrants and refugees. The issues do not only affect abstract institutions, but human beings, as the good practice cases for coverage show that we have collected.

- Modules 2-5 analyse key definitions and key facts as well as the push and pull factors impacting migration and forced displacement by using examples from Africa and Europe. Lack of opportunities, economic development, climate change, conflict, political persecution, and corruption are some of the factors *pushing* people from their countries of origin, while safety, labour markets, education, remittances and welfare programmes are key factors *pulling* people into destination countries. The modules also reflect on the role of the mass media for covering matters of migrants and refugees.
- Modules 6-9 use case studies and perspectives from Africa and Europe to illustrate the theories and models.
- Modules 10-13 apply the basic knowledge acquired so far by educating participants in courses to make issues of migration and refuge a sound and comprehensive, compelling and ethically told story. The modules will provide best-practice examples of coverage from across the globe, introduce participants to sources and reporting techniques, and provide ethical guidelines. It will also prepare a new generation of young journalists to collaborate in cross-national teams.



#### SUGGESTION FOR AN EXERCISE TO ADDRESS THE COGNITIVE SKILLS OF ANALYZING AND THE AFFECTIVE SKILLS OF RESPONDING:

Listen to the song “Emigrason Clandestino” by rapper Abdul Embalo from Guinea-Bissau, who went on a traumatic journey and returned home. You will find the rap song on the project portal [www.mediaandmigration.com](http://www.mediaandmigration.com).

Identify material on migration and forced displacement produced by local artists and discuss them in light of the questions resulting from the main messages on migrants and refugees they deliver, and how they may impact their audiences.



### SUGGESTED ASSIGNMENT TO ADDRESS THE COGNITIVE SKILLS OF APPLYING AND THE AFFECTIVE SKILLS OF RESPONDING:

Political scientist Ivan Krastev (2018) has analyzed the movement of people as the revolution of the 21st century: “It is not guided by ideology, but by Google Maps. If you want to change your life, it is no longer the smartest option to change your government. Instead, you change the country of residence.”

Write a report and an opinion piece on this claim for possible publication in a national newspaper (at least 5,000 characters): Is there evidence in your country for this “revolution” to take place – or is there not? What implications does population movement have, for your country, and for other countries affected? What do you think about his statement and why? Is it sometimes more risky to work for change at home, or smarter to flee? Do people always have choices?



### RECOMMENDED READING:

#### Academic:

McAdam, J. (2018). The Global Compacts on Refugees and Migration: A new era for international protection? *International Journal of Refugee Law*, 30(4), 571-574.

#### Journalistic:

Anyadike, O. (2015). Since you’ve been gone. The families migrants leave behind: IRIN Special Feature: Nigeria to Morocco and Gambia to Italy. Retrieved November 26, 2020, from <http://newirin.irinnews.org/special-feature-since-youve-been-gone>

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## MODULE 2

### Key Sources, Key Facts, Key Terms and Numbers

by Monika Lengauer



## MODULE AIMS

- To determine which definitions of key terms to use and why.
- To classify key actors in the field of migration and forced displacement.
- To ascertain reliable sources for data and practice how to apply them.



## LEARNING OUTCOMES

At the end of this module, participants should be able:

- To describe the imperative of using reliable sources for data and definitions.  
→ **Affective LO: Receiving**
- To discuss the meaning of different usage of key terms. → **Affective LO: Responding**
- To explain who impacts migration and forced displacement.  
→ **Cognitive LO: Understanding**
- To appropriately choose and use key definitions and data. → **Cognitive LO: Applying**
- To examine key actors and organisations in media products. → **Cognitive LO: Analysing**

## Outline

Words must be intelligible, data reliable, sources transparent and actors self-aware and conscious of assumptions, values and biases – this is part of this handbook’s vision for informed public debates on population movements. Journalists, aspiring journalists, journalism educators in particular and curricula developers bear the responsibility for making erudite decisions on the definitions, data and sources they use and thereby proliferate.

The objective of this module is to help them to guide the quality of public discourse. We introduce actors who impact the field of migration and forced displacement; discuss definitions and reveal how these relate to data; stress sources that collect and disseminate data; share data that were collected and presented in transparent methodologies and that are open to academic and public scrutiny; and point to user-friendly applications and tools that visualize research. The hope of this module is to empower users to make informed decisions about the sources, data and definitions they apply. This can also facilitate curriculum development and stimulate design of country-specific modules of reporting matters of migrants and refugees in that the sources recommended herein allow adaptation to specific case studies.

## Selected data sources

Journalists covering issues of migration and forced displacement are frequently confronted with the lack of data on the one hand and the maze of data providers on the other hand. It is complex to assess

the value of data sources and to use their data for an independent evaluation. To date, and despite many global initiatives to improve data collection and comparability, many national data collection systems are still ill-prepared to gather detailed information (UN, 2020). Various sources collect and disseminate data at the national and international levels (national statistical offices for instance through censuses or population registries). The reasons for the overarching lack of (quality) data are multifold. There are some objective difficulties, for instance all questions related to definitions: Who is a migrant? Who is a refugee? Do they differ, or do they not? Migration, as Zlotnick (1987) has highlighted, is without doubt the most difficult demographic phenomenon to measure because – unlike mortality and fertility – it is not related to a tangible biological occurrence. A baby is being born once, and it is without any doubt a new-born baby, but who is a migrant, and how often does she or he migrate, and does she or he always migrate or is she or he a refugee at some point? There are many examples from regions and countries around the globe that magnify the challenges. Let's take Africa as an example. Contrary to once-in-a-lifetime events such as birth and death – and even here, vital statistics in a number of countries in Africa are of great concern (Sankoh et al., 2020) – migration is more complex, maybe more frequent, even more vague. Oucho (1998, p. 89) explains that “sub-Saharan Africa provides a classical case for studying the [...] problem of data paucity” on internal, regional and international population movements alike. Presently, the Global Compact for Migration is tasked to deliver comparable data in comprehensive ways and the Global Compact on Refugees highlights the need to collect and present reliable, comparable and timely data (UN, 2020).

Journalism educators are often committed to guide their students towards data from academic sources first and foremost – which is difficult in migration and forced displacement because data collection is not only complex and fluid but also very costly, especially when longitudinal, recurrent and internationally comparable data are required. When possible, this handbook refers to authoritative and credible official and academic data sources (IMI, 2020) or hybrid sources (Our World in Data, 2020).<sup>1</sup> As journalism students and practicing journalists require quick access to reliable and timely data, this handbook recommends to use data from sources that:

- (1) are as trustworthy as possible based upon their mandates to collect and disseminate data, and based upon their methodologies that are transparent and open to academic and public scrutiny;
- (2) are obligated to provide data that are relevant, accurate, current and recurrent, longitudinal, internationally comparable and globally consistent, disaggregated by sex and age, credentialled, and that make the data available in open source, easily accessible and clearly understandable;
- (3) preferably also show how to visualize data in order to facilitate global comparative journalistic research on a wide-ranging scale of indicators.

1 Our World in Data is a collaborative effort between researchers at the University of Oxford, who are the scientific editors of the website content; and the non-profit organization Global Change Data Lab, which publishes and maintains the website and the data tools. See the Oxford Martin Programme on Global Development (Our World in Data, 2020).

Curated databases that do not meet these standards are not recommended (Buneman et al., 2009). This handbook recommends the Migration Data Portal (2020a; 2020d) as the first access point to data research. In four languages (English, Spanish, French and German), the portal explicitly addresses journalists and the general public, is administered by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and supported by governments (e.g. USA, Germany, Switzerland). It is a one-stop-shop for data by mandated and officially recognized international sources (UN Statistical Commission, 2020; UNSD, 2020a).<sup>2</sup> Other sources include:

- The United Nations Statistics Division (UNSD) collects and disseminates official national data on international migrant flows and stocks.<sup>3</sup> UNSD’s Demographic Yearbook data collection and its Statistical Yearbook are rich sources of varied data for all countries and regions (UNSD, 2020b; UNSD, 2020c).
- The United Nations Population Division (UNPD) prepares estimates of migrant stocks for each country using the data provided by the UNSD, and its annual statistics are very helpful to compare on timelines, across continents and countries (UNDESA, 2019a; UNDESA 2019b).
- The International Labour Organisation (ILO) collects and compiles international labour migration statistics (ILO, 2020).
- The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) – also known as the UN Refugee Agency – collects and compiles data on refugees, asylum-seekers, internally displaced people (IDPs), stateless people and other “persons of concern” (UNHCR, 2020b; see Figure 6).
- The IOM collects, uses, analyses and publishes data across a wide range of migration topics (Migration Data Portal, 2019a).
- The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugee (UNRWA) provides statistics about Palestinian refugees (UNRWA, 2019).
- The World Development Indicators (WDI) database by the World Bank is a compilation of internationally comparable statistics about global development and the fight against poverty, available in several languages including Arabic, Russian and Portuguese (World Bank, 2019).

Examples for regional foci are the African Development Bank (AfDB) with its African Statistical Yearbooks (AfDB et al., 2019; AfDB, 2020). The EU’s Statistical Office (Eurostat) has a mandate for data collection and dissemination (Eurostat, 2019).

Data collection comprises all available sources, including special field monitors and media reports, deployed for instance by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC, 2019, pp. 9, 13, 19).


2 The United Nations Statistical Commission is the highest body of the global statistical system bringing together the Chief Statisticians from UN member states from around the world. It is the highest decision-making body for international statistical activities, and oversees the work of the UNSD.

3 Definition of migrant stock and migrant flows: See glossaries recommended by this handbook: IOM (2019a); EMN (2018).

Under Covid-19 conditions, data have had to be collected under very difficult conditions, including the social distancing rules, while many migrants and refugees have been stranded at closed borders or confined to reception centres, their human rights often disproportionately affected. Timely and accurate data are even more critical in these circumstances, in order to understand the reach and impact of the pandemic, to plan interventions and to ultimately save lives (UN Network on Migration, n.d.; UNHCR, 2020c).

Given the diversity of data collection entities and target groups, it comes as no surprise that data are not necessarily congruent. Institutions often collect data independently in order to meet their own objectives, they use different definitions, criteria and parameters, making it difficult to share, compare and jointly analyse data (UNHCR, 2016a, p. 40). For example, IOM tracks “displaced persons”, and UNHCR collects data on “forcibly displaced persons” – the two measures have different meanings and cannot be used alternatively. For UNHCR, forcibly displaced people primarily comprise refugees, asylum seekers and a certain group of IDPs (UNHCR, 2019, p. 63). Palestinian refugees are often but not always included in the numbers that show forced displacement (UNHCR, 2020d, p. 2; World Bank, 2017, pp. 15-16, Annex A, pp. 34-35).

**Figure 6: 79.5 million forcibly displaced people worldwide at the end of 2019**



\*20.4 million refugees under UNHCR's mandate; 5.6 million Palestine refugees under UNRWA's mandate

\*\*Source: IDMC

Several groups of “forcibly displaced people” are under the mandate of the UNHCR including refugees, IDPs, asylum seekers and stateless people (above data by 18 June 2020). UNHCR collects data on these “people of concern”. Palestinian refugees are under the mandate of the UNRWA. Source: UNHCR (2020d, p. 2). Own illustration.



**SUGGESTION FOR AN EXERCISE TO ADDRESS THE COGNITIVE SKILLS OF UNDERSTANDING, THE AFFECTIVE SKILLS OF RECEIVING AND THE PSYCHO-MOTOR SKILLS OF DEVELOPING PRECISION:**

**Why do the numbers not match?**

Split participants into two groups.

*Group 1* will concern itself with displaced people tracked by the IOM's DTM. For example: As of October 2020, DTM tracked a displaced population of 25,064,734 million people. Quoting the IDMC as their source, the DTM also shows a population displaced by conflict and violence as of December 2019 of 37,564,555 million people (IOM DTM, 2020).

*Group 2* will concern itself with forcibly displaced persons and look into data the UN Refugee Agency provides: 79.5 million forcibly displaced people worldwide at the end of 2019 (UNHCR, 2020b).

Both groups will first update the numbers mentioned above so they work with the most recent material. They will then research what the numbers tell us, using the sources provided above:

- What was the purpose and scope of the data collection exercise?
- Which timeline was covered?
- How were data collected (e.g., were field monitors included or media reports)?

The information on the people that are represented in those numbers may include:

- The characteristics of the people on the move, e.g. their demographic profile as in age, sex, economic situation, educational attainment etc.
- Whether they were travelling alone or with family members.
- The groups of people that were counted, e.g. refugees, labour migrants, unaccompanied and separated children, women, victims of trafficking or people from certain countries of origin or people heading for certain destinations or using certain migration corridors etc.
- Their protection risks.

A short power point presentation should be produced to shed light on the stories these numbers tell. Discussing the two presentations, participants will explore why the numbers of displaced people provided by one international organization (IOM) do not match the numbers of forcibly displaced people that another international organization (UNHCR) publishes.

When discussing definitions in the next section, it will become obvious that the field still very much lacks a common definition on a key term – migrants – which subsequently impedes data comparison and analysis.

When preparing for country case studies, mandated sources are also available with relevant, time-bound, country-specific and globally consistent data. In addition to the aforementioned sources, the following can be relevant: UNdata (2020), the UNDP Human Development Reports (HDR; UNDP, n.d.; UNDP, 2019), UNESCO with education data (UNESCO & UIS, 2020), to mention just a few. Some think tanks provide analyses of data, for instance on demographic change and sustainable development (Berlin Institute for Population and Development, 2020), religious affiliation (Pew Research Center & John Templeton Foundation, 2016) and many others. Keeping in mind that maps “like speeches and paintings, are authored collections of information, subject to distortion” (Monmonier, 2018), this handbook recommends where possible to consult the UN Geospatial Information Section (2019).

### **Key terms – distinguishing migrants and refugees**

The two key terms in this debate are migrants and refugees plus the special case of Palestinian refugees that will not be further detailed at this point for matters of clarity of the two key terms. The following reflections aim at comprehending the two terms by highlighting the differences between migrants and refugees. Note that when we look at differences, the rights of all groups are always acknowledged. While refugees are protected by international law, migrants also have rights albeit not as far reaching (see below).

Refugees are persecuted in their home country and are therefore *forced* to flee. While a government usually guarantees the basic human rights and physical security of its citizens, refugees, by definition, are not protected by their governments; the international community steps in to ensure the individual’s rights and physical safety. As refugees cannot be protected in their home country, they are granted protection by international law. Migrants, on the other hand, can be protected in their home country (Cherem, 2016, p. 190). The centrepiece of international refugee protection remains the United Nations (UN) Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, the so-called “Refugee Convention”, also known as the “Geneva Convention”<sup>4</sup>; it was adopted in 1951, and modified by the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, the so-called “Refugee Protocol” (UNHCR, 2010; for specific African situations<sup>5</sup> see Module 9). A refugee, according to the Refugee Convention’s Article 1 A. (2) is a person who,

4 The Refugee Convention was adopted by the United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons, held at Geneva in July 1951.

5 Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, adopted on 10 September 1969 by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government; entered into force on 20 June 1974 (OAU, 1969).

“owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it” (UNHCR, 2010, p. 14).

People fleeing from armed conflicts and war are explicitly covered by this definition, as the UNHCR has clarified (UNHCR, 2016c). The Refugee Convention not only defines the term “refugee” but it also establishes the rights of refugees under international law. The most important right granted to refugees under the Convention is the right not to be returned to the country where their lives or freedoms are threatened; this is known as the principle of non-refoulement. “States may not, in any circumstances, return a person who is a refugee or claims to be a refugee to the country from which she or he is fleeing” (Grech, 2014, p. 41). Besides non-refoulement, protection comprises membership in a new state. Refugees should receive at least the same rights and basic help as any other foreigner who is a legal resident – including freedom of expression and freedom from degrading treatment – and the same economic and social rights including access to medical care, schooling and the right to work. For humanitarian reasons, states should allow a spouse or dependent children to join people to whom temporary refuge or asylum has been granted (Cherem, 2016, pp. 184-187; Grech, 2014, p. 191).

States have an obligation to cooperate with the UNHCR, which is mandated to provide this protection to refugees in camps, in any private housing arrangements, in transit and by returning home (“repatriation”<sup>6</sup>). In addition to refugees, UNHCR is responsible for other “persons of concern” who face grave protection risks and therefore may expect the protection of this UN refugee agency (UNHCR, n.d.a; UNHCR, 2019, p. 63):

- Asylum seekers: Individuals who have sought international protection and whose claims for refugee status have not yet been determined.
- Internally displaced people (IDPs): People who have been forced to leave their homes but who have not crossed an international border; their reasons to leave their homes may be armed conflict, generalized violence, human rights violations, disasters (e.g. floods) etc.
- Stateless people: People who are not considered as nationals by any state.
- Additional groups comprise returned refugees, returned IDPs, and other groups of concern to UNHCR.

Migrants are not as clearly defined, and their rights are not as far reaching. UNDESA has put considerable effort into trying to harmonize the many different approaches to define migrants, resulting in this definition from 1998, according to which a long-term *international* migrant is:

6 For definition of repatriation, see glossaries recommended by this handbook: EMN (2018); IOM (2019a).

“[a] person who moves to a country other than that of his or her usual residence for a period of at least a year (12 months) so that the country of destination effectively becomes his or her new country of usual residence”<sup>7</sup> (UNDESA, 1998, Box 1, p. 10).

This definition of international migrants is based on the concept of a country of usual residence which is not necessarily a migrant’s country of birth or where she or he holds citizenship. This is an important distinction in order to understand that for example a migrant from Cameroon who resided in France for over 12 months, and who then emigrates from France to Morocco will now be counted as an emigrant from France, and her or his previous emigration from the native country Cameroon is not counted at this point, although it may still be relevant to the person’s status in the second country. International migrants comprise both groups, those who depart from a country – emigrants – and those who cross a border and come into another country – immigrants (EMN, 2018; IOM, 2019a). Maybe contrary to conventional wisdom, this distinction is explained by the objective of the UN definition to facilitate international migration statistics. More complexities are implicated here, for instance the change of the migrant’s legal status when she or he passes from the sovereignty and protection of one state to that of another. “Citizenship is a particularly important concept in international migration” (Bilsborrow, 2016, p. 114) as it determines who is subject to immigration control and who is under the protection of the state – immigrants may have fewer legal rights than citizens. To make things even more complex for journalistic practice, the definition of an international migrant by UNDESA not only comprises legal migrants but also asylum seekers and those who attempt to cross borders without valid documents (passports, visa) – irregular migrants – or who stay on after their visa expired, so-called overstayers<sup>8</sup> (Bilsborrow, 2016).

Attempts to make the statistical definition of international migrants “more operational” (UNDESA, 2006, p. 4, para A.2) are reflected in the Global Compact for Migration recognizing the need to further develop the statistical definition of an international migrant including “a set of standards to measure migrant stocks and flows, and documenting migration patterns and trends, characteristics of migrants, as well as drivers and impacts of migration” (UNGA, 2018, pp. 7-8, para 17).

In the context of rights, the difference between migrants and refugees is clearly regulated by international law: Refugees are defined under international and regional refugee law, and the international community has legal obligations towards them – the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol

7 Those staying three months to less than twelve months are seen as short-term international migrants (UNDESA, 1998, p. 10, Box 1).

8 Definition of overstayers: see glossaries recommended herein EMN (2018); IOM (2019a). For migrants who do not have the required legal documents (e.g. visa) to enter and/or stay in a foreign country, terms such as clandestine, illegal, unauthorized, undocumented and irregular are common. The European Commission has used in its legislation the phrase third-country national found to be *illegally present* or *illegally staying*. The Council of Europe differentiates between *illegal migration* and *irregular migrant* – illegal is preferred when referring to a status or process, and irregular when referring to a person. The UN recognized that the term illegal should not be used to define migrants in an irregular situation. The term irregular is preferable to illegal because the latter carries a criminal connotation, is against migrants’ dignity and undermines the respect of the human rights of migrants (EMN, 2018; IOM, 2019a).

determine the obligations of signatory states. These and other legal texts, such as the 1969 African Refugee Convention (OAU, 1969; see Module 9) have “permeated into countless other international, regional, and national laws and practices” (UNHCR, 2016b). “While there is a single, legally binding convention to govern the treatment of refugees, [...] there is no one binding foundational document compelling governments to uphold the rights of all migrants” (Ferris & Martin, 2019). However, both migrants and refugees have rights by virtue of their humanity. They are entitled to universal human rights and fundamental freedoms, which protects them from racist and xenophobic violence, exploitation, forced labour etc. (Amnesty International, n.d.; Migration Data Portal, 2020c). The rights of migrants are granted mainly by human rights law, and also through treaties from other branches of international public law, for instance labour law, humanitarian law, transnational criminal law, especially treaties relating to human trafficking and smuggling (Migration Data Portal, 2020c). Migrants are a heterogeneous group faced with many vulnerabilities that women are exposed to, girls, men and boys but also people with special needs, the elderly, members of the LGBTI community<sup>9</sup>; a broad variety of factors may push them away from home and into new places inside their home country (IDPs) or beyond borders (see Module 3). When migrants and refugees arrive at the border of a transit or destination country, they face the nation state’s sovereign right to determine its immigration policy in conformity with international law. This has been reaffirmed in the Compact for Migrants and in the Compact on Refugees. It is the right of each state to determine its national migration policy, border management policies, and to govern migration within its jurisdiction. States may distinguish between regular and irregular migration status, taking into account different national realities, policies, priorities and requirements for entry, residence and work. The local integration of refugees has also been confirmed as the sovereign decision of a state. The decision of a state must be guided by human rights principles, international law and treaty obligations. This means for migrants and refugees that they will meet different immigration situations across countries (UNHCR, 2018b, p. 1, para 2; p. 7, para 33; p. 17, para 86; p. 19, para 97; UNGA, 2018, p. 5, para 15(c); p. 20, para 27).

Apart from the statistical approach to a definition of international migrants (see UN definition of 1998) and the legal definition of refugees (see Refugee Convention), the question of who is a migrant is still under debate (Anderson & Blinder, 2017; Crawley & Skleparis, 2017; Long, 2013; Zetter, 2007). Institutions vary considerably in whom they want to view as a migrant. Three ways shall be introduced, the ones suggested by the UNHCR, the IOM and a media outlet, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). Recalling that the UNHCR is mandated to secure the protection needs of its “persons of concern” – including refugees, asylum seekers and IDPs –, this refugee agency of the UN explains:

“There are important differences between the terms ‘migrant’ and ‘refugee’, which cannot be used interchangeably. Refugees are outside their own country because of a threat to their lives or freedom. They are defined and protected by a specific international legal framework. The term ‘migrant’, on the other hand, is not defined under international law, and is sometimes used

9 Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Intersex (LGBTI).

differently by different stakeholders. Traditionally, the word ‘migrant’ has been used to designate people who move by choice rather than to escape conflict or persecution, usually across an international border, [...] for instance to join family members already abroad, to search for a livelihood, or for a range of other purposes” (UNHCR, 2018a).

Accordingly, the UN expert group on refugee and IDP statistics identifies

“a need to more effectively differentiate, conceptually, between international migrants and refugees. [...] A refugee] legally, protection-wise, as well as statistically, [...] is not adequately covered under the term “migrant” and in some situations, refugees are clearly not migrants at all (for example, most Palestine refugees)” (UN Statistical Commission, 2018, p. 7, para 25).



**SUGGESTION FOR PARTICIPANTS TO ADDRESS THE COGNITIVE SKILLS OF APPLYING:**

Invite your class – after the introduction of differentiation between migrants and refugees – to:

- Group 1’s role of playing migrants,
- Group 2’s role of playing refugees.

Each group will empathize with people on the move, exploring if and how migrants and refugees may have specific characteristics, challenges and opportunities, for instance:

Migrants may	Refugees must
Choose to leave home (“voluntarily”).	Leave home because they are “persecuted”. Hence, they are “forcibly displaced”.
Migrants may assume they will be protected by their governments which guarantee the basic human rights and physical security of their citizens.	Refugees must assume their governments will no longer protect them.
Before leaving from home, migrants may gather important documents (passports, ID cards), educational certificates and employment history etc.	Refugees must quickly grab what is available at the moment of fleeing from home.
Migrants may send money home (remittances), being a bread winner from afar.	Refugees must struggle to stay in touch with their families in order not to risk the safety and welfare of those at home.
Etc.	Etc.

Extend the grid by adding defining moments to structure a discussion of the two groups’ experiences; try to follow a tentative chronology of the individual’s preparation, the decision, the departure, the transit, the arrival in the destination country, the life in the new place, and include the individual’s rights.

The IOM now works with an umbrella definition of migrants that includes refugees as well all other people who move away from their usual residence, “whether within a country or across an international border, temporarily or permanently, and for a variety of reasons”. IOM explicitly includes people who flee either wars or persecution, e.g. refugees (IOM, 2019a, pp.132-133). The organization has thus made a change from its 2011 definition that stated that the term:

“migrant was usually understood to cover all cases where the decision to migrate was taken freely by the individual concerned for reasons of “personal convenience” and without intervention of an external compelling factor; it therefore applied to people, and family members, moving to another country or region to better their material or social conditions and improve the prospect for themselves or their family” (IOM, 2011, p. 61).

In addition to the statistical and/or legal definitions of international migrants and refugees, certain media have come up with their own. The BBC decided to use an entirely different definition by adding the element of asylum claims, and assumes migrants to be:

“all people on the move who have yet to complete the legal process of claiming asylum. This group includes people fleeing war-torn countries such as Syria who are likely to be granted refugee status, as well as people who are seeking jobs and better lives, who governments are likely to rule are economic migrants” (The BBC News, 2016).

The Guardian newspaper invited readers to debate whether the term “illegal immigrant” should be replaced by “immigrant who is accused of entering the country illegally” and concluded that this may be the best option, “[c]lumsy though it may sound” (Elliott, 2014).



#### SUGGESTION FOR AN EXERCISE TO ADDRESS THE COGNITIVE SKILLS OF APPLYING AND THE AFFECTIVE SKILLS OF RESPONDING:

Invite participants to prepare short papers (two pages) on how to define the two key terms migrants and refugees. The papers should address the following questions and conclude with recommendations:

1. How do you define migrants? How do you define refugees? Why?
2. Which term or terms do you recommend for your journalistic practice and how do you suggest defining it/them?

The terminology in the official language of your home country and especially in local and ethnic languages might add interesting layers to our discussion. Share and post on the project portal [www.mediaandmigration.com](http://www.mediaandmigration.com).

Many more terms are used in the debate on migration and forced displacement – clandestine, illegal/irregular/undocumented versus legal migrants, circular migration, repatriation, returned migrants, returned refugees or returned IDPs, asylum seekers and IDPs. The concept of mixed movements of migrants and refugees points to the fact that migrants and refugees are often moving on the same routes, in the same group, facing the same hardships, aiming for the same destination – often even for the same reasons but using different labels (Crawley & Skleparis, 2017).

This handbook advises users to consult academic works before adopting terminology. There are encyclopedias, although these are often contingent on subscriptions (Oxford Research Encyclopedias, 2019) which requires funding, not easily available for many classrooms and newsrooms across the globe. Therefore, three institutional glossaries – all are open access – offer a first access point to navigate the terms: Firstly, the glossary “Asylum and Migration”, published by the European Migration Network (EMN), makes an effort to present different contexts, and translates the terms in 22 languages. The glossary’s title hints at the publisher’s focus on asylum and migration (EMN, 2018) – a perspective that the BBC also favours (see above). Secondly, UNHCR’s glossary refers to the agency’s persons of concern (UNHCR, n.d.a). Thirdly, we recommend the IOM’s Glossary on Migration (IOM, 2019a). These glossaries are best used in parallel in order to recognize the institutions’ vantage points. Academic or institutional glossaries from Africa or Asia are not easily available, but a South African journalistic glossary exists while mainly referencing the IOM (Chiumia, 2016).

In the assortment of definitions, a decision about the right term to use is difficult. Scholars reveal the depth of the interdisciplinary issue. The media requires short words that are accurate, connect to their recipients, are easily understood, and attract attention. International statistics need to provide evidence for policy formulation. Institutions follow their mandates. This handbook looks at migrants and refugees as distinct groups of people on the move or on the run. Both groups have rights as outlined above. The perspective rests on the situation in the countries of origin, where refugees are not protected by their government: They are in dire need of protection abroad. Migrants remain under the protection of their governments. Those who are mandated to safeguard and assist them – including their governments, agents of international development cooperation, NGOs etc. – may reach the potential migrants in their home country with specific programmes and projects. Viewed from the perspective of the country of destination suggests that countries that have signed the 1951 Convention are obliged to protect refugees on their territory and treat them according to internationally recognized standards. Overall, nation states have a sovereign right to determine their immigration policies in conformity with international law, and they may distinguish between asylum seekers, regular and irregular migration status (as is reaffirmed by the Global Compact for Migration and the Global Compact on Refugees, see above).

This handbook therefore generally refers to migrants and refugees and issues of migration and forced displacement. It also recognizes other groups such as stateless people or IDPs and refers to

mixed movements of migrants and refugees if the contexts suggests this for clarity. We emphasize that all people on the move or on the run have rights, albeit different ones. We further underline that journalism should always unpack the categories of persons involved in any statistical system being cited, to avoid inadvertent connotations and assumptions.

The terms Global North and Global South are widely used in academia (Kloß, 2017). The media also like them, in both hemispheres (Glennie, 2016; Kelegama, 2014; The New Humanitarian, 2012). They are reminiscent of the North-South Commission chaired by Willy Brandt that popularized the term, appealing for South-North-cooperation for peace and development, fighting “[w]aste and corruption, oppression and violence [...], the outburst of fanaticism, the misery of millions of refugees, or other violations of human rights which harm the cause of justice and solidarity, at home and abroad” (Schmidt, 2018, p. 7). Over time, challenges changed and solutions were adjusted, and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs; UN, n.d.a) now attempt to address these burning issues. For some observers, splitting the world into a southern and a northern part does not offer a constructive way to collaborative problem solving. In the advice of Toshkov (2018): “‘Global South’ is a terrible term. Don’t use it!”. This handbook understands the terms Global South and Global North as a heuristic for journalism. However, for meaningful classifications, we opt for those used in the annual Human Development Reports (HDRs) that identify human development with the three dimensions (1) to live a long, healthy and creative life, (2) to be knowledgeable and (3) to have access to resources needed for a decent standard of living. The HDR schema categorises countries’ human development as: very high, high, medium and low (UNDP, 2019). The international community has developed and is operating with more classifications, all of which this handbook supports, and each of which is best used in its appropriate context (UNDESA, n.d.):

- Geographic regions: countries grouped geographically into six major areas designated as Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, Northern America, and Oceania.
- UN development groups (the designations “more developed” and “less developed” are for statistical purposes and do not represent judgments about the development process):
  - ▶ More developed regions include Europe, Northern America, Australia/New Zealand, and Japan.
  - ▶ Less developed regions comprise all regions of Africa, Asia (except Japan), Latin America and the Caribbean plus Melanesia, Micronesia and Polynesia.
  - ▶ Least developed countries include now 47 countries, most (32) in sub-Saharan Africa.
  - ▶ Landlocked Developing Countries (LLDCs) comprise 32 countries.
  - ▶ Small Island Developing States (SIDS) comprise 58 states.
- The World Bank groups income economies as: low income, lower-middle income, upper-middle income, high income (World Bank, 2020).
- SDG regions: countries and areas are grouped into 8 SDG regions: (1) Sub-Saharan Africa, (2) Northern Africa and Western Asia, (3) Central and Southern Asia (4) Eastern and South-Eastern Asia, (5) Latin America and the Caribbean, (6) Oceania, (7) Europe, (8) Northern America.

## Selected key actors

Who are the actors? Translated from the language of the classroom into the language of the news-room: Are actors people? Frey (1985) explains that in the most general designation, actors are participants in political life, in their many different roles.

Traditionally, nation states have been viewed as major players regarding policies on migration and forced displacement. They retain important rights despite their membership in supranational organisations such as the European Union (EU) or the African Union (AU). EU member states, for instance, hold the right to admit or exclude people coming from non-EU countries to seek work, and a common policy on asylum is still only an “aim” to be developed (Ong’ayo, 2013; Schmid-Drüner, 2019; Sokolska, 2020).

Internationally, migration governance is guided by the SDGs: In SDG 10, target 10.7, the UN member states commit to facilitate the “orderly, safe, and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies” (UN, n.d.b). Which actors actually lead on policymaking is one question that guides the IOM’s Migration Governance Indicators (MGI), currently available for around 50 countries (Migration Data Portal, 2020b). IOM, just as other international stakeholders like the UNHCR or the UNRWA, is also a key actor (BpB, 2016), and non-state actors assume an increasingly important role.

Just as matters of migration and forced displacement have become highly political and relevant, so too have the international networks of actors become numerous, complex and highly interconnected. UNHCR, for instance, holds annual consultations with NGOs (UNHCR, 2020a), and reports collaboration with over 900 partners, and to disburse about 40% of its annual expenditure within this group (UNHCR, n.d.b). Recipients of funds are, for instance, large international non-governmental organizations with long and successful track records in project implementation like Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), CARE, Caritas, Save the Children and the International Rescue Committee (IRC), as well as local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) like National Red Cross and Red



### SUGGESTION FOR AN EXERCISE TO ADDRESS THE COGNITIVE SKILLS OF ANALYSING:

Invite participants to watch the Deutsche Welle (DW) news report of 05:20 minutes “Ceuta fence: Africa’s Spanish enclave lures desperate migrants” (DW, 2018), and derive a list of people and institutions that are considered to be key actors in the field of migration and forced displacement, internationally and particularly in your home country.

You find the link on <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w6h5X86KhCo>

Crescent Committees. They provide health care, food, secure the right of asylum, place children in school, integrate migrants and refugees, train journalists, build the capacity of local communities in community-based media projects, etc. These NGOs not only implement projects but also impact policies. For instance 200 NGOs and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) were present at the milestone high-level plenary of the UN General Assembly on addressing large movements of migrants and refugees in September 2016, 10% of which were African<sup>10</sup> (UNGA, n.d.). CSOs of all sorts have emerged, including from cities, local communities and regions (Caponio, 2019; Lausevic, 2018), the diaspora, the private sector, and groups of individuals (women, youth). Köngeter & Smith (2015) posit:

“Migration can no longer be conceptualized only in terms of nation-state policies, such as assimilation, integration, or multiculturalism. In fact, migrants do maintain ties, build up networks, and construct transnational social fields across national boundaries [...] Migrants are no longer conceptualized as victims of economic globalization or neoliberal governmentality, but are instead perceived as transnational actors in a world characterized by social inequalities and power relations” (Köngeter & Smith, 2015, pp. 1-2).

Journalists, with their different professional roles, shaped by their media systems (Hallin & Mancini, 2004; Hallin & Mancini, 2012; Hanitzsch et al., 2019) and guided by the mission and values of their media outlets, are another set of key actors in the debate. The media impacts how people think, act and react, how policies are formulated and reformed, and how migrants and asylum seekers make their decisions. A considerable stock of studies has explored the media’s impact (for instance Allen et al., 2017; Allen & Blinder, 2013), as further detailed in later modules of this handbook (see Module 5). Sometimes, two key actors merge, e.g., when migrants or refugees become journalists (Womack & Meier, 2018; Wüllner & Spies, 2019).

Another group of key actors shaping the discourse are researchers, organized in networks, research centres, publication outlets, academic programmes etc; interdisciplinary research fields are firmly established, and the IOM points to the “largest ever academic output produced” (IOM, 2019b, p. 4, pp. 125-126). There are few universities without an institutional recognition of migration and refugee studies (Yalaz & Zapata-Barrero, 2018).<sup>11</sup>

<sup>10</sup> After 2015 with the large migratory movement into Europe, new NGOs mushroomed in support of migrants. Jong and Ataç (2017) analysed refugee organizations that newly emerged in Austria after 2015, suggesting that a “new type” surfaced: highly critical of the established system, inspired by personalized relationships with refugees, combining service delivery with political demands. For all, established or new, funding is a concern, and the big names with their proven track record take the lion’s share. Local NGOs lament discrimination (Redvers, 2017).

<sup>11</sup> Academic journals in the field are well established, in migration for instance the journals: *International Migration* (since 1961), *International Migration Review* (1964), *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* (JEMS, since 1998), *Migration Studies* (since 2013). While these journals carry the term ‘migration’, they publish all types of migration, contrary to the *Journal of Refugee Studies* (since 1988) that focuses on forced displacement (Vargas-Silva, 2015). The Research Guides of the United Nations library in Geneva leads to a variety of international research centres on refugees (United Nations Library and Archives, 2019). The EU supports research on migration through its Research Framework Programme, and the programme Horizon 2020 (2014-2020) offered “unprecedented mobilization of public resources to tackle the migration challenge” (King & Lulle, 2016). In sub-Saharan Africa, research is for instance carried out at Witwatersrand University’s African Center for Migration and Society (ACMS) in Johannesburg, South Africa, focusing particularly on Southern Africa (Wits University, 2019). In North Africa, the Center for Migration and Refugee Studies at the American University in Cairo is a key academic actor (American University of Cairo, n.d.).

Not to be overlooked, the people's drive to move to other places has created a migration industry resembling a large international business, with growing commercialization; some are legal, others criminal and even inhumane, some bring pennies, others fortunes. Beneficiaries are local taxi drivers who squeeze far too many migrants with inflated charges into their cars, police demanding bribes, labour immigration agencies who receive fees for brokerage (at times for dubious assignments and at times banned by governments as in Uganda), multinational companies managing detention centres or establishing border security. The big business includes organized criminal networks profiteering from human smuggling and trafficking (Gammeltoft-Hansen & Nyberg Sorensen, 2012). As surprising as it may be to some: To view migrants and refugees as key actors seems to be a novel notion, which Fengler et al. (2020) have analysed in their study on how the matters were reported on both sides of the Mediterranean (see Module 4).



**SUGGESTION FOR AN EXERCISE TO ADDRESS THE COGNITIVE SKILLS OF APPLYING, THE AFFECTIVE SKILLS OF RESPONDING AND THE PSYCHOMOTOR SKILLS OF DEVELOPING PRECISION:**

To sum up the notion of this module with its data sources, key terms and key actors, invite participants to prepare a short report that could be published in a national newspaper (at least 2,000 characters), outlining the country profile and the migration profile of a country of choice, using the Migration Data Portal (Migration Data Portal, 2020d), for instance answering these questions:

**1. Country profile**

For the country profile (e.g. Cameroon), use data from the Migration Data Portal and from UNData, the Human Development Reports, UNHCR, UN Geospatial Information Section, think tanks like the Berlin Institute for Population and Development, the Pew Research Center or other sources introduced in this module or that comply with the recommendations laid out herein.

**2. Migration profile**

For the migration profile, students may research:

- Immigration and emigration (choose the most recent year):
  - ▶ How many international migrants moved e.g. to Cameroon?
  - ▶ Which are the three largest groups who immigrated e.g. into Cameroon?
  - ▶ How many people emigrated e.g. from Cameroon?
  - ▶ Which were the three preferred destination countries for emigrants e.g. from Cameroon?

- Vulnerability of migrants (choose the most recent year):
  - ▶ How many women were trafficked?
  - ▶ How many children were trafficked?
  - ▶ How many migrants went missing?
  - ▶ How many human rights instruments has the country of origin ratified (say which ones, if possible)?
  
- Forced displacement:
  - ▶ How many refugees does the country host?
  - ▶ How many refugees fled from the country?
  - ▶ How many people were internally displaced by conflict in the country?
  - ▶ How many people were internally displaced by disaster in the country?
  - ▶ How many IDPs did the country host in 2019?

The Migration Data Portal's country pages – some of which offer recent Migration Profile Reports (e.g. for Cameroon from 2009) – provide context.



**SUGGESTED ASSIGNMENT TO ADDRESS THE COGNITIVE SKILLS OF APPLYING AND ANALYSING, THE AFFECTIVE SKILLS OF RESPONDING AND THE PSYCHO-MOTOR SKILLS OF DEVELOPING PRECISION:**

Invite participants to watch the webinar on how to use the Migration Data Portal (Migration Data Portal, 2019b). This 45-minute lecture helps to get started on how to best use the tool. Choose one or more of the following options:

- (A)** Task the participants to research selected numbers from local media reports and cross-check the data, using the Migration Data Portal.
  
- (B)** Assign the participants to write a report for a national newspaper (at least 5,000 characters), elaborating on the Compact on Refugees and its meaning for refugees in your country, the Compact for Migration and its meaning for migrants who leave from your country; participants to include numbers using the Migration Data Portal.
  
- (C)** You might wish to invite an expert (e.g. a member of local IOM office) for a Q&A and practice session to discuss the meaning of different usages of key terms.



**RECOMMENDED READING:**

**Academic:**

Bilsborrow, R. E. (2016). Concepts, definitions and data collection approaches. In M. J. White (Ed.). *International Handbook of Migration and Population Distribution* (6th ed., pp. 109-156). Dordrecht, Heidelberg, New York, London: Springer.

**Journalistic:**

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**Institutional:**

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Bilsborrow, R. E. (2016). Concepts, definitions and data collection approaches. In White, M. J. (Ed.). *International handbook of migration and population distribution* (6th ed., pp. 109-156). Dordrecht, Heidelberg, New York, London: Springer.

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## MODULE 3

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# Context Factors for Migration and Forced Displacement

by Monika Lengauer  
and Susanne Fengler



### MODULE AIMS

- To introduce selected concepts of migration sociology to the analysis of migration movements.
- To initiate a discussion about the push and pull factors driving people to migrate or flee.
- To facilitate the in-depth understanding of selected context factors.



### LEARNING OUTCOMES

At the end of this module, participants should be able:

- To recognize the relevance of context factors for reporting matters of migration and forced displacement. → **Affective LO: Receiving**
- To explain the theory and base their research on a body of academic literature. → **Cognitive LO: Understanding**
- To identify context factors for migrants and refugees and describe that the two groups are sometimes in mixed flows. → **Cognitive LO: Understanding**
- To contextualize push and pull factors adequately by presenting them in journalistic work. → **Cognitive LO: Applying**

## Outline

Many factors may impact the move of migrants and refugees from home, of which some are political, social, gender-related, economic, ethnic, cultural, religious etc. Sociologists of migration and forced displacement<sup>1</sup> distinguish between push and pull factors, jointly also known as context factors. Push factors drive people away from home. Migrants are obliged to leave home and/or decide voluntarily to depart whereas refugees are forced to flee from war or persecution in their home country (see Module 2). Pull factors are the incentives that draw people into destination countries. This module builds upon selected concepts of the sociology of migration. It provides an overview of key push and pull factors that uproot migrants or refugees, and here we highlight when migrants and respectively refugees in particular are related to. Some of these factors will be elaborated further in the country case studies (Modules 6-8), the perspectives from Africa (Module 9) and global perspectives (the MENA region, Asia, the Americas and the Russian Federation – see the project portal [www.mediaandmigration.com](http://www.mediaandmigration.com)).

## Scholarship

Migration is an essential feature of human life, and people have migrated ever since the first human beings made their way out of Central Africa to other continents. In the history of humankind, people have always been on the move, either voluntarily or forced (Bellwood, 2013). Nonetheless, they

<sup>1</sup> For definition of forced displacement, migrants and refugees see Module 2 and the recommended glossaries: (UNHCR, n.d.; EMN, 2018; IOM 2019a)

were often seen as aliens (IOM, 2019a, p. 6).<sup>2</sup> Until the 20th century, refugees were not an issue on the international agenda; before World War I, they were treated in accordance with national laws as aliens, and no international policy addressed the specific situation of refugees. World War I (1914-1918) uprooted millions of Europeans, many of whom had to seek shelter in foreign countries. The 1933 Convention Relating to the International Status of Refugees was the first legally binding treaty (Kugelman, 2010, para pp. 18-19). As a model instrument, it also dealt with travel documents, personal status, employment, social rights, education, expulsion etc. Forced displacement, human trafficking and slavery in Africa, however, remained non-issues on the international stage until the 1960s. Under imperial and colonial expansion, large population movements of would-be settlers took place, with scant regard for pre-existing lives, cultures, languages, and property holdings and little analysis of this impact.

Scholarship on migration started in the late 19th and early 20th century (Aigner, 2017). According to initial analyses of migration flows by German-British scientist Ravenstein (1876; 1885; 1889), migrants seek to improve their living conditions, especially materially. In the historical context of mass migration from Europe to America in the late 19th century, more than 60 million Germans, Swedes, Irish, Italians, Poles, and many other Europeans migrated to North and South America in search for a better life. Migration theories of the early 20th century focused on the integration of immigrants, perceived as strangers, into the distinctively different cultures of host societies (e.g. Park, 1928). While the immigrant was described as asking for acceptance, host societies were described as seeking loyalty from the immigrant. The process of immigration was modelled as a set of stages migrants were passing through, which also include phases of competition between migrants and host societies, and conflict. Early scholars emphasized the objective of the migrants' full assimilation into the destination society, while ensuing studies also take into account the impact of the migrants' culture on the culture of receiving societies, stressing pluralism and multiculturalism. Also, different ethnic groups were found to have different modes and capabilities of coping with assimilation (e.g. Eisenstadt, 1953).

Only in the mid-20th century did the scholarly focus turn to migrants and their actual motives. Insecurity and perceived deficits in the countries of origin drive people to migrate, in the hope to overcome these deficiencies in the act of migration; but new insecurities emerge upon arrival in destination countries. Different motives impact the decisions of migrants. An important contribution to the debate was made by Lee's model of push and pull factors (1966). As a first systematic attempt to analyse factors impacting migration decisions, Lee distinguished between economic, social, political, religious, personal/family-related and environmental push factors: Lack of jobs, armed conflicts, religious intolerance, famine, and droughts are just a few of the factors pushing those people who can find the resources to make a migration decision and depart from home. Push factors work independently, interdependently or along with pull factors: People migrate to destination countries seeking security, political and other liberties, education, and employment in labour markets that are in

<sup>2</sup> For definition of aliens, see the glossaries recommended in Module 2: (EMN, 2018; IOM, 2019a).

need of (high and low skilled) workers. Research has progressively incorporated cultural and social aspects of migration. Research has positioned the study of migration into a global context, emphasized ethnic and cultural pluralism of immigration (e.g. Glazer & Moynihan, 1963) and highlighted the tensions raised by imbalances between societies, fueling a desire to migrate among members of societies perceived as less powerful and prestigious (e.g. Hoffmann-Nowotny, 1970). In a global society, international migration can be a vehicle for upward social mobility, and beneficial for crowded labour markets in countries of origin on the one side, and destination countries in need of labour on the other side (Sassen, 2007). While brain drain may initially weaken sending societies and brain gain benefit receiving societies, circular migration<sup>3</sup> may benefit the sending countries where migrants return to home (Constant, 2020, p. 5). Origin countries and destination countries are often connected by historical (colonial) patterns, cultural and ethnic ties, traditional trade relationships, language, religion etc.; together, they form a system of migration, interconnected by financial transactions (remittances) and communication (see sections below). Contacts between members of the sending societies and their compatriots residing abroad in the diaspora may lead to more migration, further facilitated by shrinking distances due to technological achievements (Douglas et al., 1994). The internet and social media enable international migrants to remain closely connected to their networks in countries of origin, reinforcing cases of hybrid identities (Dekker & Engbersen, 2014).



#### **SUGGESTION FOR AN EXERCISE TO ADDRESS THE COGNITIVE SKILLS OF APPLYING AND THE AFFECTIVE SKILLS OF RECEIVING:**

Participants should focus on their home country and write a 4,000 word-story for the campus media around the research question: What is the history of immigration and emigration in our home country?

- Research at least two academic articles or books on your country's history of migration.
- Describe your country as a place of immigrants and emigrants. In order to collect the necessary data, use the country page of the Migration Data Portal (2020d).
- Make sure to define international migrants both as immigrants and emigrants.
- Interview a local person with experiences as a migrant and weigh her or his experience against the academic literature and the data you collected.

Note: Should students not have so far studied the ethics of reporting, they may not be well prepared to interview migrants. In this case the interviews may be replaced by research of testimonials in the local media/NGOs or by interviewing a representative of a local NGO that deals with migrants (e.g. the IOM).

3 For definition of "circular migration", see the glossaries recommended in Module 2: IOM (2019a); EMN (2018).

## Migration and development

Another meta-perspective relevant for the discussion about migration is the role of development. Policymakers often find themselves under growing public pressure to fight the root causes of migration. The implicit assumption is that – along with more favourable trade agreements and economic cooperation – increasing development cooperation and foreign aid has an impact on migration: Improvements in living conditions may reduce push factors, which in turn reduces migration (Lanati & Thiele, 2017). However, analyses show that development cooperation has ambiguous effects on migration, even if one does not take into account evidence showing that a relevant part of the official development assistance (ODA) does not reach the people but is soaked up by the elites in many countries by way of corruption (Alesina & Weder, 2002; Asongu, 2012). According to some research, the number of migrants leaving a country grows in parallel with growing income and better education, and only decreases once a country has reached a relatively high Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Hence, according to such research, development – at least initially – coincides with rapid increases in migration rates because social and economic development enables and inspires people to migrate (de Haas, 2007). Taking Zelinsky's (1971) mobility transition theory and the work of Martin & Taylor (1996) as starting points, the impact of development on migration and of migration on development (for instance, through remittances) has been debated for almost fifty years. The buzz word is the “migration hump theory” (Martin & Taylor, 1996).

In line with this thought, development cooperation with low income countries may lead to further migration. Belloc (2011) shows in a survey of 48 sub-Saharan countries that what is often called ‘Overseas Development Assistance’ or ODA “has a positive and statistically significant effect on migration” (Belloc, 2011, p. 187). ODA may stimulate migration as the funds often support the institutions that allow people to build their capacity and thereby find new employment opportunities (educational, business sectors, communication, infrastructure etc.). But “[c]urbing [...] [migration flows] with development policies [in this trajectory] requires triggering unprecedented economic booms in many developing countries” (Dao et al., 2018, p. 32).



### **SUGGESTION FOR AN EXERCISE TO ADDRESS THE COGNITIVE SKILLS OF UNDERSTANDING AND THE AFFECTIVE SKILLS OF RECEIVING:**

Invite the class to listen to the video statement by Eric Chinje, former AMI president (see project portal [www.mediaandmigration.com](http://www.mediaandmigration.com)).


Ask the students to explain the link between migration and development.

North Africa may serve as an example because the majority of people who migrate to Europe originate from North African lower-middle income countries<sup>4</sup>, particularly Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. In general, migrants are not among the poorest in their societies but represent those who have acquired the means to realize a migration decision or have been able to raise the necessary funds in their communities (de Haas, 2010a, p. 239). African migrants in Europe have some assets that facilitate their strenuous and hazardous journey: youth, vigour, some funds and the ability to make money in transit, they have friends in the diaspora and make them en-route, sharing contacts and information, and the extended family at home keeps sending money (see section on networks/diaspora below). The smartphone is everybody’s powerful partner.

### Migration – “good news”, “bad news”?

The media tend to focus on dramatic incidents in the process of migration. According to one of our comparative studies (for further information on the study and the media coverage about the factors, see Module 4), spectacular boat catastrophes in the Mediterranean Sea involving migrants from Africa have dominated migration coverage in African and European media alike (see Figure 7).

**Figure 7: Selected main topics of migration coverage by percentage (%) in African and European media outlets**



Covering Migration in Africa and Europe: Results from a Comparative Analysis of 11 Countries: N=1,321. Field data, 2015/16. Source: Fengler et al., 2020. Own illustration.

4 See Module 2 for background on these country classifications which are explained in UNDESA (n.d.). As of 2020, all North African countries are lower-middle income countries except for Libya which is upper-middle income (Serajuddinada & Hamadeh, 2020).

Many citizens and policymakers in Africa have long been unaware of the often harsh, and in many occasions inhumane conditions migrants face while being in transit. It was a report by Cable News Network (CNN) about Africans being treated like slaves in Libyan camps which prompted public responses by African leaders during an African Union summit (see Module 5). The media in many African countries also picked up stories about violence in South Africa against migrants from other African countries (Bornman & Cronjé, 2020), especially when compatriots were targeted. Human rights violations and crime against African migrants in the Gulf are still underreported (Best, 2019; Thorogood, 2019).

The media needs to report dramatic incidents like those described above but they don't have to stop there, because beyond the catastrophe, there are stories that provide the public with a broader perspective: What has driven the victims out of their country? What circumstances and realities do migrants face in destination countries? What happens in transit? Ensuing modules provide inspiration on how to find better news angles to provide the public with relevant facts they need to know, how to cope with ethical dilemmas (see Module 10, Module 11), and how to sell migration stories to editors (see Module 13). Push and pull factors impact individual migration decisions and larger migration movements. However, while these factors of push and pull are valuable background knowledge, they seem not to be newsworthy in their own right. This handbook aims to reveal the many newsworthy stories hidden in background knowledge that are just waiting to be unearthed.

**Chinyere Stella Okunna, Professor at the Department of Mass Communication,  
Nnamdi Azikiwe University, Awka, Anambra State, Nigeria:**

“The media are largely silent on migration issues, or positive in their reporting of migration, in line with public opinion and government policy on migration, except in extremely life-threatening circumstances such as the recent xenophobic attacks in South Africa or the earlier Libyan slave trade scandal. In terms of coverage, the best case is exemplified by the report of the repatriation of Nigerian migrants from South Africa following the recent xenophobic attacks. The human interest report on this matter showed Nigerian returnees demonstrating a high level of patriotism in their emotional chanting of the Nigerian National Anthem when the owner of the Peace Airlines (Mr. Allen Onyema) arrived to welcome the returnees and entered his plane which had brought them home free of charge – causing many of the returnees and Mr. Onyema himself to shed tears of joy and patriotism. Such emotional and patriotic reports could stem the tide of migration out of Nigeria.”



Source: Private.



### SUGGESTION FOR AN EXERCISE TO ADDRESS THE COGNITIVE SKILLS OF APPLYING:

Introduce your students to some testimonials, for instance from the website *I am a migrant* (IOM, 2017). Explain push and/or pull factors that may trigger migrants' decision to leave their home countries. After you have shown how to use testimonials to describe these push/pull factors, invite the class to interpret factors that may have triggered migrants' decision to leave their home countries.

Small teams are tasked to:

- choose one testimonial from the website *I am a migrant* (IOM, 2017);
- search for other testimonials of migrants (on institutional websites, national media or from personal encounters).

### SUGGESTION FOR THE CLASSROOM TO ADDRESS THE COGNITIVE SKILLS OF EVALUATING AND THE AFFECTIVE SKILLS OF RESPONDING:

Ask the class to compile a list of push and pull factors mentioned in these testimonials. Each participant may write a short assessment on the strength of the testimonial, following the questions:

1. Do testimonials help others – for instance yourself – to develop a better understanding of migrants?
2. Do testimonials help migrants to speak out for themselves in your view?
3. Finally, a paragraph will offer some critical thinking on the title “*I am a migrant*”: Does this title support the integration of migrants in their host society or does it rather single them out and stereotype them – should the guiding question rather be *I am not a migrant! I am who I am?*

### Spotlight on push and pull factors for *migrants* and *refugees*

It may be eye-opening for students both from Africa and Europe to take a closer look at push and pull factors, as stereotypes and non-coverage may continue to dominate the perception. For example, European migration coverage has long implied that people leave their home countries because of war or conflict (Berry et al., 2015), which is only true for a relatively small proportion of current cross-

continental mobility (see Module 1, Module 9 and sections on conflict, economy, remittances and climate change below). On the other hand, many Africans are unaware of the actual political, economic, social and personal perspectives that migrants encounter in Europe (Zappe et al., 2019).

A few selected push factors may serve as a starting point for the discussion: Even though the economies of many African countries have experienced relatively high growth rates since 2000, and despite a wealth of natural resources (Devarajan & Fengler, 2013; UNDESA, 2005, pp. 90-93; UNDESA, 2010, pp. 125-127; World Bank, 2020a), poverty is still a reality in many African communities, even in countries with economic growth (Wilhelm, 2020). Climate change exacerbates the risk levels through droughts, sea level rise, floods, unreliability in the duration of the rainy season and other factors (Adenle et al., 2017). While many African countries have experienced profound political transformations (Decalo, 1992; Lynch, 2011), various tensions prevail, and countries like Cameroon, Chad, Mali, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sudan, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (see Module 7) and others have experienced unrest or civil wars (Alcorta et al., 2020; Moscona et al., 2018; Ottoh, 2018). Inadequate public infrastructure is another push factor as many African citizens are dissatisfied with the quality of education, health care and other public services (energy, internet, transport etc.; World Bank, 2017). Remittances are a considerable development factor and a “proven way of sharing prosperity” (World Bank, 2019, p. 15).

In the near future, demographic developments in Africa and Europe will deeply affect push and pull factors and further aggravate the imbalances between continents. The world population continues to grow and is estimated to increase by two billion<sup>5</sup> people between 2020 (7.7 billion) and 2050 (9.7 billion); more than half of that growth will occur in sub-Saharan Africa, projected to become the most populous world region by 2062 (UNDESA, 2019a, p. 6). Population growth, the “unstoppable force” (Dao et al., 2018, p. 11), is a prime determinant of migration. A “highly robust increase in immigration pressures” (Dao et al., 2018, p. 31) is being predicted in general, and to Europe in particular, mostly explained by the demographic changes in sub-Saharan Africa and in some MENA countries (Dao et al., 2018, pp. 31-32). De Haas, however, sends a strong reminder of the fact that people do not migrate “because of” population growth but because of other factors (e.g. a sluggish economic growth, high unemployment) that aggravate the effects of high population density (2010b, p. 12). For example, the high population growth in the oil-rich Gulf states with their rapid economic growth rate is not associated with an increase in emigration rates – but, conversely, the low fertility rates in stagnant economies in Eastern Europe correspond with high emigration rates (de Haas, 2010b, p. 12).

Researching migration and forced displacement from Africa to Europe under the human security paradigm, Giménez-Gómez et al. (2019, p. 1797) recapitulate that a combination of push and pull factors influences the mobility of individuals; “in particular, rising political persecution, [...],

5 Numbers and decimals are rounded in this text, keeping a good balance between accuracy and readability.

human rights violations, political instability and civil conflicts” in addition to ethnic conflicts (Giménez-Gómez et al., 2019, p. 1797). It has been widely acknowledged that singular push/pull factors do not sufficiently explain migration and that people are rarely driven by a single factor. The two levels of push and pull work hand-in-hand, and so do the respective factors, reciprocally influencing the get-up-and-go. Correlations between various factors acting in countries of origin, transit, and destination make it difficult to isolate the role of independent drivers. This makes it sometimes difficult at first sight to see who is a migrant and who is a refugee – for instance, refugees who have fled persecution across borders may be exposed to a secondary displacement following natural disasters like storms, floods or else. The correlations between push and pull factors are well documented, for instance economic opportunities versus (vs) challenges, peace vs conflict, protection vs persecution (Docquier et al., 2014; Hooghe et al., 2008). Multidimensionality also applies when the focus is on push factors only: People whose lives are at risk due to political persecution are often also affected by economic insecurities that jeopardize their livelihoods (Braithwaite et al., 2014; Maastricht University, & GMDAC, 2016; Giménez-Gómez et al., 2017). Hanlon & Christie (2016) see the levels of conflict and instability, coupled with high rates of un- and under-employment, particularly among young people, as a blend of push factors.

Increasing environmental disruptions that reduce people’s resources may also trigger conflict and violence (Raleigh, 2011). Freeman (2017) has researched this correlation for Africa, while Gleick (2014) broke grounds in describing the beginning of the war in Syria as

“the result of complex interrelated factors. The focus of the conflict is regime change, but the triggers include a broad set of religious and sociopolitical factors, the erosion of the economic health of the country, a wave of political reform sweeping over the Middle East [...] challenges associated with climate [change] [...] and the availability and use of freshwater” (Gleick, 2014, p. 331).

Afifi (2011) shows that environmental issues (e.g. droughts, soil degradation, deforestation) significantly aggravate economic insecurity and migration in Niger. Analysing data from 45 sub-Saharan Africa countries between 1965 and 2005, Naudé (2008) points to population growth and environmental pressures, which impact people’s moves through conflict and a lack of employment. Population growth and resource scarcity may trigger conflict over resource security, and increase the pressure to escape (Borderon et al., 2019).

Some context factors stand out – these are particularly economic determinants and conflict as push factors; and peace, respect for human rights and their protection and realization along with better living standards as pull factors. Population growth and communication (journalism, social media, personal communication among migrants as well as with their co-ethnic communities and migratory peers etc.) are cross-cutting context factors of great significance. The ensuing introduction of selected push and pull factors is not intended to be inclusive but it encompasses some

important context factors for migration and forced displacement. For the matter of clarity but in full acknowledgement that they are often mutually dependent, selected context factors are introduced separately.

### Population growth

Recalling that de Haas (2010b, p. 12) cautions against looking at population growth as a stand-alone push factor since people do not migrate “because of” population growth but because of other factors (see above), this section highlights some numbers and context. The global population is estimated to grow by two billion people between 2020 (7.7 billion) and 2050 (9.7 billion)<sup>6</sup>. Of these two billion people, 1.5 billion will be from 22 countries globally of which 12 are sub-Saharan African (UNDESA, 2019a, p. 13, Figure 6). Ten of these 12 sub-Saharan African countries are among the least developed countries (UNDP, 2019b, pp. 2-5)<sup>7</sup>. For instance, in the same timeframe (2020-2050), the population of the Democratic Republic of the Congo is expected to grow from 87 million to almost 200 million, the population of Nigeria is expected to double from 200 million to 400 million, and the population in Tanzania will also double – from 58 million to 129 million; the population of Ethiopia will increase from 112 to 205 million, and Egypt’s population will rise from 100 million to 160 million. As the fastest-growing region in the world, Africa is expected to surpass 2 billion people by 2050, meaning that the population in sub-Saharan Africa is projected to double by then (UNDESA, 2019a, p. 6, Table 1). In 2019, the fertility rate of 36 countries globally was above four births per woman, with 33 sub-Saharan states being part of this group. At 4.6 births per woman, the fertility rate in these countries by far exceeds the global average of 2.5 births per woman (UNDESA, 2019a, p. 23). After 2050, it is expected that Africa will be the only region still experiencing substantial population growth with the number of births increasing despite falling fertility rates (UNDESA, 2019a, p. 24).

While most children are born in Asia, at least in absolute terms, women in sub-Saharan Africa have on average the highest number of children. At the same time, they carry a greater health risk during pregnancy and birth because maternal and infant mortality are higher than anywhere else in the world. Unlike in Africa, the population is shrinking in some countries of Europe and Asia because fewer children are born than are necessary to replace the parents’ generation (Sippel et al., 2011, p. 13).

6 This is according to a medium-variant projection. Note that demographers typically insist that projections are not forecasts, although the UN’s medium variant is commonly used for that purpose. As global population trends are largely driven by fertility, this estimate is also based on the assumption that fertility levels will continue to *decline*. Average lifetime fertility of 2.1 live births per woman is roughly the level required for populations with low mortality to have a growth rate of zero in the long run (UNDESA, 2019a). The replacement level may differ from the average of 2.1 live births per woman (e.g. in Niger it is higher than 3 live births per woman).

7 Nigeria, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Uganda, Niger, Sudan, Mozambique, Madagascar, Ivory Coast are “low human development” countries, two (Angola, Kenya) are “medium human development”. Egypt, not a sub-Saharan African but an African country, is ranked in terms of high human development (UNDP, 2019a, p. 301). Top non-African countries that will account for the population growth by 2050 are mostly Asian (India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Philippines, Bangladesh, Afghanistan) and the USA (UNDESA, 2019a, p. 13, Figure 6).

In particular, the share of young people in the total population in origin countries is often analysed as a significant factor in determining higher emigration rates. UNDESA estimates that the number of international migrants younger than 19 years rose from 29 million in 1990 to 38 million in 2017 (Migration Data Portal, 2020a). Africa has the most youthful population worldwide, which is often celebrated as a “dividend”, and sometimes feared as a “disaster” (Canning et al., 2015). The rapid population growth in Africa poses a conundrum for many African governments. Take education in Nigeria as an example: 16 million people are in the age group for higher education (18 to 22 years) yet the gross enrolment rate in tertiary education was only 10% in 2011 (World Bank & UIS, 2011). Mahabub (2014) explains that the demand for university education grows in line with the population growth but the system does not keep up. The “Demographic Dividend” may only be gained when public policies change with a focus on managing fertility in order to halt or reverse population growth and empower women, leading to smaller family sizes that will allow more investment in health and education per child, a large and well-educated cohort of youth ready for well-paying jobs that have been created in an enabling environment (Canning et al., 2015; Sippel et al., 2011). Some scholars warn of critical stumbling blocks, including governments’ half-hearted political commitments toward rapid fertility decline, the lack of any absorptive capacity of labour markets; discrimination of women and youth; low salaries and poor social protection (Groth et al., 2019). If the demographic dividend is to benefit the growing number of young African people, implementation needs to be instant and tangible. The “roadmap to the demographic dividend” that Sippel et al. (2011) suggest, highlights women’s empowerment, family planning, education, health care, social security, and that there will be “no demographic dividend without jobs” (Sippel et al., 2011, p. 71). For today’s youth in many sub-Saharan African countries, demographic competition severely limits the opportunities. High expectations, when deceived, may be transformed into frustration and produce two possible outcomes: “exit or voice”, that is, migration or protest (Baudassé et al., 2016).

In addition to international migration, population growth also affects internal migration from rural regions to urban locations. By 2050, it is estimated that two thirds of the world’s population will



#### SUGGESTION FOR AN EXERCISE TO ADDRESS THE COGNITIVE SKILLS OF APPLYING:

Invite the class to watch the 4:48 minutes interview with Dr. Reiner Klingholz, former Director of the Berlin Institute for Population and Development, to be accessed on the project portal [www.mediaandmigration.com](http://www.mediaandmigration.com).

Adapt his hypotheses and data to your country or a country of your choice and research the question: How will demographic changes impact migration here? Use the Migration Data Portal to collect country specific data for your argumentation.

live in cities. As urban populations rise, the share of resources for rural populations falls. Electricity, food, water, and housing are redirected to the populous centres. Urbanisation in developing nations is different from urbanisation of most developed nations in that in the former it is not necessarily linked to manufacturing jobs (Beauchemin & Bocquier, 2004; Liddle, 2017; Mountford & Rapoport, 2014; Oucho & Gould, 1993).

## Conflict

Conflict has been identified as a significant underlying cause for people who were *obliged* or forced to leave home<sup>8</sup> (Davenport et al., 2010; Maastricht University, & GDMAC, 2016; Giménez-Gómez et al., 2017; Hayes et al., 2016). Conflict and violence may strike in any form of real or perceived threats, instability, armed conflict, generalized lack of security, political persecution, civil and ethnic conflicts, human rights abuses, intercommunal clashes or indiscriminate attacks on civilians, and it often erupts in times of transition towards a democratic political system (Adebayo, 2012). Examples include the Central African Republic, South Africa and Kenya (Amodio & Chiovelli, 2017; André et al., 2019; Klopp & Zuern, 2007; Vlavourou, 2016), and the two African case studies in this handbook, Cameroon (Mbuagbo & Akoko, 2004) and Guinea-Bissau (Ferreira, 2004). In a literature review on significant pull and push factors driving asylum-related migration (Maastricht University, & GMDAC, 2016), the authors also refer to works by Naudé (2010), Schmeidl (1997), and Moore & Shellman (2004; all cited in: Maastricht University, & GDMAC, 2016, pp. 21-22). Naudé found that in sub-Saharan Africa an additional year of conflict raised mobility by 1.7 per 1,000 inhabitants. Schmeidl proposes that different categories of violence or instability lead to different levels of forced displacement (e.g. generalized violence such as genocide, civil war causes most forced displacements). Moore & Shellman use a global sample of countries with data spanning from 1952 to 1995 to conclude that the greater the threat, the higher the number of people who flee. These various risk categories at home may also correlate to the risks people are willing to accept for their escape (Malakooti, 2015). Displacements decrease when political stability and democratic systems are established, and political and civil rights improve substantially (Giménez-Gómez et al., 2019, p. 1816).

The number of people forcibly displaced due to war, conflict, persecution, human rights violations and events seriously disturbing public order had grown to 79.5 million by the end of 2019. It is the highest number on record and nearly double the 2010 number of 41 million and a significant increase from the 2018 number of 70.8 million. The global refugee population under the mandate of the UN Refugee Agency UNHCR stood at 20.4 million people by the end of 2019 – adding 5.5 million Palestinian refugees under UNRWA's mandate, brings the global total refugee population to almost 26 million. In addition to these refugees – who by definition cross international

<sup>8</sup> For definition of voluntary migration and forced displacement, see the glossaries recommended in Module 2 (UNHCR, n.d.; EMN, 2018; IOM, 2019a).

borders – many more people are being displaced in their home country. These IDPs were estimated at 45.7 million by the end of 2019<sup>9</sup> (UNHCR, 2020b, p. 2-3, p. 8).

The two main groups of people forcibly displaced due to conflict under the mandate of the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) are refugees and IDPs (not including Palestinians in this particular framing). Several major crises contributed to the massive displacement over the past decade, including those in MENA countries (Iraq, Libya, Syria, Yemen), Asia (Afghanistan, Myanmar), Europe (Ukraine), Latin America (Venezuela, Colombia) and Africa (e.g. Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Sahel region, South Sudan; UNHCR, 2020b, p. 6).

By the end of 2019, more than two thirds (68%) of the world's refugees had come from just five countries: Syria, Afghanistan, South Sudan, Myanmar and Somalia, and the majority were hosted by just five countries: Turkey, Colombia, Pakistan, Uganda and Germany. Reviewing the past decade (2000-2019), only Pakistan, Germany and Iran held a position in the top 10 refugee hosting countries at both the beginning and the end of the decade (UNHCR, 2020b, p. 22); only Germany represents a distant destination for most refugees whereas, usually, geographic proximity is an important factor for people fleeing conflict and persecution: Syrians mostly flee to Turkey, Lebanon or Jordan; in sub-Saharan Africa, the number of refugees in the region nearly tripled in the course of the decade. In any given year of the last decade, three-quarters of refugees or more were hosted by countries neighbouring their home country. The proximity element in refugee movements burdens least developed countries disproportionately, including Bangladesh, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Rwanda, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda. Accounting for just 1.2% of the world's Gross Domestic Product (GDP), they had the least resources available to meet the needs of people seeking refuge (UNHCR, 2020b, p. 22). While neighbouring countries host most refugees, asylum seeking claims are submitted mainly in the USA and Europe (UNHCR, 2020b, p. 38; map 4, p. 45).

Widely underreported is another rapidly growing group – the IDPs. Whereas refugees by definition cross international borders to flee from persecution and/or conflict at home, IDPs are being displaced in their home country and remain under the protection of their governments, even if the government is not able or willing to protect them (UNHCR, 2020d).

Their numbers are also at record levels, and they have rapidly outpaced those of refugees. The numbers of IDPs under the protection of UNHCR increased from 6.6 million in 2005 to 15 million in 2010 and over 43.5 million at the end of 2019. For the past decade, UNHCR reports an IDP population under its mandate of 59 million people but warns that “this figure does not constitute the global number” (UNHCR, 2020b, p. 30), and points to 79 million new displacements between

9 For data, see Module 2. A note on data used here: The UNHCR quotes IDMC data for the number of IDPs (UNHCR, 2020b, pp. 2-3, footnote1).

2010 and 2019 recorded by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC). Large IDP populations of concern to UNHCR by the end of 2019 are in Colombia, Yemen, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Sudan, Ethiopia and South Sudan (UNHCR, 2020b, p. 3; map 3, p. 31). “Although forced displacement is a global phenomenon”, the AU’s Commissioner for Political Affairs writes, “it is more pronounced in Africa” (André et al., 2019, p. 7). Conflict and violence are emerging or escalating in many African countries like Cameroon, Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Libya. Many of these conflicts are not new but protracted and long-lasting (UNHCR, 2020b).

A related development concerns those mandated to protect and assist IDP populations: Internal displacement to rural areas was prevalent in the past but increasingly, IDPs move to urban areas. Two out of three IDPs are now in urban or in semi-urban settings according to UNHCR data. This has posed major protection challenges in countries with ongoing conflict in urban areas e.g. Aleppo in Syria, Bangui in the Central African Republic, Tripoli in Libya, or Jijiga in Ethiopia. IDPs live in marginalized and underserved neighbourhoods or informal settlements, among the urban poor, with limited access to safe water, sanitation, education, jobs and else, leaving them highly exposed and vulnerable (André et al., 2019; UNHCR, 2020b).

The figures for displacement associated with conflict and violence call out loudly for urgent action to halt and reverse the trend. Besides political initiatives to support or keep peace, UNHCR pursues three “durable solutions” with voluntary repatriation, local integration, and resettlement. Resettlement is the transfer of refugees to a state that has agreed to admit them and ultimately grant them permanent settlement. The UN Refugee Agency laments that “only a small number of States take part in UNHCR’s resettlement programme”, mainly in Northern America, Australia and Europe (UNHCR, 2020b, p. 2, pp. 48 ff; UNHCR, 2020c).



#### **SUGGESTION FOR AN EXERCISE TO ADDRESS THE COGNITIVE SKILLS OF APPLYING:**

Download a short video – “Who is an IDP?” This video introduces those IDPs under the mandate of the UNHCR (2020d).


Ask the class to use the data sources introduced above (by the UNHCR, and the IDMC) to prepare a 10 minute presentation which describes the IDP movement in your home country (or, if not applicable, in a country of choice).

The leading questions for the presentation are:

1. What numbers of IDPs can be found within this country?
2. Why were they forced to leave home?
3. Can you find disaggregated data by sex and age (women, children, youth)?

## Economic factors

Economic factors have consistently been highlighted as a driving force for migration. Scholars from various theoretical vantage points broadly agree that migration decisions are also shaped by the expected (lifetime) return on the investment (Borjas, 1994; Bryceson, 2019; Sjaastad, 1962). Macro-level developments as in globalization with the demands for cheap labour in manufacturing contexts and highly skilled experts in knowledge societies play a decisive role (Adepoju, 2007). Migrants usually hope for better returns on their skills in the country of destination than in their country of origin. Under economic considerations, one underlying assumption is that people move when the financial benefits from migration are higher than those from staying at home and the return on their labour is higher than the investment pooled by the individual migrant, the extended family and community of “investors”. To this end, employment opportunities and wage differentials are important stimulating factors for migration decisions. The relevance of differences in wages and living standards between the migrants’ countries of origin and destination consistently emerge as significant factors in explaining international migration. The capacity of this factor in precipitating migration, however, fluctuates with the migrants’ profile, for instance between highly skilled and lower skilled people (Kuschminder et al., 2012; Neto & Mullet, 1998; Vogler & Rotte, 2000). The Mixed Migration Monitoring Mechanism or 4M-Initiative shows an overwhelming majority of migrants motivated by economic reasons: 73% of female and 96% of male migrants from West Africa interviewed in Mali and Niger in April 2018 (total of 311 in-depth interviews) mentioned economic reasons for their migration, followed by personal or family reasons, violence, lack of services, and persecution (4Mi, 2018; see Figure 8).



Similar results have been reported by other studies. Afrobarometer found that 75% of potential migrants consider leaving in search for work (44%) or to escape poverty or economic hardship (29%; Appiah-Nyamekye Sanny et al., 2019, p. 14). Kirwin and Anderson (2018) show in their study of six West African countries (Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal) that economic reasons top the list of motives by a large margin. The publishers of the first African Migration report, AU and IOM, contest the interpretation of these numbers (Adepoju et al., 2020; see Module 9).

## Remittances

Remittances<sup>10</sup> – “the new development mantra” (Kapur, 2004) – are the most direct and well-known links between migration and development. They are usually referred to as the money migrants privately send home. They outnumber private capital flows<sup>11</sup> and ODA, account for more than three times the size of ODA, and (excluding China) are significantly larger than foreign direct investment (FDI) in developing countries (see Figure 9). These figures reflect only officially recorded data – “the true size of remittances, including flows through informal channels, is significantly larger” (World Bank, 2018b, p. 4).

Remittances can be explained as an investment strategy not only for an individual but for an entire household or community and as a manifestation of informal contractual agreements between a migrant and her or his extended family and/or community. They invest in the migrant’s journey aimed at finding employment and sending money home. These “informal contractual agreements ensure that all members share the costs and benefits of migration” (Maastricht University, & GMDAC, 2016, p. 15). An aspect often reported as migrants’ self-sacrifice for their loved ones (Jordan, 2020) is true but altruism as a motive for sending money home is not the whole story (Maastricht University, & GDMAC, 2016, p. 15). Remittances also redistribute the gains from successful migration and are a risk diversification strategy for the investing households and communities (Maastricht University, & GDMAC, 2016). Kirwin & Anderson (2018) show with recent data that jobs and remittances are prime reasons for migration from four West African countries (Ivory Coast, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal), and Tiemoko (2004) has highlighted the important role of the family in all aspects of human, social and financial capital acquisition and investment through migration, also investigating West African case studies (Ghana, Ivory Coast).

Remittances, generally, keep increasing: Low- and middle-income countries (LMICs)<sup>12</sup> have received \$501 billion in remittances in 2019, up from \$272 billion in 2009 (+84% in ten years); remit-

10 The term remittances may also include goods, ideas, knowledge etc. but in this handbook, we only refer to monetary transfers (Fackler et al., 2018).

11 “Private capital flows consist of net foreign direct investment (FDI) and portfolio investment. Foreign direct investment is net inflows of investment to acquire a lasting management interest [...] in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the investor. It is the sum of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, other long-term capital, and short-term capital as shown in the balance of payments. Portfolio investment covers transactions in equity securities and debt securities” (World Bank, 2020e).


12 See Module 2 for background on these country classifications which are explained in UNDESA (n.d.).

tances received in low income countries (LICs) more than doubled from \$10 billion in 2009 to over \$21 billion by 2019 and they jumped in middle income countries (MICs) from \$263 billion (2009) to almost \$480 billion in 2019 (+82% in ten years; World Bank, 2020d). In percentage of GDP, remittances are particularly significant for LICs where they represent almost 4.3% of GDP in 2019, compared to 1.6% in LMICs and 1.5% in MICs (World Bank, 2020c). In South Sudan, for instance, remittances made up over 35% of the GDP, in Lesotho 21%, in The Gambia, Comoros, Senegal, Liberia between 10% and 15% of GDP. In Nigeria, Africa’s largest economy, remittances represented a share of over 5% of GDP (data as of October 2020; World Bank, 2020f). Remittance flows generally show a mixed picture (see Figure 10).

When Covid-19 hit the world in 2019/2020, when borders were closed and the oil price dropped, a shockwave was sent to remittances-sending migrants, their receiving communities and countries. In April 2020, the World Bank sent a strong alert, expecting remittances to decrease by up to 20%, “the sharpest decline in recent history” (World Bank, 2020b, p. 7). As remittances alleviate poverty, the loss of financial support was expected to lead to further poverty and deprivation (World Bank, 2020b).

Noxolo (2016, p. 53) finds that the impact of remittances on poverty is considerably lower in Africa than in other contexts: A “10% increase in the share of remittances in GDP leads to an approximate 1% decrease in the poverty headcount ratio [in Africa while a study on] [...] the impact of remit-


**Figure 9: Remittance flows to low- and middle-income countries compared to ODA and FDI**



Remittances are an important factor within the development-migration nexus as they benefit the receiving household or community directly. They alleviate poverty and/or support local investment. Remittances flows to low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) exceed FDI and ODA. Source: World Bank (2018b, p. 3, Figure 1.1). Own illustration.

tances in developing Asian-Pacific countries found that a 10% increase in remittances leads to a 2.8 % decrease in poverty” (Noxolo, 2016, p. 53). The “smaller impact on poverty in Africa [...] is [primarily due to] the high cost of sending remittances to Africa” (Noxolo, 2016, p. 53). Remittance costs are of great concern in the migration-development nexus: The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) address remittances in goal 10, target 10c, which aims to reduce to less than 3% the transaction costs of migrant remittances and eliminate remittance corridors with costs higher than 5% (United Nations, n.d.). The Global Compact for Migration calls for “faster, safer and cheaper transfer of remittances and foster financial inclusion of migrants” (UN, 2020b, p. 6, pp. 27-29, Objective 20). The costs for sending money are high in developing countries and with 7.1 % in 2018 “well

**Figure 10: A mixed picture for remittance flows (3-month moving average, December 2019=100)**



While the World Bank estimated after the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic in April 2020 that remittances would fall by 20% in low- and middle-income countries, perhaps surprisingly, this did not materialize across the board. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) in September 2020 reported that “remittances often hold up in response to adverse shocks in recipient countries”. This figure shows that remittances developed “in line with virus containment policies [in high income countries] where strict measures were put in place in March 2020” causing remittances to decline. When the strictness of the measures relaxed in May, remittances increased, in some cases way above the pre-pandemic level (Kenya, Mexico, Bangladesh, Pakistan). Source: Quayyum & Kpodar (2020). Own illustration.

above” the SDG target of 3% (World Bank, 2018b, p. 6). The cost in South Asia was the lowest in 2018, at 5.2%, while sub-Saharan Africa “had the highest average cost” (World Bank, 2018b, p. 6), at 9.4%, with surging costs across many African corridors (the reasons are e.g. low volumes of formal flows, inadequate penetration of new technologies). Intra-regional corridors are the most expensive: “The corridor connecting Angola to Namibia was the costliest [...] [21.4% in 2016-2017, and the cheapest with 2.9%] was Ivory Coast to Mali” (World Bank, 2018b, p. 34).

## Institutions

Increasingly, the impact of institutions on migration decisions has been researched, presenting democratic institutions as a significant factor in attracting migrants. Baudassé et al. (2016, p. 25) argue that institutions are “fundamental” and “at the same level as economic factors” in explaining why people leave their origin country in favour of a destination country. Bertocchi & Strozzi (2008, p. 97), who analysed migration from Europe to the New World between 1870 and 1910 with a view to current developments, found evidence that democratic countries with related institutions were associated with higher rates of migration. In this line of thought, institutions relevant to migration comprise political (e.g. constitution, civil rights, participation), social (protection, income redistribution, informal solidarity etc.) and economic (e.g. property rights, entrepreneurship versus corruption as signs of weak institutions) aspects (Baudassé et al., 2016, p. 6). Bertocchi & Strozzi (2008, p. 83) differentiate the impact of institutions that can attract migrants, such as citizenship and land and education policies from the impact of political institutions.



### SUGGESTION FOR AN EXERCISE TO ADDRESS THE COGNITIVE SKILLS OF UNDERSTANDING AND APPLYING AS WELL AS THE AFFECTIVE SKILLS OF RECEIVING:

Invite participants to look into “perceptions of well-being” as per the indicators shown in the Human Development Index (UNDP, 2019b, pp. 30-33) and the Corruption Perceptions Index (Transparency International, 2019) and use these sources to:

- Collect data for your country or a country of your choice: Review human development indicators like “freedom of choice”, and perceptions about government like “confidence in the judicial system”, “actions to preserve the environment” and “trust in national government”.
- Identify media reports for the country you selected that discuss issues of corruption and “well-being” of the population in view of the human development indicators.

Several studies found that particularly high-skilled citizens emigrate as corruption increases and the quality of democratic institutions decreases (Cooray & Schneider, 2016; Kirwin & Anderson, 2018).

Corruption, rampant in a number of African countries, is a signal of weak institutions. Ambitiously and aspirationally, the Africa Union designated 2018 the year of “Winning the Fight Against Corruption: A Sustainable Path to Africa’s Transformation” (Tankou, 2018). “Corruption continues to harm Africa, hampering democracy, development and the ability to bring people out of poverty”, Transparency International warns and posits that “[t]he impact of corruption cannot be underestimated. Roughly 43 per cent of Africans are living in poverty while over US\$50 billion worth of stolen assets flow out of Africa every year”. It observes that “[w]idespread lack of development [...] is reinforced by extensive corruption schemes, which scare off investors and discourage further development.” The NGO estimates that “[m]isappropriated funds account for a 25 per cent loss of development resources in Africa” (Transparency International, 2018).

## Education

Education transforms individual lives and is key to social mobility. It is a central trigger for socio-economic change and hugely relevant for achieving the SDGs. Education is a prime value in the migration-development nexus, and, according to UNESCO, “a major driver in the decision to migrate” (UNESCO, 2019, p. xvii, pp. 2-4).

Of all world regions,<sup>13</sup> UNESCO stipulates, sub-Saharan Africa has the highest rates of education exclusion: Across the region, 9 million girls<sup>14</sup> and 6 million boys between 6 and 11 years will never go to school at all (UIS, 2020). Attesting to the fact that over 20% of children in this age group are out of school in Africa, and about 60% of youth between 15 and 17 years, UNESCO alerts that “the situation will likely get worse as the region faces a rising demand for education due to a still-growing school-age population” (UIS, 2020). That warning was sent out prior to Covid-19, which exacerbated the situation. In sub-Saharan Africa, nationwide school closures due to the pandemic came at a time when a very large number of schools had already been closed because of severe insecurity, strikes or climatic hazards (AfricaNews, 2019; UN, 2020a; Yameogo & Tidey, 2019). The pupils’ presence at home requires families not only to compensate for school meals, and to facilitate learning, even more worrisome is the threat that, without support, they may never return to school.

While Africa has made significant advances in closing the gap in primary-level enrolments, in sub-Saharan Africa the numbers fall abruptly from officially 99% in primary schools via 43% in secondary schools and only 9% in tertiary education (World Bank & UIS, 2020a; World Bank & UIS, 2020b; World Bank & UIS, 2020c). Only 4% of children in Africa are expected to enter a graduate and postgraduate institution, compared to 14% in South and West Asia and 36% in Latin America (Musau, 2017-2018). Across the board, the quality of teaching and learning is a matter

13 For regional and country classifications, see Module 2 and UNDESA (n.d.).

14 Kaps et al. (2019) highlight the exceptionally important role of women’s education in the light of falling fertility rates: „Many experts believe that education is the best method of birth control“ (Kaps et al., 2019, p. 12).


of great concern (Sifuna & Sawamura, 2009). An example from one of the most developed sub-Saharan countries, South Africa, may illustrate the magnitude of the challenge: Almost 80 % of Grade 6 mathematics teachers “cannot get 60 % on a Grade 6/7 maths test” (Spaull, 2019, p. 3); most “teachers do not currently have the content knowledge or pedagogical skills necessary to impart the curriculum” (Spaull, 2019, p. 8). One of the countries registering low in the UNDP human development countries index, this handbook’s case study Guinea-Bissau (UNDP, 2019a, p. 302), exhibits a “dire situation” (Boone et al., 2013, title) whereby only 27 % of almost 10,000 surveyed children aged 7 to 17 years were able to add two single digits, and just about 20 % were able to read and comprehend a simple word (Boone et al., 2013).<sup>15</sup>

These challenges are being addressed in research on all matters of education in Africa, and sometimes the media report the issues (AU, 2020; News24, 2011; UN, 2020b; UN, 2020c).<sup>16</sup> UNESCO’s report on “Migration, displacement and education” (2019) provides a comprehensive account on education considering migrants, refugees and host communities. The report outlines the issue from early childhood to adult education, from vocational training to university education and academic exchange programmes, addressing pupils, students, educators and comprising internal and international migrants as well as refugees. It shows that migration and forced displacement impacts education in places of origin and destination. For instance, in destination places, the education system needs to manage the new diversity in classrooms and to harmonize different educational levels of native and migrant or refugee learners, requiring better-prepared educators. In places of origin, the emigration of school-aged youth may deter investment in education and thereby reduce the opportunities for those who stay behind; the emigration of educated citizens (known as brain drain) takes the strongest performers away from home, yet, at the same time, may be partly offset in cases where migrants send money back home (see above section on remittances). These better educated people – who prompt the brain drain at home – are most likely to migrate (see Figure 11): Across 53 countries, the probability of migration effectively doubled among those with primary education, tripled among those with secondary and quadrupled among those with tertiary, compared with those with no education (UNESCO, 2019, p. 15). This said, refugees are also often semi-literate (15 % of refugees in Germany are illiterate but are least likely to attend a literacy course; UNESCO, 2019, p. 183, Figure 13.3), and “among asylum seekers with primary education, only 50 % of those surveyed in Greece and 41 % in Italy had achieved minimum proficiency level in literacy” (UNESCO, 2019, p. 117, Figure 7.2).

<sup>15</sup> See the rank of South Africa and Guinea-Bissau on the Human Development Index: UNDP (2019a, pp. 300-303). In South Africa, the teachers’ incapacity to get 100 % of the Grade 6/7 math test translates – according to nationally representative surveys – into over 60 % of Grade 5 learners being unable to add and subtract whole numbers, and they have no understanding of multiplication by one-digit numbers, e.g. they cannot do basic mathematics (Spaull, 2019).

<sup>16</sup> See, for instance: Education is one of six guiding principles of the African Union’s Continental Education Strategy for Africa (CESA) 2016-2025 (AU, 2020) with its very aspirational thoughts like “Africa’s education and training systems ... [will] meet the knowledge, competencies, skills, innovation and creativity required [...] at the national, sub-regional and continental levels”. Education is a cross-cutting theme in the Global Compact for Migration, and the Global Compact on Refugees (paras 68 and 69) addresses education particularly in view of quality, reducing the gap time for refugee children between arrival and start of school and recognition of equivalency of academic and professional qualifications (UN, 2020b). See also the SDGs, especially SDG 4 (UN, 2020c).

**Figure 11: The more educated are more likely to migrate (migration intensity rate by education, selected countries, five-year intervals, 1999-2010)**



Globally, the more educated are more likely to leave their country, but the picture in sub-Saharan Africa is particularly pronounced. Source: UNESCO (2019, p. 16). Own illustration.

While some experts see education as a major driver in the decision to migrate, others describe education as just one among many socio-economic factors that aim at a better life (Browne, 2017). Exploring the reasons to consider migration, Afrobarometer (Appiah-Nyamekye Sanny et al., 2019, p. 16, Table 1) reports that only a fraction of their respondents indicate that they wish to pursue an education (6%), considerably less than those who want to escape poverty or economic hardship (29%) and those who wish to find work (44%; Appiah-Nyamekye Sanny et al., 2019, p. 14, Figure 12). These categories are, however, closely related as economic aspirations and education go hand-in-hand, as Browne (2017, p. 2) explains. The author suggests that education becomes a factor for international migration at university level. University education is, in a global comparison, least affordable in sub-Saharan Africa and most affordable in Europe (UNESCO, 2019, pp. 148-149).

For sub-Saharan Africa, Klingholz et al. (2017) describe the lack of (quality) education as a main source of the many challenges: Young people will often be confined to making a living as simple labourers in agriculture or the informal sector. Education cannot be overestimated as a value proposition in the migration-development nexus. Kaps et al. (2019) explain that a “deficit of education and a lack of income opportunities are inhibiting economic development and thus making it difficult for people to escape the poverty trap” (Kaps et al. 2019, p. 6). To confront this risk with adequate interventions is challenging under normal conditions, let alone under Covid-19. Dreesen et al. (2020) show in a study for the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) that tailor-made responses are required. Their study of school closures in over 120 countries concludes that there is no one-style-fits-all approach to deliver content for remote learning. In addition to large global inequities in access to the internet, TV and radio (just around 3% of households in countries like Guinea-Bissau have electricity), UNICEF recommends using multiple delivery channels. In Jordan, for instance, refugee children received learning packages; elsewhere, telecommunication companies did not charge data costs for education content and SD cards for mobile phones preloaded with audio content were delivered to families in hard-to-reach areas in Burundi; TV is used by most countries to deliver educational content.

The most vulnerable learners are also among those who have poor access to digital media and distance learning, and many are not fluent in the language of instruction (UN, 2020a, p. 7). The UN therefore uses very strong words of warning: “Preventing a learning crisis from becoming a generational catastrophe requires urgent action from all” (UN, 2020a, p. 3).


### **Climate change**

The worsening impacts of climate change are expected to displace millions of people internally (raising numbers of IDPs) across three world regions – sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia and Latin America. In the most pessimistic of three scenarios (high greenhouse gas emissions and unequal

development paths), by 2050 around 143 million people (3% of the aggregate population in these three regions), could be forced to escape from their homes to safer places in their home country. This projection on climate change, migration, forced displacement and development, published by the World Bank in a landmark study titled “Groundswell” (Rigaud et al., 2018; World Bank, 2018a), offers dire perspectives even in the best “climate friendly”-scenario that assumes improved development pathways. For sub-Saharan Africa, internal displacement due to climate change will increase under all three scenarios due to lower water availability and crop productivity alongside rising sea level and storm surges (World Bank, 2018a, p. 1; see Figure 12). By 2050, the total number of IDPs due to climate change “could be as high as 85.7 million or four percent of the region’s total population” under the pessimistic scenario, more than in South Asia and Latin America; the best case scenario (“climate friendly”) projects 28.3 million people being displaced (World Bank, 2018a, p. 2).

Theoretical and empirical research on climate change causing migration and forced displacement is manifold and has increased during the past three decades (Migration Data Portal, 2020c). At the time of writing this handbook in 2020, a literature review was published that offers a recent overview of the topic (Flavell et al., 2020). As outlined in the section on conflict (see above), the numbers of IDPs are larger than those who are displaced across borders (refugees), and garner

**Figure 12: Projected total numbers and shares of internal climate migrants in sub-Saharan Africa under three scenarios by 2050**



Source: World Bank (2018a, p. 2, Figure 1). Own illustration.

relatively little international attention. This also applies to people who are being displaced due to climate change. The IDMC laments that IDPs are “internally displaced but internationally disregarded” (Bilak, 2020). Even some standard international reference documents like the SDGs do not explicitly address this group (Zeender, 2018). Few sources in Africa make the issues public – for instance the Africa Portal’s “Climate Change and Migration in Africa”-series (2020) and occasional journalistic overviews (Fagan, 2019), to mention just two examples.

There is a consensus, “Groundswell” assures, that climate change-induced displacement within countries – rather than displacement across international borders – will continue to be by far “the larger phenomenon” (World Bank, 2018a, p. 2). Substantial development challenges are implied, and the report makes a strong case for “concerted action on climate change mitigation and adaptation, together with inclusive development policies and embedding climate migration into policy planning” (World Bank, 2018a, p. 1). In this line of thought, Klingholz et al. (2020) advocate for a re-orientation of Africa’s agricultural sector towards sustainability with more productivity in order to feed the growing population; the bases for this “great leap are research, development and dissemination of technical and social innovations, as well as knowledge transfer and entrepreneurship” (Klingholz et al., 2020, p. 67).

The “Groundswell” report refers to climate migrants, not to climate refugees. This editorial decision is in line with international law and UNHCR’s position to uphold the refugee definition.<sup>17</sup> In public debate and even in the glossaries recommended by this handbook, the usage and definitions of terms varies – in use are, for instance, environmental migrants, climate refugees – and sometimes definitions even include people displaced after industrial accidents (EMN, 2018; IOM, 2019a; Ionesco et al., 2017; UNHCR, 2020a). This handbook refers to climate displacement, linking it to the fact that most people are displaced internally. Whatever words authors and institutions choose – they all agree that IDPs have acute humanitarian needs, vulnerabilities and need protection.

The dearth of data outlined in Module 2 on migration and forced displacement is even more pronounced regarding IDPs and particularly in view of people displaced by climate change. The IDMC reports for instance that displacement prompted by drought is grossly underestimated as data have only been available for a few countries since 2017 (André et al., 2019, p. 19). According to this source, disasters – natural hazards, excluding industrial accidents – triggered 2.6 million new displacements in 2018 and more than 21.2 million between 2009 and 2018. A total of 85% of all disaster displacement recorded in Africa since 2009 have been the result of floods. Cyclones Idai and Kenneth caused most devastating disasters in 2019, with 2.2 million people affected, and

<sup>17</sup> Recall definitions discussed in Module 2. A “refugee” is defined as a person who has crossed an international border “owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion” according to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees.

617,000 newly displaced in Mozambique, Malawi, Zimbabwe and Madagascar (André et al., 2019, p. 19, p. 24). The development news organisation “The New Humanitarian” shares impressions of Praia Nova, a shanty town in Mozambique’s port city of Beira that was the first to be struck by cyclone Idai. The neighbourhood of around 500,000 people was largely destroyed. Families are still torn between staying at home in emergency shelter, hoping for reconstruction, and relocating to new settlements supported by the government and aid groups in villages away from low-lying, flood-prone areas (Kleinfeld, 2019).

The “Groundswell” report concludes that internal climate displacement “will likely rise through 2050 and then accelerate unless there are significant cuts in greenhouse gas emissions and robust development action” (Rigaud et al., 2018, p. xix).

### **Co-ethnic networks (diaspora)**

Research on networks and migration often assumes that individuals are more likely to migrate to places where they have many connections. This is true but it is not the whole story. Larger networks may actually deter migration, for instance if migrants compete with one another over opportunities and resources and sense some rivalry over information sharing (Blumenstock et al., 2019, pp. 2-3), or when they are disillusioned over a lack of peer protection (Kuschminder, 2016).

Networks of co-ethnic community members, family and friends at home and abroad have, however, been identified as key drivers for migration. People are indeed more likely to go to places where they know other migrants who have recently moved there, and these networks play an exceptional role in providing support (material, social) and as a source of information from the planning stage, during the journey and at the destination by facilitating, and even influencing destination country decisions (Maastricht University, & GDMAC, 2016, pp. 21-22). As Blumenstock et al. (2019) found for the example of Rwanda, the social network of a single migrant is extensive.

As important as the co-ethnic network is in the destination, the family and kin at home is the decision making entity, sending their members off on regular or irregular paths to migration, often facilitated by the use of social media (Cummings et al., 2015; Fleischer, 2006; Migration Data Portal, 2020b; Simpson, 2017). For them, equipping their trusted community member with funds and sending her or him abroad, is often seen as a family risk diversification strategy.

As indicated earlier, this selection of context factors is a non-inclusive presentation. Journalism educators using this handbook will hopefully find inspiration to invite their classes to critically reflect on these and other context factors; it is hoped that they will contribute to complete the picture by revealing their country perspective.



### **SUGGESTED ASSIGNMENT TO ADDRESS THE COGNITIVE SKILLS OF UNDERSTANDING AND APPLYING AND THE AFFECTIVE SKILLS OF RECEIVING BY PRESENTING THEM IN JOURNALISTIC WORK:**

Invite participants to summarize the course on context factors in a 2-page paper, using as case studies either their home country or a country of choice. Allow students to choose between two topics and ask them to explain the theory and base their research on a body of academic literature.

#### **Topic 1: Additional context factors for migration**

Explain the theory outlined in this module and describe which context factor(s) on migration are relevant to your country – or the country of your choice – and why. In addition, think of any relevant push or pull factors that have not been introduced in this module and argue why it is/they are important.

- Recognize the relevance of context factors for reporting matters of migration and forced displacement by reviewing the media coverage of one media outlet in the country of your choice over a week (select a week with sizable coverage): Trace which push/pull factors were covered.
- Identify those context factors that bring together migrants and refugees in mixed flows.
- Contextualize the context factors and present them in a 2-page paper.

#### **Topic 2: Refugees in situations of multiple risks**

Refugees are persecuted at home and have to flee across borders. Because they are persecuted, they are subjected to additional challenges that, at first sight, may appear like push factors for migration, for instance the lack of employment opportunities. Take a women journalist as an example and describe her multiple risks and challenges in your home country or a country of your choice. Choose from life stories collected by the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ, 2020).

- Explain the theory and base your research on the body of academic literature.
- Recognize the relevance of context factors for reporting about women refugees: What are their specific risks?
- Contextualize push/pull factors by exploring how women refugees are presented in the media. Reviewing the media coverage of women in a media outlet of your choice over a month (select a month with sizable coverage): How are women as refugees presented, and are they listened to?
- Identify context factors for women refugees and describe how they are sometimes in mixed flows together with migrants.

**RECOMMENDED READING:****Academic:**

Piché, V. (2013). Contemporary migration theories as reflected in their founding texts. *Population*, 68(1), 141-164. <https://doi.org/10.3917/popu.1301.0153>

**Journalistic:**

News Deeply (n.d.). *Articles*. Retrieved January 5, 2021, from <https://deeply.thenewhumanitarian.org/>

**Institutional:**

IOM (2019b). *World migration report 2020*. Geneva. Retrieved December 15, 2020, from [https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/wmr\\_2020.pdf](https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/wmr_2020.pdf)

UNDESA (2019b). *International Migration 2019: Report*. New York. Retrieved December 15, 2020, from [https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/publications/migrationreport/docs/InternationalMigration2019\\_Report.pdf](https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/publications/migrationreport/docs/InternationalMigration2019_Report.pdf)

UNHCR (2020b). *Global Trends: Forced displacement in 2019*. Copenhagen. Retrieved December 15, 2020, from <https://www.unhcr.org/5ee200e37.pdf>

## GENDER

*by Monika Lengauer*

The terms *gender* and *sex* should not be – but are being – used interchangeably. Gender describes the characteristics of women, men or some other identity, which are socially constructed, while sex refers to those that are biologically determined (or sex is “a categorization based on the appearance of the genitalia at birth” (LGBT Resource Center, n.d.)). Gender identity and gender roles also determine the experiences of women, girls, men, boys and members of the LGBTI-group as migrants and refugees. In data collection, however, gender and sex are not only frequently used synonymously but gender often equates to women only; in addition, data are hardly ever disaggregated by LGBTI identification (Migration Data Portal, 2020). Sex-disaggregated data at minimum are critical for evidence-based policymaking and planning, and the Global Compact for Migration and the Global Compact on Refugees are committed to improve these inadequacies (Hennebry & Petrozziello, 2019; UN, 2018; UNGA, 2018). Concluding from the fragmented data available, women account for around 50% of all forcibly displaced persons – refugees, internally displaced people (IDPs) or stateless populations (UNHCR, 2020)<sup>1</sup>. The share of women in international mobility has not changed significantly in recent decades but more women migrants are moving independently for work, education and as heads of households (Migration Data Portal, 2020).

The research field of gender and migration is as well established as the research field on gender and forced displacement<sup>2</sup>. Regarding migration studies, “scholars now insist that migration itself is a gendered phenomenon and requires more sophisticated theoretical and analytical tools than studies of sex roles” (Donato et al., 2018, p. 6-7). Refugee studies have researched gender issues from a broad spectrum, including the exploration of legal and moral grounds for individuals to receive asylum and protection from gender-related persecution (Gerver & Millar, 2013). In their edited collection of gender, violence and refugees, Buckley-Zistel and Krause (2019) not only elaborate on these and other concepts but also allow insights into a wide spectrum of case studies – including LGBTI – from Angola in Southern Africa to Sweden in Northern Europe.

In human mobility, gender has arguably “the biggest impact” on the experiences of women, girls, men, boys and people identifying as members of the LGBTI (Migration Data Portal, 2020). Gender influences motives, routes and networks people use, experiences, reception, opportunities, restrictions and vulnerabilities at home, in transit and in destination countries shape debates in the media and policies (Schrover & Moloney, 2013). There are, obviously, many differences between these groups while women, men and members of the LGBTI group may be confronted with specific


1 Women account for around 48% of the international migrant stock. Note that “[s]tocks include all foreign-born residents in a country regardless of when they entered the country”. These data can therefore not be compared with UNHCR data on forcibly displaced persons. See Migration Data Portal theme page “Gender and Migration” for data sources (Migration Data Portal, 2020).

2 Literature reviews show the scope of both fields, for instance Fleury (n.d.) or Joint Data Center on Forced Displacement (2020).

or shared vulnerabilities and may all be exposed to forms of gender-based violence. Research – for instance, the previously quoted edited collection by Buckley-Zistel & Krause (2019), institutions and the media have made public horrific crimes of sexual violence and abuse. “Women on the run” is a study conducted by the UNHCR in El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Mexico revealing “epidemic levels of violence” that have “surpassed governments’ abilities to protect victims” (UNHCR, 2015, p. 2) in large parts of the countries, and where women flee from murder, extortion, and rape. The Democratic Republic of the Congo has experienced displacement following rape in conflict contexts, and The Washington Post newspaper has shown the rebels’ denial about their human rights abuses (Wilén & Ingelaere, 2017).

Women face specific discrimination and are subjected to explicit vulnerabilities as migrants and refugees, particularly in human trafficking (see Figure 13). Human trafficking is a crime.<sup>3</sup> It broadly follows routes and patterns of migration and forced displacement. According to the UNODC’s 2018

**Figure 13: Shares of detected victims of trafficking in persons in subregions recording diverse patterns, 2016 (or more recent)**



The UNODC study reports abduction of women and girls for sexual slavery and for forced marriage in many conflicts in Central and West Africa and in Middle East (UNODC, 2018, p. 12). Source: UNODC, 2018, p. 10. Own illustration.

3 “The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.” Source: Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (IOM, 2019, p. 213).

global report on human trafficking, “women represent the vast majority of the victims of trafficking for sexual exploitation, and 35% of the victims trafficked for forced labour” are women and girls (UNODC, 2018, p. 10). The report points to “considerable regional differences in the sex and age profiles of detected trafficking victims. [...] In West Africa, most of the detected victims are children, both boys and girls, while in South Asia, victims are equally reported to be men, women and children” (UNODC, 2018, p. 10). In Central Asia, a larger share of adult men is trafficked than in other parts of the world; in Central America and the Caribbean, more girls are recorded (UNODC, 2018, p. 10).

Women escaping from conflict situations are particularly vulnerable. The need to take urgent action has been recognized by the 2018 Nobel Peace Prize, awarded to Denis Mukwege and Nadia Murad, who were awarded “for their efforts to end the use of sexual violence as a weapon of war and armed conflict” (Nobel Price Committee, 2018). Denis Mukwege, a surgeon from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, “has treated thousands of victims of sexual violence in armed conflicts, and has criticized governments for not doing enough to stop the use of sexual violence against women as a strategy and weapon of war” (Nobel Price Committee, 2018). Nadia Murad founded “Nadia’s Initiative” (Nadia’s Initiative, 2020), a non-profit organization dedicated to rebuilding communities in crisis and advocating globally for survivors of sexual violence. The NGO currently focuses on re-developing the Yazidi homeland in Sinjar (Iraq), where Nadia Murad grew up. ISIS terrorists had destroyed her village, killed, enslaved and raped community members (Arraf, 2019; Marczak, 2018; Nobel Price Committee, 2018).

“The international protection regime is failing refugee women and girls”, wrote the Forced Migration Research Network, University of New South Wales, in their contribution to the UNHCR participatory process leading up to the Global Compact on Refugees (Bartolomei et al., 2017). The authors also inferred that being vulnerable as a woman does not equate to being “inherently vulnerable” nor being a passive victim or a helpless aid beneficiary. Krause (2020) shows this in her research on Uganda, recognizing women as “social actors”, and also “actors in the refugee regime”. In a photo essay, UN Women presents women refugees as empowered despite their lives in refugee camps (UN Women, 2016).

Women journalists as refugees and as migrants are underreported from almost every angle, maybe with a few exceptions, such as the Missouri School of Journalism that produces the *Global Journalist* portraying journalists in exile (Global Journalist, 2020) and Reporters Without Borders (2019) as well as the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ, 2020), to name but a few. The *Refugees Deeply* site, hosted on The New Humanitarian website, has a special story on women journalism refugees from Libya (Nallu, 2016).

Fleury (n.d.) reveals in a literature review on women and migration how varied the field is and how many different empirical studies have shed light on different aspects. The “state of gender and

migration studies is fundamentally healthy [...] [with a] veritable tidal wave since the late 1980s of research”, posit Donato et al. (2018, pp. 6-7).

In the subfield of migration and development, remittances that women send home tell newsworthy stories hidden in sex-disaggregated data. Azam et al. (2020) conclude from a small study covering eleven countries<sup>4</sup> that migrant women are remitting substantial portions of their earnings, sending as much or even more than men. This study seems to confirm previous research which shows migrant women in Spain remitted 38.5% of their incomes compared to men who remitted 14.5% (Fleury, n.d., p. 14). These patterns of women’s remittances occur despite a global gender pay gap whereby they are paid on average 20% less than men and despite women-specific preferences in money transfer modes: Women reportedly prefer to use money transfer businesses whereas men use mobile money transfer technology more often. This trend has been explained by the persistent digital gender divide and women’s lower digital literacy. Women are reported to remit smaller amounts but more frequently, which results in higher costs for them (Azam et al., 2020, p. 4; Fleury, n.d., p. 15). At the receiving end, several studies have shown that women use the money to improve the welfare of their families; they invest it in health and education whereas men receiving remittances are more likely to purchase assets (Fleury, n.d., p. 15). Women are at the core of the development process, and investments in the educational sector are urgently required because education “is a prime factor in reducing fertility rates, whereby women’s education is particularly impactful” (Kaps et al., 2019, p. 12).

Another difference between migrant women and men is the segregation in labour migration. Men tend to work in production or construction. Migrant women generally work as domestic workers or caretakers, in both low-skilled as well as in high-skilled employment – low-skilled women workers are mostly domestic helpers and caretakers, high-skilled women are for instance those in nursing positions (Fleury, n.d., pp. 10-11). Women migrant workers are often exposed to abuse, at work as well as in their homes, as Hiralal (2017) has documented for migrant women in South Africa. “It is critical that we put an end to gender-blind migration governance”, petitions UN Women, which also recalls the key UN human rights treaty bodies addressing the linkages between gender and migration, including the Committee on Migrant Workers (CMW), the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), and the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR; von Hase, 2017).

4 The study is not representative and is limited in scope in that it refers to national household surveys from 11 countries where the sex of remittance senders is included as a variable in the database along with the value of remittances received from the sender. The 11 countries are 6 sub-Saharan African countries (Burkina Faso, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, Uganda, Tanzania), three South Asian countries (Bangladesh, India, Nepal ) and two countries from Eastern Europe/Central Asia (Albania and Tajikistan; Azam et al., 2020, p. 4).

**RECOMMENDED READING:****Academic:**

Buckley-Zistel, S., & Krause, U. (Eds.) (2019). *Gender, Violence, Refugees. Forced Migration*. New York: Berghahn.

**Academic/Journalistic:**

Global Journalist (2020). *Project Exile*. Retrieved January 22, 2020, from Global Journalist website: <https://globaljournalist.org/2018/01/8964/>

**Institutional:**

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## MODULE 4

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# The Media and the Migration Story – An Analysis Across Countries

by Susanne Fengler



### MODULE AIMS

- To provide an overview of research results on coverage of migration and refugee matters.
- To encourage participants to analyse different perspectives in media reporting.
- To sensitize participants to stereotypes and ‘blind spots’ in the coverage of migrants and refugees.



### LEARNING OUTCOMES

At the end of this module, participants should be able:

- To discuss the potential impact of shortcomings in the coverage of migrants and refugees. → **Affective LO: Responding**
- To compare media coverage in different political cultures and media systems. → **Cognitive LO: Analysing**
- To identify key challenges especially for the coverage of matters of migration in a changing journalistic environment. → **Cognitive LO: Analysing**

## Outline

The media today operate in a world of political and social upheaval; a time of growing globalization and digitization. The current migration movements are part of this changing world. With the ways diverse media report about matters of migration, journalists can shape the perception of migrants and refugees in countries of origin as well as in destination countries. Even if media do not, or only hesitantly, cover the topic, this may have an impact on audiences and decision-makers. People may not understand the full consequences of migration matters for their own society, make misleading decisions, do or do not exert pressure on policy-makers to take action, or feel betrayed by media. For Europe, media scholars even argue that the high visibility of the so-called ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015 in the media has promoted Euroscepticism among citizens (Harteveld et al., 2018). For Africa, Eric Chinje from the African Media Initiative argues that as long as migration is not adequately covered in African countries, one might never see a critical constituency that fights for policies to effectively navigate issues of illegal migration. A migrant from Kenya, interviewed for one of our research projects, notes that the Kakuma refugee camp, accommodating over 180,000 refugees and asylum seekers, is simply “a forgotten story” in the Kenyan media (Bastian et al., 2018).


In order to enable a more “independent, objective and quality reporting of media outlets” on migrants and refugees, as urged by the United Nations (UN) Compact (2018), we need to study the status quo of migration coverage and identify achievements as well as shortcomings in the way media may treat the topic. A comparative analysis of migration coverage will enable us to better understand the way that media in origin countries on one hand, and media in transit and destina-



**SUGGESTION FOR THE CLASSROOM TO ADDRESS THE COGNITIVE SKILLS OF UNDERSTANDING AND THE AFFECTIVE SKILLS OF RECEIVING:**

Discuss how you perceive media coverage of migrants and refugees in your country. You may also take a look at the survey results for Europe below (see Figure 14).

**Figure 14: European’s satisfaction with media coverage of migration**



Source: European Commission (2018, p. 4). Own illustration.

tion countries on the other hand, frame the issue. Hafez (2011, p. 486) argues that “media systems construct events according to their national preferences. Seemingly homogeneous events [...] are simultaneously reported in a very different manner around the world.” Is this still true for our times, when matters of migrants and refugees have become one of the key issues of global policy?<sup>1</sup> The notion of “objective” reporting is highly contested as an ideal and its meaning varies across discourse about journalism. What seems clear however is that the interpretation and application of professional standards of verification and public interest are coloured by narratives related to economic, political, institutional, demographic, cultural and identity issues.

**Studies on migration coverage: literature review**

Various phases of migration have triggered mass communication studies on the coverage of immigration, while coverage of minorities (sometimes related to the issues) has been a recurrent subject of mass communication analysis at least since the 1980s. The studies provide a base to assess the

<sup>1</sup> Parts of the text of this module have been taken from the author’s prior publications (Fengler et al. (2020a).

development and status quo of migration coverage across countries, seeking to understand “the factors that shape media coverage of migrants and minorities, as well as the effect of that coverage on public attitudes, policy outcomes or social relations” (Bleich et al., 2015, p. 857). It needs to be noted that the vast majority of these studies has originated in the Global North. While the causes and consequences of migrants and refugees movements have steadily dominated the media agenda in ‘Western’ societies since 2015 (Fengler & Kreutler, 2020; Krüger & Zapf-Schramm, 2016), few stories and headlines in African media focus on people leaving the continent and heading north, according to Eric Chinje of the African Media Initiative (Chinje, 2016). Research on the coverage of migrants and refugees in African countries is largely restricted to South Africa, which has experienced recurring incidents targeting migrants from other African countries. Authors analyzing the South African print media include Danso & McDonald (2001), McDonald & Jacobs (2005), and Fine & Bird (2002), who argue that South African media in recent years provided an “incomplete” and “simplistic” picture of xenophobic incidents (Smith, 2009, p. 11). Apart from these studies, Assopgoum (2011) has looked at the coverage of migration from Senegal to Germany, and White (2015) has produced an overview of frameworks and conditions for migration coverage, which also includes a few African countries. White (2015) argues in “Moving Stories” that journalists fail to tell the full story and routinely fall into propaganda traps laid by politicians. In migrants’ and refugees’ countries of origin, censorship or a lack of resources, or a combination of both, are mainly to blame for poor coverage (see Module 5; see also Al-Mazahara, 2016).

Before reviewing mass communication studies in the Global North, it needs to be noted that countries in Europe vary considerably in their migration history: Long-standing immigration to UK and France due to the countries’ colonial pasts, and the ‘Gastarbeiter’ movement of Southern European and Turkish migrants into Germany since the 1960s, contrast with the recent history of immigration in the 2010s into Spain, Italy and Greece, which had been previously been ‘sending countries’ to Northern Europe. This has had an impact on the way national media cover the migration issue. Also, the majority of studies analyses coverage of migration, (im)migrants and refugees in a single country, even though “this policy domain is increasingly shifting to supranational decision making within the EU, which means that analysing immigration-related public debate from a Europeanised perspective becomes increasingly relevant” (Horsti, 2008, p. 42). Yet, as Meltzer et al. (2018, p. 1) summarize a meta-analysis, “there is little comparative research on the salience of immigration-related issues or actors in the media across different European countries”.

These studies show considerable variation in line with different political positions towards migration within European countries, but also with different journalistic routines, media cultures, and access to sources for migration coverage. Caviedes (2015, p. 898) has compared migration coverage in France, UK and Italy, based on the observation that a large proportion of migration coverage is “increasingly linked with crime and security issues”. Migration is also associated with “threatening economic prosperity and cultural identity”. His analysis finds both the economic and the ‘securitisation’ frames dominant in migration coverage 2009-2012. “[D]ebates over immigration vary in

intensity and issue salience between countries, such that they may each sustain their own particular critical narratives” (Caviedes, 2015, p. 912). According to Esses et al. (2013, p. 520), negative frames and conflicts continue to characterize European coverage of migrants and refugees. Intra-EU migrants are more often described by the media as a “threat to the economy and welfare system”, while non-EU migrants are portrayed as a “threat” to host countries’ culture (Meltzer et al., 2018, p. 6). A recent study in seven EU countries confirms that migration from outside the EU into the EU is framed more negatively, and tends to focus on matters of securitization (Eberl et al., 2019).

Horsti (2008) offers one of the few studies examining African migrants into Europe, focusing on media coverage of the arrival of 30,000 undocumented African migrants in Spain’s Canary Islands, in 2006 (Fohrn, 2009). According to her study of one Finnish and one Swedish newspaper, most stories did not present Africans as sovereign actors taking rational decisions; also, the event was largely ‘domesticated’ in the papers, by emphasizing Finnish and Swedish actors and perspectives on this distant event in Southern Europe. Another study by Balabanova & Balch (2010) researched labour migration in the UK and Bulgaria after the EU’s enlargement 2007, and thus compared coverage in the sending countries of migrants and their host countries. The authors expected different types of coverage in host and sending countries, due to various stakes in migration. However, the media agenda in Bulgaria largely mirrored the UK’s, because the Bulgarian news media imported UK news due to lack of newsroom resources for original coverage.

Focusing on the so-called ‘European refugee crisis’ of 2015, Berry et al. (2015) found that coverage of migrants and refugees differed significantly among European countries: Humanitarian issues were more prevalent in Italian media; Swedish publications had the most positive tenor; those in the UK remained largely negative. According to an analysis by the European Journalism Observatory (EJO), newspapers in Western Europe were generally more compassionate towards the plight of migrants and refugees, compared to Central and Eastern European countries (EJO, 2015). Georgiou & Zaborowski (2017) conducted a research project on media coverage in eight European countries, concluding that the media paid little and scattered attention to the context of the migrants and refugees in Europe, and stories were only rarely connected to war reporting or other international news stories from countries of origins of migrants and refugees. Fotopoulos & Kaimaklioti (2016) compared how the Greek, German and British press have addressed the initial coverage of the ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015; according to them, migrants and refugees were portrayed as helpless and desperate victims of the civil war in Syria, and newspapers paid a lot of attention to the tragedy. As argued by Caviedes, coverage tends to emphasize the consequences and effects of immigration from the viewpoint of economics and labour markets (Goedeke Tort et al., 2016). Moreover, studies identify a lack of reporting about migrants’ individual stories (Georgiou & Zaborowski, 2017). A study by the ICMPD (2016) points towards a lack of knowledge about the complex issue of migration among journalists in European and MENA countries about migrants’ countries of origin, and newsrooms’ vulnerability to pressure by populists and via social media.



### SUGGESTION FOR AN EXERCISE TO ADDRESS THE COGNITIVE SKILLS OF UNDERSTANDING AND THE AFFECTIVE SKILLS OF RESPONDING:

The literature review has pointed to noticeable differences in media coverage of migration across countries. Along with various political contexts, media systems and cultural perspectives may also have a strong impact on the quantity and quality of media coverage of matters of migration and forced displacement. Discuss the potential impact of the following issues on the quantity and quality of migration coverage in African and European countries: Press freedom, pluralism in the media system, professionalism/journalism education, newsroom resources, technology, advertising markets (you may add more topics).

## Cross-country studies of migration coverage I: Africa and Europe

In order to analyse migration coverage across political systems and journalism cultures, the Erich Brost Institute for International Journalism (EBI) has conducted two studies comparing the coverage of migrants and refugees in Africa and Europe (study 1) as well as across Western and Eastern Europe, the United States, and the Russian Federation (study 2). This handbook presents the key results of the two studies and offers comprehensive accompanying material on our project website, hoping to encourage fellow researchers and advanced students to conduct similar studies in Africa and on other continents, to build a broad knowledge base of migration coverage.

The first study compared newspaper content in six European and five African countries (Fengler et al., 2020a). A consortium of European and African universities analysed articles related to migration and forced displacement published in the online editions of two leading daily newspapers from Germany (Süddeutsche Zeitung, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung), the UK (The Independent, The Telegraph), France (Le Monde, Le Figaro), Italy (La Repubblica, Corriere della Sera), Greece (Ta Nea; Kathimerini), Spain (El País, ABC) and Kenya (The Daily Nation, The Standard), Uganda (The New Vision, Monitor), Tanzania (Daily News, The Guardian), Ethiopia (The Ethiopian Herald, Addis Zemen) and Ghana (Ghanaian Times, Daily Graphic). Through a keyword search, 1,512 articles within one year (1 June 2015 to 31 May 2016) dealing with migration from Africa to Europe were surveyed and evaluated using quantitative content analysis. The aim was to ‘de-Westernize’ (Waisbord & Mellado, 2014) the research perspective, and to investigate the phenomenon of migration from different angles. Thus, the African and the European researchers co-operated closely on all levels of the investigation – in the creation of the codebook, data collection and evaluation as well as the final analysis.


The study found a huge gap regarding the quantity of migration coverage between African and European media. More than 88% of the articles found during the study period 2015/2016 are from European media, with only 12% from African media. This is a striking imbalance, even when

we take into account that African newspapers on average have less space for news compared to European newspapers, and radio is the dominant medium due to financial and technological restrictions as well as a lack of literacy (African Media Barometer, 2018).

Coverage in Europe and Africa was dominated by day-to-day politics, and severely lacks deeper insights; less than 9% of total coverage is devoted to relevant background information, which would help the audience to understand the actual causes and impact of migration and forced displacement. The main topics of the examined reporting are politics (43%) and migration in general (48%) – with a focus on spectacular disasters and boat catastrophes. Media on both continents largely ignored other topics such as economics (2%), media and journalism (1%), everyday life (app. 0%), historical, ethnic or cultural backgrounds (1%) or strategic implications of migration (2%). Thus, media audiences in both Europe and Africa received little background information to assess matters of migrants and refugees – or to understand the relevance of the topic.

In Europe, coverage of migration from Africa was heavily self-centred and revolved around European security issues. Only a quarter (26%) of the articles by European media focused on African main actors (see Figure 15). At the same time, the European media largely ignored the sub-Saharan African countries of origin. Libya as the crucial African transit country to Europe received some attention (5%). Eritrea, with the highest share of migrants to Europe during the study, attracted less than 1%. ‘Africa as a continent’ was the ‘main country’ in 3% of the articles. Little at all was said about who African migrants and refugees are and why they actually decide to leave.

**Figure 15: Types of national main actors of migration coverage**



Source: Author’s own diagram, data retrieved from Fengler et al. (2020b).

However, African media paid even less attention. Instead, accidents and disasters in the Mediterranean Sea dominated the coverage in African media. Migration coverage in African countries neglected the people: Only 13% of main actors in the African media coverage were citizens – authorities and politicians dominated the news. Coverage was focused on authorities and lacked a human face: African newspapers nearly twice as often named international actors (relief organizations, etc.) as acting key actors (more than a third of all actors in Africa altogether). ‘Elitist’ actors such as political actors (presidents, government representatives or opposition politicians), state authorities (judiciary, police, military or intelligence services) and ‘elitist’ international actors such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) dominated. It needs to be mentioned that the study finds support for many of the shortcomings of foreign coverage in general, as described by Hafez (2002). Besides negativism, politicization and elitism, de-contextualization was especially evident. Economic and cultural aspects were almost invisible, as were structural problems of migration (see also Module 3; Fengler et al., 2020a; Fengler et al., 2018).

To triangulate the content analysis of media coverage in Africa and Europe, the EBI research team additionally conducted qualitative panel discussions with African migrants in Germany (Zappe et al., 2020). According to this study, participants agreed that matters of migration and forced displacement were hardly treated in the media in their home countries. In particular, specific information in this area had been scarce; the little information they had prior to their migration decision was almost entirely from personal sources. In addition, there were repeated references to deficits in the truthfulness of such information, mediated as well as interpersonal, as this contribution by a Senegalese migrant shows: “In Senegal, you do not have the truth. They do not tell you the truth. You get the truth when you are here” (cited in Zappe et al., 2020, p. 136). It should be noted, however, that the participants pointed out that this may have changed slowly for the better in recent years. Participants also highlighted a distorted picture of the German reality of life in African media and society, which, among other things, repeatedly implied the idea that financial success is almost guaranteed. Interviewees demanded that African media should draw a more balanced picture of Europe: “Our journalists in Africa, for whatever reason, refuse to show [...] also the negative parts of Europe, like I keep telling people in Africa. [...] And that is why journalism in Africa, I think, plays also some role



**SUGGESTION FOR AN EXERCISE TO ADDRESS THE COGNITIVE SKILLS OF ANALYZING AND THE AFFECTIVE SKILLS OF RECEIVING:**

Why do media in the Global North pay much more attention to the coverage of migration? Compare the political and societal implications of migration and forced displacement in origin and destination countries, as well as cultural patterns and ethical norms. Provide the participants with the necessary information and let them describe the potential impact for media coverage. Keep in mind the potential impact of different media systems and issues affecting journalism as well as the potential hindrances to migration coverage.

that people migrate” (said a Ghanaian migrant, cited in Zappe et al., 2020, p. 136). Not only migration from Africa to Europe, but also pan-African migration is, according to the experiences of the participants in the discussion, only sporadically addressed by the media. Here as well, interpersonal communication dominates when communicating information. For more details, see the working paper provided by Zappe et al. (2020) available for download on our project website.

### Migration and international news flows

The analysis of migration coverage must also be embedded into the discussion about news flows and foreign coverage in both the Global South and North, as initiated historically by several United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) studies (MacBride, 1980; Sreberny-Mohammadi et al., 1985; UNESCO, 1954) with long-lasting impact on the scholarly agenda. Hafez (2002, p. 24) understands foreign coverage as any system of journalistic information, “in the course of which information and news cross state borders”. It has basic structures and characteristics: Foreign coverage frequently focuses on politics, and political elites are at the centre of reporting (Hafez, 2002). Foreign coverage is also characterized by ethnocentrism (Meier, 1984), regionalism (Sreberny-Mohammadi et al., 1985) and domestication (Kamps, 2008), through which the media anchor international events in a ‘national world of perception’. An equally characteristic structural feature of foreign reporting is a dominant negativism, which can be found especially in crisis and conflict issues.

Given the deficits in international news flows, reporting about Africa remains a specific challenge. Segev (2014, p. 425) states “[a]t the global level, under-represented countries were mostly from Africa”. Studies on reporting about Africa in European media identify numerous deficits, especially the emphasis on conflict reporting about Africa, and Western frames dominating the coverage (Mükke, 2009). A negative bias in the coverage by Western media about Africa is created through focusing on topics such as war, crises, disasters, diseases, corruption, and crime (EL Zein & Cooper,



#### **SUGGESTION FOR AN EXERCISE TO ADDRESS THE COGNITIVE SKILLS OF ANALYZING AND THE AFFECTIVE SKILLS OF RECEIVING:**

Let the participants analyse the foreign coverage in your country in a discussion about the following questions:

1. How do you evaluate foreign coverage in your country?
2. How is your country being reported about abroad?
3. Which stereotypical assumptions do you have about countries in the Global North/Global South, and where do they come from?
4. How can the shortcomings in foreign coverage outlined above possibly impact migration coverage?
5. What can you as a journalist do to change this?

1992; Mengara, 2001). While some current studies conclude that the African continent continues to be a 'blind spot' for foreign reporting (Franks, 2010; Serwornoo, 2018), others point towards a recent decline of "Afro-pessimism" in the Western press (for Australia: Obijiofor & Hanusch, 2011; Obijiofor & MacKinnon, 2016; for the US and UK: Scott, 2015), and put sharp criticism of Western coverage of Africa into perspective (Nothias, 2016).

African scholars have tackled the issue of representation of Africa in the 'Western' media as well (notably Obijiofor & Hanusch, 2011; Serwornoo, 2018; Wa'Njogu, 2009). Oguh (2015) argues that most media fail to keep pace with the actual developments in African countries, for example with the booming urbanization that contrasts the recurrent depiction of 'rural' Africa. According to Wa'Njogu (2009), this problem can be attributed to the reality that a lot of the global news about Africa is not issued by African media organisations, but by Europeans. In addition to endogenous factors, the news about Africa is also shaped by media structures. The lack of news agencies in Africa, a shrinking number of foreign correspondents on the ground and the limited knowledge about Africa among editors in Europe often leads to a rather stereotyped selection and adaptation of news (Hafez, 2005; Mücke, 2009; Stürmer, 2013). Negativism and a conflict perspective also play a role in Africa, because the negative image of Africa in Western media interacts with the self-perception of African actors (see Hall, 1997; Mengara, 2001).

Michael Yao Serwornoo PhD, professor of journalism in Ghana, has conducted a pilot study on the image of Africa in the Ghanaian press (Serwornoo, 2018). His analysis concludes that Africa is mostly represented with the same frames as Western media uses, as African media rely on sources from the Global North even for the coverage of neighbouring African countries. Due to the lack of original coverage, poor editing, lack of space due to advertising policy, and assumptions about the public's interest in political affairs, the quality of foreign coverage remains extremely low, and political and economic problems that trigger the causes of the migration crises in Africa remain rarely invisible in the African media. Asante, Sun, and Long (2013) conclude that "Africa [...] is victimized by her inherent weakness of media outlets". Also, little research has been conducted on the pressing problem that African media tend to marginalize other African countries, frequently due to lack of newsroom resources, which may have a severe impact for example on potential bilateral trade options (Turkson, 2012). Consequently, Ogunyemi (2011) asks whether the internet could be a valuable tool for creating more truthful representations of Africa due to participation via social media.


### **Cross-country studies of migration coverage II: Europe, USA, Russia**

A second multi-country study by the EBI compares migration coverage in 17 countries in Western and Eastern Europe, the United States and Russia. The study analyses reporting in six exemplary weeks between August 2015 and March 2018 (Fengler & Kreutler, 2020).<sup>2</sup> We will highlight some key

2 The study weeks were selected on the basis of a preliminary study in eight media, in which the weeks with the highest increase in the number of articles compared to the previous week were identified. Details on the methodology of the study and an overview over the articles retrieved per country are available online: Fengler and Kreutler (2020).

results here, while the full text is available online on the project website. The study has retrieved a total of 2,417 articles for the six selected study weeks between August 2015 and March 2018 (see Figure 16). Significant differences in the intensity of reporting about migration and forced displacement across countries were evident during the study weeks. Coverage in Germany and Hungary – the two countries with highest numbers of first-time asylum applicants in 2015 – stands out in terms of

**Figure 16: Number of articles on migration published during the six study weeks**



Acronym Outlets: FAZ – *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*; EFSYN – *Efimerida ton Syntakton*; NZZ – *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*. For outlets with more than 100 articles, 100 articles were random-selected. Periods of analysis: 31.08.-06.09.15, 09.11-15.11.15, 04.01-10.01.16, 09.10.-15.10.17, 11.12.-17.12.17, 19.02.-25.02.18. Source: Fengler and Kreutler (2020, p. 20). Own illustration.

volume. In other European media, the topic receives much less attention. A high number of articles was also found in the international leading media (The New York Times and The Guardian).

Also, many European media treat matters of migrants and refugees as a “foreign topic”, taking place far away from users’ own country. A focus on migration as a domestic topic is only apparent in Italy, Germany and Greece. French and British media see their country involved on an international scale, as well as the Hungarian media – the latter certainly a consequence of the political focus placed by the country’s government on alleged dangers and burdens of migration. In the Italian media, and partly in the French media, immigrants from Africa dominate the media coverage; other countries in Europe focus on migrants and refugees from the Near and Middle East. In the Russian Federation, immigrants from Eastern Ukraine are reflected. Also, it often seems to be impossible for the journalists to differentiate between refugees with the respective rights under the Geneva Convention and other migrants. Journalists may also be unfamiliar with the definitions themselves, as most of the articles (60%) mention a mix of various status groups, or the status question remains unclear. We have however observed that the proportion of articles that clearly speak of refugees with the relevant rights decreased over the study period.

Western European and left-leaning or liberal media focus more on the situation of, and aid for, migrants and refugees, while Central and Eastern European and more right-wing or conservative media focus on problems and protests. Yet, in almost all countries, audiences do have a choice, as the two leading media studied offered different positions on the topic. The analysis of the main actors underlines again the policy focus in migration reporting particularly in regard to the acting persons and institutions. It is actually a government focus. In 37% of the articles the government, or a single actor of the government or ruling party, is the main actor; opposition actors are described as main actors in only 2% of the articles. Migrants represent a total of 26.6% of the main actors, but they are more often represented by large, anonymous groups than individuals or small groups such as families, whose members could still be experienced as individuals. By a factor of ten, more non-migrants than migrants are quoted directly or indirectly. These results underline previous studies on the specificities of migration reporting, but they also show some differences between the countries studied. For example, the two US newspapers surveyed are those which portray more individual migrants and refugees, possibly as a result of a journalistic professional ethos that aligns with the goal to giving ‘a voice to the voiceless’.



**SUGGESTION FOR AN EXERCISE TO ADDRESS THE COGNITIVE SKILLS OF ANALYSING AND THE AFFECTIVE SKILLS OF RESPONDING:**

Discuss the findings of this study. Which of these problems can be seen in the different media? Which hinderances and obstacles may be faced by journalists and newsrooms? What is the potential impact of shortcomings in the coverage of migration and forced displacement?



### SUGGESTED ASSIGNMENT:

- to address the cognitive skills of analyzing and the affective skills of responding (A,) or
- to address the cognitive skills of analyzing and creating (B):

**(A)** Let the participants select one sample country and ask them to prepare presentations/produce a podcast/create a poster on the challenges for the coverage of migration and forced displacement in a changing journalistic environment.

**(B)** Download the codebook from our project website. Ask students to form groups and conduct a content analysis for media in your country, for a selected time period (e.g. four weeks), with their results being presented in the last session. Ask them to compare the media coverage in your country with the media coverage in the countries studied in the research from Fengler and Kreutler (2020).



### RECOMMENDED READING:

#### **Journalistic:**

Fengler, S., & Kreutler, M. (2020a). Migration coverage in Europe's media: A comparative analysis of coverage in 17 countries. Frankfurt/Main: OBS Working Paper 39.

#### **Academic:**

Chinje, E. (2016). "Europe Has to Deal with the Causes of Migration from Africa." Retrieved December 20, 2020, from <http://www.theafricancourier.de/europe/europe-has-to-deal-with-the-causes-of-migration-from-africa-eric-chinje/> (accessed 22nd June 2018).

#### **Institutional:**

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## MODULE 5

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# Migration Coverage – Media Effects and Professional Challenges

by Anna-Carina Zappe



## MODULE AIMS

- To sensitize participants to the relevance of media effects when reporting about migrants and refugees.
- To address the impact of media coverage on national and international media audiences.
- To highlight professional challenges with which journalists covering migrants and refugees are confronted.



## LEARNING OUTCOMES

At the end of this module, participants should be able:

- To discuss the relevance of key models of media effects for migration coverage.  
→ **Affective LO: Responding**
- To examine the factors challenging professional coverage of migrants and refugees for different countries. → **Cognitive LO: Analysing**
- To critically assess the potential ethical implications of stories matters concerning migrants and refugees. → **Cognitive LO: Evaluating**

## Outline

Journalists can be considered “contemporary historians” (Feinstein et al., 2018, p. 1), recording events of national and global relevance. Migration and forced displacement, as stated in the preceding modules, are truly relevant global – as well as local – issues, which need to be documented. Professional and thoughtful migration coverage requires more than professional skills and factual knowledge, but also sensitivity for the effects of one’s own reporting. Media have an impact on (potential) migrants or refugees as well as on people in transit and destination countries; media can impact political decision-makers and decision-making-processes; media can shape public perceptions of issues and images of people.<sup>1</sup> This confronts journalists with a range of professional challenges. In addition, covering migration and matters concerning refugees is of course influenced by many other factors.<sup>2</sup> This module also looks at barriers that journalists face in reporting on the matters concerning migrants and refugees.

1 There is a great deal more research on the general impact of the media on public opinion, election campaigns and politics, and additionally on discrimination, discriminatory media language against immigrants or otherness of immigrants in the media – which of course can also be critically discussed. In addition, media theories like the ‘uses and gratifications theory’ or ‘cultural studies’ even more strongly acknowledge the active role of the audience in the flow of information. The relevance of the audience is discussed in Module 13, which in turn can influence media content through its use of media. Because this module is primarily intended to introduce the topic and to invite reflection about media effects and migrants and refugees in a first step, only the selected core aspects mentioned are given attention.

2 It includes the “political economy” of migration coverage. Hence, the structures that enable or hinder such coverage like the economic, political, cultural or technological structures, and related ideology can influence the media and do their part to shape the narrative on migration in different parts of the world or even globally.

## Public opinion on migration


A study from the International Organization for Migration (IOM), in which 183,000 adults across more than 140 countries have been interviewed between 2012 and 2014, revealed that 34% of respondents across the world would like to see immigration decreased, 21% increased, 22% kept at its present level and 22% did not give opinion (Esipova et al., 2015). That was at a time when the so-called ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015 had not yet reached Europe and the Global North (see Figure 17).

Nevertheless, according to the IOM study, people in Europe seemed to hold most negative views towards immigration, with the majority (52%) saying immigration levels should be decreased. In Africa, 40% wanted to decrease immigration into their countries (Esipova et al., 2015).

With the increase of migrants and refugees coming to Europe in 2015, the prioritization of the topic also changed. Migration became a number one topic – one of which people are critical. According to a Eurobarometer study conducted in November 2016 with more than 32,000 European respondents, immigration was perceived as the number one issue, ahead of terrorism and the economy (European Commission, 2016). In August 2015, when the German chancellor Angela Merkel said “Wir schaffen das” (“We can do this”), and a transformation in the political atmosphere in Europe and around the world started, reactions were polarized (Thränhardt, 2019).

**Figure 17: Attitudes towards immigration by region (in percent)**


“In your view, should immigration in this country be kept at its present level, increased or decreased?”



Notes: \*Total group results are weighed by population size. Figures might not add up to 100% due to rounding.  
Source: Esipova et al. (2015, p. 8). Own illustration.

The threat assessment of the so-called ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015 varied across Europe (Poushter, 2016). A 2016 survey by the Pew Research Center indicated that many Europeans (a median of 59% across 10 European countries) were concerned that the influx of refugees will increase the likelihood of terrorism and impose a burden on their countries. However, this insight differentiates between the countries: 76% said this in Hungary and 71% in Poland, but only 46% in France and 40% in Spain (Poushter, 2016).

Attitudinal variations were revealed in a survey conducted by the Pew Research Center in 2018 that involved 27 countries on five continents: Europe (11), Asia (6), American (5), African (4) and Oceania (1). The survey (see Figure 18) indicates that people in those countries in Europe, which have been entry points for large numbers of migrants and refugees, were more critical towards migration. Especially respondents in Greece (82%), Hungary (72%) and Italy (71%) said they wanted fewer or no immigrants in their countries. However, respondents in four African countries under study were more positive towards immigrants into their country – Nigeria (50%), Kenya (60%) and South Africa (65%); all countries that hosted tens of thousands of migrants and refugees in the past years. In Tunisia, the fourth country on the African continent that was surveyed, even less than half (42%) of people surveyed were against immigration. In addition, the share of



people who want more immigration was also higher in all four countries (Tunisia: 20 %, Nigeria: 20 %, Kenya: 15 %, South Africa: 11 %) than the European median (10 %) was (Connor & Krogstad, 2018; Migration Data Portal, 2020).<sup>3</sup> Another survey in seven European countries (the UK, Spain, Germany, Sweden, Poland, Hungary, Romania) indicates that immigration was perceived more as a threat than a benefit across Europe. An (economic and cultural) benefit was only associated with migrants from within Europe, while safety threats were particularly associated with migrants from Africa and the Middle East (Meltzer et al., 2018).

Recent survey results suggest that the attitudes towards immigration in the Global North have not turned positive: A study about migration narratives in Europe through conversations on public social media showed that the conversations are dominated “by a resoundingly anti-migration stance” (Rinke, 2019, p. 5).<sup>4</sup> Such attitudes do not remain without consequences and can be mirrored in politics and in the media and vice versa.<sup>5</sup>

### Election campaigns and migration

In recent years, many populist parties across Europe have exploited widespread fears and insecurities about the impact of growing migration and forced displacement on European societies. The debates about migrants and refugees heavily impact election campaigns across Europe. However, migration debates have also impacted election campaigns in Africa. Here are some recent examples:<sup>6</sup>

- Kenya 2017: Before the 2017 presidential election in Kenya, the government announced that they would close the Somali migrant and refugee camps. Although the High Court ultimately blocked this as unconstitutional, it suggested that the rise in terrorism had prompted this as a political strategy (Warah, 2016; Whitaker, 2019). The acting president Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta won in the election after a noteworthy election period.<sup>7</sup>
- South Africa 2019: The issue of xenophobia played a major role in the national and provincial election campaign. The Democratic Alliance party’s campaign poster read e.g. “secure our borders”. They became the second largest party with 20.77 % of the vote, which is a slight reduction compared to the previous election. Nevertheless, the far-left political party Economic Freedom Fighters was one of the fastest-growing parties in the 2019 election, increasing its share of the vote from 6 % to 10 % (Electoral Commission of South Africa, 2019; Sguazzin, 2019).

3 At the same time, more than 60% of people in each of the four African countries worried about people leaving their home for jobs in other countries (Connor & Krogstad, 2018).

4 Further studies and current figures about public opinion on migration can be found at the Migration Data Portal (2020).

5 The opinion in societies on the issues of migration and forced displacement is of course not only influenced by or dependent on the media on its own. Economic, political, cultural and technological, and related ideologies or events like the economic and financial crisis also shape parts of the world or also global understanding of these movements.

6 In the following, contexts are presented, but it is not necessarily said that there is a causal correlation with regard to election results and people’s attitudes towards migrants and/or refugees.

7 For further examples of electoral success and acting of anti-immigrant political parties in Africa, see Whitaker (2019).

- The UK 2015: The election was considered to be important for the entire EU, as anti-EU movements such as the UK Independence Party (UKIP) which were promoting the UK to leave the EU, had received significant support in recent years. UKIP rose to be the third largest party by votes. The topic of migration was used extensively by UKIP to highlight the perceived disadvantages of EU membership (Evans & Mellon, 2019).
- Austria 2017: The Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), a populist and national-conservative party, received 26 % of the voter’s share and thus came in as the third-strongest party in parliament. News media refers to the party as the “anti-immigration Freedom Party” (“Austria far right”, 2017).
- Germany 2017: The Alternative for Germany (AfD) party, previously not represented in the German parliament, became the third-strongest party in the Bundestag, with about 13% of the votes in the federal elections. In the state of Saxony, it was even the strongest party in the 2017 federal election. The so-called ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015 changed the political scene in Germany. The AfD voiced – sometimes aggressively – widespread concerns about Chancellor Angela Merkel’s asylum policy (Decker, 2020; Hanewinkel, 2017).
- Italy 2018: The Lega party, a Eurosceptic and populist party, and their campaign against refugees and the political establishment received widespread support from voters, with 18% of the votes (Dobbert, 2018; “Italian elections 2018“, 2018).
- European Parliament 2019: The right-wing parties received 73 of the 751 seats in the parliament elections, which comprise about 10% (Europäisches Parlament, 2019). The media began to write about “a recent boom in voter support for right-wing and populist parties” (“Europe and right-wing”, 2019).

### Migration coverage and media users: potential effects

It can be assumed that media and journalists can influence public attitudes towards migration and forced displacement (Entman, 1993; Iyengar et al., 1984; McCombs & Shaw, 1972; Weaver, 2007). The level of influence depends partly on which aspects are visible to the public in the coverage of migrants and refugees and which are invisible.

#### SOME KEY MEDIA THEORIES ON MEDIA IMPACT

**Agenda-setting theory:** The Press “may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about” (Cohen, 1963; McCombs & Shaw, 1972, p. 177). Mass media shapes public perception by coverage, irrespective of frequency, of a certain issue, and by positioning the issue as high or low on the news agenda, thus prioritizing topics (Pürer, 2003).

**Priming theory:** Priming is not about a cognitive impact on media consumers, but an affective impact. The media agenda can change attitudes, assumptions, mindsets and, ultimately, choices, e.g. a voter's election decisions by drawing attention to some issues while ignoring others (Iyengar et al., 1984).

**Framing theory:** This theory is also known as second level agenda-setting, although these two concepts are different (Weaver, 2007). Entman (1993, p. 52) states that

“to frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described.”

**Exemplification:** These media stories have a different effect as compared to abstract descriptions (Fast et al., 2014). “[V]ivid examples, compared to pallid ones tend to foster superior accessibility” (Zillmann & Brosius, 2010, p. 48). As a consequence, exemplary descriptions of individuals as case studies may influence the judgment of media users (Brosius & Bathelt, 2016; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). “The fact that a news story can change opinion about a controversial issue based on the exemplars chosen to illustrate the points of debate, and not on information alone, is important” (Perry & Gonzenbach, 1997).<sup>8</sup>

Current relevant research results in the context of the coverage of migrants and refugees based on the agenda-setting, priming and/or framing approach show how media can potentially influence the audience (European Migration Network, 2018; IOM, 2019; UNHCR, n.d.):

- In an agenda-setting and framing theory study, Sogelola (2018) found out that in 2016, the UK's Daily Mail – before the Brexit referendum about leaving the European Union – raised the salience of immigration and framed it in a negative manner.
- Goedeke Tort et al. (2016) have looked at the media framing of immigrants in Germany in 2014. Of five frames, that of “criminal” was found to be the most dominant for migrants from South East Europe (44 %), but also existed for African migrants (more than 20 %). The valuation bias was more negative in this cluster than any other (94 %).
- In the Netherlands, researchers focused on attitudes towards migrants and found out that a focus on multicultural issues had a positive effect on the attitudes towards migrants, while victimization frames caused negative effects (Bos et al., 2016).

<sup>8</sup> In addition to the mentioned theories there are many more. Moreover, individual factors and smaller units of influence also come into play. Even single words can have an effect (see also module 10). For example, sometimes media usage of terms with very different meanings interchangeably or mixing up migrants, refugees, irregular migrants, internally displaced people (IDPs), mixed migration flows etc. can lead to negative reactions in the public. For definitions, please consult the glossaries recommended in Module 2 (EMN, 2018; IOM, 2019; UNHCR, n.d.).

- Lawlor (2015, p. 351) studied the framing of immigration in Canadian and British news media between 1999 and 2013 by a comparative analysis; her findings suggest that “there remains a strong undercurrent of negative debate in the mainstream news that cannot simply be attributed to those who are ‘anti-migration’.”
- Medianu (2014) found out that media portrayals of refugees in Canada may cause an (unintended) dehumanization of refugees – referring to the priming effect of Arendt (2013).

In addition, hostile media effects may occur when media users perceive news coverage of a conflict or controversial issue as being biased (Vallone et al., 1985). In Germany, Merten & Dohle (2019) studied the perception of media coverage on the so-called ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015 among Germans welcoming refugees, and Germans critical towards refugees.

“The results of the study show that hostile media perceptions occur in both groups, especially among the opponents of a refugee-friendly culture of welcome. The perceptions correlate with lower trust in the media, a worse evaluation of topic-specific reporting quality, and increased anger.” (Merten & Dohle, 2019, p. 274)

These results indicate that the news media’s reporting on migration in the Global North seems to put migration in a dominantly negative frame, which is likely to result to a certain extent in a negative influence on public opinion towards migrants and refugees in the Global North. For journalists who cover matters of migrants and refugees it is of particular interest to study what positively impacts on public perception. Articles framing a collective identity (by challenging the notion that immigrants get employment at expense of workers in the host community) tend to result in more positive attitudes toward immigrants.<sup>9</sup> In addition, promoting a common national ingroup that includes both non-immigrants and immigrants, though topics stressing common ethnic backgrounds and a common national identity, may also lead to more favourable attitudes towards immigrants (Esses et al., 2001; Esses et al., 2006; Meltzer et al., 2018). A study focusing on asylum law reporting in 2006 in Switzerland showed that positive campaign coverage of minorities has an impact on out-group attitudes in the public as well (Schemer, 2014).<sup>10</sup> While there are not any available studies from African countries analysing migration coverage using the models described above,<sup>11</sup> McDonald & Jacobs (2005) researched xenophobic coverage in Southern Africa countries, and found negative stereotypes of (im)migrants in the South African press, a strong pro- and anti-immigration split in Zimbabwe’s media and xenophobic media coverage in Botswana.

9 In this context, see for example the research of The Guardian. According to the newspaper, “[n]ew EU migrants have not had a significant impact on the employment prospects of British school-leavers”, but “almost half of British voters believe that the impact of immigration on employment underlies their sense of economic insecurity” (Howard, 2014).

10 Wojcieszak & Azrout (2016, p. 1051) showed “that mere exposure to outgroup members in the news is sufficient to improve attitudes”. The quantity of mediated contact with outgroup members decreased social distance and perceived threat as well as the contact quality, or exposure to higher number of positive over negative news stories about outgroup members (Wojcieszak & Azrout, 2016). “Thus, a positive or at least nonthreatening depiction of migrants” might have this impact, too (Meltzer et al., 2018, p. 16).

11 Onyebadi (2012) focuses on the newspaper agendas and public opinion in the 2007 Kenyan presidential election and demonstrates that the agenda setting theory can be found beyond its geographical origin in the United States of America (USA) and in Europe, Asia and Latin America.



### SUGGESTION FOR AN EXERCISE TO ADDRESS THE COGNITIVE SKILLS OF ANALYSING:

Organize a discussion (A) or use the jigsaw technique (B).

**(A)** Media scholars have developed different models to explain the way media can impact their users. These theories may also play a major role for the coverage of migrants and refugees. Even though social media gains more relevance for media users across the world, traditional mainstream media continues to influence – also via social media – what people know about migration. Re-discuss mass communication models and theories known to the participants from earlier classes in the light of the challenge covering migrants and refugees. The paragraphs in the info-box above (“Some key media theories on media impact”) may guide the discussion.

**(B)** Make an interactive presentation of media effects in the context covering migrants and refugees. Use the jigsaw technique, which is a method of organizing classroom activity that makes students dependent on each other to succeed. Break the class into groups. Each group has to prepare one media effect. Students gather into groups divided by topic. Each member presents the topic and the group has to prepare a poster to answer the question: “How does media affect opinion and politics in the context of matters concerning migrants and refugees?”

### ALTERNATIVE SUGGESTION FOR THE CLASSROOM TO ADDRESS THE AFFECTIVE SKILLS OF RESPONDING:

Construct reporting situations that call for decisions. For example: A crime that was committed by a migrant and the question, how relevant is the naming of the perpetrator’s and victim’s nationality, when reporting about the crime? Ask the participants how they would proceed. Then address the associated media effect (in this example: framing).

## CNN effect and the case of ‘Alan Kurdi’

The CNN effect describes the impact international media coverage has on policy-makers across the world. The model implies that global news networks, of which CNN has been one of the earliest examples, as well as the 24/7 news cycle have a considerable effect on the decision-making process of political leaders across the world, who may feel under public pressure to intervene into humanitarian situations and political crises they may not have a stake in otherwise (Robinson, 2002). “[I]t is commonly argued that intervention during the humanitarian crisis in northern Iraq (1991) and Somalia (1992) were particularly driven by news media coverage of suffering people”

(Robinson, 2002, p. 1).<sup>12</sup> Thus, in the context of the current migration movements, partly inflicted by crises and wars, political effects similar to the CNN effect can be observed:

- Both US-President Donald Trump and Barack Obama were confronted with horrible images from Syrian gas attacks that were reported worldwide (Doucet, 2018). In April 2017, images of dead and dying children from a chemical gas attack on Khan Sheikhoun in Syria went viral. According to a Washington Post article, President Donald Trump announced that the pictures had a big impact on him (Bahador, 2017). He reacted with statements like “something should happen” (Bash et al., 2017). It appeared to generate a shift in Trump’s Syria policy (Bahador, 2017). “Observations from the Trump and Obama administrations underline that the media were a key part of the constant pressure on policy-makers from politicians, pundits, and the array of powerful actors involved in the Syrian crisis” (Doucet, 2018, p. 154).
- A report in 2017 by CNN revealed that refugees in Libya were kept in shockingly inhumane conditions. The report showed how migrants were being sold by smugglers and that a slave market existed in Libya (“People for sale”, n. d.). The report caused worldwide reactions and for the first time also brought African politicians to action in that matter; for instance, Rwanda was subsequently “offering refuge to enslaved African migrants trapped in Libya” (Said-Moorhouse, 2017). Also, the political leaders discussed the topic at the African Union-European Union summit (Smith-Spark, 2017). Interestingly, the IOM had pointed out the existence of migrants being auctioned as slaves in Libya before the CNN report. Still, only the alarming CNN report finally produced a major political reaction from Western and African politicians (Völlinger, 2017).

In recent publications, authors suggest a differentiated interpretation of the impact of global media on international politics (Gilboa, 2005; Gilboa et al., 2016). Nevertheless, media can impact people through the way they cover the matters concerning migrants and refugees. A striking illustration is the example of the image of Alan Shenu (often reported as “Aylan Kurdi”<sup>13</sup>), the three-year-old Syrian boy, who was found drowned on a beach in Turkey while trying to reach Europe with his family. The picture went viral and became a symbol of the refugee crisis in the Western world and the widespread international apathy until that point. Over-sized pictures of the boy’s dead body were published on newspaper frontpages and were shown on TV news across the globe. Data indicate that the picture made public opinion more welcoming of refugees (Sohlberg et al., 2018).<sup>14</sup> A cross-country study showed that in Portugal, UK, Germany and Italy positive humanitarian stories about migrants and refugees increased three-fold immediately after the photographs were published (EJO, 2015). Slovic et al. (2017) refer to data that illustrate the “iconic victim effect”<sup>15</sup>. Regarding policy implications, Burns (2015) has found expressions of sorrow by global political

12 The effect Al Jazeera’s reporting has had on politics, the so-called Al Jazeera effect, for instance in the Arab Spring e.g. in Egypt, has been cited as an example of a spin-off of the CNN effect. For further information see among others Seib (2008), Zingarelli (2010), Ricchiardi (2011).

13 The family is said to have changed their name when they came to Turkey (Elgot, 2015).

14 The increased support of liberal refugee policies was only brief and people increasingly saw the picture through an ideological lens just one month after Alan’s death (Sohlberg et al., 2018).

15 “The photograph of a single identified individual captured the attention of people and moved them to take interest and provide aid in ways that were not motivated by statistics of hundreds of thousands of deaths” (Slovic et al., 2017).

leaders and attested a correlation between the image and politicians' responses; a result also confirmed by Vis & Goriunova (2015). Getty Images vice-president Hugh Pinney adds another point:

“And the reason we're talking about it after it's been published is because it breaks a social taboo that has been in place in the press for decades: a picture of a dead child is one of the golden rules of what you never published.” (Laurent, 2015)

The question is: Why did journalists break this taboo? One possible explanation could be an attempt by journalists to get their stories out to the audience's attention (see Module 13). At a time when audiences are faced by an overload of pictures showing overcrowded boats bound for Europe, or of numerous stranded migrants in transit countries such as Libya, they quickly become used to such horrible images. These pictures also tell a very different story – not of individuals, but of large groups of migrants, making it easy to speak of “floods of migrants”. It is striking to observe that African migrants, in particular, are frequently not shown as individual migrants (see Module 4). Moreover, they are not depicted as migrants predominantly moving within their region – e.g. not leaving the continent (see Module 9). The one-dimensional reporting might invoke fears in the Global North against the “flood of migrants” coming to Europe – as statistics referenced at the beginning of this module partially show. Images with boats full of migrants or refugees or a mass of people arriving at the beaches seem to have become iconic images of the current migration debate (McAuliffe & Kitimbo, 2018). Thus, a photo with a single dead child might ensure more attention and also a different kind of attention. Overall, individualized stories can impact audiences (Brosius & Bathelt, 1994; Fast et al., 2014; Zillmann & Brosius, 2010). Media coverage of Alan Shenu is a striking example.



#### SUGGESTION FOR AN EXERCISE TO ADDRESS THE COGNITIVE SKILLS OF APPLYING AND ANALYSING:

Introduce the CNN effect, the effect of an individual and their scope in the field of the matters concerning migrants and refugees and use one of the videos to start a discussion:

- Vpro documentary about the image of Alan Shenu: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VcliHwsf8jl>
- CNN report about refugees in Libya: <https://edition.cnn.com/2017/11/14/africa/libya-migrant-auctions/index.html>

What are other examples of the CNN effect or the effect of an individual in the reporting about migrants and refugees?

To address the cognitive skills of evaluation, let participants judge the quality and potential ethical implication of reports creating this media effect based on their knowledge about media effects.

The story of Óscar Alberto Martínez Ramírez, who died with his 2-years-old daughter, Valeria, as they tried to cross the border from Mexico to USA, is another (see Module 11).

### Professional challenges

Journalists covering matters concerning migrants and refugees are not alone among the journalism profession in being confronted with a range of professional challenges. These range from a lack of resources (e.g. time, money, resources, personnel, knowledge and education) to sources with their own agenda, which spreads especially in times of social media, through to censorship and lack of press freedom. It is not uncommon for several factors to accumulate in one case. Of course, this is also evident when it comes to reporting on migrant and refugee matters.

**Dusan Mladjenovic, a Serbian TV journalist and anchor covering migration, provides examples from the south of Europe:**

“Over the years, journalists have many problems covering the migration issue. Migration centres are usually off limits for journalists, and journalists are only allowed to enter specific centres (those with best conditions for migrants). There is also an issue that officials in the region (Croatia, Hungary and Serbia) respond with limited or no answer to specific questions about the conditions and treatment of migrants. Migrants are often used for daily political topics. [...] These issues come in favour for the actual nationalistic leaderships in both countries.”



Source: Private.



**SUGGESTION FOR THE CLASSROOM TO ADDRESS THE COGNITIVE SKILLS OF ANALYSING:**

Ask participants to think about challenges journalists face when covering migrants and refugees (1) and how they are related to the situation in their country (2).

1. Conduct a guided mind-mapping exercise. In this process, participants think about challenges journalists face when covering migrants and refugees. On the basis of the national context (media system, journalistic role models, culture, etc.) participants will identify professional challenges for their specific journalistic context.

2. Check the situation in a country of your choice: How are the resources for journalists? How is the freedom of the press, censorship, media law and corruption? What is the role of social media in relation to news in the country, for instance?

### Lack of resources

Resources are needed first and foremost. Already in 2015, it was reported that:

“[N]ewsrooms are depleted, having seen large-scale retrenchments in recent years, and newspapers are unable to do the kind of day-to-day reporting they did a few years ago. There are few specialist reporters and certainly none who have expertise in the migration question, even though it has been a major political and economic issue.” (White, 2015, p. 96)

Across the globe, newsrooms are shrinking, and a diminishing journalistic workforce struggles to cope with complexities in an ever more competitive digitized media eco-system (Cision, 2019; Hanitzsch et al., 2019). As the UK’s *The Guardian* published regarding the African media landscape: “A shortage of money and skills leaves local reporters struggling to compete with big Western media outlets” (Allison, 2013). Too often, African journalists lack education and resources to do their own research. One writer assesses that there is an “increase in the number of journalism and communication qualifications offered by public and private journalism training colleges [...], the quality of the output is still lacklustre” (Manda, 2018, p. 35). Journalists also lack a wide range of professional (African) news agencies to quickly access international content from an African perspective. Due to their economic weakness, African media hardly have any correspondents in neighboring countries, and therefore use the information from global news agencies – they in turn have hardly any correspondents in Africa (Mükke, 2009; Sturmer, 2013; Wittmann, 2006). The overwhelming majority of newspapers across the African continent use sources like Reuters, the Associated Press (AP), Agence France Presse and the BBC, as well as Al-Jazeera and increasingly also Chinese sources. In the field of migration reporting the consequences can vary from a spread of stereotypes to an omission of entire topics or aspects (see Module 10).

Moreover, journalists and the media are – more or less worldwide – under financial pressure. This can also be a challenge for reporting on migrants and refugees. On the one hand, immigrants are seldom part of the addressed audience (see Module 13), and in reverse the media might not feel a need to report about them with a high expenditure of resources. Module 4 already showed only certain topics concerning migrants and refugees attract media attention. For example, when there is xenophobic violence, media coverage is extensive and detailed; otherwise, migrants appear

mostly in crime reports, or are not present in media (White, 2015). Expensive research for a topic – where it can be simply be overtaken by a press report about disasters that generate news content – does not seem to fit in the budget for many media. Of course, there are exceptions and complex research and digital platforms that make networking possible exist – some can be found as (good practice) examples in the Modules 10-13. Nonetheless, the financial situation remains an influencing factor and a challenge. This also includes questions about the ownership of the media outlets and what else the proprietors own.

Overall, the lack of resources is a challenge that is particularly important in complex issues such as migration and forced displacement. The more complicated a topic is, the more knowledge journalists should bring with them and the more time, money, resources, personnel and education are needed. If these resources are fundamentally lacking, it is a particular challenge. Regarding the coverage of the matters concerning migrants and refugees with the focus on Africa, this means that reporting from that continent often only barely scratches the surface (Allison, 2013). But also elsewhere in the world articles on that topic which are well-founded, well-researched, and multi-faceted are rare (see Module 4).

### **Stereotypes and bias**

The very small number of (African) news agencies and of foreign correspondents (from African and from European countries based in Africa), and the lack of factual knowledge about (African) countries can lead to a rather stereotyped selection and adaptation of content (Hafez, 2005; Mükke, 2009; Sturmer, 2013). Particularly when it comes to the coverage of migrants and refugees, it is important not to simply report stereotypes (see Module 10). Journalists have to keep in mind that migrants are generally a very heterogeneous group, and differentiated into sub-groups (women, children, especially unaccompanied children, people with disabilities, LGBTI people, etc.). The fact that the editorial offices and journalists themselves could be more multi-cultural and have a migration background could encourage more diverse reporting with fewer stereotypes.

In addition, news content from the Global North may be likely to contain implicit or explicit bias (Bailey, 2018). This bias may then be passed on unfiltered to African audiences. Relying on news sources from other political and media contexts accelerates the risk that African newsrooms omit their own, regional, national or continental perspectives, which would be necessary frameworks to fully understand the relevance and impact of migration movements within African countries (see Module 9). A related professional challenge – other than the lack of skills and knowledge, education and training of journalists – is the absence of intra-African networks to connect with colleagues from neighbouring countries (Zappe, 2015). These consequences of a lack of resources do not only apply to Africa and the reporting there and about it. Similar consequences can occur in other regions of the world under these conditions.

## Press freedom and sources with own agenda

If professional and ethical journalism standards in a country are low, or journalists have no chance to do their job based on profound research, media loses credibility and trust. Local media structures, media systems and political conditions also play a major role for the journalistic work in this context. The degree of media freedom in a country – measured by “pluralism, independence of the media, quality of legislative framework and safety of journalists” as indicators (Reporters Without Borders, 2019) – may also have a strong impact on the freedom of journalists to pursue stories focusing on migrants and refugees (Cottle et al., 2016). Organizations and associations like Transparency International (Transparency International, n.d.), Reporters without Borders (Reporters Without Borders, n.d.), Freedom House (Freedom House, n.d.) and others inform about the situation of the press all over the world.

Additionally, journalists need to be aware that sources may be very likely to pursue their own agenda. With the rise of social media, “the once clear lines between independent journalism, public relations and advertising, and activism or propaganda have blurred with new corporate and government players entering what once would have been deemed the journalism arena” (Wahl-Jorgensen et al., 2016, p. 810). The new media eco-system puts at risk the role of journalists as “contemporary historians” (Feinstein et al., 2018, p. 1).

This development – a combination of a lack of resources, the power of social media and the influence of third parties on news – can be hazardous. This counts especially with such a sensitive and controversial topic, as the numbers about people’s attitudes at the beginning of this module showed. Here are some examples related to migration and refugee coverage:

- The British newspaper The Guardian interviewed several employees of the Hungarian state TV network who believed the anti-migrant messages in coverage often come directly from officials. (Noland & Walker, 2018).
- In a European survey, a number of Italian journalists covering migration “highlighted a high degree of managerial direction – sometimes to the point of interference – as well as significant influence from both internal (such as proprietors) and external (such as political parties, the Catholic church, commercial bodies and trades unions) sources. This may affect their autonomy in both the choices of and shaping of stories” (Karstens et al., 2018, p. 40).
- People from The Gambia move across the Sahara to Libya and then continue by boat to Europe. Many have died on their way. But in 2015 in The Gambia, reporting about migration of large numbers of these people was described as limited and stories about the hardship migrants endure were rare. “Censorship or a lack of resources – or a combination of both – are mainly to blame for the inadequacies of coverage. Self-censorship, where reporters do not want to offend either their media employer or the government, is also an issue” (White, 2015, p. 6).

- In February 2019, Uganda was hosting more than 1.2 million refugees, which was at that time the highest number in the country's history (UNHCR, 2019). Although Uganda is one of the largest host countries in the world, this is not reflected in coverage. Instead, “global media did not give adequate reporting to Uganda’s situation compared to coverage given to movement across the Mediterranean Sea” (Media Challenge Expo, 2018, p. 8). The assumed reasons for this lack of adequate coverage are that African media lacks resources to cover the story from inside Uganda and put it on the global news agenda, and often poorly-trained media workers have to deal with political pressure and manipulation (Media Challenge Expo, 2018).
- In Africa, much of the media focus on people striving to leave the continent. But many migrants are also moving to South Africa, which in turn is challenging for South African newsrooms (see Module 9).

It is important to be aware of these challenges, and to know how to deal with them. Modules 10-13 offer suggestions how to overcome these challenges.



**SUGGESTED ASSIGNMENT TO ADDRESS THE COGNITIVE SKILLS OF ANALYSING AND EVALUATING (A) AS WELL AS THE AFFECTIVE SKILLS OF RESPONDING (B):**

**(A)** Participants should choose a foreign country or get offered an unknown media outlet from a foreign country and should be asked to link the journalists’ challenges there with the root causes (freedom of the press, financial situation of media outlets ...). How are structural features related to challenges journalists face? Let the participant find reports in the media that can illustrate the challenges. Ask them to reflect on the potential ethical implications.

**(B)** Let them also include the media effects for covering migrants and refugees as challenges journalists are faced with. Ask for a brief written discussion of the connections “media effects”, “professional challenges” and “root causes” based on the example of a selected country.



**RECOMMENDED READING:**

**Academic:**

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**Journalistic:**

Laurent, O. (2015, September 4). What the image of Aylan Kurdi says about the power of photography. *Time Magazine*. Retrieved March 29, 2019, from <https://time.com/4022765/aylan-kurdi-photo/>

**Institutional:**

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## MODULE 6

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### Case Study Guinea-Bissau (West Africa)

by Monika Lengauer



### MODULE AIMS

- To understand a case study from an underreported African country.
- To present selected push and pull factors for a country recognized with low human development indicators.
- To sensitize participants for the human story behind numbers.



### LEARNING OUTCOMES

At the end of this module, in parallel to previous case studies so they are all internationally comparable, participants should be able:

- To discuss the complexity of decisions made by migrants and refugees.  
→ **Affective LO: Responding**
- To explain what the audiences need to know about migration so they are empowered to make informed decisions. → **Cognitive LO: Understanding**
- To use knowledge and sources to prepare a short country profile and a short profile on migration and forced displacement. → **Cognitive LO: Applying**
- To analyse – from a global perspective – the country case study of Guinea-Bissau.  
→ **Cognitive LO: Analysing**

### Outline

Guinea-Bissau is uniquely positioned to put Lusophone countries on the map to investigate African issues of migrants and refugees, in addition to the widely used case studies from Anglophone and Francophone Africa.<sup>1</sup> Guinea-Bissau is an under-researched and under-reported country, not only in academia and journalism, but also in global studies. Guinea-Bissau, however, showcases some important context factors of migration and forced displacement, for instance poverty, but also recognition of stateless people. The country has been confined to the lowest ranks of human development since independence in 1974, and the population has been trapped in a cycle of political instability, corruption, poverty and lack of opportunities.

### Country profile

Guinea-Bissau is a small coastal West African country. It is small by land size (36,000 km<sup>2</sup>)<sup>2</sup> and population (2 million), particularly in comparison to its direct neighbours Guinea (13 million people and 250,000 km<sup>2</sup>) and Senegal (17 million people and 200,000 km<sup>2</sup>). In Europe, Guinea-Bissau compares in surface area to Belgium, and in population numbers to Latvia, all being coastal countries (UNdata, 2019).

1 Six African countries are Lusophone or Portuguese speaking (Angola, Cape Verde, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, São Tomé and Príncipe; CPLP, 2020).

2 Numbers and decimals are rounded in this text, keeping a good balance between accuracy and readability.

It is estimated that the population of Guinea-Bissau will grow from today's 2 million to over 3.5 million by 2050 (UNDESA, 2019b, pp. 24-25). Fertility will go down from 4.51 live births per woman (2015-2020) to 3 live births per woman (2045-2050; UNDESA, 2019b, pp. 138-139), and the average annual rate of population growth will decline from 2.5% (2015-2020) to 1.65% (2045-2050; UNDESA, 2019b, p. 59).

The population of Guinea-Bissau is ethnically diverse.<sup>4</sup> Islam is the dominant religion, Christianity is a minority and the practice of indigenous animist beliefs is widespread. People speak many distinct languages which obviously affects the practice and impact of journalism and journalism education. The official language is Portuguese but people usually speak Kriol (Creole) or a variety of native African languages (Ocrisse-Aka & Bossard, 2006).

Guinea-Bissau's land is lush, green and fertile; its unique biodiversity comprises pristine national parks, dense tropical forests, vast agricultural lands, rivers, mangrove swamps and an archipelago with dozens of islands. This dormant economic potential comprises timber production, bauxite and phosphate extraction, and high-value international tourism. The advantageous geographical location is conducive to maritime and inland waterway transport and trade. Albeit, this richness lies fallow. Agricultural products, mainly cashew nuts, are sold unprocessed and much of the economy is not monetized, based instead on bartering. Public sector management is challenged in serving society beyond the political and military elites. Guinea-Bissau underperforms relative to most of its peers in West Africa,<sup>5</sup> which is reflected in the HDI (UNDP, 2019c, pp. 300-303). On an optimistic note, development has occurred. The country's overall human development value improved continuously since 2010 (UNDP, 2019a) despite losing three ranks between 2013 and 2018 (UNDP, 2019c, p. 306). Life expectancy has increased by almost eight years for women and nine for men since the year 2000 and is now at 61 years for women and 57 years for men<sup>6</sup> (UNDESA, 2019b, pp. 188-189). The life expectancy in the other two case studies of this handbook is 62 years for women and 59 years for men in Cameroon, 84 years for German women and 80 years for German men (UNDESA, 2019b, pp. 180-215). Bissau-Guineans have a healthy life expectancy<sup>7</sup> of 52 years (Cameroonians: 55 years; Germans: 70 years; UNDP, 2019b, pp. 6-9).

Guinea-Bissau stands out as the “first sub-Saharan African nation [that] unilaterally declared its sovereignty from European colonialism following a protracted armed struggle. Most African nations gained their independence from colonial powers by negotiation and peaceful transfer of authority” (Lobban, 1974, p. 15). The high hopes of independence were superseded by decades of disillusion

3 Data refer to a 5-year period preceding the reference year (UNdata, 2019).

4 Fula (25%), Balanta (25%), Mandingo (14%), Papel (9%), Manjaca (9%) and Mancanha people according to UNIOGBIS (2020).

5 Member countries making up the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Senegal and Togo (ECOWAS, 2016; only Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger and Sierra Leone have a lower HDI rank than Guinea-Bissau; UNDP, 2019c, pp. 300-303).

6 Data refers to a 5-year period preceding the reference year (UNdata, 2019).

7 Healthy life expectancy at birth is defined as the average number of years that a person can expect to live in full health by taking into account years lived in less than full health because of disease and injury (UNDP, 2019b, p. 9, Notes).

through chronic political instability with coup d'états and political assassinations. The year 2019 promised to mark a historic turning point: For the first time, a president completed an uninterrupted five year mandate, democratic legislative elections were held in March, followed by the presentation of a gender-balanced cabinet in July and presidential elections in November with a second round in December. Last but not least, the judicial police seized its largest ever quantity of cocaine (almost 800 kilograms) on 9 March 2019, the night before the legislative elections, and six months later a further 1,800 kilograms. However, a subsequent report assessed there had been “a reconstituting of the old military criminal entrepreneur network that has been responsible for trafficking in Guinea-Bissau since 2007” (Shaw & Gomes, 2020, p. 14). The US, in July 2020, expressed concerns “whether or not the political will exists to do the necessary in terms of stopping the flows of drugs through that region” (US Department of State, 2020). The fact that Guinea-Bissau’s president dismissed two leading figures in the fight against drug trafficking – the justice minister and the head of the judicial police – was noted as troublesome. The BBC reports the developments with an optimistic headline: “How Africa’s ‘narco-state’ is trying to kick its habit” (Shryock, 2020).

## Migration profile

As one of the countries in the “low human development” category of the HDI (UNDP, 2019a), Bissau-Guineans show mobility in many ways, and the country is home to people from other parts of West Africa.

### *Internal migration*

The first migratory step is usually from rural to urban settings. The net migration in the country’s regions is considerable. Almost 44 % of the population live in the few urban areas, and the share is increasing (UNdata, 2019). Here, people find the most and best of the nation’s limited services and the lowest poverty incidence compared to regions like Oio, Bafata, Cacheu or Gabú. Particularly Bissau, Gabú and Oio have become the starting point for “irregular migration [...] a widespread phenomenon lately” (IOM, 2018). These moves are also shown in a study of arrivals from Guinea-Bissau through the Mediterranean Sea route to Italy: 37 % of all Bissau-Guinean respondents are from the capital city Bissau followed by 23 % from Gabú (the Eastern-most region bordering with Senegal and Guinea) and 18 % from Oio (the Northern region bordering with Senegal; Scarabello, 2019, p. 44). Abreu (2012), in his dissertation on migration and development in Guinea-Bissau through a case study of two villages, describes out-migration of striking dimensions.

### *Internally Displaced People (IDPs)*

The magnitude of IDPs has been described earlier in this handbook as an increasing challenge for Africa. In Guinea-Bissau, the UNHCR reports incidents only for 1998, the time of the civil war (fought from 7 June 1998 to 10 May 1999) when almost 200,000 people were internally displaced (UNHCR, 2020b); this equates to 17 % of the total population of around 1.2 million people in 1998

(UNDESA, 2019b, p. 24). The IDMC observes and reports displacement resulting from conflict, disaster and development. For Guinea-Bissau, the IDMC-report assumes comparatively low incidences. The annual conflict and disaster displacement figures do not show any displacements due to conflict. New displacements due to disasters are recorded for 2008 (500 people), 2010 (2,000), 2018 (3,700), and 2019 (410). Recorded displacements are mainly weather related. The 2020 rainy season (May to October) destroyed hundreds of homes, exposing tenants to food insecurity and deteriorating health conditions, particularly under conditions of Covid-19. As unfortunate and traumatizing as displacement is for these individuals, the numbers are manageable for those who are mandated to support them. In the future, IDMC foresees on average 770 people to be displaced annually due to disaster (IDMC, 2020), which is expected to be exacerbated by climate change (see Module 3).

### *Intra-African migration*

The ECOWAS allows free movement of persons. But it is more than the ease of logistics and geographical proximity that make people move regionally. Today's nation states of Guinea-Bissau and its neighbours Guinea and Senegal host many of the same ethnicities: the Fulani, for instance, live in considerable numbers in Guinea-Bissau, Guinea and also in The Gambia; the Malinke live in Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, The Gambia and Senegal. The "concept of ethnicity with its three basic elements of shared cultural attributes, consciousness, and cultural boundaries" (Young, 2017) is tangible in this West African region. Common properties include shared ancestry, language, social practices, naming conventions, rituals etc. Nevertheless, sub-ethnic identity is a key element in the political process that is also apparent in electoral competitions (Young, 2017). Temudo (2009) shows how the Balanta people in Guinea-Bissau clearly refined their distinction, which carried their Party for Social Renovation (PRS) to the presidency in the elections of 2000, eliciting a reprimand for Balanta "tribalism" (Temudo, 2019, p. 57) by competing political parties like the PAIGC.<sup>8</sup> The merging of ethnicity and politics, tradition and contemporaneity, is described by Lundy (2018, pp. 13-14).

### *International immigration and emigration*

The international migrant stock<sup>9</sup> in Guinea-Bissau (27,000 people in 2019) is mainly represented by citizens from Senegal (13,600), Guinea (5,400) and The Gambia (1,600); reciprocally, most Bissau-Guineans move to these same countries as far as Africa is concerned: Senegal (30,600), The Gambia (13,800) and Guinea (4,300). The West African island country of Cape Verde<sup>10</sup> is a top destination for Bissau-Guineans (5,300; 2019) while the number of Cape Verdeans moving to Guinea-Bissau is negligible (606). The numbers of immigrants from Europe and North America are

8 PAIGC, African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde, was founded by Amílcar Cabral. PAIGC led the country, after a long war for independence from the colonial power Portugal in the 1960s, to independence in 1974.

9 Statistics refer to international migrant stocks. Stocks include all foreign-born residents in a country regardless of when they entered the country. For the definition of migrant stock, see the glossaries recommended in Module 2 (EMN, 2018; IOM, 2019a).

10 Cape Verde is one of the most developed West African countries. It is ranked 126 of 189 countries in the medium human development category as shown in the HDI (UNDP, 2019c, pp. 300-303).

insignificant while migration to Europe has increased from 29% of all international migrants from Guinea-Bissau in 1990 to 42% in 2019. At the same time, migration to African countries has declined from 71% of all international migrants from Guinea-Bissau in 1990 to 57% in 2019 (UNDESA, 2019a). These Bissau-Guinean trends coincide with those observed for the African continent in general (see Module 9). A recent study confirms the shift: The number of Bissau-Guinean nationals regularly residing in Italy quintupled from 2012 to 2018, slowly at first (by around 100 residents annually), jumping after 2015 (increase by over 600 people from 2017 to 2018), and the number of asylum applications quadrupled between 2012 and 2018 (Scarabello, 2019, pp. 39-40).

Usually, migration predominantly takes place within spatial or cultural proximity, e.g. Bissau-Guineans opt for Lusophone and Francophone<sup>11</sup> countries, which are Senegal (30,600 immigrants from Guinea-Bissau), Cape Verde (5,300) and Guinea (4,300) in the region, and Portugal (29,000 immigrants from Guinea-Bissau in 2019), France (3,400) and Brazil (1,300) in Europe and the Americas (data for 2019; UNDESA, 2019a).

#### *Regular international migration 1: Destination Portugal (Europe)*

Immigration to Portugal follows the special relationship with the former colonial power, not only sharing an official language and institutional links through the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP) but also enjoying special immigration rules and regulations. Every citizen of Guinea-Bissau who wishes to travel to Portugal in documented ways (regular migration) needs to apply for a visa (the process has been outsourced to the private company VFS Global). Visas are either free of charge (children up to 6 years), usually cost €60 in fees and up to €75 for student visa and work permit visa (Portugal Visa Application Centre in Guinea-Bissau & VFS Global, 2020). A Bissau-Guinean journalist has a salary of less than €100 per month, if she or he gets paid at all. Thus, visa fees easily equate to one month of salary but the expectation is to find work in Portugal and to quickly amortize visa and travel costs. The chances are, however, low. Capucha et al. (2016, p. 10) report unemployment rates in Portugal among immigrants from Lusophone African countries that are much higher than those for immigrants from other countries (40% among Bissau-Guineans versus 15% for Ukrainians). The jobs Lusophone Africans secure require lower skills than the positions the general population holds (37% of Lusophone African immigrants worked in lower skilled jobs in Portugal versus 13% of the general population, data from 2011). The wages that immigrants from Lusophone Africa receive are below those of the general population (€500 versus €600). Abreu (2012, p. 222) found out that most of the economically active migrants from his case study villages were working in Portugal as construction workers or were unemployed. Scarabello (2019, pp. 44-46) shows that Bissau-Guinean migrants are predominantly young men (aged 19 to 30 years) and not well educated (30% have not completed any type of formal education);

<sup>11</sup> Guinea-Bissau is a member of the community of Portuguese speaking countries (Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa, CPLP) and of the community of French speaking countries (Organisation internationale de la Francophonie (OIF), La Francophonie).

most declared that they had been (self-) employed (54 % of respondents<sup>12</sup>) – mostly in construction, transportation, agriculture – or unemployed (37 % of respondents) before leaving Guinea-Bissau. As for the factors that pushed them to migrate, most indicated war or conflict (34 %) and the economy (32 %), followed by personal violence (21 %) and limited humanitarian services (10%). It is noteworthy that migrants did not necessarily head directly from Guinea-Bissau for Europe but often after extended stays in Libya (Scarabello, 2019, pp. 45-46).

Portuguese law provides some types of residence visas for Bissau-Guinean citizens for employment, self-employment, studies, and family reunion. Under an agreement between the two countries, Bissau-Guineans can travel with a temporary visa for medical reasons to Portugal. Subsequently, some migrants obtain a residency permit because they found employment or because their medical condition prevents them from returning home. The medical facilities in Guinea-Bissau are insufficient to provide the necessary services to the population. The assessment of progress in achieving SDG 3 (“Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being at all ages”; UNDESA, n. d.) is “stagnating” and “major challenges remain” (Sachs et al., 2020, p. 45, Figure 19; pp. 242-243).

In 2020, major developments supported migrants and refugees in Portugal: Under the impact of Covid-19, the government decided to temporarily grant them full citizenship rights. The move was taken in order to permit full access to healthcare and reduce the risks for public health (Schengen Visa Info, 2020). A second development enables children of migrants to become Portuguese citizens if their parents have held residence permits for one year (before, the national law had set the residence requirement at two years, according to the European Union; 2020).



**SUGGESTION FOR AN EXERCISE TO ADDRESS THE COGNITIVE SKILLS OF UNDERSTANDING AND EVALUATING AS WELL AS THE AFFECTIVE SKILLS OF RESPONDING:**

A senior student of the Institute of Journalism, TU Dortmund University, and practicing TV journalist, Chantal Beil, has prepared a couple of video features on migration and forced displacement in regards to context factors from/to Guinea-Bissau. Chantal Beil has also trained Bissau-Guinean journalists in Bissau with the UN on how to best deliver a migration story as a TV journalist.

The feature stories are available on the project portal [www.mediaandmigration.com](http://www.mediaandmigration.com). Show them in class.

<sup>12</sup> The interviews were conducted in IOM’s DTM surveys of national groups arriving through the Central Mediterranean route between 2016 and 2018, according to Scarabello (2019, p. 42).

Each participant should write a 1-page media critique of the journalistic work, following the questions:

- Which messages on matters concerning migrants and refugees does Beil deliver?
- How does she structure her story?
- Which journalistic story telling techniques does she apply?
- Is her view Eurocentric or is she telling rather one of the African or Bissau-Guinean stories of migrants and refugees?
- Does her work reflect knowledge about Guinea-Bissau?
- Are the aspects that audiences need to know about migration and forced displacement reflected in the stories so that they can make their own informed decisions?
- What could Beil have done better?

#### *Irregular migration from Guinea-Bissau*

According to the IOM, irregular migration, especially from the Bissau-Guinean regions of Gabú, Oio and Bafata, has “become a widespread phenomenon lately with an increasing number of youth falling prey to unscrupulous smugglers [...]” (IOM, 2018). In the worst cases, these young people pass away in their attempt to cross the Sahara Desert or the Mediterranean Sea. Lack of knowledge about the dangers of irregular migration often triggers the departure. While en-route, many young people end up in appalling conditions, stripped of their rights. One way to return home safely and voluntarily is through the EU-IOM joint initiative for migration protection and reintegration. The IOM assists voluntary returnees in making a living at home, either by funding a business plan or helping with some cash-for-work projects (see the video features by Chantal Beil, details in Suggestion for classroom, above; EU & IOM, 2020; IOM, 2019b).

Stakeholders across the board report that Guinea-Bissau is heavily affected by trafficking in persons, including child trafficking for forced labour and sexual exploitation. The most evident and reported form is the trafficking of children (known as talibés) to Senegal. Parents entrust their children to adults who claim to be religious leaders and to provide religious education to the children. The children often end up in forced labour or begging and experience severe abuses (Gama, 2020). Einarsdóttir and Boiro (2016, p. 863) describe the expectations of the childrens’ families.

#### *Regular international migration 2: Destination Brazil*

As a destination country for migration, Brazil gained relevance for Bissau-Guineans when President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva took office as president in 2003 and introduced policy changes.

The number of Bissau-Guinean migrants increased from no data in 2000 to 1,270 in 2019 (UNDESA, 2019a). For Brazil, Africa had become a top foreign priority – the rationale has included strategic approaches to strengthen its role in the South-South cooperation and as a BRICS country.<sup>13</sup> Africa was important as a source of raw materials and as a market for Brazilian products; history connects the countries as millions of West Africans were forcibly taken to Brazil in the transatlantic slave trade. Geographical and cultural proximity also facilitated cooperation. Portuguese is a common official language and both countries are members of the CPLP. Guinea-Bissau was included when Brazil cancelled around \$900 million in African debts (Abdenur & Neto, 2013). African history has become an integral part of school curricula, and a university has been established that is open to African students, particularly from Lusophone countries (Abdenur & Neto, 2014, p. 56). The situation on the ground in 2020, however, is different. Antonio Brasil, a TV journalist and journalism professor at the University in Florianopolis, Brasil, explains that there has been a change of priorities regarding Brazilian international relations and economic strategies (Brasil, 2020).

Nevertheless, people from Guinea-Bissau and other countries in West Africa hope to find a better life in Brazil, work, and remit money home or study for free. But migrants describe the 3,000 kilometre long journey as challenging (Phillips, 2018).

### *Asylum*

The number of refugees, asylum seekers, returned refugees, stateless people and others who sought shelter and protection in Guinea-Bissau shows a picture of conflict-induced migration in the region. Over the years, the majority of refugees in Guinea-Bissau have come from Senegal's protracted Casamance-conflict (the Casamance is a region bordering Guinea-Bissau). Refugees from Sierra Leone surged during the country's years of civil war (1991-2002; UNHCR, 2020a).

The number of asylum seekers from Guinea-Bissau in Europe is very low. In 2019, 740 asylum seekers and first-time asylum applicants were registered, which is modest in comparison to the neighbouring countries of Guinea (13,590) and Senegal (6,695). In 2019, the numbers were down to the mid-2010s level – they had peaked during the height of the refugee crisis with 1,240 (2015) and 1,315 (2016) asylum seekers. The chances for positive decisions of asylum applications are low. In 2019, 65 first instance decisions were positive, of which 30 were based on the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol (see Module 2), 25 were taken for humanitarian reasons and 770 were rejected (Eurostat, 2020).

13 BRICS is the acronym for five major national economies: Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa.



### **SUGGESTION FOR AN EXERCISE TO ADDRESS THE COGNITIVE SKILLS OF APPLYING AND ANALYSING AS WELL AS TO ADDRESS THE AFFECTIVE SKILLS OF RESPONDING:**

Allow the class to acquire some knowledge of Guinea-Bissau as a country of migrants and refugees before studying the country's pull and push factors.

Invite participants to prepare a short country profile and a short profile on migration and forced displacement of Guinea-Bissau.

- To compose these two profiles, participants select their data from the sources shown in Module 2, particularly the Migration Data Portal country page on Guinea-Bissau (Migration Data Portal, 2020).
- To bring the data to life, participants explore media reports from or about Guinea-Bissau which they consider enlightening and telling.
- Present the two profiles in plenary and conclude with five highlights to identify the top characteristics for Guinea-Bissau.

### **SUGGESTION FOR THE CLASSROOM TO ADDRESS THE COGNITIVE SKILLS OF UNDERSTANDING:**

Task the participants to describe which aspects of the country profile are relevant for the audiences, particularly regarding those aspects that empower them to make informed decisions on migration and forced displacement.

## **Selected context factors 1: poverty**

Poverty affects the majority of Guinea-Bissau's population. SDG 1 calls for an end to poverty in all its manifestations by 2030, e.g. in ten years from writing this handbook. The HDR (UNDP, 2019c, p. 67) concedes that "poverty reduction may not be fast enough to end extreme poverty by 2030 [...] after decades of progress, poverty reduction is slowing". Poverty can indeed be eradicated as global progress has shown one billion fewer people living in extreme poverty in 2015 than in 1990. In 1990, 36% of the world's people lived in extreme poverty on less than \$1.90 a day compared to 8.6% in 2018. The opposite is true for sub-Saharan Africa where the number of people living in extreme poverty has grown from an estimated 278 million in 1990 to 413 million in 2015. If current trends continue, by 2030, nearly 90% of the world's people living in extreme poverty will be in sub-Saharan Africa. Guinea-Bissau may be one of them (UNDP, 2019c, p. 67; World Bank, 2018a, pp. 1-2).

What does it mean to be poor? Poverty is multidimensional<sup>14</sup>, and income poverty is only one form. The Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI)<sup>15</sup> addresses three dimensions of poverty (health, education, living standards) with ten indicators (nutrition, child mortality; years of schooling, school; cooking fuel, sanitation, drinking water, electricity, housing and assets; OPHI, 2019, p. 1; OPHI, & UNDP, 2018). In Bissau, over 67 %<sup>16</sup> of the population live below the income poverty line of \$ 1.90 a day which is substantial even in the sub-Saharan African context where 45% of the population live below the income poverty line. While severe poverty is rampant in the capital city of Bissau, it is much worse in the rural areas (OPHI, 2019; UNDP, 2019c, pp. 67-70, p. 320).

Services are minimal, if they exist at all (IMF, & Government of Guinea-Bissau, 2011, pp. 22-72). Only 53% of the rural population has access to safe drinking water, compared to 84% of the urban population. Only 5% of the rural population uses improved sanitation facilities versus 35% in urban areas. Less than 10% of women in rural areas are literate as opposed to 40% at the national level, and over 50% in the capital city of Bissau (data from 2010). Electricity is not always available, and especially communities in rural areas do not usually have access. In urban environments, power is frequently cut, and not available to all households. The operating costs are high, as are the losses owed to theft and low rates of bill collection. Since 2019, the city of Bissau has been supplied with electricity from a ship docked in the port of Bissau. The national road network comprises 2,746 km of which only 770 km (28%) are paved. Road transport, however, is the main means of access to most of the rural towns and communities. It is not only a hazard for people to reach, for instance, medical facilities, but it also limits the timely transportation of agricultural goods to the consumers in the urban areas. Internet and phone lines are mainly unavailable in the inner part of the country. Not even 3% of the population in Guinea-Bissau are able to use the Internet (Migration Data Portal, 2020).


“Seizing the moment” is the aspirational title of a report published in 2018 (World Bank, 2018b). It shows that the country had 4.7 security personnel per 1,000 inhabitants on the payroll compared to less than 1 per 1,000 for frontline health workers (data of 2017; World Bank, 2018b, p. 4; p. 38, Figure 2.2; p. 40, Table 2.2). The dearth of investment in core sectors of the country is shown in the overview of public expenditures by sectors with data from the country’s Ministry of Economy and Finance (see Figure 19).

Poverty is distributive inequality and “not only deprives but also oppresses” (UNDP, 2019c, p. 89). In Guinea-Bissau, the richest 10% of the society hold 42% of the income, while only 12.8% of the

14 This handbook considers two approaches: The one published annually in the Human Development Report (HDR) and the one published by the World Bank. Each uses different indicators, but both approaches are internationally comparable. The World Bank’s global multidimensional poverty measuring includes monetary poverty – measured as having less than \$ 1.90 a day – and deprivations in education and in basic infrastructure such as water, sanitation and electricity (World Bank, 2018c; World Bank, 2020b; World Bank, 2020a).

15 The Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative (OPHI) prepares the MPI, and the Human Development Reports publish the MPI since 2010 (OPHI, & UNDP, 2018).

16 2007-2017. Data refer to the most recent year available during the period specified (UNDP, 2019c, pp. 320-321, footnote c).

**Figure 19: Guinea-Bissau: expenditure by sector (\$) 2015-2017**


Development in Guinea-Bissau is still challenged, and resources are limited: “Government spending on the social sectors is low, which, combined with low efficiency, translated into weak outcomes. In health and education, not only does the country spend less than most Sub-Saharan African countries but also achieves poor outcomes for every dollar spent” (World Bank, 2018b, p. 1). \*Data missing in the source document. Source: World Bank (2018b, p. 123, Figure 6.15). Own illustration.

income is held by the poorest 40% (2010-2017<sup>17</sup>) – this is almost an inverted pyramid. The Gini coefficient<sup>18</sup> stands at 50.7, which is very high compared to the neighbouring countries Senegal (40.3) and Guinea (33.7), and among the highest globally. Bissau-Guineans also agonize over higher inequalities than their neighbours in most inequalities measured in the inequality-adjusted Human Development Index (UNDP, 2019c, pp. 308-311). The other two case studies of this handbook represent a Gini coefficient of 46.8 (Cameroon) and 31.7 (Germany). The best Gini performers globally are the Ukraine at 25.0, Slovakia at 26.5 and Finland at 27.1 while South Africa has the highest Gini coefficient with 63.0, followed by Namibia with 59.1 and the Central African Republic with 56.2 (UNDP, 2019c, pp. 308-311).

## Selected context factors 2: population growth and youth

As outlined earlier (see Module 3), population growth is one of the macro factors impacting migration. The “youth bulge” may be a “dividend” if, for instance, governments invest in health, education and in the empowerment of women; otherwise, population growth may add to the challenges in achieving the SDGs. In reference to the SDGs, population growth is “sometimes called the elephant in the room [...] widely perceived as a politically sensitive topic” and not contextu-

<sup>17</sup> Data refer to the most recent year available during the period specified (UNDP, 2019c, p. 311, Notes e).

<sup>18</sup> Gini coefficient: Measure of the deviation of the distribution of income among individuals or households within a country from a perfectly equal distribution. A value of 0 represents absolute equality, a value of 100 absolute inequality (UNDP, 2019c, p. 311, Notes).

alized “explicitly” (Abel et al., 2016, p. 14298). SDGs addressing child mortality, maternal mortality, causes of death, and reproductive health and particularly education are, however, related – the more educated women are, the lower birth rates and child mortality (Abel et al., 2016, p. 14298).

Population growth in Guinea-Bissau has risen steadily from 1950 (1.47% annually) up to its current rate of 2.5% (2015-2020), and is predicted to decrease to 1.65% annually by 2050 (UNDESA, 2019b, pp. 58-59). Fertility rose from the 1950s until the highest rate was recorded in the early 1980s (1980-1985) with 6.7 children per woman after which the numbers progressively decreased to (2015-2020) 4.51 children per woman (UNDESA, 2019b, pp. 138-139). As is the case throughout Africa, Guinea-Bissau’s population is young: The median age of the total population is 18.8 years (2020; sub-Saharan Africa: 18.7 years<sup>19</sup>; UNDESA, 2020). These young people need opportunities in education and career development which the country barely offers.

UNESCO finds unvarnished words for a schooling system that is “simply due for a radical overhaul” (UNESCO, 2016, p. 1). The knowledge of a big proportion of the population “is of such limited level that the country’s prospects of economic take-off [and of alleviating poverty] are bleak” (UNESCO, 2016, p. 1). The households, impoverished as the MPI describes them (see above), bear the greater share of the country’s educational expenditure. Imagine a mother of three, making some money as a domestic worker, not being paid regularly, affording – or owing when she is unable to pay – the tuition fees, the school feeding and the uniform for the kids at private schools (see the video features by Chantal Beil, Suggestion for classroom, above). Guinea-Bissau, writes UNESCO, has an “abnormally low level of full school provision” (UNESCO, 2016, p. 2).

About half of all children aged six years and almost one third of children between the ages of 6 and 11 “have never attended school” (World Bank, 2018b, p. 74; data from 2014). In the rural areas, and for poor households, the situation is compounded: Among those who do go to school, dropout rates “gradually rise from 5 to 44% between the ages of 12 and 24 years” (World Bank, 2018b, p. 74). Nearly 40% of pupils aged six to eleven years in rural areas have never attended school – compared to 12% in urban areas (World Bank, 2018b, pp. 74-75). The gross attendance rates in secondary education are lower than 25% in some regions – compared to 115%<sup>20</sup> in Bissau (World Bank, 2018b, p. 73). The three most disadvantaged groups in the education system are girls, children in rural areas and the bottom income group, whereas public spending “tends to favour wealthier households” (World Bank, 2018b, p. 76).

19 In comparison, the median age of the total population in Europe is 42.5 years, in Latin America and the Caribbean 31 years (UNDESA, 2020).

20 The Gross Attendance Ratio (GAR) “can exceed 100% due to inclusion of over-aged and under-aged students. Reasons include early or late entry, and grade repetition. For tertiary education, the GAR can exceed 100% due to the inclusion of students outside the 5-year age group starting from the official secondary school graduation age” (UNESCO UIS, 2021).

Teachers themselves are deprived of both knowledge and remuneration. State-employed new entrants were paid for only six months in 2013, and this is not an exception. Periodically, teachers strike for pay or students strike to protest the teachers' strikes (AfricaNews, 2019). Learning outcomes are poor also due to the low quality of the teachers' knowledge. The regional Program for the Analysis of Education Systems (PASEC) found that nearly 94 % of teachers in Grade 5 were unable to answer all questions in Portuguese – the language of instruction – and 98% in mathematics (World Bank, 2018b, p. 76).

Given this lack of opportunities, young people have dreams of better lives elsewhere, as Bordonaro (2009) reveals. He shares the hopes of young men from the Bijagó islands who want to be modern, and modernity is the “Ideal Elsewhere” (Ramsey-Kurz & Ganapathy-Doré, 2011; see Module 7). As for the young men of Bissau portrayed by Vigh (2006), “migration is one – if not the easiest – ‘navigational tactics’ to escape from social exclusion and marginalization” (Bordonaro, 2009, p. 135). Europe is the dream destination: “The fancied migratory paths lead towards Bissau, Dakar, Conakry, but everybody’s dream is still Europe [...] an idealized spring of power and wealth” (Bordonaro, 2009, p. 135). In Europe, the vision goes, there are income opportunities that their country does not provide – with an unemployment rate of 6 % that doubles for the youth (12 %; Migration Data Portal, 2020). It is expected that “there”, in Europe, it is very easy to make good money, and the “sole option for becoming a socially acknowledged adult” (Bordonaro, 2009, p. 135). Bordonaro (2009) and Lundy (2018) suggest that migration may have become the modern version of traditional initiation practices for young men. Schrover, & Moloney (2013, p. 17), too, describe a “lust for adventure” which creates a “culture of migration” as a standard stage of adult life. Traditional initiation for the Balanta, for instance, comprises several stages including competitions at harvest dances, wrestling in tournaments, stealing cattle, circumcision, etc. before the elderly decide time is ripe for the young man to participate in a rather dangerous honour. Physically, he spends two months in the bush, now spiritually “vulnerable to witchcraft attacks” by enemies (Lundy, 2018, p. 10). International migration, Lundy (2018) speculates, may be the new space to express adult masculinity, closely aligned with ideas around global citizenship. Migration, however, is a luxury that only a few can afford in Guinea-Bissau. Carling (2002) has coined the term of “involuntary immobility” which has not yet made it into the migration glossaries.

### **Selected context factors 3: pulling into Bissau**

Given the “implementation gap” on the otherwise forthcoming AU policy and definition of refugees (see Module 9), it is remarkable that Guinea-Bissau is leading in Africa to naturalizing stateless people. The UNHCR representative in Bissau welcomed the “salutary decision [...] unprecedented in West Africa and I would say even in the world” (UNIIOGBIS, 2018, pp. 1, 6). A solution was found for refugees who had been living in the country for as long as 20 years. The UNHCR’s request to grant nationality to all Senegalese refugees was accepted in 2018. Some 7,000 Senegalese refugees from the Casamance conflict were issued valid identity documents, and refugees from

Liberia and Sierra Leone are also included in the UNHCR agreement with the Government of Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS, 2018, p. 6).

A few factors qualify Guinea-Bissau as a destination or point in transit for migrants, refugees and asylum seekers from the region, for instance, the relative peace in the absence of hot conflicts. The largest outbreak of Ebola in history circumvented Bissau while it ravaged the West African region (Gamma et al., 2017) and even Covid-19 did not impact Guinea-Bissau as much as it affected other countries in Africa (WHO, 2020). Last but not least, free movement within the ECOWAS community facilitates migration (Adepoju et al., 2010).



### **SUGGESTION FOR AN EXERCISE TO ADDRESS THE COGNITIVE SKILLS OF APPLYING AND ANALYSING AS WELL AS THE AFFECTIVE SKILLS OF RESPONDING:**

Assign participants to identify and outline two selected context factors – two push factors or two pull factors or a combination of one each – for Guinea-Bissau.

- In order to identify two context factors, participants can use Module 3 of this handbook. Ideally, participants will also introduce new context factors as the listing of Module 3 is not inclusive.
- Bringing the conditions to life that prompt Bissau-Guineans to leave their homes and others to turn to Guinea-Bissau, participants will explore media reports or testimonials.
- Presenting their selected context factors in plenary, participants will attempt to strike a balance between theory and the human element behind the theory.

With its move to naturalize stateless people, the country has made it as very good news into the World Migration Report 2020 and the news media (IOM, 2019c, p. 41; Maclean, 2018).



### **SUGGESTED ASSIGNMENT TO ADDRESS THE AFFECTIVE SKILLS OF RESPONDING AND THE COGNITIVE SKILLS OF APPLYING AND ANALYSING:**

Ask your participants to make a case for migrating to or seeking refuge in Guinea-Bissau.

- Consult the resources that have been introduced, for instance the Migration Data Portal (Migration Data Portal, 2020), the Human Development Indicators (UNDP, 2020b) or media reports (The New Humanitarian, 2020).

- Consider the case of stateless people. Present country of origin of migrants or forcibly displaced people briefly, using the above sources.
- Make the case for why Bissau is appealing as a destination country, use photos, videos or other media.

Perhaps a person from Cameroon appreciates the relative peace? A person from Mali thrives on the opportunity to make a living as a fisherman? A person from Portugal blends in easily because the same official language is spoken? Show that a country shaken by political turmoil and low human development with a dearth of services has the power to attract people from outside its borders.

### SUGGESTED ASSIGNMENT TO ADDRESS THE COGNITIVE SKILLS OF UNDERSTANDING AND EVALUATING:

Find reports about Guinea-Bissau in your local or international media and provide fellow students with one report. Each participant should write a 1-page media critique of the journalistic work, assessing the quality.



### RECOMMENDED READING:

#### Academic:

Abreu, A. J. (2012). *Migration and Development in contemporary Guinea-Bissau: A Political Economy Approach*. (PhD Thesis). London, UK: SOAS, University of London.

#### Journalistic:

DW reports regularly on developments in Guinea-Bissau in English and the official language of Guinea-Bissau, Portuguese (DW, 2020).

#### Institutional:

World Bank (2016). *Guinea-Bissau: Turning challenges into opportunities for poverty reduction and inclusive growth: Systematic country diagnostic (SCD)*. (Report No. 106725-GB). Washington, D.C. Retrieved November 18, 2020, from <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/24695/Guinea0Bissau00try0diagnostic00SCD0.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>

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## MODULE 7

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### Case Study Cameroon (Central Africa)

by Monika Lengauer and Johanna Mack



### MODULE AIMS

- To understand a case study from an officially bilingual African country.
- To present selected context factors for a country affected by two violent conflicts.
- To sensitize to the human story behind the numbers.



### LEARNING OUTCOMES

At the end of this module, in parallel to previous case studies so they are all internationally comparable, participants should be able:

- To thoughtfully debate migrants' choices and refugees' conclusions.  
→ **Affective LO: Responding**
- To communicate effectively what recipients need to know about migration and forced displacement so they are empowered to make informed decisions.  
→ **Cognitive LO: Understanding**
- To develop and implement a brief country profile and a brief profile on migration and forced displacement, using knowledge and databases. → **Cognitive LO: Applying**
- To analyse – from a global perspective – the country case study of Cameroon.  
→ **Cognitive LO: Analysing**

## Outline

Cameroon uniquely comprises both Anglophone and Francophone African history. Due to its construction out of one former British colony and one former French colony, Cameroon today is not only a bilingual country, but has two different legal systems, education systems and media spheres. Because of its ethnic, cultural and geographic diversity – Cameroon is home to more than 200 different ethnic groups – the country is often referred to as an *Africa in miniature*. Overlaying Cameroon's rich ethnic diversity is a legacy of the country's divided colonial history (MRGI, 2020) which links to massive internal displacements. Nyamnjoh (2010) reports that Cameroonian media regularly foster ethnic identities which also challenges nation building. Cameroon has a history of immigration, displaying *pull factors* such as apparent stability and economic prosperity, at least in the past (early 1950s, late 1960s, 1970s) and relative to neighbouring countries (International Crisis Group, 2010). These circumstances attracted migrant workers and refugees, mainly from Central and West Africa. For the past years, people who have been fleeing from the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria, and from wars and conflicts in the Central African Republic, Chad and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, have been and are being hosted here (Udelmann Rodrigues & Tomàs, 2012).

Cameroon showcases important factors that *push* people to migrate and/or seek refuge elsewhere, including conflict, terrorism, contested politics and limited press freedom. Cameroon also experiences gender injustice, high unemployment rates, a young and rapidly growing population with limited opportunities, high poverty rates and a significant diaspora network (IOM, 2009, pp. 27-35; p. 96). Two main conflicts precipitate displacements. In the Far North – the country’s poorest region – the Boko Haram armed insurgency has spilled over from Nigeria and has been conducting its operations from within Cameroon since 2014. The so-called Anglophone crisis in the North-West and South-West regions of the country represents a second cause for major displacements. It began in 2016 when authorities cracked down on Anglophone protesters. By 2018, the situation had escalated.

### Country profile

Cameroon is situated in Central Africa,<sup>1</sup> bordering Nigeria, Chad, the Central African Republic, Congo, Gabon and Equatorial Guinea and has coastlines with the Gulf of Guinea and the Atlantic Ocean. The country’s regions formerly colonized by France gained independence in 1960. Today’s two Western provinces (North-West and South-West) voted to become independent from the United Kingdom one year later and formed a federal union with Francophone Cameroon. The country has a population of over 26 million people and is the second most populous country among its direct neighbours (between Nigeria with a population of 206 million and Chad with 16 million people; UNDESA 2019a, pp. 23-35). As is the case throughout Africa, Cameroon’s population is young: The median age of the total population is 19 years (in line with sub-Saharan Africa<sup>2</sup>; UNDESA, 2020). The population growth of 2.61 % annually (2015-2020) is also in line with the sub-Saharan average (excluding high-income countries; World Bank, 2020f; UNDESA 2019a, p. 57). The fertility rate (births per woman) is at 4.6 children per woman, slightly lower than the sub-Saharan average (excluding high-income countries) of 4.72 and double the average global rate of 2.47 children per woman (2015-2020). It has decreased from 5.75 children per woman (1995-2000) (UNDESA 2019a, p. 137; World Bank, 2020b). In 2018, life expectancy for women was 60 years (compared to 63 years in sub-Saharan Africa, excluding high-income countries), for men 58 years (compared to 59 years in sub-Saharan Africa, excluding high-income countries), up from 53 (women) and 50 (men) in 2000 (UNDESA, 2019a, pp. 186-187; World Bank, 2020c; World Bank, 2020d). These developments indicate important progress yet challenges do persist: The country’s “poverty reduction rate is lagging behind its population growth [...] the overall number of poor people increased by 12% to 8.1 million between 2007 and 2014”, and poverty is increasingly concentrated in the Northern regions, with 56 % of poor living here (World Bank, 2019). Population growth and the youth bulge is supposed to be translated into the “demographic dividend” in

1 Note the different definitions of Central Africa (sometimes listed as Middle Africa): The region comprises Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon for the AfDB whereas the UN also counts in Angola and São Tomé and Príncipe.

2 In comparison, the median age of the total population in Europe is 42.5 years, in Latin America and the Caribbean 31 years (UNDESA, 2020).

Cameroon (African Union, 2017) and young people have their own ideas how to go about this (Nyingi, 2019). In 2015, radio host Richard Onanena, a journalist for Kalak FM radio in Yaoundé, told the World Bank that “there is a real need for a government reform of the education system to address unemployment amongst youth” (World Bank, 2015). These calls to include youth in planning and policy making remain on the agenda.

Young people often perceive their life opportunities as limited. The song “White Collar” by the Cameroonian band Prolific Dream Revolution highlights the level of economic hardship with difficult access to the job market, resulting in precarious living conditions and low social security: *“Man get degree for law ooohh, but ei di push ei na truck!/Man get masters for medicine eh, but ei di sell na achombo!!”*<sup>3</sup> (Prolific Dream Revolution 237, 2018). Around 6% of Cameroon’s youth (age group 15 to 24 years) have been unemployed in the past decade which is, however, better than the sub-Saharan context with a youth unemployment rate of around 12% since 2010 (World Bank, 2020e).

Cameroon’s political system is a unitary republic with an executive president, a position first held by Ahmadou Ahidjo from 1960 to 1982, and by Paul Biya for the past almost four decades. Morse (2018) explains that Cameroon is a “dominant-presidential system”, in line with the “resilience of African electoral authoritarianism” (Morse, 2018, pp. 114-115). Cameroon has a low level of democracy in the global comparison (ranking 142 of 167 countries), displaying in 2020 the lowest scores since 2006 (EIU, 2020, pp. 10-14, p. 21, p. 43; V-Dem Institute, 2020; Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2020, p. 5).

Political parties were legalized in 1990 after “persistent popular and international pressure” (Morse, 2018, p. 122). In 2008, the presidential term limits were abolished (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2020, p. 5) following which the then president was able to run again, and he was re-confirmed in the two ensuing presidential elections of 2011 and 2018. The results of the 2018 presidential election remain highly contested as with the parliamentary and municipal elections of 2020 and a source of conflict (International Crisis Group, 2020). Anglophone separatists had called for boycotts of these polls. The Bertelsmann Stiftung (2020, p. 3) notes a reported 10% turnout rate in English-speaking regions, other observers note only 5% (International Crisis Group, 2020, pp. 9-10).

Cameroon possesses rich natural resources including gas, oil, minerals, fertile land, and a hospitable climate for growing a large variety of crops. However, the country is ranked 153 of 180 countries in the corruption index of Transparency International (2020). It assumes a low position in the medium human development-category of the HDI with a ranking of 150 of 189 countries (UNDP, 2019, pp. 300-303). Regarding the migration-development nexus, personal remittances increased noticeably over the past two decades, from \$15 million in 1999, \$185 million in 2009 to

3 “Someone might get a degree in law but ends up pushing a truck. Someone else gets a Masters in medicine, but ends up selling achombo” (deep-fried buns eaten with beans or sauces; translation by authors).

\$334 million in 2019. But they declined to an estimated \$319 million in 2020 (World Bank, 2020g), presumably caused by the Covid-19 pandemic (World Bank, 2020a). Remittances represent less than 1% of GDP (in the African context, this is a low value; World Bank, 2020g) while over one quarter of respondents in a recent study reported being in some way dependent on them (McMahon & Kalantaryan, 2020, p. 14). Cameroon is a low middle-income country with sharp regional differences. Poverty, for instance, is deteriorating in the Far North, North-West and South-West regions.

## Migration profile

The first Africa Migration Report, published by the AU and the IOM, does not particularly elaborate on migration from or to Cameroon. It only generically refers to the fact that “[g]lobally, over two thirds of African countries were in the top 10 of new conflict-related internal displacements”, including Cameroon (Adepoju et al., 2020, pp. 54-55). Afrobarometer, in its analysis “Updating the narrative about African migration” (Appiah-Nyamekye Sanny & Rocca, 2018)<sup>4</sup>, concludes that on average more than one-third of Africans (37%) have at least considered emigration to another country, including nearly one in five (18%) who have given it “a lot” of thought (see Module 9; Appiah-Nyamekye Sanny & Rocca, 2018, p. 2). Fewer respondents from Cameroon (14%) than from sub-Saharan African (37%) have given emigration “a lot” of thought (rank 13 of 34 for Cameroon), 26% considered emigration “somewhat/a little bit” and 59% “not at all” (Appiah-Nyamekye Sanny & Rocca, 2018, p. 3; Appiah-Nyamekye Sanny et al., 2019, p. 5).

In 2019, Cameroon had a migrant stock<sup>5</sup> of 506,000, representing 2% of the population, slightly less than 2017 (540,000). The net migration rate – immigrants entering Cameroon minus emigrants leaving the country – is at minus 24,000 (Migration Data Portal, 2021).

*Immigration:* A period of relative stability and economic potential in the second half of the 20th century attracted migrant workers, circular migrants<sup>6</sup> and permanent settlers. The situation deteriorated in the 2010s when conflicts (Boko Haram insurgency; Anglophone crisis) started to weaken the internal stability. Nonetheless, a Gallup survey across 146 countries in 2011 showed that 84% of Cameroonian respondents believe their country to be a good place for immigrants to live in. This response exceeds response rates from sub-Saharan Africa (66%) but the region still ranks third after the Americas and Europe (Wu & Ray, 2012). On the World Happiness Index, too,

4 The analysis is based on official figures and surveys conducted between 2016 and 2018, asking more than 45,000 Africans in 34 countries how they see and think about migration according to Appiah-Nyamekye Sanny & Rocca (2018, p. 2).

5 Statistics refer to international migrant stocks. Stocks include all foreign-born residents in a country regardless of when they entered the country. For countries where data on the foreign-born population are not available, UNDESA uses data on foreign citizens. As such, the number of international migrants may not include second-generation migrants that were born in the country but have parents who migrated. Stock data should also not be confused with annual migration flow data (i.e. the number of migrants that entered or left a country within one year). For definition, see glossaries recommended in Module 2 (IOM, 2019; EMN, 2018).

6 For a definition of circular migration, see glossaries recommended in Module 2 (EMN, 2018; IOM, 2019).

Cameroonians are upbeat (rank 98 of 153), assuming a 2-digit ranking along with Ivory Coast, Benin, Congo and Ghana (Helliwell et al., pp. 20-22).

*Refugees and asylum seekers in Cameroon:* UNHCR (2020a) reports around 2 million persons of concern in Cameroon by November 2020, including over 430,000 refugees from the three main countries of origin of the Central African Republic (310,000), Nigeria (117,000) and Chad (2,000). Most refugees, however, do not seek asylum in Cameroon (see Module 3, Module 9). The discrepancy between the high number of refugees and the low number of asylum seekers is noticeable: In 2019, only 7,400 asylum seekers were from the Central African Republic while 293,000 refugees from the Central African Republic were registered under UNHCR's mandate in the same year. Likewise, from Nigeria only 54 asylum seekers were registered besides 111,000 refugees (UNHCR, 2020c). The NGO Human Rights Watch laments non-compliance with the African Union's Refugee Convention by referencing forcible return of Nigerian asylum seekers since 2015 (Human Rights Watch, 2019a, p. 118).

*Internal displacement (IDPs):* An estimated 710,000 people under UNHCR's mandate have been displaced due to conflict and violence in the North-West/South-West regions and 320,000 in the Far North region (UNHCR, 2020a). The IDMC (2020) also reports almost one million IDPs due to conflict and violence by the end of 2019 and 80,000 new displacement in the first half of 2020. But these data is often 'guesstimates' (see Module 2). Data collection and dissemination are inadequate both on internal displacement and cross-border movements, very little data on the impact of the conflicts is available. In September 2019, the IDMC was "still unable to say with any certainty how many people had lost their homes, how many children were not attending school or how many families had been separated in 2019" (André et al., p. 50).

*Refugees from Cameroon:* Because the country was previously known for its relative stability, the numbers of refugees from Cameroon were stable at around 10,000 in the early 2010s. By 2018 they had increased to 45,000 refugees and in 2019 they rose to 66,000. Destination countries are mainly Nigeria (52,000), followed by the USA (5,000) and Italy (2,200) while the top countries of asylum are in Europe and North America (UNHCR, 2020b).

*Emigration:* Afrobarometer concludes from its survey that the "[y]oung and educated Africans [are] most likely to consider moving abroad" (Appiah-Nyamekye Sanny et al., 2019, p. 1). Almost a fifth (18%) of the Cameroonian respondents in the age group 18 to 25 years consider emigration "a lot", compared to 14% across all age groups (Appiah-Nyamekye Sanny et al., 2019, p. 5, Figure 2; p. 7, Figure 5; p. 27, Table A.2). An aggregate of 4% of all Cameroonian respondents are making preparations for emigration, 16% are considering to do so in the next year or two, 20% have no current plans and 59% do not consider emigrating (Appiah-Nyamekye Sanny et al., 2019, p. 9, Figure 6; p. 10, Figure 7). If they "were to move to another country", 12% of Cameroonian respondents would choose a country within the region, 8% elsewhere in Africa, 26% Europe, 33% North America (Appiah-Nyamekye Sanny et al., 2019, p. 13, Figure 11). The majority of Cameroonian respondents

report the desire to “find work” as their main reason to consider emigration (35%), followed by the wish to “escape poverty/economic hardship” (24%) and to pursue an education (10%). Only a minority of the respondents note that they wish to find democracy/freedoms (3%) or peace/security (6%; Appiah-Nyamekye Sanny et al., 2019, p. 15, Figure 13; p. 16, Table 1). While most respondents wish to move within their home region and opt for movements across borders to be free (56% of Cameroonian respondents), they find it difficult or very difficult to cross international borders (60%; Appiah-Nyamekye Sanny et al., 2019, p. 20, Figure 17; p. 21, Figure 18). The authors of the Afrobarometer study conclude that “far fewer are actually making plans to leave, of course” (Appiah-Nyamekye Sanny et al., 2019, p. 2) but alert to the fact that if all those who think about leaving were to do so, the country would experience large losses in their youth population (see Module 9). Jobard (2019) shows the hardship of an irregular (“clandestine”)<sup>7</sup> migrant in a photo feature story.



#### **SUGGESTION FOR AN EXERCISE TO ADDRESS THE COGNITIVE SKILLS OF APPLYING AND ANALYSING AND TO ADDRESS THE AFFECTIVE SKILLS OF RESPONDING:**

Allow the class to acquire some knowledge of Cameroon as a country of migration and forced displacement before studying the country’s pull and push factors.

Invite participants to prepare a short country profile and a short profile on migration and forced displacement of Cameroon.

- To compose these two profiles, participants select their data from the sources shown in Module 2, particularly the Migration Data Portal country page on Cameroon (Migration Data Portal, 2021).
- To bring the data to life, participants explore media reports from or about Cameroon, which they consider enlightening and telling.
- Present the two profiles in plenary and conclude with five highlights to identify the top characteristics for Cameroon.

#### **SUGGESTION FOR THE CLASSROOM TO ADDRESS THE COGNITIVE SKILLS OF UNDERSTANDING:**

Task the participants to describe which aspects of the country profile are relevant for which audiences, particularly regarding those aspects that empower them to make informed decisions on migration and forced displacement.

<sup>7</sup> For definitions of irregular, illegal or clandestine migration, see the glossaries recommended in Module 2 (EMN, 2018; IOM, 2019).

## Selected context factors

*Conflict:* Conflict is one of the main factors that push people to migrate (see Module 3). Women are especially vulnerable to situations of conflict (see section Gender of this handbook, and the gender part in this Module) as Zenn & Pearson (2014) show for the Boko Haram's systematic gender-based violence. In Cameroon, two major conflicts precipitate displacement, the Anglophone crisis and the Boko Haram insurgency. Human rights violations are widespread (Human Rights Watch, 2019a; Human Rights Watch, 2019b).

*Boko Haram insurgency:* The words "Boko Haram", translated from Hausa into English, mean "Western Education is Sinful" (Zenn & Pearson, 2014, p. 46). The group that goes by this name has stated as one of its ideological objectives to introduce Islamic law (Sharia) across its territory. The armed group is based in northeastern Nigeria and has spread to neighbouring countries including Chad, Niger and Cameroon. Since 2014, the insurgent group has carried out attacks in Cameroon's Far North region. Cameroon is the second most-affected country by the violence and insecurity linked to Boko Haram, after Nigeria. At least 17 civilians were killed in an attack on the town of Nguetechewe in August 2020 when the Islamist group used "apparent children as suicide bombers to attack displaced people [which] is a grossly repugnant war crime" (Human Rights Watch, 2020, pp. 175-176). This attack followed a major rise in violent incidents since the beginning of 2020, with almost daily killings, kidnappings, and destruction of property attributed to Boko Haram. In addition, the region is affected by food insecurity and a lack of economic opportunities. Conflict exacerbates widespread human insecurity with economic, food, health, educational and environmental hardships (Abel et al., 2019; Lundy & Adebayo, 2016). While the conflict with Boko Haram "has diminished significantly", according to the Bertelsmann Stiftung (2020, p. 7), the Islamist group remains active, and "numerous vigilante groups [...] arose in self-defence" against Boko Haram, as the government re-deployed military forces from these areas to the Anglophone regions (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2020, pp. 7-8).

*Anglophone crisis:* The Anglophone conflict is "one of the world's most neglected crises" (André et al., 2019, p. 14) that triggered 20 times more displacement than the Boko Haram insurgency, posits the IDMC. This crisis is severely underreported and thereby humanitarian and development interventions are underfunded (André et al., 2019, p. 8; IDMC, 2019). Tamfu (2018) describes some of the hardships.

Education is at the heart of this conflict, with French being the language of instruction at schools for the Anglophone populations. Sondo (2020) narrates the difficulties for an English speaking student and journalist to study and research in predominantly French-based institutions. Numbers of Anglophone Cameroonians feel underrepresented in the country, systematically neglected by the central government and economically disadvantaged (IDMC, 2019; Manih, 2018). Addressing the violence "under mounting international pressure" (International Crisis Group, 2020, p. 6), the

government initiated a national dialogue in autumn 2019 but made only “minor concessions” following which the Anglophone separatists boycotted the event and “stepped up their campaign of violence” (International Crisis Group, 2020, p. 7). Access to education, medical care and services is lower in the Anglophone areas than elsewhere in the country. The Southern Cameroon Ambazonia Consortium United Front (SCACUF) declared an independent republic in 2017, which was cracked down by the government (Human Rights Watch, 2019a).

*Press Freedom:* The constitution guarantees press freedom, explains Ngangum (2020), but “there is limited optimism for press freedom, and the role of the media in democratization” (Ngangum, 2020, p. 10). The country’s media freedom ranking is declining, down to a rank of 134 of 180 countries in 2020 from rank 131 in 2019 and rank 129 in 2018 (Reporters Without Borders, 2020a; Reporters Without Borders, 2020b; CPJ, & ESCR-Net, n.d.).

Cameroon has two news agencies, the English language Cameroon News Agency, and the French Agence Cameroun Presse. The BBC shares a selection of most influential media outlets, pointing to “a busy media environment” with state-run CRTV, radio networks, “dozens of private radio and TV stations and hundreds of press titles” (The BBC, 2019). Tita & Wantchami (2016, p. 3) point to a decline in professional standards: “Standard principles of reporting such as accuracy and fairness, integrity are not respected [...] media practitioners have low integrity and are corrupt”. Low salaries and poor working conditions serve as an explanation. The media is being portrayed as either under strict government control (state media) or often intimidated (private media). Newspapers have been banned, journalists sanctioned, prosecuted for defamation and for “insulting the presidency” (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2020, p. 11). The 2014 anti-terror bill has been applied to restrict covering government activities during the fight against Boko Haram and the Anglophone crisis (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2020). As the possibilities of independent reporting in the media decreased, the use of social media increased – and the government including its supporters also embarked upon the social media to spread their messages. Social media use is surging: 23% of the population is using the internet (2019; World Bank, 2020h), with 59% using smartphones to access the internet (International Crisis Group, 2020). Facebook is the most popular social media platform in Cameroon (International Crisis Group, 2020, pp. ii-iii; pp. 23-26).

The harassment of journalists is increasing, according to the Committee to Protect Journalists (see Figure 20). News anchor Samuel Wazizi, imprisoned since 2 August 2019, was accused of collaborating with Anglophone separatists and spreading separatist information. He died in a military hospital in Yaoundé in June 2020. UNESCO (2020) urged investigations into his death, calling “on the authorities to shed light on the events that led to Wazizi’s demise and ensure that any contravention to his rights as a journalist and as a detainee are brought to justice.”

The internet was shut down in the Anglophone regions for 240 days in 2017 and 2018. Whenever possible, people created ways around the ban, used Virtual Private Networks (VPNs; Kenmogne,

n. d., p. 2); wrote their emails on their mobile phones which friends carried to Francophone parts of the country where the emails would send (Kingsley, 2019); initiated the “Internet refugee camp”, a space with internet coverage where people passed by to connect (Kenmogne, n.d., p. 3). The government justified the ban with “the propagation of false information on social media capable of inciting hate and violence in the crisis-hit regions” (Mukeredzi, 2017). The “misinformation” argument, human rights activists in Cameroon posit, began as a government explanation for internet shutdowns but has become a “real problem that everyone has to contend with” (Marchant & Stremlau, 2020, p. 4332).

Shutting down the internet not only “violates international law [and] [...] suppresses public debate, [...] deprives Cameroonians of access to essential services and basic resources”,<sup>8</sup> the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, David Kaye, stated in 2017 (CIPESA, 2017, p. 6). It also significantly impacts the economy. The Collaboration on International ICT Policy in East and Southern Africa (CIPESA) calculates that Cameroon lost almost US \$40 million in 93 days of shutdown in 2017 (CIPESA, 2017, pp. 21-22). The loss particularly impacted Silicon Mountain, a technology center in the South-West Anglophone region (Kenmogne, n. d.). Globally operating businesses were unable to reach their partners and lamented that “[m]oney is being lost” (Mukeredzi, 2017). Kenmogne (n. d.) narrates the 93 days of blackout in 2017, sharing the experiences of an ICT teacher who was unable to register students for Technovision Challenges; a mother, residing abroad, disconnected from her children; a researcher, cut off her online studies. They say that the shutdown angered people and increased tensions. Digital rights NGOs – Internet Sans Frontières and Access Now – sued the Cameroonian government for imposing the shutdown in the two Anglophone regions (Access Now, 2018).


Media NGOs alerted the world to the case of radio journalist Mancho Bibixy, who was arrested in 2017 on terrorism charges after he advocated for Anglophone rights and sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment (CPJ, 2020b).

The Global Journalist’s “Project Exile” portraits the struggle of journalists to survive in their home country and in exile, for instance Cameroonian cartoonist Ako Eyong or Charles Atangana, a former investigative reporter (Beaton, 2018; Ethiemere, 2017). The woman journalist Mimi Mefo Takambou received the Freedom of Expression Awards in the journalism category (Index on Censorship, 2019). She is a reporter and first-ever woman chief editor of the English service of a private media outlet in Cameroon, and established her own news platform (Mimimefo, n. d.; English Pen, 2020).

8 The UN Human Rights Council, in the Resolution adopted on 5 July 2018, “[c]ondemns unequivocally” measures in violation of international human rights law that prevent or disrupt an individual’s ability to seek, receive or impart information online, calls upon all States to refrain from and to cease such measures” (UNGA, 2018, p. 3; p. 5, para 13). The Resolution highlights that the internet needs to “remain global, open and interoperable”, that states are expected to refrain from “undue restriction of freedom of opinion and expression online” including those states that have “manipulated or suppressed online expression in violation of international law”. Para 12 is a reminder to provide “a safe and enabling online environment” that allows journalists to “perform their work independently and without undue or unlawful interference” (UNGA, 2018, pp. 4-5).

Mimi Mefo, Paul Chouta and Boris Bertolt are three political bloggers with over 100,000 followers each on their social media platforms (two live abroad and one is in jail in Cameroon; International Crisis Group, 2020, p. 16).

**Figure 20: Journalists at risk in Cameroon since 1992**



Media NGOs like Reporters Without Borders and the Committee to Protect Journalists as well as UNESCO alert the international community to journalists at risk. Source: CPJ (2020a). Own illustration.



**SUGGESTION FOR AN EXERCISE TO ADDRESS THE COGNITIVE SKILLS OF APPLYING AND ANALYSING AND TO ADDRESS THE AFFECTIVE SKILLS OF RESPONDING:**

Assign participants to identify and outline two selected context factors – two push factors or two pull factors or a combination of one each – for Cameroon.

- In order to identify two context factors, participants use Module 3 of this handbook. Ideally, participants will also introduce new context factors as the listing of Module 3 is not inclusive.
- Bringing the conditions to life that prompt Cameroonians to leave their homes and others to turn to Cameroon, participants explore media reports or testimonials.
- Presenting their selected context factors in plenary, participants will attempt to strike a balance between theory and the human element behind the theory.

## Gender

Gender is one of the most important factors to determine motives, experiences, priorities and conditions of migration and forced displacement (see section Gender in this handbook). The UNHCR says that women refugees “who are unaccompanied, pregnant, heads of households, disabled or elderly are especially vulnerable” (UNHCR, 2020d). Women fleeing English-speaking areas of Cameroon for Nigeria face a lack of work in Nigerian reception facilities and a higher risk of sexual and gender-based violence, as well as domestic violence, but many incidents go unreported (UNHCR, 2018).

Gender equality is inscribed in Cameroon’s constitution (Nijkem, 2017), and it is part of government policy, with the National Gender Policy (NGPC) as “a foundational guiding and reference document [...] [that intends] to promote an egalitarian and equitable society” (Mefire et al., 2017, p. 37). Women’s representation in parliament has increased since 1997 (World Bank, 2021), but it “remains low overall with significant differences between national and local levels” (UN Women, n.d.) and the women parliamentarians’ work is largely affected by “party discipline and the parliamentary system” (Fokum & Fonjong, 2018, p. 754). Women’s political participation is essential for sustainable development and to alleviate poverty (Fokum & Fonjong, 2018, p. 755; Mefire et al., 2017, p. 37; see Module 3), especially in a country where 51 % of women live below the poverty line compared to 39 % of the national population; only 53 % of girls (65 % of boys) are enrolled in secondary school; 43 % of women in partnerships face domestic violence (OCHA, 2019).

In comparison with neighbouring countries of the same medium human development group<sup>9</sup>, Cameroon bodes relatively well on rank 140 of the Gender Inequality Index compared to Congo (145; no data for Equatorial-Guinea; UNDP, 2019, p. 318). In the comparison of its two neighbours in the medium human development group, Cameroon has a lower adolescent birth rate, has higher rates of women in parliament, and a higher rate of women participating in the labour force. On the other hand, Cameroon falls short in terms of women and men with at least some secondary education. Indicators report for Cameroon almost 600 deaths per 100,000 live births compared to 440 in Congo and 340 in Equatorial-Guinea (data from 2015; UNDP, 2019, p. 318). Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) is prohibited in the national legislation and the performance is criminalized (Thomson Reuters Foundation, 2018). The legal age of marriage is 18 for women and men. Some observers consider Cameroon’s efforts to be “key strides toward gender equality and women’s empowerment” (Njikem, 2017). Others address the challenges in implementing existing legislation that aims to achieve gender equality and to prevent violence against women girls, men and boys, to provide protection and justice for the victims (UN Women, n.d.). Economically, too, equality for women is still on the agenda. While women are, in many ways, the backbone of the economy, they are still largely marginalized and are even “more dependent on men economically than in precolonial or traditional times” (Nana-Fabu, 2006, p. 148).

9 In 2019, Congo assumes rank 138 on the HDI, Equatorial-Guinea assumes rank 144, and Cameroon rank 150 (UNDP, 2019, p. 302).

For 2019, the UN reports around 194,000 women and 189,000 men migrating from Cameroon – more women than men migrate from Cameroon (Migration Data Portal, 2021). Since 1990, both groups increasingly chose high-income countries, more developed regions and European destination countries over sub-Saharan African destination countries. The number of women migrants from Cameroon has increased from 1990 to 2019 by almost 250%, with a particularly steep rise in the 2000s. While in 1990, the majority of women migrated to less developed regions (54%) compared to more developed regions (46%), this pattern is now reversed: 68% of the women migrants from Cameroon move to more developed regions (men: 60%). Over the years, they have continuously preferred high-income countries over middle- or low-income countries, but the proportion has become more pronounced: In 1990, 45% of women migrated to high-income countries and 27% to middle- and low-income countries respectively, while in 2019 68% of the women migrated to high-income countries, 21% to middle-income countries and only 11% to low-income countries. The preferred destination region is Europe (50% of all women migrating from Cameroon in 2019; men: 40%), followed by Africa (32%) and Northern America (18%), and this trend with a preference for Europe intensified between 1990 and 2019: In 1990, 43% of women migrated to Europe compared to 50% in 2019 while in 1990 54% of women migrated within Africa compared to 32% in 2019. In Africa, most Cameroonian women migrate to Gabon (21,000 in 2019), Chad (18,577 in 2019), and Nigeria (12,717; UNDESA, 2019b, Table 2, Table 3).

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries are main destinations for migrant women from Central and West Africa, who are frequently employed as domestic workers (IOM, 2018). In search for jobs and aspiring to bring “pride and respect” (Malit & Oliver, 2020, p. 130) to the family through international labour migration, women migrants to the GCC countries have reported abuses (Chimtom, 2015; Ebo’o & Oyono, 2019) which prompted efforts to stop the trafficking (Kindzeka, 2016). Stories of “Mirabel” from the Cameroon’s Anglophone region (she went to Dubai on a tourist visa, expecting to work in her teaching profession, but only found work as an assistant teacher) match those of “Susan” who expected to work as a nurse in Kuwait and ended up as a domestic worker (Chimtom, 2015; Malit & Oliver, 2020).

In Europe, Cameroonian women are mostly migrating to the French speaking countries France (57,000 in 2019), Belgium (10,000) and Switzerland (5,000), and to the English-speaking United Kingdom (5,000); Germany (7,700 women migrants in 2019; see Module 8) and Italy (6,500 women migrants in 2019) are also prime destinations (UNDESA, 2019b, Table 3). In Germany, the proportion of women migrants from Cameroon has been rising over the years, and the diaspora’s “key role” in Cameroon’s development process has long been acknowledged (GTZ, 2007, pp. 8-9).

Getting to Europe is not an easy endeavor, as Frías (2019) shows. She introduces “Mireille” from Cameroon, the first African woman to surmount the fence between Melilla (Spain) and Morocco,

who shared experiences of her long journey from Cameroon to the Spanish enclave with the media. She had not been abused or harassed during her migration journey across Africa, and had decided for the unknown because “[e]ven if we go to school and get a diploma there is nothing for us to do” (Frías, 2019, p. 172). The second African woman to surmount the fence in Melilla was also a Cameroonian woman, “Astan”, twelve weeks pregnant. Tatiana Kanga, also from Cameroon, navigated the continental route, crossing the Mediterranean Sea, nine months pregnant (Frías, 2019). For many women, migration is a way to “increase access to productive assets”, explains the IOM (2020). Why do they go? Alpes (2017), based upon her extensive ethnographic fieldwork, emphasizes that “migration aspirations [...] touch young Cameroonians from wealthier as well as poorer families from all walks of life and with varying levels of education. Both men and women succeed in getting financial support from their families to try to migrate” (Alpes, 2017, p. 306), and the strongest is “destined to become a migrant” (Alpes, 2017, p. 313), man or woman. Just as young people in Guinea-Bissau migrate in search for the “Ideal Elsewhere” (Ramsey-Kurz & Ganapathy-Doré, 2011; see Module 6), this seems to be the case when Kanga exclaims “It’s Europe!” (Frías, 2018, p. 174). But not all migration ends with the desired access to productive assets. Those who are disillusioned and wish to return home may benefit from return and reintegration programmes, implemented by the IOM (2020). At home, returning women like “Rafiatou” from Cameroon share experiential knowledge with potential migrants because “young women and girls must know what the risks are along the way” (IOM, 2020).

As is generally the case (see Module 3), Cameroonian women, too, are obligated to meet the expectations of the investors at home – family and community members – who “usually arrange initial contact with the ‘travel agent’s or smugglers [and] [...] pay these people” (Mixed Migration Center, 2018, p. 36). In her ethnographic field work conducted over six years between 2007 and 2013, Alpes (2017) uncovered the interdependencies between migrant women, their families and brokers in Cameroon, and is able to show how complex migrant decision and dependency-networks are.



### SUGGESTED ASSIGNMENT TO ADDRESS THE AFFECTIVE SKILLS OF RESPONDING AND THE COGNITIVE SKILLS OF APPLYING:

Ask your participants to outline internal displacement in Cameroon.

- Consult the resources that have been introduced, for instance the Migration Data Portal (Migration Data Portal, 2021), the Human Development Indicators (UNDP, 2019c) or media reports (The New Humanitarian, 2020).
- Present the numbers and causes for internal displacement, using the above sources, including the databases provided by the IDMC, the UNHCR and IOM on Cameroon's IDP populations. Outline the factors that push people out of their homes to safer places in Cameroon – and describe the reasons why they do not cross international borders.
- Make the situations of internal displacement tangible – use photos, videos or other media.

### SUGGESTED ASSIGNMENT TO ADDRESS THE COGNITIVE SKILLS OF UNDERSTANDING AND ANALYSING:

Provide a report about Cameroon and IDPs, migrants or refugees using your local or international media. Each participant should elaborate on important aspects for Cameroon and identify information that empowers the audiences to make informed decisions about migration and forced displacement.



### RECOMMENDED READING:

#### Academic:

Global Journalist (2020). *Project Exile*. Retrieved January 22, 2020, from <https://globaljournalist.org/2018/01/8964/>

#### Journalistic:

Jobard, O. (2019). *From Cameroon to France: Travel Journal of a Clandestine Immigrant* (Moving Walls). New York, Washington D.C., London: Open Society Foundation. Retrieved January 21, 2020, from <https://www.movingwalls.org/moving-walls/13/cameroon-france-travel-journal-clandestine-immigrant.html>

#### Institutional:

Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, & UNHCR (2012). *Cameroon: Corruption of journalists. The falsification of newspaper articles for the purpose of refugee claims*. Retrieved January 21, 2020, from <https://www.refworld.org/docid/4f9e37342.html>

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## MODULE 8

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### Case Study Germany (West Europe)

by Monika Lengauer and Johanna Mack



### MODULE AIMS

- To understand the case of a destination country for migrants and refugees.
- To present selected context factors that attract record numbers of migrants and refugees.
- To sensitize to the human story behind the numbers.



### LEARNING OUTCOMES

At the end of this module, in parallel to previous case studies so they are all internationally comparable, participants should be able:

- To thoughtfully debate migrants' choices and refugees' conclusions.  
→ **Affective LO: Responding**
- To communicate effectively what recipients need to know about migration and forced displacement so they are empowered to make informed decisions.  
→ **Cognitive LO: Understanding**
- To develop and implement a brief country profile and a brief profile on migration and forced displacement, using knowledge and databases.  
→ **Cognitive LO: Applying**
- To interpret Germany as a country of origin and destination for migrants and refugees. → **Cognitive LO: Analysing**

## Outline

The idea of Europe, according to the legend, goes back to Greek mythology and Princess Europa. Greek antiquity developed clear conceptions of the earth as consisting of three continents: Europe, Asia and Libya (Africa). The modern idea of Europe has changed with time. Initially, it was identified with three concepts: freedom, Christianity, and civilization. Later it was associated with diversity, democracy, and then with nationalism. Over time, the idea of a common identity leading to integration has come to the fore (e.g. Schmale, 2010). Contemporary (post World War II) European research on migration and forced displacement with a German focus comprises a variety of theoretical frameworks and foci, including forced displacements by European conflicts (e.g. the Yugoslav wars, Kosovo, Ukraine, Crimea); the migration of ethnic Germans<sup>1</sup> from Eastern European countries, so-called Aussiedler; the flight or migration from East to West Germany<sup>2</sup>; the so-called

1 The German government points out that it “acknowledges its responsibility to all the German minorities in Eastern Europe who faced special difficulties due to World War II, started by the Nazi Germany [...]. Ethnic German resettlers are Germans within the meaning of the Basic Law who return to the country of their ancestors to live there permanently” (BMI, 2020).

2 As Germany was divided into two sovereign states between 1949 and 1990, citizens from the German Democratic Republic (GDR, also known as East Germany) who fled to the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) are known as Übersiedler, noting their special status as Germans. After reunification these spatial movements became categorized as internal migration.

quota refugees (Kontingentflüchtlinge) from the former Soviet Union (120,000 Jewish refugees between 1990 and 1999; Dietz, 2000); the Gastarbeiter (guest workers), e.g. migrant workers who were recruited for a restricted time, particularly in the 1950s and 1960s – the term was adapted to various country contexts and languages but is no longer used in international institutional settings (EMN, 2018; Fassmann & Münz, 1994; Glorius, 2010; Hoerder, 1999; IOM, 2019a; Münz & Weiner, 1997; Panagiotidis, 2015). The latest reference point in current affairs for discussing matters of migrants and refugees in Europe and Germany have been the events of the years 2015/2016 when an unprecedented number of people tried to reach Europe – the largest inflow in 70 years (since the end of World War II in 1945). Germany, this module attempts to show, is a complex country case in regard to migration and forced displacement. The module also brings two groups to the fore which often escape the public eye, the elderly and children: The elderly are a major group in Germany – and, they are also a major group of international migrants (Migration Data Portal, 2021). Children migrants often reach Germany in unaccompanied ways.

## Country profile

Germany goes by different names in different languages. It is l'Allemagne in French, Germany in English and Deutschland in German – take this as an invitation to look into the country's history. What determines Germany still today is also the Nazi regime (1933 to 1945) and the Holocaust. Germans in their mid-80s and older remember dictatorship, war, destruction, expulsion and separation into two states.<sup>3</sup> This handbook is not the place to ably and responsibly do any justice to the pain these years have brought upon the world and Germany, with ramifications felt until today for individuals and the global system.


German citizens expect their presidents to find appropriate words and gestures to address the magnitude, based upon the presidents' party-political neutrality and their expected eminence as a source of “clarification, to dismantle prejudices, to articulate what is in the minds of the citizens, to influence public debate [...] [and to] make proposals” (Der Bundespräsident, 2020). In this capacity, some presidents have taken the debate to new frontiers: Richard von Weizsäcker famously told the German parliament during the Ceremony Commemorating the 40th Anniversary of the End of War in Europe and of National-Socialist Tyranny on 8 May 1985 at the Bundestag, Bonn, that “the 8th of May [1945] was a day of liberation. It liberated all of us” (von Weizsäcker, 1985, p. 2). President Frank-Walter Steinmeier begged the Polish people's pardon for “Germany's historical guilt”: “I bow in grief before the victims' pain. [...] I recognize our enduring responsibility” (Steinmeier, 2019). Imagine that Germany never marked Refugee Day until President Joachim Gauck did in 2015, breaking the impasse in remembering post-World War II expellees from former German settlements in

3 The Multidimensional Remembrance Monitor (“MEMO”) regularly monitors the state of Germany's culture of remembrance. The researchers at the Institute for Interdisciplinary Research on Conflict and Violence at Bielefeld University, Germany, investigate the “persecution, displacement and annihilation of people and groups of people that took place during the time of National Socialism” (Zick et al., 2020, p. 3). When asked what they consider the most important event in German history, almost 50% of the respondents mentioned the German reunification, and almost 39% mentioned events from the context of National Socialism (Zick et al., 2020, p. 7).

Eastern Europe (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 2015). He spoke on 20 June 2015, the height of the refugee crisis. President Gauck started his speech by commemorating all those who have been uprooted, the “refugees and expellees, who have been forced into emigration”, in the past, present and future. He changed a paradigm when he continued to include German refugees and expellees of the past:

“For the first time, Germany is now marking an official national day of remembrance for the millions of Germans who were driven out of their homeland at the end of the Second World War. For the first time, therefore, the German Government is officially marking World Refugee Day, as adopted by the UN General Assembly fifteen years ago. For they belong together in a quite essential manner – the fate of people back then and the fate of people today, the grief and the expectations back then and the fears and hopes for the future of today. I wish the memory of those who fled or were expelled back then could enhance our understanding for those who have fled or been displaced today. And vice versa: our encounters with those who are uprooted today could enhance our empathy with those who were uprooted back then” (Gauck, 2015).

Figure 21: Amnesty International: Refugees Welcome Index 2016



Amnesty International's Refugees Welcome Index 2016 ranks 27 countries across all continents based on people's willingness to let refugees live in their countries, towns, neighbourhoods and homes. Source: Amnesty International (2016b). Own illustration.

The German people and many civil society organizations, often supported by the media, prepared and implemented what is known as the ‘Refugees Welcome’ culture (in German: Willkommenskultur). In Amnesty International’s global survey, Germany turned out to be the second strongest “refugees welcome”-culture worldwide (Amnesty International, 2016a; Amnesty International, 2016b; see Figure 21). How this resonated with migrants and refugees is the focus of their own reflections (Welcome Democracy, n.d.) and of research (see Module 4).

Reunification in 1990 transformed Germany into one of the largest countries in the EU<sup>4</sup> in regard to land area (ca. 350,000 km<sup>2</sup>) and population size (83 million in 2020;<sup>5</sup> UNdata, 2020). Germany assumes rank 4 in the category “very high human development” of the HDI, and has maintained this high standard over the years 2013-2018; UNDP, 2019b, p. 304).

Germany has a negative annual population growth rate (-0.06 %; 2020-2025), down from circa 0.5 % in the preceding five year interval (UNDESA, 2019b, p. 65). Statistically, the fertility rate has been increasing slightly for two decades from 1.3 live births per woman (1990-1995) to 1.6 (2020-2025; UNDESA, 2019b, pp. 144-145). Life expectancy has risen steadily, and it is now close to 80 years for men and 84 for women (UNDESA, 2019b, p. 213). This profiles an ageing society with an old-age dependency ratio of 44<sup>6</sup> projected for 2030 (UNDP, 2019b, p. 343). Germany spends less on health than its peers in the very high human development-group of the HDI and the OECD (11.1 % of the GDP in Germany versus over 12 % in the two groups; UNDP, 2019a, pp. 6-9), and slightly less on education (4.8 % of GDP versus 4.9 % in the very high human development-group of the HDI and 5 % in the OECD; UNDP, 2019a, pp. 10-13). The percentage of school-age youth enrolled in tertiary education is at 68 % clearly lower than the average in very high human development-countries (79 %) and the OECD (75 %; UNDP, 2019a, pp. 10-13). Nonetheless, Germans have the highest skill level (5.79 versus 4.02 in countries of very high human development and 3.70 in OECD countries; UNDP, 2019a, pp. 18-21), which may point to high standards in Germany’s vocational education. Employment largely occurs in services in Germany as well as in other very high human development-countries and the OECD (over 70 % of all employment; UNDP, 2019a, pp. 18-21). Trade accounts for over 87 % of Germany’s GDP which is very high compared to the reference groups which range between 56 % and 62 %. Foreign direct investments (FDI; 2.6 % of GDP) and private capital flows (4.7 %) are high in Germany (FDI in very high human development countries: 1.2 %, OECD: 0.9 %; private capital flows: 0.1/0; all data from 2018; UNDP, 2019a, pp. 26-29).

4 Data for 2020 (population) and 2017 (land area): France: 550.000 km<sup>2</sup> with over 65 million people. Italy: 302,000 km<sup>2</sup> with over 60 million people; Spain: 500,000 km<sup>2</sup> with 47 million people; UK: 243.000 km<sup>2</sup> with 68 million people (UNdata, 2020).

5 Numbers and decimals are rounded in this text, keeping a good balance between accuracy and readability.

6 Definition of old-age dependency ratio: The ratio of the population ages 65 years and older to the working age population (aged 15-64). Japan tops the list with an old-age dependency ratio of 53.2, followed by Italy, Lithuania, Portugal, Finland, Hong Kong (UNDP, 2019b, pp. 343-347).

In 2020, over 83 million people – a new record high – were living in Germany (UNDESA, 2019b, p. 39). The Federal Statistical Office summarizes that since reunification, “the country’s population has mainly been growing [...]. This population growth has exclusively been due to net immigration. Without the migration surplus, the population would have fallen since 1972 because more people died than were born in each year ever since” (Destatis, 2020d).

### **The ageing society**

While in 1990, 13% of the German population was 67 years and older (19% in 2020), this age group will more than double by 2050 and then represent 27% of the total German population (Destatis, 2020c).<sup>7</sup> The trend of populations ageing as life expectancies increase is global: For the first time in 2018, there were more people over 64 years than children younger than five years (Ritchie & Roser, 2019).

The ageing of society is a key aspect in the migration-demography nexus and has been discussed as such for decades (Marois et al., 2020; UNDESA, 2001). One key to assessing the challenge and/or dividend of the youth and the elderly is the age dependency ratio that shows how the non-working population compares to the workforce, e.g. the ratio of younger or older people to the working-age population (those between 15 and 64 years). In Germany, the youth dependency ratio dropped from 32% in 1960 to 20% in 2017 while the age dependency ratio rose from 17% in 1960 to 33% in 2017 (Ritchie & Roser, 2019) – almost an inverted pyramid.

An aggregate of 1.6 million people (9%) of the generation older than 66 years had a migrant background<sup>8</sup> in 2014. Only a minority (23,000 or 1.6% of all migrants in 2014) migrated to Germany at old age, of whom most were returning Germans (6,000), besides EU citizens in addition to elderly coming from Turkey and Syria (Destatis, 2016, pp. 11-13). Scholars have inquired migration of older people for instance from the perspectives of equality, justice and social inclusion (Ciobanu et al., 2016; Westwood, 2019), and successful ageing (Jopp et al., 2015).

### **Migration profile**

The complexities of Germany’s migration history compare to other countries, which still struggle with unresolved issues from World War II, like South Korea (the Republic of Korea) and North Korea (the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea). The UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) was founded to address the magnitude of forced displacements in the aftermath of World War II. Germany was a major scene with seven million displaced persons and 12 million German refugees. Former forced labourers of the

<sup>7</sup> In the global context, the number of people aged 65 and above is rising and stood at around 9% of the world population in 2019. Japan has the oldest population worldwide representing 28% of its population, clearly above the average of high-income and OECD countries (18%; World Bank, 2020).

<sup>8</sup> Migrant background in this context comprises people who moved to Germany after 1950, are descendants of migrants, or have a foreign citizenship (Destatis, 2019, p. 11).

Nazi regime and prisoners of the notorious death camps (concentration camps) migrated to the United Kingdom, United States of America, Israel or even remained close to home, choosing East or West Germany (Möhring, 2015, pp. 369-370). The UNHCR was mandated to address the extraordinary needs. This phase of war adjustment (1945-1954) is the first of four phases which Schmidt & Zimmermann (1992) identify in Germany's recent migration history. Phases two and three comprise the beginning and the end of the active recruitment of manpower (Gastarbeiter, 1955-1974) with around 14 million foreign workers, mainly from Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Turkey and former Yugoslavia<sup>9</sup> of whom, over time, 11 million returned home (Bauer et al., 2005, pp. 199-200; Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2016, p. 3). Two other ethnic groups bridged phases two and three: Ethnic Germans repatriating from Eastern European countries to West Germany (Aussiedler) and East Germans who managed, often risking their lives, to get into West Germany (Übersiedler). Phase four of the recent German migration history comprised the dissolution of Communist governance in Europe, effected the extinction of a country – East Germany – and the reunification of the two Germanys in 1990.


Starting in May 1989, mass escape from the former socialist German Democratic Republic (GDR) via Hungary, the former Czechoslovakia and Austria to West Germany – caused by a lack of freedoms, electoral fraud, poor economic performance etc. – contributed to the end of the GDR. Only a few weeks earlier, when Chris Gueffroy was shot-to-kill in his attempted escape from East to West Germany, few anticipated that he would be the last victim of one of the world's most fortified borders of the Cold War (1945-1990), the Berlin Wall (Lüpke-Schwarz, 2014). Recalling that the Communist countries during the Cold War severely restricted the emigration of their citizens, only rare cases were granted permission to travel to places behind the iron curtain, e.g. emigrating from the socialist republics. Unauthorized departure was a crime, punishable under the Penal Code Article 213, and the National Defence Council ordered border guards to shoot those perceived as defectors (Goodman, 1996, p. 733, p. 746). Nonetheless, during the German separation into two states between 1949 and 1990, around four million East Germans managed to migrate to the West (Ulrich, 1990, p. 3). Contrary to the GDR, West Germany retained the view of one German citizenship (Möhring, 2015, p. 398). On 3 October 1990, the two Germanys reunited in one state after some 40 years of separation.

A new phase heralded in the 2010s, unprecedented in many ways, despite Germany's abounding recent history of migration and forced displacement: In June 2015, the numbers of migrants and refugees in Europe and Germany from neighbouring world regions jumped. For the first time, over 50,000 people were registered who intended to apply for asylum in Germany, enrolled through the EASY<sup>10</sup> system which refers to the initial distribution of asylum seekers in Germany. In August 2015, the EASY numbers exceeded the 100,000 mark, in September of the same year 150,000 and in November 200,000 (Sola, 2018, p. 7; see Figure 22).

9 The labour recruitment agreements with Greece, Italy, former Yugoslavia, Portugal, Spain, Turkey that were signed between 1955 (Italy) and 1968 (former Yugoslavia) were discontinued in 1973. The number of foreign employees subject to social security contributions is not clear from German official statistics (Destatis, 2020a) but are said to have been as high as 14 million (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2016).


10 The acronym stands for the initial distribution of asylum seekers, in German "Erstverteilung der Asylbegehrenden (EASY)".

**Figure 22: Arrivals of asylum seekers and salience of immigration in Germany**



The numbers of people who intended to apply for asylum in Germany jumped from over 50,000 in August 2015 to over 200,000 within the next three months. Source: Sola (2018, p. 7). Own illustration.

**Figure 23: Number of first-time asylum applicants (non-EU-27 citizens) in the EU, 2008-2019**



\*2008-2014: Croatia not available. \*\*2008: Bulgaria, Greece, Spain, France, Croatia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Hungary, Austria, Romania, Slovakia and Finland not available. 2009: Bulgaria, Greece, Spain, Croatia, Luxembourg, Hungary, Austria, Romania, Slovakia and Finland not available. 2010: Bulgaria, Greece, Croatia, Luxembourg, Hungary, Austria, Romania and Finland not available. 2011: Croatia, Hungary, Austria and Finland not available. 2012: Croatia, Hungary and Austria not available. 2013: Austria not available.


The number of asylum applications in Europe increased to a record high in 2015. Note that figure 23 uses the numbers of first-time applicants (green line) and not the total number (grey line) in order to presumably better reflect numbers of new arrivals. Source: Eurostat (2020a). Own illustration.

Almost 2.5 million asylum seekers submitted their applications for the first time in the EU in 2015 and 2016 – more than the entire population of Guinea-Bissau, one of this handbook’s case studies (see Module 6). Looking only at those who submitted their claims for the first time shows that the numbers more than doubled from 2008 to 2012, re-doubled by 2014, and then exceeded the 1 million-threshold in 2015 and in 2016. The numbers fell by 50% in 2017, and increased again in 2019 to a level higher than the high level of 2014 (Eurostat, 2020a; see Figure 23).

Most asylum seekers in the EU were registered in Germany, in 2019 as in previous years. With over 142,000 applicants registered in 2019, Germany accounted for 23% of all first-time applicants in the EU (France: 20%, Spain: 19%, Greece: 12%, Italy: 6%; Eurostat, 2020a). Migrants increasingly choose high income countries as their destination (see Module 6, Module 7/Gender, Module 9) – the share grew from 58% in 2000 to 64% in 2017; in parallel, the share of middle-income and low-income countries decreased (UNDESA, 2017, p. 4; see Figure 24). Germany (rank 4 of 189 countries in the HDI, see above) is a top choice and takes third place as a destination country after the USA and Saudi Arabia (UNDESA, 2017, p. 6, Figure 3). This development is in line with a trend observed in Africa whereby the proportion of migrants moving to other African countries has decreased between 1990 and 2017, and the proportion of people leaving the continent has increased (UNDESA, 2017, pp. 11-12; Connor, 2018; see Module 9).

Recalling that the statistical UN definition of international migrants as reflected in the UN chart above does not differentiate between migrants and refugees (Module 2), the country of destination

**Figure 24: Percentage of international migrants by income group, 2000 and 2017**




Note: For both charts, the classifications of countries and areas by income level is based on 2016 gross national income (GNI) per capita, in US dollars, calculated by the World Bank.

Source: UNDESA (2017, p. 4). Own illustration.

for migrants on the one side and for refugees on the other side may not necessarily coincide, and this is indeed the case: While the USA, Saudi Arabia and Germany have been the top three destination countries for migrants in 2000 and 2017 (UNDESA, 2017, p. 6, Figure 3), only Germany is also as a top country hosting refugees – along with Turkey, Pakistan, Uganda and Sudan in 2017 and 2018 (UNHCR, 2018, p. 3; UNHCR, 2019, p. 3). Reviewing the past decade (2000-2019), just Pakistan, Germany and Iran maintained positions in the top 10 refugee hosting countries at both the beginning and the end of the decade (UNHCR, 2020a, p. 22). Of these, Germany represents a distant destination for most refugees whereas geographic proximity is usually an important factor for people fleeing conflict and persecution: Syrians have mostly fled to Turkey, Lebanon or Jordan; in sub-Saharan Africa, the number of refugees in the region nearly tripled in the course of the decade – situations that represent “an urgent need for sharing the burden and responsibility of hosting and caring for refugees more equitably” (UNDESA, 2017, pp. 7-8; Module 9). To get to German borders, refugees and migrants must surmount agonizing natural obstacles with the Sahara Desert and the Mediterranean Sea in addition to hazards like human traffickers.

The numbers of migrants and refugees in Germany have been rising consistently since the 1990s, as Figure 25 shows.



The large numbers of refugees and migrants in 2015-2016 prompted the EU-Turkey agreement that was reached in March 2016. The aim was to “end the irregular migration from Turkey to the EU [...] which is necessary to end the human suffering and restore public order” (European Council, 2016). The partners agreed to return from Europe to Turkey all migrants who were not in need of international protection and who were crossing from Turkey into the EU-member state Greece, as well as to take back all irregular migrants intercepted in Turkish waters; measures against migrant smugglers would be stepped up. For every Syrian being returned to Turkey from Greece, it was also agreed, another Syrian would be resettled from Turkey to the EU. Turkey looked forward to accelerated EU-visa liberalisation for its citizens and to re-energised commitments to its accession to the EU. The EU pledged €6 billion in support of concrete projects for refugees and their host communities in Turkey, notably in the field of health, education, infrastructure, food and other living costs (European Council, 2016). Two years on, in April 2018, the EU celebrated the agreement with Turkey as a “game changer” with immediate effects: The number of deaths in the Aegean Sea had decreased from 1,175 in the 20 months before the deal to 130 by April 2018. The number of arrivals in the EU had subsided from a daily average of 6,360 in October 2015 to 80 between March 2016 and 2018 (European Commission, 2018). Human rights organizations like Amnesty International criticized the deal as “Europe’s year of shame” (Gogou, 2017). Four years after the Agreement, on 27 February 2020, Turkey discontinued the controls at its borders to Greece, and thousands of migrants restarted their movements towards Europe. The Turkish decision did not come as a surprise, but the trigger at that moment is said to have been the killing of 36 Turkish soldiers in a raid by Syrian government forces in the Syrian city of Idlib, one hour drive from the Turkish border (Dagi, 2020; Mandiraci, 2020).

While most first-time asylum applicants in Germany come from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan (Eurostat, 2020b), they are not alone. 11.2 million foreigners were living in Germany by the end of 2019 (an increase of 313,000 individuals or 2.9% compared to 2018). In 2019, most foreigners from non-EU countries originated in Turkey (1.5 million people), Syria (789,000) and Afghanistan (263,000). 43% of all registered foreigners are EU-citizens, mostly from Poland, Romania and Italy (Destatis, 2020b). Migrants<sup>11</sup> from sub-Saharan Africa outnumber migrants from North Africa, and the share of migrants from Africa is growing (from 57% in 2012 to 69% in 2019; Destatis, 2019, pp. 23-24, Table 3).

Naturally, most irregular migration takes place underneath the radar of those who count migrants and refugees. It is this group whose lives are most at risk. Irregular attempts to enter Europe via the Sahara Desert and the Mediterranean Sea are extremely hazardous. Nonetheless, 93% of African migrants “would make the perilous Europe journey again, despite the risks” (UN News,

<sup>11</sup> Note that the reference groups in these statistics are foreigners (“Ausländerinnen und Ausländer”). They are defined as all persons who do not have German citizenship (Destatis, 2019, p. 7).

2019), a conclusion drawn from the “Scaling fences” report (UNDP, 2019c). Respondents<sup>12</sup> in this study highlighted irregular migration as an investment in a better future, and just 2% said that a greater awareness of the risks of the irregular migration journey would have caused them to stay at home. The research confirms that migrants are taking calculated risks, comparing the potential gains and losses of migration with those of staying at home (UNDP, 2019c, p. 5).

Given that data on arrivals in Europe can only be partial due to the large scale of irregular movements, sex and age disaggregated data for 2018 show that men mostly arrive with considerable numbers of unaccompanied children (unaccompanied and separated children, UASC), particularly in Italy (83%), Spain, (81%) and Bulgaria (54%; UNHCR, UNICEF, & IOM, 2019, p. 2).

Germans themselves do not migrate in big numbers: Only 270,000 Germans left the country in 2019, mostly to Switzerland (16,000), Austria (12,000) and the USA (10,000; Destatis, 2020e). These moves confirm again that migration routinely flows in spatial or cultural proximity (see Module 3, Module 9).



**SUGGESTION FOR AN EXERCISE TO ADDRESS THE COGNITIVE SKILLS OF APPLYING AND ANALYSING AND THE AFFECTIVE SKILLS OF RESPONDING:**

Allow the class to acquire some knowledge of Germany as a current destination country for migrants and refugees – and as a country of refugees’ origin in the past.

Invite participants to prepare two short profiles: one country profile and one profile on migration and forced displacement in Germany.

- To compose these two profiles, participants select their data from the sources shown in Module 2, particularly the Migration Data Portal country page on Germany (2020c).
- To bring the data to life, participants explore media reports from or about Germany, which they consider enlightening and telling.
- Present the two profiles in plenary and conclude with five highlights to identify the top characteristics for Germany.

**SUGGESTION FOR THE CLASSROOM TO ADDRESS THE COGNITIVE SKILLS OF UNDERSTANDING:**

Task the participants to describe which aspects of the country profile and the country’s profile on migration and forced displacement are relevant for their audiences so the audiences’ new knowledge empowers them to make informed decisions.

<sup>12</sup> The primary sample comprised of 1,970 irregular migrants from 39 African countries who had not travelled for asylum or protection-related reasons and who had cited economic or other reasons as their most important reason for coming to Europe (UNDP, 2019c, p. 16).

## Unaccompanied children in the EU: the invisible

Children are mostly defined by the age group under 18 years, using the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). The numbers of migrant children rose moderately from around 24 million in 1990 to 27 million in 2010 and then distinctly to 33 million by 2019 (Migration Data Portal, 2020a). Globally, there are approximately 13 million child refugees and 936,000 asylum-seeking children, and 17 million children who have been forcibly displaced inside their own countries (IOM, 2019b, p. 238). Unaccompanied children seeking asylum in Europe in 2018 mostly came from Afghanistan (16%), Eritrea (10%), Syria, Pakistan (7% each), Iraq, Guinea (6% each) and Somalia (5%; UNHCR et al., 2019, p. 4). Of all asylum decisions taken in 2018, 56% were positive. Of those who received positive decisions, a higher percentage of children were granted refugee status in 2018 (63%) than in 2017 (50%). Child asylum applicants receiving negative decisions were mostly from North African countries (UNHCR et al., 2019, p. 4).

Children usually derive their immigration status from their parents. However, children unaccompanied by guardians migrate in increasing numbers to Europe and further onwards to Germany. In 2015, there were five times as many children estimated migrating alone than in 2010-2011. Accordingly, the number of unaccompanied children applying for asylum has increased (Migration Data Portal, 2020a). In 2018, nearly one third of all new asylum seekers in Europe were children (191,000 out of 603,000) including over 20,000 unaccompanied children; most of them claimed asylum in Germany (78,270 in 2018; UNHCR et al., 2019, p. 4).

Ferrara et al. (2016) write of the “invisible children” whose human rights are inscribed in the CRC. Roudik (2017) surveyed the laws of 20 jurisdictions globally that are related to the treatment of undocumented migrants who arrived as minors, their eligibility for obtaining legal status and access to social benefits, and their possibilities for becoming citizens. While focusing on children of undocumented (irregular) migrants<sup>13</sup>, the report also outlines laws related to unaccompanied child migrants. In Italy, for instance, “Law No. 47 of 2017 was enacted to protect foreign minors who enter Italy without an adult by recognizing the same rights for them that Italian and EU-minors have [...]. Foreign unaccompanied minors may never be rejected at the border, and refoulement and expulsion are prohibited” (Roudik, 2017, pp. 46-47). In 2020, the crisis of unaccompanied migrant children reached its peak when they were living in overcrowded reception centres on the Greek islands during the Covid-19 pandemic (Psaropoulos, 2020; Schmitz, 2020; UNHCR, 2020b).

### Pull factor: welfare magnet

Refugee benefits in Germany are “quite high,” and Germany is allocating more than other EU members, Germany’s Interior Minister said when calling for an EU-wide agreement on the amount of benefits that refugees receive (Staudenmaier, 2017). Euronews with Reuters (Trevelyan & Gareth,

<sup>13</sup> For definitions, see glossaries recommended in Module 2 (IOM, 2019a; EMN, 2018).

2015) prepared a synopsis of benefits for migrants in EU member states which was diverse at the time. In Germany, services vary from state to state, and even from city to city. The German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF; BAMF, 2020) informs migrants and refugees in Germany about matters concerning residence, integration, protection, voluntary return, etc. The EU Immigration Portal provides hands-on information about procedures in all EU member states (European Commission, 2020a).

The welfare magnet is often assumed to be a major pull factor from countries with less developed welfare systems to countries with refined welfare systems like Germany. Public worries about welfare migration are being voiced, with migrants and asylum seekers assumed to be benefiting from social services such as free provision of health, education, food (or money to buy it), shelter, access to interpreters and lawyers, etc. Other German publics argue that the asylum process leaves the applicants in a situation where they are dependent on welfare benefits. These issues are being addressed in research, institutional reports, and public debate. The Oxford philosopher David Miller – in his book “Strangers in Our Midst” (2016) – analyses the issue from a normative framework that aims to identify political solutions; for a German contextualization of Miller’s philosophy, see Bieber (2017). The Economist (2018) sees “welfare chauvinism” on the rise.

Skill level is researched as an important determinant of immigrants’ welfare appreciation, with higher-skilled immigrants being less dependent than their lower-skilled peers (Giulietti & Wahba, 2012). A generous welfare system attracts lower-skilled migration while demand-driven migration policy draws more skilled migrants according to Razin & Wahba (2011). Ponce (2018) contrasts the welfare magnet with the hypothesis of inclusion and found that migrants are pulled by the promise of social and political inclusion, and to places where their co-ethnics have become fully-fledged citizens.

### **Pull factor: safe haven**

Germany, 75 years after the end of the Nazi tyranny and 30 years after reunification, has successfully completed its transition to democracy (see above, Outline). A 2019 survey showed that 99% of respondents expressed their appreciation for the democratic model of governance over autocracy (Decker et al., 2020). The study also shows that the majority of Germans are dissatisfied with the way the system proceeds, particularly in regard to social and economic policies. It is perhaps in line with these perceptions that Germany only ranks 17 out of 156 countries in the World Happiness Index (Helliwell et al., 2020). The country is a top performer in all global rankings of freedoms: Besides its high rank 4 on the HDI (see above), Germany retains rank 13 out of 167 countries in the category “full democracy” of the Democracy Index (EIU, 2020); press freedom earns Germany rank 11 out of 180 countries (Reporters Without Borders, 2020); corruption penetration is low as rank 9 out of 180 countries denotes (Transparency International, 2020); security is high, given rank 17 out of 163 countries on the Global Peace Index (IEP, 2019), and risks are generally low as rank

162 out of 181 countries on the World Risk Index reveals, which takes the impact of Covid-19 into consideration (Bündnis Entwicklung Hilft, & IFHV, 2020, pp. 6-7, p. 25, pp. 59-60).

Asylum is one of the few legal ways to get access to Europe. EU member states have different traditions for granting and withdrawing refugee status. The EU has been working, since 1999, towards creating a “Common European Asylum System” (CEAS) with the aim of harmonizing protection and reception standards. The “New Pact on Migration and Asylum” (European Commission, 2020b) draws conclusions from the 2015/2016 refugee crisis, aiming to “build a new system that manages and normalizes migration for the long term and which is fully grounded in European values and international law” (European Commission, 2020b, p. 1). The new approach comprises policies of migration, asylum, integration and border management. It aims to “reduce unsafe and irregular routes and promote [...] safe legal pathways into Europe for those who need protection” (European Commission, 2020b, p. 2) The new approach is meant to manage the interdependence between the various policies and decisions of the EU member states in the spirit of “solidarity and responsibility sharing” (European Commission, 2020b, pp. 5-6). The needs of children have been identified as a priority. Migrants “who have no right to stay” will be returned “swiftly” and “effectively”, and voluntary returns will be promoted (see Module 6). Currently, only one third of people ordered to return from a EU member states actually leave, which “erodes citizens’ trust in the whole system of asylum and migration management” (European Commission, 2020b, p. 7).

In Germany, besides the ‘Refugees Welcome’ culture (see above, Outline), the increasing support for right-wing parties and the presumed general German public’s disapproval of migrants have made international headlines (Al Jazeera, 2019; Bennhold & Eddy, 2020; Eddy, 2015; France24, 2017). A representative survey measuring the integration climate in Germany has, however, shown that the German citizens’ attitudes to refugees are predominantly positive (SVR, 2018). Germans, with and without a migration background, were surveyed, including ethnic German resettlers (Aussiedler), people of Turkish descent, and migrants from the EU and the rest of the world. The majority of respondents believe that refugees enrich the country culturally and economically. 60% of those without a migration background believe that Germany should continue to receive refugees, even if it were the only EU member state to do so. Results vary across migrant groups, with the highest level of agreement registered among people of Turkish descent; ethnic German resettlers are “markedly more cautious” (SVR, 2018, p. 1). Sola (2017) concludes from his survey conducted during the peak of the refugee crisis, from June 2015 until the end of that year: The concerns among the German population increased by 22% compared to the pre-refugee crisis level which he evaluates as “substantial” (Sola, 2018, p. 1). In light of all of the above, Germany is one of the most immigrant accepting countries, retaining rank 24 of 140 countries in the Gallup Migrant Acceptance Index (Fleming et al., 2018). The authors conclude that “somewhat surprisingly, the countries whose recent elections were marked by considerable anti-immigrant rhetoric – the USA, the UK, the Netherlands, France, and Germany – are all among the most accepting of migrants” (Fleming et al., 2018, p. 116).



### **SUGGESTION FOR AN EXERCISE TO ADDRESS THE COGNITIVE SKILLS OF APPLYING AND ANALYSING AND THE AFFECTIVE SKILLS OF RESPONDING:**

Assign participants to identify and outline two selected context factors – two push factors or two pull factors or a combination of one each – for Germany.

- In order to identify two context factors, participants use Module 3 of this handbook, and will ideally also introduce new context factors as the listing in Module 3 is not inclusive.
- Participants explore media reports or testimonials to bring to life the conditions that prompted Germans in the past to leave their homes, as well as the conditions that are prevalent in the lives of migrants and refugees in Germany today.
- Participants will attempt, when presenting their selected context factors in plenary, to strike a balance between theory and the human element behind the theory.



### **SUGGESTED ASSIGNMENT TO ADDRESS THE AFFECTIVE SKILLS OF RESPONDING AND THE COGNITIVE SKILLS OF APPLYING:**

Ask your participants to evaluate Germany as a destination country for migrants and refugees.

- Consult the resources that have been introduced, for instance the Migration Data Portal (Migration Data Portal, 2020b), the Human Development Indicators (UNDP, 2019a) or media reports (The New Humanitarian, 2020).
- Present the refugees' and migrants' countries of origin. Outline the factors that pull refugees to seek refuge and migrants to seek better life opportunities in Germany.
- Make the situations of refugees and migrants in Germany palpable for people in other world regions – use photos, videos or other media.

### **SUGGESTED ASSIGNMENT TO ADDRESS THE COGNITIVE SKILLS OF UNDERSTANDING AND ANALYSING:**

Provide a report about migration and forced displacement in Germany, using local and/or international media. Each participant should elaborate on important aspects in these reports that are relevant to the audiences, empowering them to make informed decisions about migration and forced displacement.



### RECOMMENDED READING:

#### Academic:

Geddes, A., & Scholten, P. (2018). *The politics of migration and immigration in Europe* (2nd ed.) London: Sage.

#### Journalistic:

Casey, R. (2019). The two contrasting sides of German refugee policy: 'They try to integrate some people while really try to get rid of others'. *The New Humanitarian*. Retrieved December 1, 2020, from <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2019/11/11/German-refugee-integration-policy>

#### Institutional:

BAMF (2020). *Putting people first: providing security, creating opportunities, embracing change*. Retrieved December 2, 2020, from [https://www.bamf.de/EN/Startseite/startseite\\_node.html](https://www.bamf.de/EN/Startseite/startseite_node.html)

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## MODULE 9

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# African Movements: From the Continent, within the Continent, within Countries

by Monika Lengauer



### MODULE AIMS

- To comprehend African movements of migrants and refugees from Africa (cross-continental), within Africa (regional) and within countries (internal).
- To understand the complexities of African migration and forced displacement in country contexts.
- To tell the “African story” of migrants and refugees.



### LEARNING OUTCOMES

At the end of this module, participants should be able:

- To tell their African story of migrants and refugees. → **Affective LO: Responding**
- To use knowledge and sources to prepare a short country profile and a short profile on migration and forced displacement. → **Cognitive LO: Applying**
- To relate the different movements from the continent, within the continent and within countries (internal). → **Cognitive LO: Applying**
- To be proficient in contextualizing the movements from the continent, within the continent and within countries from the perspective of a case study country. → **Cognitive LO: Analysing**

## Outline

“While most of the discourse on African migration<sup>1</sup> focuses on the Mediterranean, it is important to stress that general intra-African migration accounts for 70 % [of all African migration]. This percentage rises to 80 % for sub-Saharan Africa”, said the African Development Bank’s (AfDB) Senior Vice-President Charles Boamah at the Africa Resilience Forum (AfDB, 2019). Mr. Boamah recalls that Africans accounted for around 10% of international migration in 2017 (AfDB, 2019). Along this way of thinking, the AU, in its first-ever African Migration Report, and its co-publisher IOM want to tell the “story of African migration from the perspective of Africa” (Adepoju et al., 2020, p. xiv). This ambition is also an important part of this handbook (see Introduction; Module 1), its case studies (Modules 6, 7) and this Module 9. It intends to contextualize the two institutional statements by the AfDB and the AU/IOM, and has invited three distinguished authors – William Tayeewa from Uganda, Levi Manda from Malawi and Levi Obonyo from Kenya – to tell African stories of migrants, refugees and host communities. It is hoped that journalism educators using this handbook will encourage their classes to write their own African stories of African migrants and African refugees as well as host communities based on knowledge, both academic and experiential, and upload these to the project portal [www.mediaandmigration.com](http://www.mediaandmigration.com).

1 Note the definitions of migration and international migrants as laid out in Module 2 and as summarized in the glossaries recommended in Module 2 (EMN, 2018; IOM, 2019a; UNHCR, n.d.).

The numbers that institutions, think tanks, the media and the public use should be treated with caution (see Module 2). Measuring migration and forced displacement from and within Africa is no easy endeavour, because the data remain scarce. The 2020 Africa Migration Report points to the fact that the continent has not updated the total number of international migrants since the year 2000-round of population censuses (Adepoju et al., 2020, p. 15-16). Many African countries also “lack the capacity to collect high-quality data disaggregated by sex and age” (Adepoju et al., 2020, p. 15), and the insufficient “official statistics do not capture the full migration picture in Africa because much migration is irregular” (Adepoju et al., 2020, p. 20). The dearth of data on migrants and refugees has been a recurrent concern in almost all modules of this handbook, addressed mainly in Module 2 but also in the sections on gender (see Module 3, Module 7). In addition, as pointed out earlier, the question of definitions is crucial – who is referred to when Mr. Boamah mentions international migration? Migrants? Refugees? A reminder on data and definitions in this respect: The following statistics operate with the statistical UN definition of a long-term international migrant as “[a] person who moves to a country other than that of his or her usual residence for a period of at least a year (12 months)” (UNDESA, 1998, p. 10, Box 10). This definition excludes movements that are due to “recreation, holiday, visits to friends and relatives, business, medical treatment or religious pilgrimages” (UNDESA, 1998, p. 10, para 37) but it does include all other people on the move or on the run, and for this handbook particularly important, it includes forcibly displaced persons like refugees (EMN, 2018; IOM, 2019a; UNHCR, n.d.).


### **International African movements, from the continent**

Most international migrants in sub-Saharan Africa (89%; UNDESA, 2019) originate from another country in the same region<sup>2</sup>. Migrating to neighbouring countries is a standard (first) move in international migration. Moving across countries within the home region feels effortless to many migrants as well as, often, to the host communities. In Africa, crossing an international border, for instance from Guinea-Bissau to The Gambia, may feel like moving within the traditional ethnic home turf (Knörr & Kohl, 2016). Figure 26 visualizes these standard international movements. But the trend in Africa has changed: For migrants born in Africa, the “proportion of those living in a country outside of their region of birth increased” (UNDESA, 2017, p. 12). By contrast, the share of international migrants who moved within their region of birth has increased in Asia, Europe, Latin America and elsewhere between 2000 and 2017 (UNDESA, 2017, pp. 11-12, Figure 5).

Connor (2018; Figure 27) also shows this – in international comparison unusual – African trend. By comparing data from 1990 and 2017, he reveals that the proportion of intra-African migrants has decreased by seven percentage points between 1990 and 2017 (from 75% to 68%), and the proportion of Africans who exited the continent has increased – migration to Europe has increased by six percentage points from 11% to 17%, and to the USA by four percentage points from 2% to 6%.


<sup>2</sup> Numbers and decimals are rounded in this text, keeping a good balance between accuracy and readability.

**Figure 26: Number of international migrants classified by region of origin and destination, 2017**



Notes: NA refers to Northern America, LAC refers to Latin America and the Caribbean. This figure visualizes that people routinely move within their own region of birth – but this standard flow has changed for Africa: For migrants born in Africa, the proportion of those living in a country outside of their region of birth has increased (UNDESA, 2017, pp. 11-12). Source: UNDESA (2017, p. 11, Figure 5).


**Figure 27: Destinations of emigrants from sub-Saharan Africa are changing (people born in sub-Saharan Africa and living in other countries, by country/region of residence, %)**



In 1990, 75% of emigrants from countries in sub-Saharan Africa lived in other sub-Saharan countries, a share that dropped to 68% by 2017. Over the same period, the share of people from sub-Saharan African who live in Europe and in the USA has increased (Connor, 2018). Source: Connor (2018). Own illustration.

In absolute numbers – published by the UN and the IOM – African migrants living outside the continent “has more than doubled [since 1990] with the growth to Europe most pronounced” (IOM, 2019b, p. 54). In 2019, most African-born migrants living outside the region were residing in Europe (11 million), Asia (5 million) and Northern America (3 million; IOM, 2019b, p. 54). Figure 28 visualizes how rapidly international movements by African citizens have grown between 1990 and 2019, both from their continent and within it. The number of Africans leaving their home countries is very high in all perspectives – record numbers of people move to a country within the African continent, record numbers of people leave the African continent altogether. By contrast, the number of people migrating from other continents to Africa is very low (IOM, 2019b, p. 55, Figure 1).

**Figure 28: Movements to, within and from Africa, 1990-2019**



International movements within Africa have increased sharply after 2010, as shown in the middle column. International movements from Africa to other world regions have increased significantly since the 2000s (column to the right). By contrast, movement to Africa is very low (left column).  
 Note: “Migrants to Africa” (left column) refers to migrants residing in Africa who were born in another world region (e.g. Europe). “Migrants within Africa” (middle column) refers to migrants born in the region (Africa) and residing outside their country of birth, but still within the African region. “Migrants from Africa” (right column) refers to people born in Africa residing outside the region (e.g. in Europe). Source: IOM (2019b, p. 55, Figure 1). Own illustration.



**SUGGESTION FOR AN EXERCISE TO ADDRESS THE COGNITIVE SKILLS OF APPLYING AND ANALYSING AND THE AFFECTIVE SKILLS OF RESPONDING:**

Allow the class to acquire some knowledge of Uganda as a country of migration and forced displacement before studying the country perspective by William Tayeebwa. Invite participants to prepare a short *country profile* and a short *profile on migration and forced displacement* of Uganda.

- To compose these two profiles, participants select their data from the sources shown in Module 2.
- To bring the data to life, participants explore media reports from or about Uganda that they consider enlightening and telling.
- Present the two profiles in plenary and conclude with five highlights to identify the top characteristics for Uganda.

**Perspectives from Uganda**

*by William Tayeebwa, PhD, Senior Lecturer, Department of Journalism and Communication, Makerere University, Uganda:*

The importance of using the concepts of migrant, refugee, asylum seeker and related terms in academic or journalistic writing as differentiated by the UNHCR and IOM (EMN, 2018; IOM, 2019a; UNHCR, n.d., UNHCR, 2018) is belaboured by White (2015, p. 15). In reality, migrants and refugees often employ the same routes, modes of transport, and networks. Cross-border movements involving both migrants and refugees are referred to as mixed movements.<sup>3</sup> Ugandans who have been displaced from their home areas for whichever reason – including the thousands internally displaced due to the 1986-2006 civil war between government forces with the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) – but remain within the borders are not considered part of the migration narrative (Hovil & Okello, 2006). More so, the Ugandan media is clear in differentiating between IDPs and refugees. What is less clear in media reporting as well as other policy reports is the differentiation between a refugee and an immigrant.



Source: Private.

Both the UNHCR and the IOM noted that Uganda – with 1.4 million refugees in 2020 – still hosts the largest number of refugees in the context of other African host countries. The majority of refugees were from DRC, Rwanda and South Sudan (Migration Data Portal,

3 For a definition of mixed movements, see the glossaries recommended in Module 2 (IOM, 2019a; EMN, 2018).

2020c). According to the UNHCR's "Uganda Comprehensive Refugee Response Portal" (UNHCR, 2020d), around 80,000 refugees live in the capital city of Kampala where most engage in private business enterprises; all other refugees in the country are hosted in the country's 12 districts (Coggio, 2018). The UNHCR shows the countries of origin with South Sudan accounting for 62% or 888,000 people followed by the DRC at 29% or 420,000 people. Others in order of numbers are Burundi, Somalia, Rwanda, Eritrea, Sudan, Ethiopia and others (UNHCR, 2020d).

Parallel to the above scenario, South Africa hosts the biggest number of economic migrants on the continent, many of them being Ugandan. This rendered the country susceptible to xenophobic attacks as citizens protest against foreigners whom they accuse of grabbing their jobs (Bekker, 2015; Worby et al., 2008).

As many countries grapple with such a huge issue of human displacement by adopting tough entry and settlement policies, Uganda has by contrast for years exhibited an open-door policy to migrants and refugees. Uganda welcomes thousands of refugees from several African countries by providing them with amenities such as farming land, access to business opportunities and freedom of movement to social amenities such as schools and hospitals that are ordinarily meant for citizens. Such an open policy has for years endeared the country to humanitarian agencies who have often referenced the good practices of the Ugandan model (Goldstein, 2018; Patton, 2016; Strohlic & Lorec, 2019). For instance, the International Refugee Rights Initiative (IRRI) in a 2018 report states:

"While Europe and the US try ever more creative ways to create barriers to refugees reaching their territories, Uganda's open borders approach puts many other states to shame. Furthermore, the government has taken significant steps to allow for greater freedom of movement and access to work for refugees, again going against the global grain. The positive aspects of Uganda's approach, therefore, should unequivocally be applauded" (Hovil, 2018a, p. 3).

With regard to institutionalised policy, Hovil (2018a) traces the various developments from colonial times starting with the "1955 Control of Refugees from the Sudan Ordinance", to the post-independence "Control of Alien Refugees Act (CARA) of 1960" that fed into the 1999 "Self-Reliance Strategy (SRS)" and the 2003 "Development Assistance for Refugee-Hosting Areas (DAR) policy" (Hovil, 2018a, p. 6). Hovil notes that in all past and present policy frameworks, the legal status of those refugees who opt to live in urban areas remains ambiguous since they remain with hardly any assistance and "largely outside the scope of Uganda's formal refugee policies" (Hovil, 2018a, p. 7). While a comprehensive policy framework was put in place in the Refugee Act of 2006 that took into consideration the 1951 UN Refugee Con-

vention (UNHCR, 2010) and the 1969 OAU Refugee Convention (OAU, 1969), analysts have noted that implementation was initially slow until 2013 when a new conflict broke out in South Sudan forcing thousands to flee into Uganda thus bringing renewed interest and vigour in implementing the Act (Bernstein et al., 2005; Hovil, 2018a; Watera et al., 2017).

Shortcomings in implementation of the set refugee policies notwithstanding, the positive allure of the Ugandan model was shaken when in 2016 local and international media reported how Ugandan government officials who are charged with refugees' management had been involved in corrupt practices that included inflating the number of asylum seekers and refugees in some camps so as to benefit from international funding (Okiror, 2018; Patton, 2016). With such exposure, several donor countries and agencies halted funding, a situation that exposed refugees to tougher conditions and less commitment by the Ugandan government to welcome more into the country (Green, 2018; Matengo, 2019). While the UNHCR's and the IOM's projections show that more refugees will continue to come into Uganda from the troubled DRC and South Sudan, it is a certainty that the Ugandan model will continue to receive much more national and international scrutiny. Yet on a more sombre note, Lucy Hovil of the IRRI, an avid critic of the Ugandan model, wrote in 'Refugees Deeply' that without the international community delivering on its promise of significant financial support as well as resettlement in wealthier countries across the globe, the Ugandan model will "collapse like a house of cards" (Hovil, 2018b).

Reporting of inner-African migration in the Ugandan media follows the same trajectory as in other African countries as ably discussed by White (2015), Fengler et al. (2020) as well as Pierigh (2017). A more specific discussion about the issue is summarised by Nakitare (2018) who captures outcomes of a debate among journalists at the 2018 Media Challenge Expo in Kampala that brought together "356 journalism students from various universities in Uganda, 45 media houses, 22 refugee organisations, 9 media development organizations and several governmental representatives" to discuss and share during three-days on the theme of "reframing media coverage of refugees in Uganda".

Nakitare (2018) recounts that during the event, the Ethical Journalism Network (EJN) presented two workshops geared towards providing practical skills to young journalists using guidelines they have developed on 'migration reporting' as well as on avoiding 'hate speech' (EJN, n.d.). She observes that in the presentations and discussions, researchers and media practitioners noted how the framing of refugees as "people who wander aimlessly without direction" helps structure the public narrative on refugees. It was obvious from the three-day event that interest in how the media is reporting (and ought to report) about refugees and migrants is growing in the country (Turpin, 2018).

## International African movements, within the continent

In regard to intra-continental movements, the largest number of African migrants and refugees are in North Africa, e.g. in the Arab speaking countries bordering the Mediterranean Sea, particularly Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria and Libya (commonly known as part of the Maghreb) and Egypt. Protection risks in some of these countries are considerable (UNHCR, 2020c). The Maghreb and Egypt have either become destination countries in their own right or transit countries to Europe for migrants and refugees from the continent. But North Africa is not only receiving migrants and refugees from sub-Saharan Africa, its own people are also migrating and/or fleeing, mainly aiming for Europe and the Arab Gulf states – North Africans do not usually migrate or flee within Africa (IOM, 2019b, p. 66). North Africa’s characteristics as countries of origin, transit and destination for migrants and refugees simultaneously showcase the complex patterns in this part of the world (IOM, 2019b, pp. 66-68; Migration Data Portal, 2020b). Knoll & Teevan (2020) analyse these patterns through the lens of the 2020 European Pact on migration and asylum (European Commission, 2020) and with an eye on Covid-19. They conclude: “It is clear that COVID-19, by accentuating socio-economic difficulties across the region, will further complicate the process of reforming asylum and migration systems” (Knoll & Teevan, 2020, p. 2). In sub-Saharan Africa, South Africa remains the most significant destination (Migration Data Portal, 2020a). In Eastern and Southern Africa, high numbers of irregular migrants are on the move, often in mixed flows<sup>4</sup>, and uprooted by multiple context factors. Migrant smuggling is particularly virulent (IOM, 2019b, pp. 61-64). In West Africa, people mostly move within the sub-region (IOM, 2019b, p. 64), whereas Afrobarometer found that people from Central and West Africa are “considerably more likely to be thinking about emigration than Southern and East Africans” (Appiah-Nyamekye Sanny & Rocca, 2018, p. 10). Regional migration in West Africa is enabled by many ethnic groups spread out across national borders, their networks are strong, and commutes are visa-free as a policy matter for the regional community ECOWAS.<sup>5</sup> People move mainly as migrant workers in low-skilled sectors including informal trade, agriculture and for domestic work. In Central Africa, labour migration is frequent into Gabon, while conflict and instability play a larger role in displacements (IOM, 2019b, pp. 61-68).

Among the top 20 sub-Saharan African countries receiving migrants are also South Africa, Ivory Coast and Uganda (IOM, 2019b, p. 57, Figure 3). William Tayeebwa reveals in his country perspective from Uganda (see above), how the country has been praised internationally as a model migrants and refugees receiving country due to its open door policy, and how it has subsequently also been criticized for its involvement in defrauding substantial amounts in aid money for its policy.

4 For definition of “mixed flows”, see the glossaries recommended in Module 2 (EMN, 2018; IOM, 2019a).

5 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) with these member states: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Senegal and Togo (ECOWAS, 2016).

Intra-continental migration is a policy matter, facilitated by regional communities such as the East African Community (EAC) and ECOWAS. In 2019, ECOWAS celebrated the 40th anniversary of the West African Free Movement Protocol of 1979 that relates to the right of residence, and intends to foster regional integration and development (ECOWAS, 2019). The AU, too, strongly promotes intra-continental migration. In its Agenda 2063, one of 15 flagship projects anticipates “The African Passport and Free Movement of People”<sup>6</sup> (AU, 2013; AU, n.d.). The AU, it is said, concedes that its own policies are out of date, which has allowed “external influence to skew the response” (Chutel, 2019). Hence, in its first-ever Africa Migration Report (Adepoju et al., 2020), the AU together with the IOM intend to “challenge the narrative”, as the subtitle to the report alerts. The publishers summarize in their abstract three counters to the

“distortions that characterize the current narrative on African migration: (a) most African migrants are not crossing oceans, but rather crossing land borders within Africa; (b) 94 per cent of African migration across oceans takes on a regular form; and (c) most global migrants are not African. Africa accounts for 14 per cent of the global migrant population, compared, for example, to 41 per cent from Asia and 24 per cent from Europe. These fortify the need to retell the story that is largely about intra-African migration, contrary to the horrific sensationalized impression of irregular migration from Africa through the Mediterranean” (Adepoju et al., 2020, p. 1).

The publishers offer different interpretations of data, for instance of the widely shared survey by Afrobarometer (Appiah-Nyamekye Sanny & Rocca, 2018; Appiah-Nyamekye Sanny et al., 2019). It is based on 34 African countries and 45,000 African respondents who were asked how they see and think about migration. The authors conclude:

“On average, more than one in three Africans (37%) have considered emigrating, including nearly one in five (18%) who have given it ‘a lot’ of thought. Far fewer are actually making plans to leave, of course. But even at just 3% of the population, the number of Africans who say they are seriously engaged in planning and making preparations to leave, such as getting a visa, is overwhelming. Another 11% of the population say they plan to move in the next year or two, though they are not currently making preparations.” (Appiah-Nyamekye Sanny & Rocca, 2018, p. 2)

In “challenging the narrative”, the publishers of the AU’s first Africa Migration Report offer their alternative interpretation of the numbers, in that “only a relatively small percentage of people are actively planning and preparing to migrate [...]. In West Africa, 10.3 million people reported in 2015 that they were making plans to migrate in the next 12 months but only 2.7 million had made any preparations for such a move” (Adepoju et al., 2020, pp. 19-20).

6 Flagship project 4 comprises the African passport and free movement of people: “Remove restrictions on Africans’ ability to travel, work and live within their own continent. The initiative aims at transforming Africa’s laws, which remain generally restrictive on movement of people despite political commitments to bring down borders with the view to promoting the issuance of visas by Member States to enhance free movement of all African citizens in all African countries” (AU, 2013; AU, n.d.).

Afrobarometer also reports that most of their respondents would in fact prefer to stay closer to home: 29 % favour another country within their region and 7 % another country on the continent, compared to 27 % of the respondents who expressed their preference for Europe and 22 % for North America. Accordingly, the majority of sub-Saharan African migrants moved across countries on the continent – which they found “difficult” or “very difficult” at times, lamenting visa requirements, a lack of recognition and comparability of skills and qualifications across borders. The main reasons for Africans to leave their home country were to find a job (44 %) and to escape poverty (29%), according to Afrobarometer who observed this consistently across all surveyed countries. Only 6 % of their respondents want to pursue an education abroad. “In other words”, the authors summarize, people look for the “opportunity that they can’t find at home” (Appiah-Nyamekye Sanny & Rocca, 2018, p. 7).

UNDP’s Scaling Fences (2019b) found that for two-thirds of their surveyed respondents, working and earning competitive wages in their home countries did not hold them back from migrating, and extrapolated to suggest that furthermore, over 90 % of African migrants would make the perilous Europe journey again, despite the risks.



**SUGGESTION FOR AN EXERCISE TO ADDRESS THE COGNITIVE SKILLS OF APPLYING AND ANALYSING AND THE AFFECTIVE SKILLS OF RESPONDING:**

Allow participants to acquire some knowledge of Malawi as a country of migration and forced displacement before studying the country perspective provided by Prof. Levi Manda.

Invite participants to prepare a short country profile and a short profile on migration and forced displacement of Malawi.

- To compose these two profiles, participants select their data from the sources shown in Module 2.
- To bring the data to life, participants explore media reports from or on Malawi that they consider enlightening and telling.
- Present the two profiles in plenary and conclude with five highlights to identify the top characteristics for Malawi.

## Perspectives from Malawi

*by Levi Manda, PhD, Mentor at the Graduate School of Media and Communication, Aga Khan University, Malawi:*

Malawi is a geographically small but densely populated country in South-Eastern Africa with a population of 18 million inhabitants and a surface area of 118,000 sq km, making Malawi one of the ten most densely populated countries in Africa. 30% of the area are taken up by Lake Malawi, mountains, swamps and rivers (Migration Data Portal, 2019; UNdata, 2019).



Source: Private.

In Malawi, people identify themselves by their districts/regions and ethnic origins. Typically, Malawians will identify themselves as: Chewa/Nyanja who mostly occupy the central region and parts of the southern region of Malawi; as Tumbuka who are mostly found in the western parts of the northern region, as Tonga who mostly occupy the eastern part of northern and central Malawi; Yao who dominate the central and southern lakeshore of Malawi. Other major tribes include the Ngonde who are dominant in the North East of Malawi, and the Lhomwe who are dominant in the Southeast of the country (for ethnic composition see Ingham et al., 2020). In the Chitipa district, there are over five ethnic groupings, each with its language, customs and culture (Centre for Language Studies [CLS], 2006). Ethnic affiliation is manifested during funerals when a person is buried in one's home although the person may have been born, may have grown up and worked all their life in a city far away from their ethnic home. Ethnicity is even displayed on the vehicle registration number plates. Currently, Malawi's cultural policy encourages formation of cultural associations and celebration of culture and traditions (Government of Malawi, 2011).

Ethnicity is not at odds with the fact that Malawian society is always on the move. A lot of internal migration takes place. This can be intra-district, intra-region, but also inter-regional and international. The main reasons for internal migration include the search for jobs, camp fishing (ugoŵi), and translocation due to marriage, that is, when a man or woman moves out of his/her ethnic home to start a new life with his/her spouse (Beegle & Poulin, 2013). Since the Malawian society is either matrilineal (inheritance passes through the mother) or patrilineal (inheritance through the father), migration for marital reasons manifests itself in two forms. In matrilineal families, traditional marriage is matrilocal, that is, the husband moves to stay with his wife in her maternal village while in patrilineal families, marriage is mostly patrilocal with the wife moving to live with her husband in his village (Anglewicz, 2012). Migration for economic reasons is also responsible for the large numbers of Malawians in the neighbouring countries of Tanzania, Mozambique, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and South Africa. The IOM estimates that about 79% of all Malawian economic migrants emigrate to South Africa (IOM, 2015, p. 1).

The World Bank estimates that Malawians in the diaspora remit substantial amounts of money to their families in Malawi, which, in 2020 (data from October 2020), amounted to \$189 million or 2.3% share of the country's GDP – a considerable increase compared to 2010 (\$22 million; World Bank, 2020b). Due to the paucity of reliable and current data, economic migrants in foreign countries are often underreported as the IOM (2015) concedes.

Callamard (1994) and Makhema (2009) observe that while Malawi started welcoming and hosting refugees and asylum seekers in the 1970s, its biggest test as a refugee host country was between 1986 and 1993 when some 1.2 million Mozambicans flocked to Malawi. The numbers were so large that the government was forced to accommodate them without systematically following of vetting procedures and to the point that even combatants were suspected to have been hosted in the 12 refugee camps (Callamard, 1994). Prior to this period, Mozambicans came as small families seeking refuge with relations in Malawi or as individuals seeking protection. Overwhelmed by the flow of refugees, Malawi had to enlist UNHCR assistance and camps were established in all the twelve districts bordering Mozambique (Dzimhiri, 1993).

Writing about the social and economic impact of the Mozambican refugees, Dzimhiri (1993) noted that although the Malawian population benefitted from hosting the refugees in terms of jobs and businesses, the refugees proved to be a drain on Malawi's finances and they negatively affected the natural environment. Gomez & Christensen (2010), citing a 1990 joint Malawi Government, World Bank, UNDP and UNHCR report, note that due to the influx of Mozambican refugees, Malawi diverted funds from the infrastructure, development and social services budget \$9.4 million and \$8.4 million in 1988 and 1989 respectively to spend on refugee support. Dzimhiri (1993, p. 6) cites a 1992 Malawi Government assessment that indicated that "although partially financed by the UNHCR, a sector expenditure sheet on displaced persons for 1990 alone showed a net total additional cost to the Malawi Government of \$25.1 million." This sharp rise in expenditure is indicative of the number of refugees on Malawian territory at the time and the commitment of the Malawi Government. Documents reveal that during the Mozambican refugee crisis, attention was mostly on asylum, livelihood and health rather than on quality refugee education provision. Shortly after the Mozambican refugees were successfully repatriated following the end of the civil war there in 1993 (Callamard, 1994), the refugee camps were mostly closed down. Subsequently, Malawi started receiving asylum seekers from the African Great Lakes Region, from Burundi, Rwanda, and the DRC. Some of these refugees have lived, had children and even grandchildren, died and have been buried in Malawi. Compared to the Mozambican refugee crisis, the post-1993 refugee situation in Malawi pales. The current refugees are in one camp where once 2852 Mozambican refugees were housed and whom had been voluntarily repatriated (Chitsulo, 2018).

The UNHCR continuously updates the numbers and other information on refugees and asylum seekers in Malawi, offering a multitude of data via its Operational Portal (UNHCR, 2020b): By December 2020, there were around 77,000 refugees and asylum seekers in Malawi, around 30,000 from DRC; 11,000 from Burundi; 7,000 from Rwanda; and 29,000 from other countries (UNHCR, 2020b). Because repatriation is voluntary, Malawi does not send the refugees back to their countries of origin, particularly the DRC, Rwanda and Burundi where there is relative peace presently. As a result, the numbers of new arrivals and births are growing. From 2010 to 2014, the number of births to refugees in Dzaleka Refugee Camp rose from 341 to 623 (WFP, UNHCR, & Government of Malawi, 2014). These children born on Malawian soil deserve birth registration to avoid rendering them stateless. Internationally, it is against human rights to render anyone, particularly children, stateless (OHCHR, 1990).

Unlike Uganda, whose refugee management laws allows refugees and asylum seekers free movement and access to social services, such as health and education and employment (see article by William Tayeebwa, above), Malawi's refugee management policy is restrictive and does not permit refugees to move around and seek employment for self-reliance although Malawi has committed to implementing the Global Compact for Migrants and the Global Compact on Refugees (UNGA, 2018).

Journalists need to understand that migration and forced displacement are about responses to factors like persecution, conflicts, religious fundamentalism, the economy, climate change, governance and other factors (see Module 3). A deep understanding of these and other elements will help students of journalism to fully understand the factors behind migration and forced displacement. A good story is evidence-based, clearly contextualized and analytical to reveal human condition of refugees, asylum seekers and economic migrants.

Perhaps due to a lack of comprehension of migration and forced displacement, mass movements of people are rarely reported by the media in Malawi, unless something big or catastrophic takes places, such as displacement due to cyclones and attendant floods or deportation or evacuation from a foreign country for different reasons including xenophobia. Migrants, refugees and asylum seekers are virtually absent in the Malawi media except when there is a significantly serious event, such as the plan to relocate them to a different area, region, or district, such as Karonga, on the border with Tanzania, a plan that was vehemently opposed by locals (Kumwenda & Phimbi, 2016). It would appear that covering migration and forced displacement is not a newsroom priority in Malawi since most of the stories on migrants and refugees are written following sponsorship, in one form or another, by international aid and development agencies.

For the story about migration and forced displacement to receive the attention it deserves, journalists should not be afraid to engage their audiences about the factors that drive people to migrate and to challenge traditional news values which appear to often restrict journalists to following the '5Ws and H' of news and the inverted pyramid of news writing.

### Forced displacement due to conflict: refugees and IDPs

“Although forced displacement is a global phenomenon, it is more pronounced in Africa”, wrote the AU’s Commissioner for Political Affairs in the Africa Report of the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) (André et al., 2019, p. 7), and highlighted that “Africa hosts over one-third of the global forced displacement population”. By the end of 2018, some 17 million Africans lived in internal displacement (IDPs), 7.4 million were refugees and 712,000 were stateless persons.<sup>7</sup> The numbers keep rising, despite the AU’s declaration of 2019 as “The year of refugees, returnees and internally displaced persons: Towards durable solutions to forced displacement” with Uganda as the champion (AU, 2019). Displacements that took place in 2019 due to conflict and disaster<sup>8</sup> are “likely to continue rising”, predicts the IDMC in its Africa Report (André et al., 2019, p. 8). Africa is the most troubled world region by war and conflict (see suggestion for classroom, Module 1). SIPRI, an independent international institute dedicated to research into conflict, armaments, arms control and disarmament, based in Stockholm, Sweden, reported in its Yearbook 2019:

“Eleven countries had active armed conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa in 2018: Burkina Faso, Cameroon, the CAR, the DRC, Ethiopia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan. Many of these conflicts overlap across states and regions, notably in the Lake Chad Basin and the Sahel, as a result of the transnational activities of violent Islamist groups, other armed groups and criminal networks. They are also linked to extreme poverty, poor governance, economic fragility and low levels of resilience. Three cross-cutting issues also shaped the region in 2018: (a) the continuing internationalization of counterterrorism activities in Africa; (b) changes in the scale and frequency of election-related violence; and (c) water scarcity and the growing impact of climate change” (SIPRI, 2019, p. 3).


A year later, the number of countries with active armed conflicts had increased from 11 to at least 15 (SIPRI, 2020, p. 8).

7 A note on data which are not regularly comparable across sources: The UNHCR quotes IDMC data for the number of IDPs (UNHCR, 2020a, p. 3, Footnote 1).

8 The IDMC disaggregates disaster as geophysical (earthquakes, volcanic eruptions) and weather related (storms; cyclones, hurricanes, typhoons, other storms; floods; extreme temperatures; landslides; droughts; wildfires) (IDMC, 2020, pp. 33-34, Figure A.8).

While the AU’s Agenda 2063 aspires to “Silencing the guns by 2020” (AU, 2013; AU, n.d.), UNHCR concluded in its African Summary of the Global Report 2017 with the assessment that “[f]ew political solutions were in sight” (UNHCR, 2017, Foreword). The guns have not been silenced by the year 2021. A widely quoted study concludes that Africa’s civil wars are due to high levels of poverty,<sup>9</sup> failed political institutions and economic dependence on natural resources following which the best strategy would be democratic reforms and good governance (Elbadawi & Sambanis, 2000). SIPRI, too, posits that the conflicts in Africa are also linked to extreme poverty (see quote above). More than 40% of the “global poor live in economies affected by fragility, conflict and violence, and that number is expected to rise to 67% in the next decade” (World Bank, 2020a). The number of poor people is estimated to further increase at the convergence of conflict, disaster and the Covid-19 pandemic (World Bank, 2020a).

**Figure 29: Number of extremely poor people continues to rise in sub-Saharan Africa, while falling rapidly in all other regions (people in extreme poverty; millions)**



- East Asia and Pacific
- Europe and Central Asia
- Latin America and the Caribbean
- Middle East and North Africa
- Rest of the World
- South Asia
- Sub-Saharan Africa

Estimates suggest that the “share of the poor in Africa fell from 56% in 1990 to 43% in 2012 but because of population growth, in absolute numbers, many more people are poor” (World Bank, 2016), and the trend continues – but just for Africa: Globally, extreme poverty – people living on \$1.90 a day or less – has declined. “Forecasts indicate that by 2030, nearly 9 in 10 extremely poor people will live in sub-Saharan Africa” (Wadhwa, 2018). Source: Wadhwa (2018). Own illustration.

9 This handbook considers two approaches for poverty; for details, see Module 2.

Poverty is pervasive among refugees and IDPs, including extreme poverty. A World Bank (2019) study on internal displacement has revealed that armed conflict, violence and insecurity are the main causes of displacement in Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan; the study comprises refugees, IDPs and their host communities. It shows that almost nine in 10 displaced households in Sudan were uprooted due to conflict (World Bank, 2019, p. 12). Refugees and IDPs are more vulnerable and poorer than the resident populations who are already very poor themselves, especially in the rural populations. More than eight out of 10 IDPs in the four countries live in extreme poverty. Refugees are 38 percentage points poorer than host communities, while IDPs and host communities are nearly equally poor, especially in rural areas (World Bank, 2019, p. vii). In South Sudan, refugees and IDPs are mostly women. They face particular risks: They are more food-insecure than displaced men, they tend to have worse education and labour outcomes than men (World Bank, 2019, p. vii). Children under the age of 15 represent a majority as refugees (over 50%) and also as IDPs (nearly 50%), which indicates large household sizes (World Bank, 2019, p. vi). In general, “the number of extremely poor people continues to rise in sub-Saharan Africa, while falling rapidly in all other regions” (Wadhwa, 2018; see Figure 29).

### **Internally Displaced People (IDPs)**

Internal migration in African countries has traditionally been researched as movements from rural to urban regions and the massive challenges related to urbanization and the creation of mega-cities (Awumbila, 2014; Migration Data Portal, 2020d). Forced displacement exacerbates the challenges of urban areas as IDPs live in marginalized and underserved neighbourhoods or informal settlements, among the urban poor, with limited access to safe water, sanitation, education, and jobs etc., leaving them highly exposed and vulnerable. IDPs increasingly move to urban areas, which often offer them camps but the “rapid, unplanned urbanization in hosting areas puts a strain on jobs, infrastructure, and access to service” for all populations (see article by Levi Manda on Malawi, above; World Bank, 2019, p. 9). “The new poor” will probably reside here, in urban centres, engaged in informal services and those sectors most affected by lockdowns and mobility restrictions due to Covid-19 (World Bank, 2020a).

The AU has been praised for its Convention for the “Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa” – better known as the Kampala Convention – as the world’s first legally binding regional instrument on internal displacement. It represents a landmark effort to promote state responsibility for IDPs’ protection and assistance. A decade after it came into force, however, fewer than half of the 55 AU members have ratified it, and conflict and disaster events in 2019 suggest that the number of displacements is likely to continue rising (André et al., 2019; Dieng, 2017).

Around 17 million Africans lived in internal displacement<sup>10</sup> as a result of conflict by the end of 2018, the highest figure ever recorded for the continent and around 40% of the global total, reports

<sup>10</sup> UNHCR defines those IDPs under the protection or assistance of UNHCR as “people or groups of individuals who have been forced to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of, or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural- or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an international border” (UNHCR, n. d.). The numbers shared hereunder are by the IDMC.

the IDMC (André et al., 2019, p. 11). Disasters, particularly those associated with hydrometeorological hazards such as floods, storms and drought, caused 2.6 million new displacements in 2018.<sup>11</sup>

While globally, much attention is addressed to climate-change induced internal displacement, for instance in Asia-Pacific, in sub-Saharan Africa new displacements took place mainly as a result of conflict in 2018, with some exceptions like Mozambique (cyclones Idai and Kenneth, 2019) or Somalia’s droughts<sup>12</sup>. In general, floods account for 83 % of disaster-induced displacement in Africa between 2009 and 2018 (André et al., 2019, p. 19).

### Observations from Kenya

*by Prof. Levi Obonyo, Dean, School of Communication, Daystar University, Nairobi, Kenya:*

Kenya has had a long history of hosting refugees. Many of Kenya’s neighbours have had a turbulent history of war, natural disasters, and political instability forcing the citizens to seek refuge elsewhere. In the recent past, however, the majority of refugees in Kenya have predominantly come from South Sudan and Somalia. The refugees from South Sudan have traditionally been housed in the Northwest of the country, in Kakuma in the county of Turkana. Refugees from Somalia have, until recently, been hosted in the mid-eastern part of the country in a series of camps that have come to be known as Daadab. These areas are far away from the heart-land of the country in Nairobi and are traditionally of harsh terrain. Most of the refugees have stayed in these camps for long and raised families there.



Source: Private.

The media coverage of refugees in the country assumes traditional frames and news processing prisms of Kenyan journalists one of which is ethnic orientation. Kenya has to be understood as a convergence of four races: the Bantu who came into the area that is today Kenya through the Southern route, the Nilo-Hamites who came through the Western part of the country, and the peoples of Somali and Ethiopian stock who are mainly settled in the northern part of the country. One of the factors both differentiating and at the same time uniting these people groups of East Africa is their language besides other cultural practices. The people of Bantu stock – even if they come from different ethnic groups – can understand each other. These different sub-groups also have some features in common.

11 It is not clear how many people have been displaced by disaster in total by the end of 2018 rendering any comparison of displacement by conflict with displacement by disaster for that year quite difficult. An aggregate of 21.2 million people were displaced by disaster between 2009 and 2018. The lack of year-on-year data may be attributed to the fact that IDMC is restricted to “best estimates of the scale of displacement in Africa, but many data gaps remain” (André et al., 2019, p. 12, p. 19).

12 Drought is an underreported driver of displacement: IDMC recorded 1.6 million new displacements associated with drought between 2009 and 2018, but these data disaggregated by drought have only been available since 2017 and for a few countries (André et al., 2019, p. 19).

For example, Bantu people tend to look alike, while Nilo Hamites have a rather dark complexion, a feature they share in common. But the practices among these broad groups differ widely. While language is uniting it is also an instrument of othering, setting apart those who, although belonging, are simultaneously seen not to belong. In this sense then the Somali are generally seen to be different from those of other stock, a factor that could influence the media coverage of the refugees in Daadab, for example.

That Kenyan journalism is influenced by – among other reasons – the cultural background of journalists requires little labouring. While the country has some of the best-known professionals in the trade, previous exploration has also demonstrated that Kenyan journalists simultaneously exploit tribe as a tool in news processing. News sources from specific communities prefer to provide stories to journalists from their own ethnic backgrounds, while media houses post bureau chiefs from the local communities with the exceptions of the major cities of Mombasa and Nairobi. Indeed, it is an interesting commentary on Kenyan journalism that while local national media only post correspondents from local communities to cover those communities, international media act differently. In this sense then, the refugees in Daadab may be privileged in news coverage and presentation as the media houses increasingly employ journalists from these communities who are likely to identify with them as they share a common cultural orientation.

There are three major locations of refugees in the country. The camps for refugees and asylum seekers close to the town of Daadab have been one of the largest sites in the world, hosting over half a million refugees until the government recently ordered it closed. Kenya's second largest refugee camp is the Kakuma camp in the north west of the country. It hosts nearly 200,000 people (UNHCR, 2020e). Kakuma is close to South Sudan, but is a fairly long distance from Nairobi and poses challenges of access at the best of times. While the terrain there is harsh, it is not dramatically different from where the refugees themselves came from and there is a comparatively close affinity between the refugees and the local community. However, given the location of the refugee camps, covering refugee stories poses a challenge to Kenyan journalists. Much of the Kenyan media activities take place in the urban centres, or regions that are heavily populated, many of them along Kenya's traditional railway line. Both Kakuma and Daadab lie outside what may be considered as Kenya's news corridor. To start with, be it a refugee story or not, events unfolding in these areas seldom find their way to the mainstream media, and when they do, they are generally stories of famine, starvation and disaster. Due to budgetary limitations, newsrooms hardly post journalists to these parts of the country, and in any case the news space set aside for stories from these parts of the country is fairly small. Kenya's news processing is focused on the major news corridor. Consequently, it has not helped that – be it Kakuma or Daadab – these far flung regions are also difficult to

access due to insecurity associated with the routes to these places. Adding to the complexity of the situation is the fact that the camps have been there for so long robbing them of a sense of “newness” that would thus draw the attention of journalists. These refugee camps host families that have been there for a long time or indeed have been raised there.

But the other reason for the bias against refugee stories is a traditional one that journalists have tended to cover the minority through the prism of otherness. Minorities here are characterised by their lack of power, the distance from the centre of capitalism (and those who traditionally own the media) and representation of an alternative worldview. In this respect, refugees are a minority. Overall, the coverage of refugees in Kenya is episodic. It heightens when there is an influx of refugees following either a rise in conflict in their country of origin, or some natural disaster occurring in their home, e.g. famine due to drought.

Coverage by Kenyan media may also be triggered by some disturbances in the camps. Since the coverage is episodic it tends to assume a parachute approach where journalists descend on the region for the episode then return back to Nairobi. Predominantly the media content relating to refugees tends to assume three categories: opinion pieces are by far the most predominant followed by news and other editorial. In an anecdotal look at Kenya’s two leading newspapers The Daily Nation and the Standard, there is hardly any difference in terms of how the two papers have covered the refugees.

The Daadab camp was ordered closed by the Kenyan government leading to heightened coverage of it. In terms of the framing, the media assumes the predominant frame that emerges is one of a humanitarian angle, followed by exploring government policy and the extent to which it synchronises with the international policies and regulations with respect to the treatment of refugees. This situation has not been helped by the reduction of the budget for the media houses that tends to lead to a rise in armchair journalism. This is characterised by journalists relying on whatever information they can glean from the internet to form the basis of their story. Besides the adoption of policy critiques and the humanitarian dimension, the other frame used for the refugees, particularly from the Daadab camp, is one of national insecurity. Generally, it is a negative frame. Further it is worth noting that journalists give fairly limited space and airtime to the refugees’ story. At its height there is a total of about eight stories a month, given an average of half a page in the inside pages of the newspaper. This means that the stories, which predominantly are opinion pieces are not necessarily telling the story of the refugees but rather represent the opinion of social elites on the subject.

Following the closing down of Daadab, there has not been active coverage of the refugee stories in the media. But in terms of a positive presentation of the Kenyan media of the refugees, the Kakuma camp has been viewed largely as an integrated part of the local economy. In 2020, there were radio stations covering the area, and social services were provided to the community. Residents of Kakuma camp were integrated into the local economy. Refugees who have been associated with the Kakuma camp but who have made their way into the city of Nairobi tend to get harsher media representation than those who remain in Kakuma. This is because they begin to compete for resources with Nairobi's elite. A recent negative coverage was of a wealthy South Sudanese living in Nairobi and flaunting his wealth.

This is an excerpt. Please find the full paper on the project portal [www.mediaandmigration.com](http://www.mediaandmigration.com).



#### RECOMMENDED READING:

##### Academic:

Elbadawi, I., & Sambanis, N. (2000). Why are there so many civil wars in Africa? Understanding and preventing violent conflict. *Journal of African Economies*, 9(3), 244-269. <https://doi.org/10.1093/jae/9.3.244>

##### Journalistic:

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## MODULE 10

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# Professional Migration Coverage: Best Practices and Ethical Dimensions

by Anna-Carina Zappe



### MODULE AIMS

- To alert participants to the need to critically access and assess sources for migration coverage.
- To sensitize participants for correct wording and perspective.
- To offer advice for professional reporting on migrants and refugees with best practice cases and experienced journalists' advice.



### LEARNING OUTCOMES

At the end of this module, participants should be able:

- To recognize different factors (e.g. news values, relevance of choice of sources) in the process of producing news on migrants and refugees.  
→ **Affective LO: Responding**
- To use norms from guidelines for ethical reporting on migration.  
→ **Affective LO: Receiving**
- To select credible sources and work towards an ethical perspective in migration coverage. → **Cognitive LO: Evaluating and Creating**

### Outline

“Scholars of migration journalism have argued that migration is hard to cover because it’s a story that oozes, rather than breaks – so the breaking news of a smuggling ship sinking is easier to do than the massive sociopolitical, demographic and economic challenges of the entire phenomenon.” (Dell’Orto, n.d.)

Breaking news about migration may also be easier to consume for the audiences, and more attractive to publish for editors. However, this module aims to encourage participants to cover migrants and refugees in a more complex and nuanced perspective – because so much is needed to understand the phenomenon.

Covering migrants and refugee matters requires specific skills. Journalists need to know adequate research techniques, and also to assess which sources are reliable. They have to be sensitive about the choice of protagonists, focus, frames and information, as well as the forms of presentation in general. Knowing ethical guidelines developed specifically for the coverage of migrants and refugees<sup>1</sup> may help journalists facing the frequent ethical dilemma in coverage of these issues.

1 For definitions, please consult the glossaries recommended in Module 2 (European Migration Network, 2018; IOM, 2019a; UNHCR, n.d.).

Hence, this chapter includes statements from journalists, who report on migration matters worldwide and refer to their practical experience, listing what is important for responsible coverage.

## Migration as news

Profound research starts with a professional selection of the news item to be pursued. Limited by time and space, editors have to decide which news and stories might interest their audience. “Relevance is the paramount driver of news consumption” (Schrøder, 2019). People value those stories as the most relevant that influence their personal lives at the local, national, and international levels; often coupled with shareability of news. The selection of the news by the audience is discussed when working on the aspect of “selling a story” in Module 13. However, it should be kept in mind at this point, that there could exist a gap between what journalists and the public deem newsworthy (Boczkowski & Mitchelstein, 2015; Chakraborty et al., 2019). But research findings also “indicate that users do not always use what they prefer, nor do they prefer what they use” (Swart et al., 2017, p. 1343). The selection of the stories is therefore decisive, as it is already decided during the selection process that some stories about migrants and refugees never reach the recipients.<sup>2</sup> This selection, when analysed, can be attached to certain news values<sup>3</sup>. News values indicates which content journalists select as newsworthy and are also used for media-criticism.

In 1965, Galtung & Ruge (2016) developed their seminal 12-factor system of news values, which has been further developed by other scholars<sup>4</sup>. Harcup & O’Neill (2017) have added news values relevant for the digital age, like exclusivity, bad news, conflict, surprise, audio-visuals, shareability, entertainment, drama, follow-up, the power elite, relevance, magnitude, celebrity, good news and the news organisation’s agenda. Galtung & Ruge (2016) argue that news values are not universal and can differ between cultures. For Conley & Lamb (2006, p. 56), news values are “fluid and can be altered by social, economic and cultural trends”, too. On the one hand, Lee (2010, p. 377) argues that “[m]any of the journalists working at English-language newspapers in Asia tend to be Westerners and/or Western-trained and may be more likely than their vernacular counterparts to subscribe to Western news values and norms including newswriting standards”. On the other hand, Masterton (2005, p. 42) studied journalism values in “Western” countries and in Asia and concluded that “journalists around the world accept that there is a three-element core of newsworthiness without which no information can become news. They are Interest, Timeliness and Clarity”.

2 The report “Moving Stories. International Review of How Media Cover Migration”, published by the Ethical Journalism Network (EJN) lists some stories about migration that often go uncovered (White, 2015).

3 Bednarek & Caple (2017, p. 438) define news values as “the ‘newsworthy’ aspects of actors, happenings and issues as established by a set of recognized values such as Negativity, Proximity and so on” and relate the term to news writing objectives and selection factors.

4 However, research and discussions on news values are always changing and updating. Some researchers have been rethinking the concept like Donsbach (2004) who describe news values as involving subjective judgements. Others like Harcup & O’Neill (2017, p. 1482) propose that new news values have shareability, which refers to “stories that are thought likely to generate sharing and comments via Facebook, Twitter and other forms of social media”. Furthermore, other scholars focus on different perspectives like Bednarek & Caple (2017) who propose a visual analysis of news values in news photography.

**Figure 30: News values**

<i>Exclusivity</i>	<i>Bad News</i>	<i>Conflict</i>	<i>Surprise</i>	<i>Audio-Visuals</i>
<i>Shareability</i>	<i>Entertainment</i>	<i>Drama</i>	<i>Follow-up</i>	<i>The Power Elite</i>
<i>Relevance</i>	<i>Magnitude</i>	<i>Celebrity</i>	<i>Good News</i>	<i>News Organisation's Agenda</i>

Source: Own illustration. Based on Harcup & O'Neill (2017).

This is in line with a review of the literature, which shows that there is a remarkable amount of coherence and congruence regarding news values (Caple & Bednarek, 2013). Agunda (n.d., p. 4) argues that news values in African journalism can be similar to news values in “the West”, because they are “just an extension of the western journalism”. In East African countries, he observes an obsession with the political elites, who are key decision makers. Besides, media systems may have a strong impact on the news values impacting a specific journalism culture. Agunda (n.d., p. 4) raise the example of Tanzania:

“Tanzania with a relatively new tradition in private media, following the economic liberalisation since the 1990s, has tended to ignore these new celebrities, who have a lot of influence among youth, thus continuing the old tradition of the State-owned media covering party leaders and cadres almost exclusively.”

What does the fact that news values are critical for selecting and thus reporting tell us about the status quo in covering migration and refugee matters? In Module 4 we learn that reporting on this topic is often associated with conflicts and crises in European media and under-represented in the media in general. Several scholars have focused on the newsworthiness of migration and forced displacement. An overview from Eberl et al. (2018, p. 210) shows: “[Real world events, such as elections or terroristic attacks, can increase salience of immigration related issues in the media.” This indicates some crucial news value: bad news, particularly negative incidents and drama such as shipwrecks. The model developed by Harcup & O'Neill (2017) offers a wider range of news values (see Figure 30), which might be inherent in migration news stories.



**SUGGESTION FOR A CLASSROOM DEBATE TO ADDRESS THE COGNITIVE SKILLS OF ANALYSIS AND THE AFFECTIVE SKILLS OF RECEIVING OR RESPONDING:**

Compare news stories about migrants and refugees from different countries; e.g. from your home country and a neighboring country. Look at examples from various media segments (online, broadcasting, print etc.) for each country, too. Which news values from Harcup & O’Neill (2017) do you detect in which media? Discuss your results.

**SUGGESTION FOR A CLASSROOM ACTIVITY THAT ADDRESSES THE COGNITIVE SKILLS OF APPLYING AND THE AFFECTIVE SKILLS OF RECEIVING:**

The students should formulate short news in such a way that they contain as many news values as possible. Keep in mind specific news values to be selected by the class leader or through class discussion. Then the results should be discussed in the class with a focus on the various news values.

It is important to be aware of the key news values. It can be helpful for journalists to ask themselves about the news values they follow in their own news coverage when selecting news. Of course, selecting news is much more than just a pure focus on values. It may also be important to know “who is selecting news, for whom, in what medium and by what means (and available resources), [...] as whatever news values may or may not be inherent in any potential story” (Harcup & O’Neill, 2017, p. 1483). Besides the individual decision (which is consciously or unconsciously oriented towards news values inherent in any event or issue), the medium, media systems, journalism cultures etc. also might play a role in whether a story becomes news.

**Professional reporting: best practice criteria**

Shapiro et al. (2006, p. 431) examined what excellence means in journalism. Their multisource analysis resulted in some of the following criteria:

- “provide a benefit to society in terms of public impact, relevance, or service provided by the story”,
- “provide thoughtful and logical analysis of reported material, to bring clarity to complicated subjects, and to place the facts in the context of their background and of the ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions behind the news”,
- demonstrate integrity (“that is, behaving with fairness and independence from their sources”),
- “be transparent in method – that is, the audience should be able to understand where the information comes from”,
- “demonstrate exemplary storytelling technique”.

As with any topic, these quality criteria also apply to journalists covering matters of migrants and refugees – the relevance of this reporting for society is evident, particularly in light of Module 5. A look into the Modules 1 to 3 confirms that this topic is a complicated one that needs to be worked through carefully and thoughtfully. It is also important to work independently and transparently on such a diverse topic, as the various case studies of Modules 6 to 9 show the distinctions between countries.

When reporting on migration and matters concerning refugees, journalists should ensure technical accuracy, produce stories with a good structure and a story arc, surprise the audience and show creativity with the choice of topic and production. Of course, basic principles of ethical journalism – fairness, humanity and accountability – should be kept in mind (Ethical Journalism Network, n.d.c).

Journalists and news organizations may be well advised to respect codes that outline best practices for reporting on migrants and refugees. There are many international codes like the Greece Charter of Idomeni (“Charter of Idomeni,” n.d.) or the Charter of Rome (“Charter of Rome,” n.d.), as well as the international EJN’s ethical guidelines on migration reporting (Ethical Journalism Network, n.d.a), the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights’ e-Media toolkit (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2020) and many more to enhance journalists reporting skills on migration (European Federation of Journalists, 2016). Working through the various guides gives journalists valuable rules for reporting.



#### **SUGGESTION FOR AN EXERCISE TO ADDRESS THE COGNITIVE SKILLS OF KNOWLEDGE:**

As an introduction to the topic, students should collect and discuss important quality criteria for professional reporting. Tentative goals for discussion can be found in the paragraph above.

### **Choice of sources and relevant interviewees**

Covering migrants’ and refugees’ stories with professionalism and sensitivity requires additional competences. Practitioners and researchers agree: Journalists should prepare well for such assignments. They should start with profound preparation for special research into one story. The journalist should start to review the previous coverage from several media to get a general overview, to know the political, cultural, and social context of countries. To do so competently, journalists need to identify and read reports and relevant data by international, national and local organizations, institutions and non-governmental organisations (NGO) involved in the issue, as well as monitor

social media, politicians and officials, and talk to migration experts (among others: Abu-Fadil, n. d.; Terceros, 2018).

This research can proceed in a variety of ways: Journalists can access information both actively and passively. The use of internet sources is dominant in many newsrooms who are reporting on migration issues. The Erich Brost Institute for International Journalism (EBI) at the TU Dortmund University conducted training seminars on migration reporting in Africa and Europe (see Introduction). In the training conducted in Dakar/Senegal in 2018, the participants indicated that online sources seem to be the most frequently used ones. Press releases, interviews (face-to-face and telephone), other media, and information from governments and other authorities, are used rather frequently. Rarely, however, are blogs used, or do journalists ask their colleagues. Press conferences and social media are less frequently used. These results are in line with the scholarly observation that newsrooms are often rather passive recipients of information – they use press releases or information from news agencies (among others: Machill & Beiler, 2009; Neuberger et al., 2009). A considerable part of “journalistic attention focused on only a few internet offerings” (Machill & Beiler, 2009, p.178). “Search engines, in particular Google, dominate the source-determination process and thereby have a decisive influence on the entire course of journalists’ research” (Machill & Beiler, 2009, p. 178).

The wide range of sources – phone calls, social media, face-to-face and digital meetings, other media outlets, scrutinizing (big) data, investigative research and so on – is far too often unexploited. NGOs as well as established sources such as governments, political parties, judicial authorities, police departments, local governments, business organizations, trade unions, churches, international actors, and many more can be consulted. But journalists reporting on migration and forced displacement should not only rely on official and elite sources but should work with a diversity in sources of information – an aspect often lacking in European as well as North-African media (International Centre for Migration Policy Development, 2016).

An prime source for reporting matters of migrants and refugees are the affected people themselves. Indeed, stories that give migrants and refugees and local communities a chance to explain their situation comprise a favourable option for journalists (European Federation of Journalists, 2016). There are many voices outside politics which are important, because politicians are disproportionately often represented in the media coverage about this issue (see Module 4). The Ethiopian Africa News Channel guideline “Editorial Policy on Migration Reporting”, published in Amharic, advises journalists to inquire more deeply into key issues: How are people on the ground affected? Try to find ways of reporting on the almost invisible effects, such as the long-term consequences of psychological damage and trauma of migrants and refugees, perhaps increasing the likelihood that those affected will be a danger in the future, either against other people or, as a group, against other groups or other countries (Africa News Channel, 2019). This is important, because migrants and refugees are more than actors in stories. They are humans – with individual stories and feelings, as further discussed in Module 11.

**Ulriikka Myöhänen, Finnish multimedia journalist**

**“Go to the field with an open mind, talk with different kinds of people, listen as many perspectives as possible** and look for strong factual proof for your story. Also, make it clear from the very beginning in your story, why it is important to talk about these issues. And most importantly: avoid carefully the trap of stereotypes and keep the gender balance in mind!”



Source: Private.

**Gloria Laker Adiiki Aciro, Ugandan journalist coordinating the Uganda Refugee Online News Network**

**“Reporting by refugees about refugees and for refugees themselves:** Hire, train and engage young refugees and migrants’ journalists themselves to tell their own stories. [...] There is a great need to incorporate Peace Journalism into refugee and migrants reporting given the complexity of conflicts and poor economic situation driving Africans away from their homes. And by encouraging reports about local peace, dialogues and reconciliation efforts among refugees in settlements will in the long run drive refugees in contributing to peace back home.”



Source: Private.

**Jelena Prtoric, Croatian freelance journalist**

**“When it comes to reporting, spending more time with migrants, on-the-ground, is still as important as ever.** We need to spend enough time in the field in order to understand the complexities of their situation, their personal stories, the situation of the countries through which they are passing and the context in their countries of origin, to be able to tell the full story.”



Source: Private.



**SUGGESTION FOR AN EXERCISE TO ADDRESS THE COGNITIVE SKILLS OF EVALUATION AND THE AFFECTIVE SKILLS OF RECEIVING:**

Please watch the video “Choosing Credible Resources for Research” (Osinski, 2016) and discuss. A few essential characteristics of good data and good sources are mentioned in this module and in the video.

Let the participants list these characteristics and discuss whether they wish to add or omit, based upon their experience and their cultural background. You can also carry out this assessment using a journalistic example. Examples can be found in the section “Covering migrants and refugees: Practical examples” in this module.

## Credible information and reliable research

Obviously, the quality of the collected data is also important: Journalists should research impeccable data and details (see Module 2), so that they can fill a gap of quality information when writing about human stories (European Federation of Journalists, 2016). Generally, it is important to check the information.

Certainly, journalists are not able to guarantee the truth in all cases, but getting the facts right is “the cardinal principle of journalism” (Ethical Journalism Network, n.d.c). On the one hand, the increasingly toxic and contested surroundings framing the reporting on migrants and refugee matters in parts of the world, where journalists should be aware that sources might have their own agenda (see professional challenges in Module 5 for examples in migration reporting). On the other hand, “attacks on the media as purveyors” of bias, dis-information or false information, should be more than sufficient arguments for journalists to thoroughly check their sources (Abu-Fadil, n.d., p. 34). This does not only apply to official sources, such as governments with their own hidden political agenda, private companies that may have economic interests when spreading information or organisations and institutions with own interests. It also applies of course to civil society and migrants and refugees as part of the society as they can also pursue their own agenda with their information. Journalists need to choose their sources carefully and report with awareness of own preconceptions and subjectivity objectively and truthfully. “Journalism [...] needs to proactively detect and uncover new cases and forms of disinformation” (Berger, 2018, p. 11). Research on the internet can lead to webpages whose information is sketchy, obsolete or incorrect. That is why “caution on using online information is necessary. Particularly when algorithms increasingly govern the rapid spread of information online by sharing and liking information on news sites and social media” (Vergeer, 2018, p. 49). A journalist should check if a website is trustworthy, if it is transparent about where the information comes from, and if the source is indicated, how old the information is, and if the provided information sounds plausible.

This thoroughness does not only apply to the internet. In general, journalists should check the relevance, the validity, the usefulness and the logic of information – online and offline. In that sense, journalists should carry the self-awareness of everyday investigative journalists, who do background-research on all sources and issues and give “thorough analysis of the context in which the information is delivered [...] as much as one can on deadline” (Quinn, 2018, p. 6). Fact checking websites, guidelines and handbooks on disinformation are e.g. the “Journalism, ‘Fake News’ and Disinformation. Handbook for journalism education and training” (Ireton & Posetti, 2018) or “Factfulness” (Rosling, 2018). Exchange and cooperation with other journalists (see Module 13), and trustworthy sources (see Module 2) are key factors in order to find professional ways to check information.

In addition to the credibility of sources, an accurate understanding of the source for journalists and the audience must be considered. First, there is the aspect of the journalists’ understanding: For example, statistics can be tricky for journalists to deal with. Data and statistics from governments,

NGOs, and international institutions – but also civil society organisations – could provide inconsistent information. It is important to provide the proper context and sources (see Module 2 & Module 3) in reporting the story (Abu-Fadil, n.d.).

The example of Sofia Papadopoulou, a journalist from the Athens News Agency-Macedonian Press Agency (ANA-MPA), who reported from the refugee camp in Idomeni, Greece exemplified that the journalists' understanding of interviewees is as relevant as the journalists' understanding of data and statistics:

“One day, a young man came holding his newborn baby in his hands, sat at the centre of the tracks and, with the help of another young refugee who was speaking some English, he started protesting about the living conditions in the camp. The baby was obviously only a few days old and a TV journalist popped the question: Was the child born in the camp? ‘Yes,’ the man translating replied. When the father told him, in Arabic, that the baby was born in the hospital but brought to the camp only a few days after, he said ‘ma’leesh’ (It’s ok/never mind).” (Fronista & Papadopoulou, 2018, p. 138)

#### Aida Alami and Salaheddine Lemaizi, international journalists from Morocco

“Facts first: Be accurate, impartial, act independently, fair and transparently. **Avoid writing what you can’t verify for yourself. Don’t let either the authorities or organizations influence your reporting.**

Travel as much as you can to where the story is happening. Try to see things for yourself. [...] Journalism on migration is an opportunity because it is imperative that journalists return to the field. Media productions on migration can only succeed and



Sources: Private.

achieve professionalism if they manage to do field work through investigation, reporting and interviews, a lot of interviews. [...] As a journalist, you should keep distance and stay focused on the issue and the facts. However, treat your subjects with the right ethics and always keep in mind the bigger context and allow their stories to be heard. Connect with the migrants that you interview, write about the up-close and personal stories that explain the bigger issues. [...] Beware of the racial slurs and make sure you promote evidence-based coverage. Challenge hate-speech by going straight to the facts and avoid stereotypes and clichés. Independently check the facts and evidence presented to you. Always try to get your subjects to corroborate their stories as much as they can. [...] Gender-based violence and discrimination is part of migration stories. Looking at these issues through the lens of gender can only enrich the reporting and add to existing narratives.”

Mistakes or misunderstandings in translation and interpretation of foreign-language statements, confusing sources or misleading information can lead to mistakes or incorrect information in the news. Therefore, because interviewees can be misunderstood for various reasons (e.g. see Module 11), it is important that information is checked very carefully. Also, it is important that it is not dealt with in the same way as in the case cited by the Greek ANA-MPA journalist, who pointed out to some colleagues a mistake in the translation and one said: “As long as he said that and I have it on camera, I will not let your truth ruin a good story!” (Fronista & Papadopoulou, 2018, p. 138).

Second, a correct understanding of sources is also important for the audience. Journalists can help their audience to better understand the complex issue of migration. This can promote transparency in sources to counter ‘fake news’ or propaganda (European Federation of Journalists, 2016). The responsibility for news content also means correcting errors (White, 2015). Also, being transparent with sources and research methods is one crucial aspect, but another just as important is to provide context and background information to news events (Abu-Fadil, n.d.). Taking account of the bigger picture of a story avoids victimization, over-simplification and a narrow humanitarian framing of coverage (Ethical Journalism Network, n.d.b).



**SUGGESTION FOR AN INTERACTIVE ELEMENT IN THE CLASSROOM TO ADDRESS THE COGNITIVE SKILLS OF UNDERSTANDING AND THE AFFECTIVE SKILLS OF RESPONDING:**

After introducing a variety of sources and their value for migration and refugee reporting please do the following exercise, which is called “rating line”.

1. Formulate statements such as “Press releases are important sources of information for the journalistic migration coverage” or “In migration reporting, I often use press releases as sources.”
2. Place two posters in the room. On one are the words “I fully agree” and on the other “I don’t agree by any means”.
3. Ask the participants to position themselves according to the statement and discuss with them their positions. Let them argue why they use a specific source.
4. Contextualize the attitudes with hints on what aspect of each source requires focused attention.

In this way, participants learn to argue and reflect on their own use of, and attitude toward, sources.

## Correct wording and perspectives

Certainly, not every politician’s press release about migrants and refugees should be believed, and not every news item on the internet on migration is true; reporting on those issues should also mean to challenge myths (European Federation of Journalists, 2016) and stereotypes. Remembering the correct wording is one working method that can be used by journalists to avoid myths and stereotypes. For “instance, instead of writing ‘migrant or refugee crisis’ which makes the people a problem it’s better to write ‘crisis of migrant policy’; instead of talking about the ‘EU/national values’ or ‘moral values’, it’s better to talk about the ‘universal values which Europe hold dear’” (European Federation of Journalists, 2016). In expert interviews about covering immigrants and immigration, journalists are advised to stay away from using labels like “illegal” or “undocumented”. Rather, journalists should describe the situation or a person’s status as precisely as possible and provide context. For instance, no person is illegal – he or she is only currently living in the country illegally. The same goes with victimization: Migrants or refugees are not “victims”, and so they should only be quoted as such if they describe themselves that way (Carcamo et al., 2014). Also “victimizing” language such as “destitute”, “devastated”, “defenceless”, “pathetic” and “tragedy”, should be avoided. Such wording disempowers the migrants and refugees and limits the options for change (Africa News Channel, 2019). But on the other hand, any imprecise use of emotive words to describe what has happened to people is also not supportive. Migrants should not be reported as heroes. News coverage should not portray only the success of some migrants’ journeys, according to the guidelines from the Ethiopian African News Channel (Africa News Channel, 2019). The Five Point Guide developed by the EJN requires journalists to know the legal framework, in order to avoid false wording when speaking of migrants and refugees (Ethical Journalism Network, n.d.c). With words, journalists can also correct misleading images. When journalists think of the images that many people have in their minds of migrants and refugees, and about the fears they associate with them, they can show that “refugees and migrants are not young strong men using smartphones or tourist family members travelling with expensive luggages [*sic*]” (European Federation of Journalists, 2016). Many of them are (unaccompanied) children.<sup>5</sup>

Therefore, journalists should stick to salient and specific facts, instead of bringing an exaggerated emotional direction into either the stories or the words. These ethical standards are especially important for sensitive topics like migration and matters concerning refugees. Frequently, media focus only on specific events, dramatize occurrences, and pay a lot of attention to tragedies (see Module 4). An alternative approach can also give a story a wider view – away from the often-used conflict and problem orientated focus to a certain extent. Constructive journalism<sup>6</sup> is about looking into the

5 “Unaccompanied children remain a significant part of irregular migration flows” (IOM, 2019b, p. 105). The number of children among refugees is “very high, fluctuating” between 41 and 52% in the past years (IOM, 2019b, p. 39).

6 For further information about constructive journalism in general see Constructive Institute (2020), McIntyre & Gyldensted (2018), Mast et al. (2019), among others.

future. Journalists can point towards solutions instead of telling only about problems and drama. That includes for example focusing on the resilience and recovery of people who were survivors of trafficking in human beings in the context of migration and forced displacement. Policy issues and how these can be improved should be examined as well (White, 2015).

Therefore, it is important to reflect on one's own role as a journalist. A journalist should explore the story "with the same care, attention to detail and respect" that they would want "if roles were reversed" (Nobel, 2018). This also means that there is more than a national perspective. And, as already mentioned before, it is about more than one topic: Besides shipwrecks and border issues, housing, religion, employment, successful artists, professionals and entrepreneurs as well as background information can be relevant angles and issues to explore (Triandafyllidou, 2017).

#### Dr. Lydia Ouma Radoli, Kenyan broadcast journalist and media researcher



Source: Private.

**"A constructive approach will help put migration in more a positive nuance.** Migration is dynamic and we are likely to see continuous migration trends, probably looking at how migration can be tapped for international and regional cohesion, rather than a factor that brings about community disintegration and loss of identity. Editors and journalist could invest more in migration knowledge, especially **linking migration to other subjects like development, integration, cultural exploration,** unlike the focus that has always pegged to security threats, global populism politics and carnage. Not saying that these stories should not be covered, but rather there should be a balance in coverage to show that the migration story is not skewed but exposes a real human phenomenon."

#### Cécile Debarge, freelance journalist based in Italy



Source: Private.

"The majority of the stories about migration are about crossing. Crossing a border, crossing a river, a mountain, a desert, crossing the Mediterranean, everything but a story sticking to the border. It's a major mistake because migration is a process, a life-long journey. **The most original angles are the ones trying to dig deeper in the story before or after the border.** When people are not only defined by their movements. **This is where there is a space for a universal narrative focused on humans.** It usually enhances an empowering narrative, where migrants are not just suffering or receiving but are also actors of their own change. These are usually underreported features."

**Dennis Kwadwo Peprah, Ghanaian news agency journalist**

“**Dehumanizing words and phrases must be avoided.** [...] Migration stories must always be placed in a global context and a well-balanced coverage. Must include variety of sources – migrants, refugee groups, civil society, non-governmental organisation, relevance public institutions and human rights activists. General economic effects of migration for both sending and receiving countries, migration and technology (use of ICT to facilitate migration, most especially irregular migration involving smugglers), and gender/labour inequalities are good story angles that journalists can explore and place in international focus.”



Source: Private.

**Tersoo Peter Zamber, Nigerian radio journalist**

- “1. Humanizing migration stories by journalists.
2. **Being objective, stating both sides, the negative and positive sides of migration.**
3. Highlighting benefits of migration to the individual, country of origin, transit and destination.”



Source: Private.



**SUGGESTION FOR AN EXERCISE TO ADDRESS THE COGNITIVE SKILLS OF CREATING AND THE AFFECTIVE SKILLS OF RECEIVING:**

This module offers a wide range of best practices in migration and refugee reporting on the basis of which participants can develop good journalistic criteria themselves. Tentative goals are the mentioned tips above. Participants might also discuss the different assessments of the relevance of the criteria as journalistic benchmarks.

## Covering migrants and refugees: practical examples

There are excellent best practice cases for migration coverage around the globe. The following examples are suggested to study sensitive and innovative ways to cover the topic.

- “The war on my phone” is a film which offers an intimate insight into life in war-ridden Syria and four refugees torn between Syria and Europe. It looks beyond politics and tells personal stories of refugees. The film covers the topic in a human way, but keeps the emotions in check (“The war on my phone”, 2018).<sup>7</sup>
- “Workers in Spain’s Strawberry Fields Speak Out on Abuse” is a report on an aspect of migration that is partially neglected: under what conditions do migrants live in host countries? It covers the political, cultural and personal backgrounds in which the events occur. The report offers fact-based and personal insights and tries to provide a multi-perspective view. In addition, it discloses to the audience the sources and explains why some of the individuals are anonymized. Particularly relevant, it attempts to provide a wealth of background information (Alami, 2019a, 2019b).
- “Assad’s Victory. What Comes after War in Syria?” from the German magazine *Der Spiegel* is about the situation in Syria after the regime has largely won the war against the insurgents. Migration is addressed in this article, and the background stories are told. Political positions are set out, events and facts are covered in a wider – also historical, international and cultural – context. Protagonists are accompanied, presented and quoted. The journalist follows a multi-perspective approach (Koelbl, 2017; Koelbl, 2018).
- The Deutsche Welle (DW) Documentary “The gatekeepers of Europe. Outsourcing border controls to Africa” is focusing on Europe “paying African states billions of euros to act as its new border police”, and on development aid used “as a bargaining chip to control immigration” (Schäfer & Schlindwein, 2019). The DW documentary shows a fact-based background research which also includes people who are affected. It focuses on the underreported experiences of migrants and refugees who risk their lives in the Sahara Desert (Schäfer & Schlindwein, 2019).
- With “Émigration irrégulière. À bord des zodiacs de la mort” the Moroccan news website of the journal *Les Inspirations éco* provides a best practice example for compelling and informative reporting on the topic. The article recounts a boat tragedy which only 11 out of 56 migrants survived. Through interviews with survivors and relatives of the victims, the journalists uncover the tactics of the smugglers. Also due to a lack of information and knowledge, the migrants had fallen for the smugglers’ false and fatal promises. Additional sources put the story in perspective and show its relevance. The article cites official statistics, state authorities as well as national NGOs and mentions the measures seized by the UN, European Union and others (Les Inspirations éco, 2019).

<sup>7</sup> There are versions available in English, German and Spanish at Deutsche Welle (DW) online. English: <https://www.dw.com/en/the-war-on-my-phone-lifeline-to-syria-1/av-46642884>, German: <https://www.dw.com/de/the-war-on-my-phone-1/av-46642882>, Spanish: <https://www.dw.com/es/la-guerra-en-mi-celular-noticias-de-siria-1/av-46642906>.



### SUGGESTED ASSIGNMENT TO ADDRESS THE COGNITIVE SKILLS OF CREATING AND EVALUATING AND THE AFFECTIVE SKILLS OF RECEIVING AND RESPONDING:

(A) Let participants produce a report on a current event on the subject of migration and refugee, in which they apply all the (ethical) quality criteria discussed in this module.

(B) Let participants write a paper to reflect on different factors in their own process of producing news on migration (e.g. news values or values from guidelines for ethical reporting).

(C) Let participants exchange their news reports and identify selected sources. Let them judge if the sources are credible and the research reliable.



### RECOMMENDED READING:

#### Academic:

Harcup, T. & O'Neill, D. (2017). 'What is news? News values revisited (again)', *Journalism Studies* 18(12). 1470-1488. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1461670X.2016.1150193>

#### Journalistic:

Ruz, Camila (2015). *The battle over the words used to describe migrants*. Retrieved November 25, 2020, from <https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-34061097>

#### Institutional:

Ethical Journalism Network. (n.d.) *Media and Migration*. Retrieved November 25, 2020, from <https://ethicaljournalismnetwork.org/what-we-do/media-and-migration>

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## MODULE 11

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# Reporting on Migrants and Refugees: Dealing with Trauma

by Anna-Carina Zappe



### MODULE AIMS

- To understand the complexities of trauma.
- To encourage participants to work as journalists in a trauma-sensitive way.
- To help participants to think about their own involvement and mental health.



### LEARNING OUTCOMES

By the end of this module, participants should be able:

- To identify how trauma can affect migrants and refugees.  
→ **Affective LO: Receiving**
- To recognize that a journalist can be affected through a personal involvement.  
→ **Affective LO: Receiving**
- To explain how trauma and personal involvement can impact the coverage of migrants and refugees referring to key elements of psychological trauma.  
→ **Cognitive LO: Understanding**
- To work with and cover migrants and refugees in a trauma-sensitive way oriented to the TIIM-model and self-protection measures. → **Cognitive LO: Creating**

## Outline

The challenges and approaches in covering matters of migrants and refugees, discussed in the previous chapter, are now extended to include ethical, psychological and personal perspectives. Reporting on people fleeing and migrating<sup>1</sup>, who have experienced desparate events, or reporting on people living in camps, often in abysmal situations with shortages of food, sanitation facilities or health care, comes with new challenges for journalists. Interviews with, and reports about, migrants and refugees challenge both the involvement and health of journalists. Both aspects require reflection by the journalists. People can be traumatized, which can make interviews difficult and particular attention should be paid to trauma-sensitive coverage. Furthermore, journalists also have to think about their own involvement and mental health.

To understand the challenges journalists face in the context of trauma-sensitive reporting, the term trauma will be introduced and defined first. Moreover, it is important to remember a range of recommended courses of action when reporting about migration and forced displacement because of the trauma aspect. In addition, guidelines about personal involvement and mental health can help journalists to protect themselves in the field.

1 For definitions, please consult the glossaries recommended in Module 2 (European Migration Network, 2018; UNHCR, n.d.; IOM, 2019).



### SUGGESTION FOR AN EXERCISE TO ADDRESS THE COGNITIVE SKILLS OF REMEMBERING AND THE AFFECTIVE SKILLS OF RECEIVING:

Use The Guardian newspaper's brief portraits (Tondo, 2019) for a classroom discussion.

Let participants think about the challenges journalists face when reporting on these people, as covered in the article. Collect the aspects and discuss them during the seminar session.

## Psychological trauma

The titles of news articles about migrants and refugees are emblazoned with the word trauma: Traumatized migrants, Traumatic experiences of refugees, Survivors of the trauma. But trauma has a specific meaning. Journalists need to use the word carefully and accurately (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2020). Journalists who know about the term and its meaning additionally know of its relevance in the context of reporting migrants and refugee matters. The term trauma comes originally from the Greek word for 'wound' and, as Dass-Brailsford (2007, pp. 2-3) states, "connotes a physical injury and parallels the psychic wounding that can potentially follow a traumatic episode". Physiological trauma means a bodily illness or injury, while psychological trauma refers to "experiences that place a person's life or bodily integrity in jeopardy" (Ford, 2009, p. 6).

The term trauma is often used exchangeably and its meanings have blurred. While the word can describe an event, i.e. a traumatic event, it can also be the traumatic reaction to those events. The meaning as an event includes "the individual's experience during exposure to the stressor(s)" (Ford & Courtois, 2009, p. 15). The word trauma, understood as mental injury, is caused by one or more traumatic events, whose processing by extreme anxiety or the feeling of helplessness has overwhelmed the individual (Seidler, 2013).

Individual trauma differs from person to person even if "psychosocial reactions to trauma have not changed dramatically across time and culture" (Dass-Brailsford, 2007, p. 3). People react to similar traumatic events in multitude ways and with a variety of symptoms (Storr et al., 2007). Some individuals can cope with trauma, because of protective factors. Others are unable to cope with it, because of risk factors (Ford, 2009). In addition, there is more than one event that can lead to a trauma reaction. There are various types of traumatization such as war or conflict, physical violence, sexual traumatic events (rape, child abuse/sexual abuse), accidents, fire or natural



### SUGGESTION FOR AN EXERCISE TO ADDRESS THE COGNITIVE SKILLS OF REMEMBERING AND THE AFFECTIVE SKILLS OF RECEIVING:

Use the text and sources above to design a short 10-minute lecture. The lecture should deal with the term trauma, and the meaning of both trauma and the related term traumatic event in your cultural/country context. The idea is to explain the psychological understanding of trauma in contrast to acute reactions.

Create a short test that asks some of the features of trauma. Multiple choice questions, true/false questions or questions that require definitions of terms are possible tasks.

disasters (Perkonigg et al., 2001). Psychologists distinguish between Type I, a single incident trauma, and Type II, a complex or repetitive trauma. For instance, Type I could be a traumatic accident, a natural disaster or a terrorist attack; Type II ongoing abuse, domestic violence, war or genocide (Terr, 1995). In addition, the concept of sequential trauma may entail constantly recurring various stressful situations. This type is discussed in more detail in the context of migration and forced displacement. Vicarious traumatization<sup>2</sup> is traumatization of those who are indirectly affected by the traumatic event, such as helpers or journalists (Palm et al., 2004). This type is discussed in more detail in the context of the involvement and mental health of the journalist later in this module.

### Trauma, migrants and refugees

Migration and forced displacement can be traumatic. The definition of trauma applies to many mental injuries, which can be caused by a possible traumatic event like migration or forced displacement. There is evidence that migrants and refugees have an increased prevalence of mental disorder; among refugees and asylum seekers, increased post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) symptoms were associated with a higher number of traumas (among others Carswell et al., 2011; Ford, 2009; Steel et al., 2009). Brief examples of descriptive statistics illustrate the prevalence:

- In a study about psychiatric comorbidity and health status of Bosnian refugees, who had fled from the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina and living in Croatia, and who reported symptoms that meet criteria for depression (39%) and PTSD (26%), 21% of the respondents also reported symptoms comorbid for both disorders (Mollica et al., 1999).

<sup>2</sup> There are more than 20 English-language terms for vicarious traumatization, e.g. secondary traumatization (Lemke, 2013).

- A study about the trauma experience and mental health conditions among migrants from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (“food refugees”) in China shows PTSD (56 %) and above-threshold scores on anxiety (90 %) and depression (81 %). The migrants reported an average of 12 traumatic events (Lee et al., 2001).
- A systematic review of surveys about disorders in general refugee populations in Western countries shows rates of PTSD (9 %) and major depression (5 %), with a high degree of co-morbidity (Fazel et al., 2005).
- Based on self-report symptom checklists, migrants from Central America, in particular from Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala interviewed at the US border in Texas, met the diagnostic criteria for PTSD (32 %), depression (24 %), and for a PTSD/depression mix (17 %). The findings suggest that the mental health issues are responses to violence and persecution (Keller et al., 2017).

Hence, while the percentages for PTSD among migrants and refugees vary, they may in all likelihood suffer from trauma disorders. A study comparing the mental health of various groups of immigrants and native-born residents in Switzerland shows that respondents of each studied group fulfil the criteria for PTSD (by frequency rates): asylum seekers (54 %); refugees (41 %); “illegal migrants” (6 %), labour migrants (17 %); native-born Swiss residents (8%). These rates may lead to the conclusion that the residence status and/or the reason for leaving the home country is already an indicator of PTSD (Heeren et al., 2014). A Brazilian research team has shown that “[t]he prevalence of PTSD among migrants is very high (47%), especially among refugees, who experience it at nearly twice the rate of migrant workers” (Bustamante, et al., 2018). The prevalence rate for PTSD in torture victims is 50-70 % (van Velsen et al., 1996).

A special aspect about the traumatization of refugees is that often it cannot be assumed to be a single traumatization, but a sequential one. In sequential trauma, various traumatic events occur in a particular sequence (Becker, 2014; Keilson, 1979; Zimmermann, 2012). Studies (among other Marshall, 2005; Mollica et al., 1998; Mollica et al., 1999) “have shown that refugees and individuals affected by war and gross human rights violations experience a wide range and high number of traumatic events” (Carswell et al., 2011, p. 107). Migrants and refugees often experience sequential trauma.


Figure 31 based on Zimmermann (2012) could be applied to current developments: As of the time of editing this module (2020) – people fleeing war and conflict in Iraq, Syria, South Sudan or the DRC might have experienced many extremely stressful events as well as others fleeing terror, like people from Nigeria brutalised by Boko Haram, or persecution or human rights violations such as torture (see Module 3). The thing all these people may have in common is that the first traumatic event occurs before they flee. Before being forced to flee, people may lose friends and/or relatives, see death around them and experience imprisonment, torture, loss of property, hunger, malnutrition, physical assault, extreme fear, rape and loss of livelihood. In the aforementioned study exam-

ining pre-migration trauma exposure of families and individuals at the US border from Central America 83% cited violence as a reason for fleeing their country (Keller et al., 2017). But it is not a new phenomenon. In 1998, for instance, in an Australian study asylum-seekers, refugees and immigrants of Tamil background reported pre-migration trauma as “exposure to ill-health without medical care, lack of shelter, being close to death, forced separation from family members, and the murder or unnatural death of others” (Silove et al., 1998, p.179).

The next traumatic event is the fleeing, which can last days, months or even years, and may also inflict trauma on refugees, but also on migrants, traveling for many additional reasons. During this period, the people are frequently separated from family members or friends, robbed, forced to inflict pain or kill themselves, witness torture or killing, and/or lose family members or friends, who travelled with them. Moreover, they might not know where they are for a while, have lost orientation, or endure extremely harsh environmental conditions. For example, a report from UNHCR and the Mixed Migration Center from the Danish Refugee Council shows that thousands of refugees and migrants die and suffer from serious human rights violations on their journey to the African Mediterranean coast and from West to East Africa (Breen, 2019).

In transit and destination countries, which might be not places chosen by either the migrant or the refugee, people experience another event. They have to adapt to a new place, a new language and new living conditions. Often, their status remains unresolved so they cannot be sure whether or not

**Figure 31: Sequence of six potential traumatic events in the context of migration and forced displacement**



Source: Own illustration, based on Zimmermann (2012).

they will be allowed to stay in the host country. During this period, their uncertain status could become chronic: The provisional nature of the situation leaves migrants and refugees in a state of permanent insecurity. An extreme example at the time of editing this module, is the Greek refugee camp Moria, where the transitory residents have been waiting for years under particularly difficult conditions for their insecure status to change. Studies from past decades show that the consequences of such conditions can be stressful. Researchers in Germany interviewed adolescents in shelters and found out that young refugees' current (as well as past) living conditions were highly stressful. For the adolescents, the burdens included changes in family structures as well as reversal of traditional roles within the family, e.g. the question which family members handle official correspondence (Gavranidou et al., 2008).

In addition, for some migrants and refugees the trauma continues if they have to return to their country of origin. According to EUROSTAT (2019), from 2015 to 2019, approximately 2 million asylum applications were rejected by member states of the European Union (EU). The return journey could be traumatic. From handcuffing and the separation of new friends or close family in the host country to the fear what the future will be in the country of origin – there is a broad range of factors that can traumatize.

Finally, migrants and refugees becoming migrants again where the returned persons concerned decide to repeat the cycle. Returning migrants or refugees are at risk of having previously aban-



#### **SUGGESTION FOR AN EXERCISE TO ADDRESS THE COGNITIVE SKILLS OF ANALYSIS AND THE AFFECTIVE SKILLS OF RECEIVING:**

Present the suggested film elements, which show the potentially traumatized migrants or refugees and the different causes of traumatisation, to the participants. Ask participants – before showing the film elements – to pay attention to what the migrants or refugees tell and what is told about migration, forced displacement and trauma in the films. Let them also ponder to what extent the experience corresponds to the definition of a traumatic event, which is an existential threat that may exceed coping skills.

1. *Reshaping the Trauma of Refugee Children in Lesbos* (National Geographic, 2018) Timecode: 00:00-00:15
2. *Refugees on Lesbos* (Sallet, 2017) Timecode: 02:16-02:26
3. *Outsourcing border controls to Africa* (Schäfer & Schlindwein, 2019) Timecode: 20:10-21:20

Use the film material for a discussion. Discuss the results and impressions. In this context, introduce the term “sequential traumatization”.

done everything in their homeland. On returning, they do not have any basis for their existence, and may also be socially isolated from their families and compatriots (Zimmermann, 2012). Leavers returning home empty-handed might become failures in the eyes of those who stayed at home (Pujol-Mazzini, 2019). This trauma may prompt people to risk the cycle again.

### **Interviewing migrants and refugees and being trauma-sensitive**

As already discussed in the previous modules, it is important not only to talk about, but also talk *with* migrants and refugees. Sometimes the interviews with migrants and refugees are published or broadcast in full, sometimes quotations are published in the context of a report. Each time, however, journalists have to meet migrants and refugees, talk to them, ask questions. A look at the news in Europe since 2015 has revealed making of such interviews and reports (see Module 4). Let's have a look at another case: Remember the photo of Óscar Alberto Martínez Ramírez and his daughter, Valeria, who was not quite two years old. They drowned on the US-Mexican border, as mentioned in Module 5. Many media outlets posted a video of Óscar's mother, Rosa Ramirez, desperately crying and telling about the last contact with her son and about the dolls of her granddaughter, while flash lights went on and off everywhere. In an interview, Rosa Ramírez told with tears in her eyes how she felt when her son and his young daughter set out on the journey and how she feels now in a house without her son and granddaughter. Journalists asked Rosa several – partly haunting – questions (among others: Renteria, 2019; Thebault et al., 2019; BBC News, 2019). It is well known that questions can shake up traumatic memories. That aspect applies of course not only to the mother of a deceased migrant and his child, but to all migrants and refugees, so it is important to consider which questions are suitable for potentially traumatized migrants and refugees and their families (among others: Hanaford et al., 2016; McMahan et al., 2014).

The Dart Center for Journalism and Trauma (Dart Center), a resource center and think tank for journalists who cover potentially traumatic events around the world, has published a teaching DVD/online film for working journalists and students to learn techniques for an ethical, sensitive and accurate reporting of victims and survivors of trauma in general. In the video, seven families, struck by tragedy, tell of the best ways to ethically treat people, who become the focus of media. It is available in English and Spanish (Dart Center, 2014).<sup>3</sup>

It is more than just the choice of questions that journalists should be aware of in such personal interviews, as their attitude, behaviour and demeanour also are significant factors. A journalist's prime responsibility concerns the individual facing her/him: the migrant, the refugee, the interviewee, who will be the protagonists of the journalist's story. But some journalists act more like "disaster tourists than migration correspondents", the public editor of the Italian daily La Stampa

3 Further general information on the topic of trauma reporting can be found at e.g. Healey (2019), who is a highly experienced BBC journalist, or Simpson et al. (2006). Roger Simpson worked as a journalist for The Wall Street Journal and the Detroit Free Press and was the founding director of the Dart Center.

Anna Masera was quoted as saying in 2016 (Albeanu, 2016). Focusing on the suffering of migrants and refugees and interviewing them without awareness of their sentiments and mental health, makes reporters appear more like vultures of disaster than reputable and professional reporters. In order not to act like ‘disaster tourists’, journalists must reflect their attitudes in each specific encounter. Is the interviewee a “victim”, unable to change his/her situation? Or a “survivor”, who has mastered a difficult situation? The answers to these questions are relevant for the interviews (Nobel, 2018). But they may also require change in the behaviour of the journalists, as well as in their voice, questioning technique, and perspective on the story.

Furthermore, journalists should consider the question how they can avoid re-victimizing already-traumatized individuals. For example, during an interview, a small detail can trigger flashbacks or other intrusive memories, and journalists need to give the interviewees time to recover (Hanaford et al., 2016). In general, journalists should not forget that the interviewees are not professionals who talk soberly about facts, but people who are at least potentially traumatized.

“A journalist should make every effort to give some control to the person being interviewed – interviewees should understand that they don’t have to answer questions they don’t want to answer, and that they can end the interview at any time. It’s important to reiterate this as it can be difficult for traumatised people to trust others.” (Hanaford et al., 2016)

That’s what Katy Robjant, a consultant clinical psychologist, said in an interview with the Dart Center about reporting on migrants and refugees (Hanaford et al., 2016). It can be important for the journalists to be specific, rather than asking open-ended questions. Hence, the migrant or refugee interviewed can share all the information he/she wants to, without feeling forced to share details the interviewee does not want to even think about (Hanaford et al., 2016). A list of standards for journalists to follow when interviewing trauma survivors from the Journalist’s Resource<sup>4</sup> also points out that “journalists have a responsibility to do everything they can to avoid exposing the interviewee to further abuse and to avoid undermining an interviewee’s standing in the community” (Nobel, 2018). Therefore, journalists should be aware that migrants and refugees may wish to respond to parts of the story (if possible) prior to release, as this may reduce the impact and possible trauma of public exposure (Nobel, 2018).

Several guidelines and publications<sup>5</sup> for trauma-sensitive interviews inform journalists how to (re-) act in interviews. We have compiled the following standards called *TIIM – Trauma Informed Interviews with Migrants* for interviews with migrants and refugees (see Figure 32, from relevant guide-

4 The Journalist’s Resource, based at Harvard’s Shorenstein Center on Media, Politics and Public Policy, edited a list of standards for journalists to follow when interviewing trauma survivors. The list was originally from The War Horse, a nonprofit news publication focused on covering war, trauma and veterans’ affairs (Nobel, 2018).

5 The Journalist’s Resource (see Footnote 4) is one, another is the set of standards which Dart Center created for journalists to follow when interviewing trauma survivors (Hight & Smyth, 2009). Moreover, the Dart Center’s Interview “Reporting on Refugees: Tips on Covering the Crisis” (Hanaford et al., 2016) and the article “Working With Victims and Survivors” (Dart Center, 2011) also provide more standards for journalists.

lines (Dart Center, 2011; Hanaford et al., 2016; Hight & Smyth, 2009; Nobel, 2018). The guidelines promote awareness that the interviewed migrant or refugee can be traumatized or has similar mental health issues.

### **TIIM – Trauma Informed Interviews with Migrants**

1. **Preparation – Thoroughly prepare interviews.** Besides particular skills (e. g. interview techniques) and understanding of immigration law, statistics about migrants and refugees as well as migration backgrounds, journalists should be aware about trauma aspects. If journalists know about the potential presence of trauma and have informed themselves about it, they have taken an important step in preparation. Be aware of potential gender, language, class, culture or nationality factors that could influence the engagement on both sides.
2. **Identification – Be honest and transparent right from the beginning.** Before asking the first questions, journalists should introduce themselves and their role: “My name is John Doe and I would like to report about migration for the Daily Magazine.” Journalist may receive an abrupt insensitive reaction. But they should not respond in a like manner and keep in mind that the reaction may be due to a traumatization. If a potential interviewee does not agree to the interview, journalists could leave a contact card and suggest to talk later.
3. **Explanation – Keep in mind that your interviewees are rarely media experts.** Journalist should know that migrants or refugees might come from a media culture different to theirs. They should try to explain the media process in their region and how their story, photo and/or footage is likely to be used. Journalists should also explain that the material could be edited before or after publication, may be used several times or may not be used at all. Above all, journalists should refrain from giving abused people the additional burden of an (exclusive) contract. Media contracts are relatively unknown to most and negotiating such a contract – as a traumatized person – can be a burden.
4. **Respect – Always treat the interviewees with dignity.** Journalists should respect the rights of migrants and refugees not to be interviewed, filmed and/or photographed – this means that people should always be asked in advance. Thus, traumatized migrants or refugees may be unable to be interviewed, filmed or photographed – and unable to give informed consent to an interview. Journalists should take that into consideration. People suffering from traumatic situations might not want to talk about their experiences but do so about other issues. Journalists should not press people into an interview, by saying they would help others.
5. **Setting – Feel responsible for a safe space for the interview.** Traumatized people do need to talk about their trauma(s) without unwanted listeners or disturbance. Moreover, journalists should endeavour to give some control to the interviewees. Create an atmosphere in which migrants or refugees understand that they do not have to answer all questions or tell (traumatic) details and that the interview can be ended at any time in case they do not want to talk anymore.
6. **Words – Pay attention to your choice of words.** Journalists should not feign compassion but use considerate terms. The supportive phrase “I’m sorry for what happened to you” rather than the

bluntly “How do you feel?” Journalists should also avoid saying “I understand how you feel.” No matter how well-prepared journalists are, they do not “understand” what a traumatized migrant or refugee has experienced. Moreover, journalists should prefer the term “survivor” instead of “victim.” Migrants or refugees are not “victims” unless they describe themselves with the word “victim”. In addition, journalists should avoid the language of blame: They should be careful of asking “why” questions, “devil’s advocate” questions or questions that suggests that the interviewee could have (re-)act in another way, because refugees or migrants might feel self-blame, guilt and shame.

7. **Time – Take enough time for the interview.** For migrants or refugees, their (potentially traumatic) experience is very intense and personal. Thus, journalists should spend enough time with them. Then migrants or refugees can develop a sense of trust in journalists. That means journalists also need time to listen – actively and non-judgmentally. Over time, the interviewee might be more likely to reveal aspects, about which journalists would not have asked.
8. **Reaction – Be prepared to respond to emotional incidents:** During an interview, journalists may inadvertently mention a detail that triggers a flashback or other stressful memories. The interviewee could become desperate, collapse emotionally or distance themselves. If they show a traumatic reaction, journalists should give the migrant or refugee time to recover. An advice is: “Try to stay calm and keep your actions predictable” (Hanaford et al., 2016). Journalists should offer help, reassure the migrants or refugees that it is a safe situation in a safe location and remind them who they are. After a while, when the interviewee has gathered, journalists can ask: “Are you ready to move on with the interview?” It is also possible to cancel the interview after a collapse.

**Figure 32: TIIM – key points to remember**



Source: Compilation of guidelines from Dart Center (2011), Hanaford et al. (2016), Hight & Smyth (2009) and Nobel (2018). Own illustration.

After an interview with migrants or refugees, journalists should consider if something has changed for the interviewees simply because the interview has taken place. Journalists should ask themselves who might take care of the interviewees. If the interview was emotionally disturbing, it is important not to leave them on their own. At the same time, the important question arises: How to deal with the desire for personal contact? Moreover, how to deal with the desire of migrants or refugees to be helped? Assistance should be provided so that interviewees can find personal answers to these questions. Some of these aspects also refer to the later discussed aspect of involvement and health of the journalist. Moreover, it is important to let sources – especially when they stay illegally in a country – remain anonymous, i.e. make the decision for themselves if they do or do not want their name to appear in the news media. When writing an article or producing a story, journalists should abide by the interviewees' wishes. This applies also, if prior to publication, migrants or refugees decide not to be identified or reported anymore (Carcamo et al., 2014).

Furthermore, ethical reporting that is sensitive to trauma does, of course, apply the guidelines that were already discussed in Module 10: Source- and fact-checking, wording and perspective should also be balanced in a report about migrants or refugees, so that the publication does not have a negative impact on already traumatized migrants or refugees. Journalists should take into consideration that when first talking to a migrant or refugee, the person may be confused or absent minded. Double-checking of information can ensure accuracy (Hight & Smyth, 2009). People who have experienced trauma and who have been covered in the media afterwards particularly complained about stories with distorted facts, e.g. misspelled names, incorrect ages or chronology of events and dates (Simpson et al., 2006).



#### SUGGESTION FOR AN INTERACTIVE EXERCISE TO ADDRESSES THE COGNITIVE SKILLS OF CREATING AND THE AFFECTIVE SKILLS OF RECEIVING:

To train participants for the situation of encountering and interviewing migrants, use the roleplay templates provided. Afterwards, let the students talk about their personal experiences during the roleplay. Hand out the list of standards for interviews with migrants and refugees (TIIM) and discuss the rules. To address the affective skills of responding: Let the participants repeat the interview situation – this time, they should stick to the new rules.

#### **Material for roleplay:**

*Rules:* Form groups with four to six participants in each group. One participant should play a refugee, the others play journalists. Distribute prescribed roles and give the participants a short amount of time to read their role. Tell them that they are going to have 15 minutes for the actual roleplay.

*Role of a journalist:* Your job is to report about the personal situation of a refugee in the refugee camp. Why did she/he leave the home country? What did she/he experience? What was the worst experience?

The outcome of the interview should include direct quotes and, of course, a photo of the person.

*Role of a refugee:* Have a look at Module 2 and find inspiration from existing testimonials (Infomigrants, 2020; IOM, 2017; Médecins Sans Frontières, 2019). There are descriptions of personal histories of migrants and refugees.

Suggest that the role-players devise a story for their character.



#### ALTERNATIVE TO ADDRESS THE COGNITIVE SKILLS OF ANALYSIS AND THE AFFECTIVE SKILLS OF RECEIVING:

Show the participants the suggested videos from the Dart Center “Trauma-Informed Interviewing: Techniques from a Clinician’s Toolkit” (Porterfield, 2019) and discuss the individual guidelines for trauma-sensitive interviews afterwards.

## Mental health of journalists covering migrants and refugees

Journalists can also be traumatized by their reporting (Feinstein & Storm, 2017). Indirect traumatization may already occur when a journalist is being told the details of a traumatic event – even from a distance, and without direct sensory impressions of the actual incident (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Thus, a trauma only presented verbally may inflict on listeners intrusive memories similar to those developed after an experience of a traumatic event (Krans et al., 2010). As a consequence, symptoms of a trauma can transfer to helpers, relatives or journalists. Reporters can be traumatized by talking to traumatized migrants or refugees. An analysis of several studies on journalism and PTSD shows that there are job-specific risk factors for journalists, e.g. traumatic experiences in the personal history, the severity of traumatic exposure, a low level of social and professional support, and a lack of work experience.<sup>6</sup> The analysis also shows that coping strategies exist, e.g. social support and a professional distance to the traumatic events – the latter can also be understood as a dissociation symptom (Weidmann, 2008). An example of how journalists reporting on migrants and refugees feel the burden of events is provided by Simon Shuster, reporter for

<sup>6</sup> But also a longer professional life accumulates more traumatic experiences (Weidmann, 2008).

Time Magazine, the New York based magazine, who mentioned about his experience in the refugee camp of Idomeni in northern Greece: “It was quite shocking for me when I arrived there and saw the conditions – there were numerous scenes that were very painful to watch” (Scott, 2016). Will Vassilopoulos, a Greek journalist who works for Agence France-Presse, described the situation on Lesbos (Greece) in 2016 as “sinister” and “horrible” (Feinstein & Storm, 2017, p. 21). These impressions may not remain without consequences.

Besides PTSD or depression, journalists covering refugees and migrants could also be affected by moral injury (Feinstein et al., 2018), defined as one’s own gross violation of moral or ethical standards. It is also possible to be affected by moral injury by being a (non-)direct witness of misbehaviour (Stein et al., 2012). “[M]oral injury in journalists covering the refugee crisis is associated with being a parent, working alone, no previous exposure to war, a recent increase in workload, a belief that organisational support is lacking and poor control over resources needed to report the story” (Feinstein et al., 2018, p. 4). A significant association can also be found between guilt and moral injury. Journalists who reported about migrants and refugees stories close to home, or who decided to assist migrants – instead of reporting about them, but staying in their role of being a journalist – feel more guilty (Feinstein et al., 2018). There are many moral conflicts, which can make journalists feel responsible for the well-being of their interviewees or the subjects they cover and can bring them into a role conflict, like the above-mentioned case of Simon Shuster, who described that he was mostly switched into a civilian mode and had helped people. He called it “a constant assessment where you have to really stop and think” about what the chief obligation is – either to report or to do humanitarian things (Scott, 2016). This is also like the case involving a Syrian refugee, who was pleading with journalist Jess Hurd to help him, saying “Shoot me, or put me in your trunk” (Hurd, 2015). Likewise, the refugee who furiously approached German journalist Raniah Salloum, and started blaming her for being unable to stop police violence against the refugees (Hanaford et al., 2016).

This also means that journalists always have to be aware of their own role in the context of events: What am I, a helper or reporter? What tasks I do are associated with which role? What exceeds the remit? Where is human action and help necessary? “(D)ata provide preliminary evidence that moral injury may be less likely to surface in journalists if they understand what their professional role is and do not blur the boundaries of what they are expected to do” (Feinstein & Storm, 2017). The case of the journalist Fredrik Örnevall shows which dilemma a reporter can face: Örnevall, his camera operator and his interpreter smuggled a refugee child to Sweden from Greece while they were producing a TV documentary in Greece, broadcast in 2015. Örnevall went to court, where he testified that if he had not helped the boy, it would have haunted him forever (Crouch, 2017).<sup>7</sup> The case of Alice Petré, migration correspondent for Swedish Radio,

<sup>7</sup> More tips on mental health care for journalists can be found at Karki (2017) or Hylton (2015).

is another one. When she reported about a family from Afghanistan in Southern Europe, she gave them three times a small amount of money out of her own pocket. But then she changed her mind. She explained:

“He has been writing to me and asking for more money and I told him, ‘I am a journalist, not an activist’. I cannot go over that border again. I did it because I felt very much for the family, but then I realised it wasn’t such a good idea because it raises expectations and I cannot live up to these expectations so I had better stop it.” (Feinstein & Storm, 2017, p. 27)

Journalist Sofia Papadopoulou offered to help a couple in Idomeni camp in Greece: “It was then that I understood it is very hard to abide by the strict journalistic rules learned at school, and that no field experience can be compared with a class lesson” (Fronista & Papadopoulou, 2018). Journalists are well advised to think about their role in the context of the coverage about migrants and refugees and may have to redefine it again and again.

All in all, journalists should be aware they can be personally involved in a great many ways. Journalist should think about how to deal with the situation, and how to protect themselves, before they step into them. They should be aware that reality may be even more challenging than anything they considered in theory. In a tip sheet from Columbia Journalism School, safety and self-care strategies are summarized for journalists, urging them to take care of themselves in the field, and to be prepared, mindful and focused (Hylton, 2015).



**SUGGESTED ASSIGNMENT TO ADDRESS THE COGNITIVE SKILLS OF UNDERSTANDING AND CREATING AND THE AFFECTIVE SKILLS OF RECEIVING:**

(A) Ask students to watch Simon Shuster’s video report from the Idomeni camp (Shuster, 2016). Assign them to write about not only how trauma and personal involvement can impact the coverage of migrants and refugees but also the possible conflicts the reporter encountered when doing the report and to what extent those conflicts can influence the reporter’s own mental constitution.

(B) If there is an opportunity to give students access to migrants or refugees (through associations or authorities), ask your students to conduct an interview with a migrant or refugee. Otherwise let the students prepare such an interview and develop a personal schedule for such an interview – where they also consider possible complications regarding trauma reactions and own mental health.



### RECOMMENDED READING:

#### Academic:

Fronista, P., & Papadopoulou, S. (2018). Down and out and wet and bedraggled: Navigating the emotional and ethical maelstrom of reporting from the crisis flash-point of Idomeni. In Dell’Orto, G. & Wetzstein, I. (Eds.), *Refugee news, refugee politics: Journalism, public opinion and policymaking in Europe* (127-140). New York: Routledge.

#### Journalistic:

Shuster, S. (2016, March 24). This 13-Year-Old Girl Stranded in a Refugee Camp Is Praying to Get Out. [Video]. *Time Magazine*. Retrieved May 11, 2020, from <https://time.com/4269714/syrian-refugee-girl/>

#### Institutional:

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## MODULE 12

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# Towards Collaborative Coverage of Migration

by Tina Bettels-Schwabbauer  
and Nadia Leihls



### MODULE AIMS

- To demonstrate different forms of collaborative journalism and best-practice examples.
- To equip participants with knowledge about teamwork and intercultural communication.
- To point out benefits of collaborative journalism, especially for the coverage of migration.



### LEARNING OUTCOMES

At the end of this module, participants should be able:

- To recognise the importance of embodying various perspectives into their reporting.
  - **Cognitive LO: Analysing**
- To collaborate with journalists from diverse geographical backgrounds as well as with audiences in the production of migrant and refugee stories.
  - **Affective LO: Responding**
- To know what is required to be able to work in (intercultural) teams.
  - **Cognitive LO: Analysing**

## Outline

The previous chapters have shown how much data about migration and forced displacement is available – the International Organisation of Migration (IOM) Migration Portal, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA), just to name a very few. These offer rich material to compare matters of migration and forced displacement between countries and continents. Combined with data from the World Bank, the Statistical Office of the European Communities (EUROSTAT) or the Mixed Migration Monitoring Mechanism Initiative (4Mi), they may allow journalists to conceive stories that transcend borders and relate the situation in countries of origin with the situation in destination countries. What are the facts and context factors in the home and transit countries of migrants and refugees, and what are the relevant statistics for destination countries? While the previous chapters have also served as an introduction how to make the best use of the available data, this chapter focuses on a promising perspective for telling the story behind the facts: Collaborative journalism may substantially broaden the scope of stories about migration and forced displacement by combining the efforts of journalists from origin, transit and destination countries. In a cooperative effort, they may achieve much more than a single journalist. Certainly, collaborative projects in journalism require a substantial investment of time and energy, and thus may be realized only once in a while, when the topic really merits the effort. However, the true story of migration and forced

displacement can only be told from more than one place. With a shrinking network of foreign correspondents even in the ‘Western’ media, and extremely scarce resources in many newsrooms to report even from neighbouring countries, collaborative projects may emerge as one viable solution to contextualize the coverage. Journalists may also team up in inter-continental or cross-continental networks to jointly analyse migration data and develop story ideas. Furthermore, collaborative projects may include migrants and refugees and finally make them more visible in the media.

### **Collaboration between media professionals**

Collaborations between journalists and news organisations have become increasingly important, especially for those media concerned with investigative journalism. Collaboration allows them to join resources and expertise to investigate issues of public relevance, for example in the fields of politics, business, trade, and crime – both at a pan-national and a cross-border level (Alfter, 2016; Sambrook, 2018). Especially with issues such as “highly developed systems of financial technology, or internet-enabled crime”, journalistic collaboration becomes an urgent need (Sambrook, 2018, p. 95). When there are massive amounts of data involved, there is a particular need for journalists to collaborate and support each other (Sambrook, 2018, p. 94). The trend of data-driven journalism, in particular, forces journalists to team up with software developers, designers and academics to investigate and interpret the data correctly, and present it in an attractive manner to their audiences.

One driving force of this new trend in journalism has been digitalization. While it enabled journalists to communicate and to collaborate more easily across newsrooms and national borders and made remote communication quick, easy and cheap, it also left legacy media struggling with decreasing audience numbers and advertising revenues (Pew Research Center, 2014, p. 2). Collaboration became a way to “stretch limited resources” at a time when costs had to be cut, staff had to be reduced and audiences learned to search information online, more often than not deciding to stop paying for news and entertainment (Stonbely, 2017, p. 9). While major news organisations might still have “an institutional weight and broad audience reach which newcomers lack” they increasingly decide to join forces with new, online-only journalistic teams as those come up with fresh novel ideas that may attract a younger audience with new technical skills (Sambrook, 2017). In other cases, legacy media organisations collaborate with former competitors to build shared technology such as content management systems, audience metrics or paywalls in an attempt to cope with the economic struggles they face (Collaborative Journalism, 2020a).

The Panama Papers, revealed in 2016, have been a prime example of cross-border journalism. Led by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) and the German newspaper *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (SZ), it has been the largest worldwide collaborative journalism project in history. More than 400 journalists – among them reporters, editors, computer programmers and fact-checkers – from nearly 80 countries, working in 25 languages, collaborated on the Panama Papers. They exposed offshore companies linked to more than 140 politicians in more than 50 countries (ICIJ, 2017; ICIJ, 2018).

In collaborative journalism, fellow journalists and newsrooms do not see each other as competitors – instead they team up “for the amelioration of their organisations, their products and their audiences” (Stonbely, 2017, p. 17). Also, Howe et al. (2017, p. 2) see “the beginning of a kind of sea-change, from a news industry that was competitive and siloed to one inclined toward sharing, cooperation, and transparency”. Howe et al. (2017, p. 3) observe that in innovative media outlets the “traditional newsroom balkanized production into departments – design, photo, research, city, sports, classes” will be replaced by collaborative environments which will “allow nimble, multi-faceted teams to self-organize”. The pioneers of collaborative journalism are those who got involved into the community of software developers and adopted the widely spread altruistic ethos of open source norms and practices (Howe et al., 2017, p. 2). Nevertheless, journalists still compete about best ideas and access to information and might find themselves confined by their employers in the future.



**SUGGESTION FOR CLASSROOM (TO ADDRESS THE COGNITIVE SKILLS OF UNDERSTANDING AND THE AFFECTIVE SKILLS OF RESPONDING):**

Discuss the advantages and challenges of collaborative projects in journalism. Use the table below to structure the outcome of the debate.

Benefits:	Obstacles:
Cross-disciplinary teams create journalistic innovations more easily.	Media organisations must construct collaborative environments to allow for teamwork.
Development of new formats of reporting (e.g. data journalism, multimedia storytelling).	Cross-border collaboration needs agreement on a common language and consider different time zones.
Development of new business models.	Multi-skilled teams can struggle with different work philosophies.
International network can protect against external interferences from national forces.	Partners might violate agreements, e.g. publishing prior to agreed deadlines, not deliver results, miss deadlines, story theft.
Enhancing the position of single journalists when negotiating with editors and newsroom managers.	Not all partners might have access to sources such as official statements.
Combination of journalists with highly specialized experts for example to analyse big data.	Partners might be hindered by structural or financial constraints.
Reach and quality of news reporting can be enhanced.	Digital communication might be under surveillance.

Koch (2018, pp. 64-77) also considers non-governmental organisations (NGOs) such as Transparency International as valuable cooperation partners. Alfter (2018, p. 42) believes that “any cooperating team of disparate character such as journalists and scholars” can participate in collaborative journalism. According to Alfter (2016, p. 300) cross-border journalism includes four features:

“Journalists from **different countries** ...  
 ... collaborate to research a **shared theme or story**.  
 They **compile, mutually cross check and merge their findings** in order to ...  
 ... fact check and **tell these findings to their individual target groups** on regional, national or local level.”

While there is general agreement that competitive thinking is counterproductive to collaborative journalism, the dimensions of a potential cooperation vary enormously. Stonbely (2017, p. 14) sees collaborative journalism solely as “a cooperative arrangement (formal or informal) between two or more news and information organisations”. She distinguishes six types of collaborative journalism along the features of temporary or on-going, and in terms of the production of content by the collaborating partners in separate, co-creating or integrated working teams (Collaborative Journalism, 2020a; Stonbely, 2017, pp. 20-50).<sup>1</sup>



**SUGGESTION FOR AN EXERCISE TO ADDRESS THE COGNITIVE SKILLS OF UNDERSTANDING AND THE AFFECTIVE SKILLS OF RESPONDING:**

Ask participants to read the interview with Tabea Grzeszyk, a German journalist and co-founder of Hostwriter, an inclusive network that aims to connect journalists and enable its members to easily share story ideas and find partners from a variety of countries to work collaboratively on journalistic investigations (Hostwriter, 2020).

Ask your students to discuss in small groups if Hostwriter is a suitable form to connect journalists from across the globe and what other possibilities there might be to get in contact with journalists from other countries.

**Cross-border journalism and migration coverage**

*Three questions to Tabea Grzeszyk, journalist and one of the founders of Hostwriter*

→ See next page.



Source: fotostudioneukoelln.de

<sup>1</sup> See also her tip sheet online (Collaborative Journalism, 2020b).

**What are the advantages of cross-border journalism?**

**Tabea Grzeszyk:** I believe that at some point in the future there will be certain topics where this question won't come up at all anymore, because it will be obvious that we MUST collaborate to be able to investigate these topics. No matter if it's migration, cross-border crime or climate change coverage, how could one report on these issues as a single journalist? To be able to live up to the claim of being a watchdog and to aspire to quality journalism, I believe journalists have no other choice but to work across borders. After all, it is a fact that we live in a globalised world, and many big topics of the 21st century often have this cross-border facet. I don't want to deny that there are also local issues, so one does not always have to report everything per se across borders where it makes no sense. But if a journalist needs local expertise from abroad, if there are foreign languages involved, then she/he is dependent on colleagues who are at home in other countries and who have access to local sources.

**What would you recommend to journalists who have never worked across borders before?**

I would always recommend talking to people who have done this before. There are quite a few out there by now, organised in networks, be it Investigate Europe (Investigate Europe, 2020), the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (2020) or the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ, 2020). Often their members can be met at conferences and they are also very approachable and like to talk about their cross-border investigations.

We have also founded Hostwriter precisely for this purpose, motivated by the fact that we thought that cross-border journalism should not only be available to the best investigative journalists in the world, but that it is actually a craft that every journalist in the world will need in the future, so we also see ourselves as a very inclusive network where journalists can take the first steps. It is also open to journalism students, so even as a student you can register and search for other journalists and participate in discussions. We want to help to ensure that cross-border journalism becomes more and more mainstream and, above all, more accessible - even to people from regions that are less privileged in terms of access, money and contacts. Our aim with Hostwriter is to have a member in every country in the world. We already have members in 150 countries and are confident to eventually connect journalists in all countries in the world.

Trust is, of course, very important in cross-border collaborations. Trust develops with time – that's why I wouldn't recommend starting off with a giant investigative research right away. Beginners should start working with a small team on a project that doesn't require high trust and security levels; probably a person from the team already knows somebody who will also join the team, and so on. These journalists must first pass through some quite slow trust-building processes before they can think of a large-scale publication. One should also always try

to meet in person, keeping in mind that visa restrictions may apply to international journalists when choosing the most accessible location to meet.

**Why is the topic of migration predestined to be covered cross-border?**

People flee across borders. This fact alone makes it a cross-border story. It is not only worth reporting that the refugees have arrived in Germany, for example, but in every country they transit through, there are a lot of stories worth reporting to get the bigger picture. It is important to work collaboratively with journalists from the migrant's home country, the transit countries, and the destination country. Local journalists have better insights into the respective situation on site and can get beneath the surface. Adding the perspectives of journalists in transition countries can also help to overcome a reductionist narrative of migration – for instance, by including how European Union (EU) trade agreements have contributed to people fleeing their countries in the first place. After all, Europe is not only a destination for refugees; it has also contributed to the problems that cause migration.

**Collaboration with citizens**

While there is no consensus yet in the profession or in the scientific community about whether to understand the integration of the audience, also known as crowdsourcing, as being part of collaborative journalism, some scholars consider audience participation as a possible if not essential part of collaborative journalism. Stonbely (2017, p. 4) for example sees it as “an engagement element”. Bradshaw (2013, p. 4) proposes that collaborative journalism is “a way of pursuing stories that involve people outside of the traditional newsroom”, e.g. crowdsourcing with the help of social networks and online communities.

The boundaries of the term citizen journalism are blurry. The terms “participatory journalism” and “citizen journalism” are often used interchangeably to describe the use of content produced by non-media professionals in the reporting of mainstream media. Other terminology refers to user-generated content, reciprocal journalism, citizen media, networked journalism, co-creative journalism or social news. Participatory journalism typically refers to the production of professional journalistic content with members of the audience being involved. This implies a process of co-creating content, with both parties (citizens and professional journalists) contributing for example original content or commentary.

The amount of content produced by citizens is rising, be it that they are coincidentally eyewitnesses of an event or deliberately producing texts, photos or videos to raise awareness of a topic. However, content produced by citizen journalists is usually only seen by a mass audience when mainstream media organisations decide to circulate it (Usher, 2016, p. 248), although this appears to be changing in regard to some content on social media. When confronted with crisis situations

like terror attacks in urban settings, natural disasters, or civil war, the mass media is increasingly dependent on the use of content produced by non-professionals. In a time of rising political polarization, the need to fact-check any content from social media is paramount (Stearns, 2016; Wardle, 2016). Other important points when integrating user-generated content are to ask for permission, to educate citizen contributors about basic journalistic standards and to ensure their physical, psychological and digital safety.

A specific form of collaborating with the audience is crowdsourcing, a neologism which combines the terms “crowd” and “outsourcing” that was popularised by Howe (2006). The distribution of smaller jobs to members of the audience can be used for a wide range of tasks, such as the recognition of text and images or for verifying, analysing and categorizing different forms of content such as text documents, audio or video files or sharing personal experiences and gathering data (Aitamurto, 2015; Onuoha et al., 2015). Well-known examples from the journalistic world are The Guardian’s call to investigate documents on the expenses of members of the British parliament (Rogers, 2009) and the CrowdNewsroom by the German investigation center Correctiv (Correctiv, 2020).

### **Collaborative reporting – with migrants and refugees**

Collaborative journalism may enable newsrooms to include a much broader perspective on migration and forced displacement into their reporting, either by teaming up with journalists from abroad, with the audience or with the main characters of the coverage – the migrants and refugees. The Refugee Journalism Project, based in London, claims that journalists have to rethink their reporting as “the refugees [...] have often been passive by-standers in the construction of their narratives” (Abidi, 2018). It supports refugee and exiled journalists to re-start their careers in the UK. Participants are offered a range of workshops, mentoring and internships. The project’s core aims are to help prepare refugee journalists for work in the UK media industry, and to create opportunities to publish their work and build a wider network. One resulting story is an investigation about reverse migration to Syria as a growing phenomenon, the “Road back to Damascus”, published for the first time in Arabic in the Irish Times (Hayden & Ghandour, 2017). It was produced by UK journalist Sally Hayden, an award-winning journalist and photographer who is focused on migration, conflict and humanitarian crises, and Ziad Ghandour, a British Broadcasting Cooperation (BBC) Arabic researcher and free-lance journalist who escaped Syria in 2015 (The Refugee Journalism Project, 2020).

Federico Tarditi, Innovation and Audience Engagement strategist at the news organization Fusion and one of the organisers of the “19 Million Project” (2015a), describes the issue of migration as “too complex for just a single point of view” (cited in Gupta, 2017, p. 6). The participants of these projects campaign for giving migrants and refugees a voice in the coverage of migration and forced displacement. Almost 150 journalists, coders, designers and citizens from around the world formed teams, brainstormed, talked to and worked with migrants and refugees, and created collaborative media and technology projects devoted to migration, with a focus on the so-called “refugee crisis” of 2015. According to their mission statement, they are committed to finding innovative ways to

advance the narrative around the refugee crisis and explore how the latest technology and digital storytelling methods can improve the reporting and drive global action to address this topic. One of the resulting projects was “Moving Voices”, a mentorship programme that paired journalists and storytellers with migrants and refugees to help them share and publish their stories. It aimed “to empower migrants to tell their own stories in their own voices – direct, unfiltered and real. It is based on the premise that empathy derives from human stories told from first-hand experience” (19 Million Project, 2015b).

For one and a half years, El País (Spain), The Guardian (UK), Le Monde (France) and Der Spiegel (Germany) were closely following newly-arrived migrant and refugee communities in Europe to demonstrate their integration challenges, their humanitarian situation, their professional ambitions, and the impact of their arrival on both the destination and the home countries. According to the media’s own statements, the project closely follows the focus on migrants and refugees to ground their reporting on their realities (The New Arrivals, 2020).

During the peak of the so-called “refugee crisis” of 2015, the international non-profit media development organisation Internews partnered with the volunteer organisation Standby Task Force (SBTF) to collect and publish information with the aim to provide it to people on the Balkan route. Internews had noticed that many refugees arriving from Turkey lacked essential information such as the location and the extent of support organisations for refugees in Europe (Norris, 2016, p. 229). As the SBTF already had a wide network of volunteers experienced in gathering and verifying data, Internews collaborated with the organisation to collect information from public sources, media reports and user-generated content from the Internet and social media during one week in September 2015 (SBTF, 2015). Internews published the information through a range of online channels and in a variety of formats such as blogposts, spreadsheets, maps and visualizations. In the following month, drawing on the experience of collaborating with SBTF, Internews started the news service “News on the Move” to publish information relevant for people on the migration routes to Europe.<sup>2</sup>



**SUGGESTION FOR AN EXERCISE TO ADDRESS THE COGNITIVE SKILLS OF UNDERSTANDING AND THE AFFECTIVE SKILLS OF RESPONDING:**

Select one of the projects described above and study the stories with your participants. Discuss the outcome, and the added value provided by collaborative techniques. Discuss if, and how, such projects can be realized within the restrictions of newsrooms in your country.

<sup>2</sup> The webpage is not online anymore, but the Twitter channel, which was activated in October 2015 and ran until May 2017, provides an insight in the kind of published information: <https://twitter.com/newsthatmoves>.

## Cross-border collaboration

In recent years, cross-border collaborative journalism projects have attracted a lot of attention due to their mutually shared investigations of highly relevant stories in a wide range of countries despite their distinct languages and journalism cultures, and their simultaneous targeting of regional, national and international audiences (Alfter, 2018). A major advantage of teaming up with other reporters from abroad is that the story can be pitched to a broader range of media platforms and audiences. Additionally, being part of an international journalistic community might grant some degree of protection especially to journalists who work in a repressive environment. To be able to cooperate in international teams, intercultural skills as well as mutual trust are important (Alfter, 2019, pp. 64-78).

The sender-receiver model only functions partly in intercultural communication, that is to say only if intent and content of messages are understood by both parties in the same way [...]. Often, a successful intercultural communication can be only reached within a process. Intercultural communication can only function if one is willing to engage with a foreign culture, that is to say accepts it as alien to its own culture. It is important to acquire knowledge – language, important symbols of the body language, cultural peculiarities – and the ability to look patiently for different ways of communication. (Broszinsky-Schwabe, 2011, p. 40)

In general, it can be noted that the foundations of all intercultural communication are respect and patience. When there are disagreements and misunderstandings, patience with oneself and others help remove them. Some ground rules regarding punctuality, meetings, communication, disagreements, etc. developed collaboratively by the group are also beneficial. Asking questions when something is unclear is better than making assumptions. It is also important to check that all parties are 'reading from the same sheet' to avoid misunderstandings (Commisceo Global, 2016).

Alfter (2019, pp. 49-54) differentiates between three levels of intensity of cross-border collaboration: the loose network, the limited collaboration, and the close collaboration.

- In a loose network, there are colleagues with similar subject areas who report on the same international major corporations or use the same methods. It can be seen as a non-binding network, which makes things easier: It can give access to further contacts, stories or subject areas of the network members, thus it can be seen as a possible starting point for finding an actual cross-border investigation team. Contacts often emerge through encounters at a press event, a workshop or a conference.

- In a limited collaboration, network members exchange restricted but clearly defined information on companies in a foreign country or a request via the Freedom of Information Act or equivalent. Members should not forget that collaborating is supposed to be a win-win situation: One should not only ask for the experiences and insights from colleagues, but also offer one's own information. A limited collaboration can dissolve once the information is shared.
- The most intensive form of cross-border collaboration is the close collaboration with investigation teams in several countries. The network copes with a task which single journalists would have been unable to accomplish. All team members can access the materials and can use the information that is relevant to their national or regional target groups. Especially here, trust is an important prerequisite, and it is important to speak openly and constructively about working methods and cultural differences. As trusts builds over time, most journalists working in close collaborations have known each other several months or years. Often, they have done smaller and easier investigations first before they have engaged in more difficult investigations.



**SUGGESTED ASSIGNMENT TO ADDRESS THE COGNITIVE SKILLS OF ANALYSING AND THE AFFECTIVE SKILLS OF RESPONDING:**

1) Ask your participants to use the e-learning-session on “Implementing a collaborative project – intercultural communication”, developed within the EU project “New skills for the next generation of journalists” (NEWSREEL), to prepare themselves for a classroom discussion about intercultural skills.

2) Ask your participants to use the e-learning-session on “Planning a collaborative project”, developed within the EU project (NEWSREEL), to prepare a pitch to an editor in a newsroom or for funding by a foundation, and ask them to present it in the classroom and get feedback from their peers.

You can find both sessions here: [https://newsreel.pt.e.hu/e\\_learning/collaborative\\_journalism](https://newsreel.pt.e.hu/e_learning/collaborative_journalism)



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## MODULE 13

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# Improving the Impact: Journalistic Strategies and Editorial Marketing

by Anna-Carina Zappe  
and Gordon Wüllner-Adomako



### MODULE AIMS

- To establish who the audience is for stories about migration and forced displacement.
- To equip participants with strategies to raise awareness for migration-related topics.
- To encourage participants to think innovatively about migration and refugee reporting.



### LEARNING OUTCOMES

At the end of this module, participants should be able:

- To tell how journalists can improve the impact of migration and refugee stories.  
→ **Affective LO: Responding**
- To be able to remember patterns of media use. → **Cognitive LO: Remembering**
- To use strategies (e.g. the SOI model) to make the migration story relevant to the audience. → **Cognitive LO: Applying**
- To demonstrate the skills of ‘selling’ a migration-related story.  
→ **Cognitive LO: Applying**

### Outline

When referring to the millions of people fleeing the civil war in Syria, Jan Egeland, a Norwegian diplomat, political scientist, humanitarian leader and former politician, stated that the “media attention, with some notable exceptions, fell on deaf ears with an apparent lack of interest on the part of the vast majority of television and radio companies and major newspapers” (Egeland, 2015, p. 1).

Unfortunately, reports on migrants or refugees<sup>1</sup> that are well-researched (see Module 10) and ethically reflective (see Module 11) do not necessarily reach a large audience. By contrast, reports steering clear of scandalization, simplification and sophistication often tend to stay below the radar of public attention. Actually, a huge part of the story about migrants and refugees happens beyond the media’s radar. In Aidan White’s report “Moving Stories. International Review of How Media Cover Migration”, published by the Ethical Journalism Network, some of these stories that often go uncovered are listed (White, 2015). Egeland argues that underrepresentation of stories like this happens because “there is no photographer or journalist on the ground to tell the story” (Egeland, 2015, p. 1); reasons for the absence of journalists are reflected upon in Module 5. However, there are more factors than the mere presence of journalists at the sites of unfolding events, which will be discussed in this module. Journalists should know the media use of their audience, so that they know which target

<sup>1</sup> For definitions of migrant, refugee and other key terms, consult the glossaries recommended in Module 2 (European Migration Network, 2018; IOM, 2019; UNHCR, n. d.).

**Aida Alami and Salaheddine Lemaizi, Moroccan-based journalists**

“Journalism on migration is an opportunity because it **requires us to innovate** not only in terms of content but also in terms of format. We can no longer tell migration stories in the same way we have done for years. The public has grown tired of the miserable stories of ‘migrants’. Migrants themselves also want information. Which involves new forms of journalistic writing, data journalism, information verification, both long and short formats are to be multiplied.”



Sources: Private.

groups they can reach with their stories or where they can find those target groups. Moreover, journalists have to navigate media outlets and editors who may not believe in their stories – and the story needs to find an audience. Case studies with Greek online newsrooms show that audiences were apathetic to published refugee stories in 2015, but the media did not use new practices to attract audience’s attention as well (Panagopoulos, 2019). When the audience does not pay attention to the news, it is high time to rethink strategies and look for innovations.

“Excellent journalism should not just be *original* [emphasis in original] in content (breaking news stories or providing unique angles on the news) but should be innovative and engaging in the technique used to tell those stories” (Shapiro et al., 2006, p. 431).

Indeed, with regard to stories about migration and forced displacement journalists should be innovative in producing, but also ‘selling’ stories. Besides offering useful information about the audience and how to make a migration story relevant to audiences and editors, this module provides successful and innovative stories on migrants and refugees to inspire the participants of the course.

### Media use in Africa and Europe

Before providing stories on migrants and refugees to the audience, journalists should clearly answer the following questions: Who is their audience? In general, audiences are the range of people in the countries of origin and those in the destination countries. These include individuals who are thinking of leaving their country, individuals whose family members have fled or emigrated, and also residents of destination countries, in which migrants and refugees have arrived. A look at their media consumption shows how important certain media are for these groups and why it is important that journalists reach people through these channels. Also key are audiences who shape and/or respond to public opinion and public policy. News therefore is not only about targeting a general public but also opinion-leaders and policy-makers in parliaments and government.

Despite the enormous diversity of the African media environment (Paterson, 2013, p. 80), in general media consumers in Africa are either “haves” or “have-nots”: those living in urban areas have access to options of both analogue and digital media (the haves) while their rural counterparts have no access to digital media and limited access to electronic analogue media like a limited choice of radio and possibly TV stations (Balancing Act, 2014, p. 5). In Africa, described as the “radio continent” (Bergstresser, 2009, p. 4), 70%-80% of the population own a radio. Since the turn of the millennium, the quantity of private radio stations as well as non-profit and collectively-owned community radios significantly increased, partly because of the “thirst for alternatives to government-controlled media” (Myers, 2008, p. 12). Community radios, due to their access and dissemination in rural areas, are also of great importance for the “have-nots” (Paterson, 2013, p. 81). Despite this obvious inequality with regard to access to news, Wangari (2017) argues that African millennials “with over 60% using social media as their primary source of information”. In particular, Facebook “has grown to become the most widely used social media platform with nearly 20 million users in Nigeria and Kenya alone” (The Nielsen Company, 2015, p. 22). Also officials of the AU frequently turn to social media and online websites as their primary news source (Bronsther et al., 2016, p. 15).

Similarly, in Europe, “[t]he Internet and online social networks are the most rapidly growing media used by European citizens” (European Commission, 2017). Another report by the EU Commission from 2019 confirms that digital penetration continues to increase: 80% use the internet at least once a week, which is an increase of two percentage points since autumn 2018 (European Commission, 2019). In many European countries, however, “the growth in the use of social media for news [...] has stopped or gone into reverse” (Newman et al., 2018a, p. 10). Taking the UK as an example, usage grew from 20% (2013) to 41% (2017) before falling back to 39% in 2018. As explained in the Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2018, which shows data from 24 European countries, the algorithm changes in prioritization of private information over news that Facebook offered in 2018 have led to this new situation (Newman et al., 2018a, p. 11). However, Europe is still a very fruitful terrain for social media distribution – which has also boosted the emergence of alternative, populist or partisan websites (Newman et al., 2018a, p. 20). Other characteristics of European digital news consumption include the high proportion of young people below 25 years of age who use social media as a gateway to news (Newman et al., 2018a, p. 15), the importance of smartphones as the vehicle for social media usage and the popularity of online video content (Newman et al., 2018a, p. 27). In Europe, the downward trend of print press usage that started long ago now appears to have halted with 26% claiming they read the print press every or almost every day. Nonetheless, it is significantly less relevant in comparison to the 80% who watch television (terrestrial and digital TV) and the 47% who listen to the radio (European Commission, 2019). “Audio is [...] attracting renewed interest from publishers as mobile listening grows and on demand technology in the car disrupts linear radio listening” (Newman et al., 2018b, p. 54). This has led to a new market for podcasts, which enjoy growing popularity in numerous European states (Newman et al., 2018b, p. 54). Of course, when looking at the number of users, it should not be forgotten that ‘print media’ even online still play a leading role in agenda-setting especially for citizens, opinion-leaders and policy-makers.

## How migrants and refugees use media

According to a panel discussion study conducted with African migrants and refugees in Germany (Zappe et al., 2020), participants stated they had found only little information on migration and forced displacement in the media of their home countries. Information that motivated them to make their decision to migrate came primarily from interpersonal communication, mostly supported by positive images of Europe shared via social media. Information from the public web – in contrast to traditional media – played a rather subordinate role for migrants in their countries of origin according to this study. Personal contacts – such as communication via social media – are important for African migrants (Fiedler, 2017). Other studies have highlighted the importance of mobile connectivity and social media for refugees. Nine out of ten refugees in one study used Facebook (UNHCR, 2016, p. 17), for many of them mobile connectivity is even more important than education, clothing or health care (UNHCR, 2016, p. 19). A study conducted in two Ugandan camps (Nakivale and Kakuma) showed that only a small percentage of refugees (less than 20%) have no access to a mobile device.

According to another study, “Facebook, WhatsApp and Google provide the majority of communication platforms used by refugees and were often cited as trusted channels, comprising around 40% of all internet-based activities” (Hounsell & Owuor, 2018, p. 31). Additionally, WhatsApp, Facebook, Viber or Telegram – a study from Germany also showed – are important for refugees from Syria, Iraq and Central Asia. The preference differs depending on the country of origin. Research suggests that information from both television and the internet is not much trusted (Emmer et al., 2016, p. 9). This shows that social media is an “indispensable source of information for today’s refugees” (Dekker et al., 2018, p. 9), despite many unverified sources and rumours spread on the key social media platforms. Journalists can play a crucial role here by combatting dis- and misinformation. Platforms like Infomigrants.net, a collaborative effort of German international broadcaster DW, the EU and other European media, may serve as an example.



### SUGGESTION FOR AN EXERCISE TO ADDRESS THE COGNITIVE SKILLS OF REMEMBERING:

Implement an informative element in class by using the text and sources above and design a short 10-minute lecture dealing with the audience and their media use. You can also focus particularly on your country or selected media or media outlets, expand the presentation with local aspects and do a quiz.

Provide additional material and let participants play the role of different media users, who tell each other about their media diet.

## Audiences and media interests

As already mentioned in Module 10, audiences consume news, which is relevant for them at the local, national, and international levels (Schrøder, 2019). The relevance depends on the audience – as Lee (2010) emphasizes in her study: News consumption can be information-motivated, entertainment-motivated, opinion-motivated or social-motivated. All kinds of people have their own distinct kinds of motivations to consume news (Lee, 2010).<sup>2</sup> Moreover, what is relevant for audiences does not always have to be what the editors consider as relevant news. One analysis, for example, of the editorial versus audience news selection and consumption in online news media concluded that while the media outlets highlight more hard news (e.g. political and finance topics) in their selections, the audience tend to favour more soft news (e.g. softer lifestyle or other human-interest stories) (Chakraborty et al., 2019). Another study comparing the topic selections between user rankings and journalistic news selection indicates the journalists have a greater preference for political issues than the broad audience. While the internet audience in general is less interested in politics and favours service topics, journalists neglect the service issues (Wendelin et al., 2017). But the results of the analyses on migration and refugee reporting show that this is particularly politically focused (see Module 4). Hence, it stands to reason that the reporting on migrants and refugees may not consistently be interesting and relevant from the broad public's perspective (Panagopoulos, 2018). The statements of the journalists Lydia Ouma Radoli, Ulriikka Myöhänen and Cécile Debarge, who have already reported a lot on matters concerning migrants and refugees, show that they recommend widening the (political) focus to people and personal stories. At the

### Lydia Ouma Radoli, Kenyan broadcast journalist and media researcher



Source: Private.

“I would recommend that a focus on migrants as people, their human experiences, struggles and triumphs is enhanced in pitching stories, so that migration is not reduced to statistics or indicators of problems in the global North, but journalists expose **faces behind the statistics**. Also, interrogate existing assumptions and stereotypes that exist in the social construction of migration.”

### Ulriikka Myöhänen, Finnish multimedia journalist

“My best advice for the fellow journalists is to find a **perfect protagonist** for your story. This means, know the people you're producing a story about and try to find something which makes it easier for the audience to **identify** with him/her.”

Source: Private.



<sup>2</sup> There is a multitude of typologies, differentiations and survey results of audience's motivations and demands, which may be known to the participants from other courses they have taken. To name just two: The Digital News Report from Newman et al., (2019) and the typology from Schrøder & Kobbarnagel (2010).

**Cécile Debarge, freelance journalist based in Italy**

Source: Private.

“To sell migration and refugee **stories out of the box**, out of a crisis context, is very hard because migration is mainly considered as a consequence of a crisis or a critical situation. Migration can be much more. For instance, many stories focus on countries sending back refugees to their country of origin but only a few pieces interview the migrants, who are back. Media over-covered the migrants caravan in Central America and the American policy of the administration of Donald Trump but when I’ve been in Guatemala to meet some deportados, I realized, while researching, that no one had told their stories before. Like some of them who didn’t ever grow up in Guatemala, were sent back to Guatemala City, without speaking a single word of Spanish. In this case, covering migration becomes more like a post-crisis coverage.”

same time, one needs to avoid generalising across time and place, because political dimensions relevant to migration can be of great interest to a wide range of audiences.

Obviously, matters concerning migrants and refugees are not fundamentally uninteresting to the broader public: For example, the coverage of the tragic case of Alan Shenu (often reported as “Aylan Kurdi”), as discussed in Module 5, has moved the media and audiences. People were interested in the topic, which was originally not a political event. Migration issues can draw large audiences when media tell stories about the smuggler boat route from Libya and shipwrecks in the Mediterranean, about the situation in Calais, where the French and British police dealt with irregular migrants trying to cross the Channel, about boats crossings from Turkey to Greece or “the scenes of people moving through the Balkans” (Trilling, 2019).

However, the examples from Europe mentioned here focus on peaks of disasters, and electoral campaign periods. Migration had a considerable share of political coverage in German public broadcasting during the election campaign 2017 (Liesching & Hooffacker, 2019). Nonetheless, this focus on politics may not always be a favourite of the (online) wider audience. Journalists are therefore faced with a complicated task: Globally, they frequently have to deal with editors reluctant to disseminate stories on migration without a political focus – even more so in many African countries, where the topic is not yet firmly established on the news agenda of mainstream media, as shown in Module 4. Scandals and simplification are more likely to generate clicks and sales than fact-based, complex background reports, and the latter are particularly expensive for media companies. This poses a considerable challenge for journalists to find ways of reaching the broad audience.

One option to tell the tragic aspects of the story may be to broaden the focus. The role of constructive or positive reporting was already addressed in Module 10 and, according to AFP journalist Will Vassilopoulos, it attracts audience.

**Will Vassilopoulos, Greek AFP journalist:**



“The migration and refugee story is associated with misery and must be told, but there are also **uplifting stories** just as important. Those that show courage, dignity, love and perseverance of the human spirit under the direst circumstances. That’s the story I find compelling to read, that’s the story I want to film.”

Source: Angelos Tzortzinis.



**SUGGESTION FOR AN EXERCISE TO ADDRESS THE COGNITIVE SKILLS OF UNDERSTANDING AND THE AFFECTIVE SKILLS OF RECEIVING:**

Use one of the quotations from Lydia Ouma Radoli, Ulriikka Myöhänen, Cécile Debarge or Will Vassilopoulos, as mentioned above, as a starting point for a discussion with the participants. Let them reflect on which news about migration and forced displacement they like to consume and which they do not.

Complete the discussion with the study results mentioned above. Local and regional data might also be added.

**Story of interest**

Journalists can consider and highlight arguments that make the story about migrants and refugees a story of interest. Here are some examples for arguments provided by the Story of Interest model (SOI; see Figure 33):

1. It is a global story with a large target group.

*Example: Eritrean emigrants have to pay 2% income tax if they want to engage the services of the Eritrean authorities (Wüllner et al., 2016). Failing to pay means Eritreans could run into difficulties in the labour market of their country of destination<sup>3</sup> – which suddenly makes the tax legislation in Eritrea relevant to German, Italian or Swedish media.*

2. It is a highly sensitive story.

*Example: The disastrous situation of refugees staying in general detention centres in Libya constitutes such a harsh violation of human dignity (Hayden, 2019) that it arouses compassion far beyond national identities.*

- 3 For example, the Eritrean in the report from Wüllner et al. (2016) did not receive his university diploma. Birth certificates, etc., which can be used as an indication of work qualification are missing and can lead to difficulties.

**Figure 33: Story of Interest Model**



**1. A global story with a large target group.**

**2. A highly sensitive story.**



**3. A story with multiple angles.**

**4. A story that hasn't been told yet.**



**5. A story told in a different way.**

**6. A story that affects people.**



Source: Own illustration.

3. It is a story with multiple angles.

*Example: The multidisciplinary character of migration studies also relates to journalistic coverage on migration. Research on causes of Cameroonians leaving their country could result in stories on the Anglophone-Francophone conflict, the domestic fertility rate, deficits in the labour market, encouragement of the Cameroonian diaspora, the public image of favoured destination countries or effects of climate changes across the Guinea gulf amongst other topics.*

4. It is a story that hasn't been told yet.

*Example: Rather than chasing the same stories, find stories that are new or create a new path. "The world's most neglected displacement crises" in 2019 gives an idea of new stories and angles in this report about people on the move in the DRC, because "[i]nternational media attention throughout the year focused mainly on the outcome of the delayed presidential election and the Ebola outbreaks" (Skarstein, 2019).*

5. It is a story told in an alternative way.

*Example: If people daily receive dozens of news about disasters and shipwrecks from the Mediterranean and they always see pictures of hundreds of refugees in fear or dying, they are sur-*

*prised by another perspective, as happened with the image of Alan Shenu – often reported as “Aylan Kurdi”.*

6. It is a story that affects people.

*Example: If people need news they can use, that should also be taken into account when reporting on migration and forced displacement. It can help to point out sources of further information and action, for example.*

Certainly, collaboration with other journalists can help in achieving some of these goals in presenting a story in an attractive way for the audience (Egwu, 2020). Module 12 offers a wide range of tips on how to collaborate in reporting about migrants and refugees.



#### **SUGGESTION FOR AN EXERCISE TO ADDRESS THE COGNITIVE SKILLS OF APPLYING AND THE AFFECTIVE SKILLS OF RECEIVING:**

Before the presentation of the SOI model, do a mind-mapping-exercise with the participants and ask them to think about several arguments that specifically can transform the migration issues into a story of interest (ideas in the text above). After the presentation of the SOI model, do a mind-mapping exercise with the participants and ask them to think about concrete ideas for stories that they could implement.

### **Successful stories on migration and forced displacement: a best practices overview**

Stories have to stand out from the crowd and break new ground. Stories should address the interests of people in origin as well as in destination countries. They should be appealing for members of both guest and host communities. Certainly, the SOI model can help to change the direction of a story to make it attractive. Journalists can make stories about migrant and refugee issues more notable and present them in unique way – while still fulfilling the quality criteria, as discussed in Module 10 and Module 11. The following good practice cases may serve as an inspiration for journalists looking for new perspectives on the topic:

- How does it feel to be a refugee or migrant, facing confusion and fear during a journey by boat? BBC Media Action (BBC’s international development charity) created an impressive film (“Your phone is now a refugee’s phone”), which is designed to be viewed vertically on a mobile phone.

The strikingly innovative composition of the information and the technical solutions provide new possibilities to experience what refugees go through. Users see frantic text messages arriving, communicating via mobile networks and social media, having no signal, running out of battery power. Its unusual presentation makes the story more attractive for a wide audience. Based on research conducted by BBC Media Action, the film is also distributed on social media such as Facebook. A similar approach has been taken in the videos “Jafor is calling...”, “Aisha is calling...” and “Nani is calling...”. In each of these films, following a simulated phone call, a character tells their story from the largest refugee camp in the world in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh (BBC Media Action, 2016).<sup>4</sup>

- The “Migration Trail project” uses maps, data and audio. Alison Killing’s immersive online documentary project lets the audience follow along in real time as two fictional characters make a perilous ten-day journey to Europe. The aim is to tell a deeper and more surprising version of an issue that many people feel they already know well from media coverage. Users will be reading migrants’ text messages, following them on maps and listening to audio pieces; stereotypes fade out, and migrants and refugees show up as individuals. The real-time technique makes the story urgent and immediate, while the use of maps and data brings a new approach and enables a better understanding of facts and statistics. Although the characters are fictional, they are based on true stories. In addition, there is a podcast, which is entirely factual (Migration Trail, 2017).
- Time Magazine’s “Stories of Migrants Risking Everything for a Better Life” is a combination of photos of migrants and refugees, a video showing drawings of migrants and refugees and about their home and their journey, comments, and an in-depth political background and portrait story. It is a cross-border report produced by journalists from a variety of countries, and the various characters and aspects in the story provide multiple angles (Edwards, 2019).
- #FindAzam has received international attention on various (social) media platforms. The journalist John Sweeney briefly met the boy refugee “Azam in Serbia in September while making a documentary for BBC current affairs program Panorama, about the refugee trail through Europe”. The documentary sparked the social media campaign #FindAzam. Hence, Sweeney decided in 2015 to search for him and “retraced the steps on the refugee trail that Azam” took (Sweeney, 2015). He documented the journey on social media, using Twitter, Facebook, YouTube and Snapchat and blogged about it along the way. The story was translated into Arabic and Turkish. The search for Azam has individualized the route of many migrants and refugees and eases access to a complex topic. Because the development of the events could be followed live and on social media, the story was accessible to a particularly broad, international audience (Sweeney, 2015).
- “Refugee Bedtime Stories” chose an everyday aspect as the starting point for reporting on the situation of refugees many recipients can relate to: Bedtime stories, told to refugee children (Epp et al., 2018; Nastasa et al., 2016).

<sup>4</sup> Link to information and film: Hannides et al. (2016). Link to the films on Facebook: BBC Media Action (2019b), BBC Media Action (2019c), BBC Media Action (2019a)



### SUGGESTION FOR AN EXERCISE TO ADDRESS THE COGNITIVE SKILLS OF ANALYSING AND THE AFFECTIVE SKILLS OF RECEIVING:

Show some of the good-practice examples and have a discussion about them with the participants. What previously thematized aspects which make up a good story and appeal to the audience can be found in these examples?

- “A Refugee’s Christmas Carol” was published in the UK in The Telegraph newspaper. Before Christmas 2015, a journalist visited a Rome migration day centre and spoke to two children about how they used to celebrate back home, what they will be doing this year, and their hopes for the future. In addition, the two stories are illustrated with black and white illustrations (Rowley, 2015).
- The web report “The Smuggling Game” from the Thomson Reuters Foundation News is told via an interactive graphic package. Video, audio, pictures and graphic animation in combination with text provide various incentives and visualize a complex topic in an accessible way; peoples’ personal stories are combined with figures and numbers (Taylor & Cardi, 2017).
- CBC produced the story “I Am A Refugee” in which, in their own words and language, ‘six new Canadians’ share their stories. The audience can read the handwritten statements, watch videos in different languages with English subtitles, as well as pictures and graphics with numbers and texts. It is a cross-border report, produced by journalists from a variety of countries (Haleem, n.d.).
- It may also be worthwhile to take inspiration from the work of related NGOs. Amnesty International has produced the project “Upworthy”, connecting refugees and people from host countries in Europe. The emotional realization of the stories encourages a better understanding (Amnesty International Vlaanderen, 2018; Upworthy, 2016). The “Migrants as Messengers” campaign project set up in West Africa by the IOM uses smartphone technology for migrants to share authentic accounts of their migration experiences, and to disseminate them through different social media platforms and social networks, e.g. Facebook. Migrants share their experiences and speak directly to target groups (Migrants as Messengers, n.d.).

### ‘Selling’ stories on migration and forced displacement

Even if journalists know who their audiences are and through which channels and thematic presentation they reach it, it is nonetheless as important that they can also ‘sell’ these tailor-made stories to the editors-in-chief and managing-editors.

**Anthony Akaeze, Nigerian journalist**

“Journalists need the ability to briefly but powerfully articulate their story ideas beginning with the **headline** and show why they matter is what could lead to their pitches easily getting a look-in from an editor.”

Source: Private.



The quote from experienced migration reporter Anthony Akaeze shows that it is important to have a good sense of the story instead of a half-baked idea when pitching stories on migrant and refugee matters. But there is some more basic advice that might be helpful when selling stories on migrants and refugee matters. Journalists may follow the recommendations provided for freelancers, such as that of Kira Cochrane (2016) targeting *The Guardian* Opinion readers, Abigail Edge (2016), who summarizes the advice of other freelance journalists', and Mattia Peretti (2015), who asked several journalists about the perfect pitch.<sup>5</sup> These tips can also help staff writers to better prepare their ideas for a story before they try to convince their superiors to accept them: Freelance journalists should think about the editorial line of media outlets and then target the right media. There is no point in offering a long, well-researched background report of migration to a boulevard magazine.

It may be recommended to pitch the idea of a fully-fledged story in a few sentences. Envision the supposed quintessence of the story. Journalists should be precise, answer the most important questions (why is it important, what makes the story timely, what is your angle and who are you planning to interview?) and explain why this piece needs to be reported right now. This requires knowledge in the field of reporting on migration and forced displacement which can mean extensive preparatory work with statistics, legal basics, politics and history as well as research on the actors (see Module 10) to withstand a robust critique by an editor. Besides the content, it might be helpful to be clear about the format. As mentioned above in the module, not every form is equally appealing. Moreover, a tactic for convincing editors may be to emphasize special expertise or special access in the field of reporting on migrants, refugees and their host communities that qualifies the journalist to produce that particular story. And even if journalists do not receive an answer, they should not hesitate to formulate a reminder and invest time in a phone call or meet in person with the editor.

Keeping in mind the growing importance of social media as a primary news source, journalists might also attach specific value to online marketing. Social media also offers ways for journalists to present themselves as experts in the field of migration and forced displacement.

<sup>5</sup> It may be also helpful to take AJ Labs (2016) “How to pitch to Al Jazeera.com” into consideration.



**SUGGESTION FOR AN EXERCISE TO ADDRESS THE COGNITIVE SKILLS OF ANALYZING AND THE AFFECTIVE SKILLS OF RESPONDING (A) AND THE COGNITIVE SKILLS OF APPLYING AND THE AFFECTIVE SKILLS OF RESPONDING (B):**

(A) Ask participants to read the guidelines from Cochrane (2016), Edge (2016) and Peretti (2015), and to produce a written reflection. Ask them to consider the particular interest in selling stories about migration and forced displacement.

(B) Let the participants choose one of the good practice examples from above and let them take on the role of the authors. Let them create a fictional promotional strategy: How did they 'sell' the story to their editors? How did it refer to the audience?



**SUGGESTED ASSIGNMENT TO ADDRESS THE COGNITIVE SKILLS OF APPLYING AND THE AFFECTIVE SKILLS OF RESPONDING:**

Simulate a pitch. Let the participants formulate an email to an editor, to whom they want to 'sell' a story about migration and forced displacement. Within the letter, the participants should also explain why the story is of interest to the audience of precisely this media outlet and/or media platform. Furthermore, they should reflect in the letter on their terms of reference to improve the impact of stories on migrants and refugees.



**RECOMMENDED READING:**

**Academic:**

Panagopoulos, A. M. (2019). Why refugee crisis don't get clicks. From indifferent audiences to passive online gatekeepers. In Drok, N. & Veglis, A. (Eds.), *Crisis reporting*. European Journalism Training Association (EJTA) Conference 2018 (pp. 73-93). Thessaloniki, Greece: Aristotle University of Thessaloniki. Retrieved November 25, 2020, from [https://www.academia.edu/38644820/Crisis\\_Reporting](https://www.academia.edu/38644820/Crisis_Reporting)

**Journalistic:**

Hannides, T., Bailey, N., & Kaoukji, D. (2016). *Research report: Voices of refugees*. BBC Media Action. Retrieved November 25, 2020, from <https://www.bbc.co.uk/mediaaction/publications-and-resources/research/reports/voices-of-refugees>

**Institutional:**

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## PICTURES

### Title:

Over 272 million people worldwide have been migrants and refugees in 2020. This number has been rising over decades and it still is. Some migrants leave home voluntarily, looking for better life opportunities. Others are forced to flee from persecution or war. Some move legally, others use irregular ways. The irregular journey is hard and often life threatening – yet, many migrants repeatedly try to reach their preferred destination country. The media in countries of origin, transit and destination are challenged to report ably, responsibly and compassionately about this complex topic. It requires considerable knowledge on the one hand and on the other hand considerable cross-cultural understanding. Source: Fishman64 (Shutterstock.com)

### Module 1: Matters of Migrants and Refugees – Challenges of the 21st Century

A Syrian family – on the move now, and no longer on the run. As refugees from Syria, at the moment the picture was taken, they arrived in Sweden after they were accepted for resettlement. The family had fled to Egypt, but said they faced discrimination. Source: J. Bävman (UNHCR)

### Module 2: Key Sources, Key Facts, Key Terms and Numbers

The paper shown in this photo represents a double challenge: People who are registered with this document are not only refugees but also stateless. UNHCR explains the case of Kurdish refugees from Syria in Iraq who were forced to flee Syria before they could apply for nationality. Source: A. Sen (UNHCR)

### Module 3: Context Factors for Migration and Forced Displacement

A woman found safety in Bamako, Mali. She was kidnapped by armed men and raped near her home in Mali's Timbuktu region. Rape is just one traumatizing weapon of war – not only in Mali. And war is only one of the context factors for migration. Source: H. Caux (UNHCR)

### Module 4: The Media and the Migration Story – An Analysis Across Countries

The work of Myanmar photographer Minzayar Oo – detained by Bangladeshi authorities last month while covering the Rohingya refugee crisis – was one of the most talked-about topics at today's Rory Peck Awards 2017 in London, where he became the first photographer to receive the Martin Adler Prize. The prize honors a local freelancer who has made a significant contribution to newsgathering. Source: M. O'Shea

### Module 5: Migration Coverage – Media Effects and Professional Challenges

A woman reads the local newspaper at home in Khartsyzsk, Donetsk region, in 2015. Starting in 2014 pro-Russian separatists took control of several towns in the Donetsk region. Khartsyzsk was declared to be part of the so-called Donetsk People's Republic. Since then the city is controlled by this unrecognized state. Newspapers and the TV serve as the main source of information for people on both sides of the frontline. Source: S. Korovainyi

### Module 6: Case Study Guinea-Bissau (West Africa)

The youthful population of Guinea-Bissau faces the challenges of a country of low human development. Their unpaved ways towards adult life comprise a lack of services in all sectors, including education, health, jobs, and these hardships are exacerbated for women and girls. It is a long walk towards development for the country and its people. Source: C. ten Brink

**Module 7: Case Study Cameroon (Central Africa)**

Journalists in Cameroon are vocal and demand press freedom. The profession is increasingly under attack, posit the media NGOs like Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) and the Reporters Without Borders (RSF). Press freedom rankings show decreasing values. Source: C. K. Arnaud

**Module 8: Case Study Germany (West Europe)**

Numerous refugees and migrants arrived in Germany in 2015. The picture shows volunteers, who are ready to welcome refugees from Syria in Frankfurt/Main, Germany in September 2015. Source: S. Dinges

**Module 9: African Movements: From the Continent, within the Continent, within Countries**

Inner-African migration has many faces. The young woman named Nyakong is from war-torn South Sudan. She has been hiding in an unsafe village with her family and their cows for months. Because of the floodwaters she could not bring her three young children to a refugee camp in Ethiopia.

Source: C. Tijerina (UNHCR)

**Module 10: Professional Migration Coverage: Best Practices and Ethical Dimensions**

Will Vassilopoulos, a Greek journalist, at work in the city of Patras/Greece, in an abandoned factory where migrants live. In the early hours they try to sneak in trucks that board the ship for Italy.

Source: A. Tzortzinis

**Module 11: Reporting on Migrants and Refugees: Dealing with Trauma**

For migrants and refugees, traumatic experiences can be part of their story. This woman experienced Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) attacks on her village in the north-east of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). She had been a prisoner of the brutal Ugandan rebel group for almost two years.

Source: M. Hofer (UNHCR)

**Module 12: Towards Collaborative Coverage of Migration**

This US highway sign shows a group of migrants running across the street, and motorists are alerted to take care. The sign was found north of the Mexican-American Tijuana border, on highway 5.

Source: J. McIntosh (flickr)

**Module 13: Improving the Impact: Journalistic Strategies and Editorial Marketing**

Journalists, during a journalists training organized by the Erich Brost Institute and its partners, visiting an NGO in Dakar/Senegal in 2018. During the training, the journalists got to know a wide variety of ways in which they can increase the impact of their work about migrants and refugees. Source: W. Vassilopoulos

## EDITORS

**Prof. Dr. Susanne Fengler** is Professor for International Journalism at the Technical University Dortmund and Scientific Director of the Erich Brost Institute for International Journalism at TU Dortmund University, Germany. She has managed numerous international projects in the fields of journalism research and journalism education in collaboration with the VolkswagenStiftung, the Robert Bosch Stiftung, the German Foreign Office, the EU, and many other sponsors. Her research focuses include media accountability, media and migration and the reporting of foreign affairs. An overview of the projects of the Erich Brost Institute can be found under [www.brost.org](http://www.brost.org).



Source:  
TU Dortmund.

A member of the Institute of Journalism and the Erich Brost Institute for International Journalism (EBI) at TU Dortmund University, Germany, **Monika Lengauer** contributes as a senior researcher to teaching and research. She is particularly involved in global journalism with a focus on Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and sub-Saharan Africa, researching the reporting of forced displacement and migration, journalism education and media accountability. Here, she also pursues her Ph.D. on journalism education in MENA. A political scientist by training, a journalist by profession, her expertise is based on over thirty years of communication, development work and representation, including the establishment of journalism programmes in Jordan and Myanmar, and political communication in German government and international organizations.



Source:  
Leon Pollock.

**Anna-Carina Zappe** is a senior researcher at the Institute of Journalism and the Erich Brost Institute for International Journalism (EBI) at TU Dortmund University, Germany, as well as a practicing TV journalist and a Ph.D. candidate at TU Dortmund University, Germany. As a researcher, she is particularly involved in understanding the roles of journalists – as they report under exceptional circumstances, cover disasters and experience their own traumas. She is committed to increase the quality reporting on migrants and refugees with a focus on sub-Saharan Africa. She is a lecturer in global journalism, ethics and reporting techniques. As a trainer for mid-career journalists, she supervised cross-continental collaborative research and reporting projects. Her expertise is based on more than 15 years of practical experience as a journalist. She is founder and co-head of a TV production company. She holds a Master's degree in Journalism from the TU Dortmund University.



Source:  
Private.

## CONTRIBUTING AUTHORS

**Ghadeer Ahmed Ali** is a research assistant. Her research interests are focused on media policies and its affiliation with both public policy and administration. Ghadeer currently works as a senior communication officer with the public policy program at The School of Global Affairs and Public Policy (GAPP), American University of Cairo, Egypt.\*



**Aida Alami** is a Morocco-based freelance journalist who is reporting from North Africa, France, and, more recently, the Caribbean. She regularly contributes to the New York Times, and her work has also been published by the New York Review of Books, Middle East Eye, Al Jazeera English, and Foreign Policy.



**Dr. Michael Andindilile** is the Dean of the University of Dar es Salaam's School of Journalism and Mass Communication in Tanzania. Previously, Michael had worked as a chief sub-editor for the Tanzania Daily News. He also worked as a reporter for the Times of Zambia.



**Prof. Abdellatif Bensfia** holds a doctorate in sociology of information and communication from the University Paris VII. He is Director of the Higher Institute of Information and Communication (ISIC) in Rabat, Morocco. He is also an Executive Director of the Center for Research and Media Education at Rabat University.



**Tina Bettels-Schwabbauer** is a senior researcher at the Erich Brost Institute for International Journalism at TU Dortmund University, Germany and the managing editor of the German website of the European Journalism Observatory (EJO) ([www.ejo-online.eu](http://www.ejo-online.eu)).



**Prof. Svetlana S. Bodrunova**, Dr. hab. in Political Science, is Professor at the School of Journalism and Mass Communications, St. Petersburg State University, Russia. She leads the SPbU Center for International Media Research and hosts CMSTW, an annual conference on comparative media studies.\*



**Prof. Monica B. Chibita** is Dean of the Faculty of Journalism, Media and Communication, and coordinator of the NORHED "Building capacity for a changing media environment" project at Uganda Christian University (UCU). She holds a Doctor of Literature and Philosophy in Communication (University of South Africa), an M.A. in Journalism (University of Iowa), and B.A in Education (Makerere University).



**Eric Chinje** is the Executive Chairman of the global communications outfit "Kory Africa" and a Senior Director at the Washington-based Greystone Global Strategies (GSS). He was the Chief Executive Officer of the African Media Initiative (AMI) and the Director of Strategic Communication at the Mo Ibrahim Foundation and a Visiting Scholar at the George Mason University in Fairfax, Virginia. Prior to that he worked at the World Bank and the World Bank Institute (WBI). Mr. Chinje studied at the Universities of Yaoundé (Cameroon), Syracuse (New York), Harvard (Cambridge, Massachusetts) and lectured at the Yaoundé University School of Mass Communication in Cameroon.



\*Contributors to online resource "Global perspectives on media and migration"

**Layire Diop** is a TV journalist with extensive experience at the Senegalese National Radio and Television Company. He earned degrees in foreign languages, communication, and journalism at Cheikh Anta Diop University (Senegal). In 2016, Layire Diop was admitted at the School of Journalism and Communication of the University of Oregon for a Ph.D.\*



**AHM Abdul Hai** has worked as a reporter and editor in the Bangladesh national news agency BSS, Bangladesh Television BTV and Deutsche Welle in the past two decades. Presently Hai is doing his Ph.D. research on journalism education and international media development cooperation in Myanmar and at the University of Bonn, Germany.\*



**Prof. Naila Hamdy** is Associate Professor and Associate Dean for Graduate Studies and Research, School of Global Affairs and Public Policy at the American University in Cairo. Dr. Hamdy a former journalist, and has current research interests in the Arab journalism profession. She serves on the board of Arab-US Association for Communication Educators (AUSACE), the Broadcast Educators' Association (BEA) and is advisor to the Ethical Journalism Network (EJN).\*



**Dr. Sher Baz Khan** is a postdoc fellow at the Erich Brost Institute for International Journalism at TU Dortmund University, Germany. Earlier, he was an assistant professor at the Media Studies Department of Bahria University Islamabad, Pakistan.\*



**Marcus Kreutler** is a senior researcher at the Erich Brost Institute for International Journalism at TU Dortmund University, Germany. He participated in several international research projects and is the co-ordinator of a study on the coverage of migration and refugee matters in media in 17 countries.\*



**Isabella Kurkowski** is an international media development expert and lecturer at the Erich Brost Institute for International Journalism at TU Dortmund University, Germany. She has supported the implementation of media self-regulatory institutions in several countries as a long-term expert.\*



**Nadia Leihs** is a research fellow at the Erich Brost Institute for International Journalism at TU Dortmund University, Germany. Besides, she works as a freelance journalist and is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Erfurt and the Freie Universität Berlin.



**Salaheddine Lemaizi** is a journalist from Morocco, specialized in reporting on migration and refugees for ten years. With others colleagues from Morocco, he created the Moroccan Network of Journalists on Migrations in 2018.\*



\*Contributors to online resource "Global perspectives on media and migration"

**Anna Litvinenko, Ph.D.**, is a researcher at the Institute for Digitalization and Participation at the Institute for Media and Communication Studies, Freie Universität Berlin. Between 2007 and 2015, she worked as an associate professor at Saint Petersburg State University, where she received her Ph.D. in 2007.\*



**Johanna Mack** is a Ph.D. fellow researching media development assistance in the Graduate School Medas-21 at the Erich Brost Institute for International Journalism. She has supported many international projects of the Erich Brost Institute and contributes to the EJO.



**Prof. Scott R. Maier** is Professor of Journalism at the University of Oregon, USA. He worked as a journalist for nearly 20 years after earning a Ph.D. from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.\*



**Juanita Malagón** is a freelance journalist and editor. She graduated from the Universidad de la Sabana in Colombia and holds a M.A. degree in Anthropology and Development from the University of Nairobi, Kenya.\*



**Levi Zeleza Manda, Ph.D.**, is a Malawian communications and media researcher, trainer, advocacy strategist, public awareness specialist, and newspaper columnist. He has taught journalism at the Malawi Institute of Journalism at the University of Malawi and Blantyre International University.



**Dr. Adolf E. Mbaine** obtained a doctorate in Journalism from the University of Johannesburg, South Africa in 2019. He worked as a print media journalist for three years, mostly as Editor of National Analyst Magazine. He is a lecturer in the Department of Journalism and Communication at Makerere University, Uganda.



**Kaitlin Miller** is an Assistant Professor in Journalism and Creative Media at the University of Alabama, USA. She is a former TV reporter and teaches a variety of courses in broadcast journalism.\*



**Prof. Alice Nga Minkala** is a senior lecturer and deputy director in charge of studies at Yaoundé II University, School of Information and Communication Sciences and Techniques, Cameroon.



**Prof. Levi Obonyo** is an Associate Professor of Communication and Media Studies, and Dean of the School of Communication at Daystar University. He previously served as Chairman of the Media Council of Kenya and later as a member of the Board of the Communications Authority of Kenya.



\*Contributors to online resource “Global perspectives on media and migration”

**Prof. Chinyere Stella Okunna** is a Professor of Mass Communication at Nnamdi Azikiwe University (UNIZIK), Nigeria, where she has taught and served in various administrative positions. She is the first female professor of mass communication in Nigeria.



**Lekhanath Pandey** is an assistant professor of Journalism in Tribhuvan University, Nepal. He teaches media research and communication theories, and serves as an editor for the Nepal Youth Journal.\*



**Timothy Quashigah** is a senior lecturer at the Faculty of Journalism, Ghana Institute of Journalism, Accra, Ghana. Tim holds an M.Phil. degree in Global Leadership and an M.A. (Journalism) degree from the UK. He is an advanced Ph.D. candidate at the University of Ghana.



**Rajeev Ravisankar** is a Ph.D. student in media studies at the University of Oregon. He received a B.A. in political science and international studies and a Master of Public Administration from the Ohio State University and completed a Post-Graduate Diploma in journalism at the Asian College of Journalism in Chennai, India.\*




**Dr. Michael Yao Wodui Serwornoo** is a lecturer at the Department of Communication Studies, University of Cape Coast, Ghana. He is a member of the International Communication Association, the International Association for Media and Communication Research and the Communication Educators Association of Ghana.



**Mathewos Tadesse** graduated from Addis Ababa University, in 1982 in a B.A. Degree in Geography and also got an M.A. Degree in 2006 in Journalism and Communication from the same university. He works as an university instructor, lecturer and Assistant Professor.



**Dr. William Tayeebwa** is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Journalism and Communication at Makerere University in Uganda. He is a previous postdoctoral fellow at the University of Cambridge in the UK (2014) and at the Interdisciplinary Center for the Study of Global Change (ICGC) at the University of Minnesota, USA (2019).



**Prof. Cilene Victor** is a full professor in the Social Communication Program at Metodista University of Sao Paulo (UMESP), Brazil and Paulus Communication College (FAPCOM). She is a Latin America Honorary Representative of the International Center for Developing Peace, Culture and Rationality, based in Iran. She holds a Ph.D. in Public Health from the University of Sao Paulo and a Master's degree in Science and Technology Communication. She developed postdoctoral research in the Territorial Management and Planning Program at the Federal University of ABC (UFABC) in Santo André, Brazil. As a journalist for 30 years, she has focused on humanitarian issues.\*



**Gordon Wüllner-Adomako** is a political editor and columnist at Germany's biggest regional newspaper Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung. He holds a Bachelor's degree in Journalism from the TU Dortmund University.



\*Contributors to online resource "Global perspectives on media and migration"

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This handbook enables journalism educators worldwide to address one of the challenges of the 21st century – migration and forced displacement. In a set of thirteen modules, journalism educators are provided with a comprehensive curriculum. It covers all aspects needed to train analysis, research, presentation, marketing, and ethics of migration coverage.

The handbook is unique as it comprises results of communication studies as well as political and social sciences. It has been developed by an international and cross-cultural group of media researchers, media educators and media practitioners.

Journalism educators will be enabled to jump-start a new curriculum. Journalism students will learn that matters of migration and forced displacement are concerned about human beings and therefore require knowledge and awareness of accurate facts, reliable sources, ethical reporting and good practices. Experienced journalists will benefit from using the volume as a self-learning tool, and media development organizations may adapt the curriculum to their training plans.

The project will impact a more comprehensive coverage of migrant and refugee matters in countries of origin, transit and destination, and a more balanced and informed public debate across countries and cultures.

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